I’ve just updated my Current Market Tactics page. Is the correction over? …why I think so.
I was listening to Bloomberg Radio (again!?!) earlier this month and heard an interview of Cathie Wood, the CEO/CIO of recently formed ARK Investment Management. I don’t know Ms. Wood, although we both worked at Jennison Associates, a growth-oriented equity manager with a very strong record, during different time periods. Just before ARK, she had been CIO of Global Thematic Strategies for twelve years at value investor AllianceBernstein. (As a portfolio manager I was a big fan of Bernstein’s equity research but I’m not familiar with her Bernstein output.) She’s been endorsed by Arthur Laffer of Laffer Curve fame, who sits on her board.
ARK is all about finding and benefiting from “disruptive innovation that will change the world.”
Ms. Wood was promoting two actively managed ETFs that ARK launched at the beginning of the month, one focused on industrial innovation (ARKQ) and another the internet (ARKW). Two more are in the works, one for genomics (ARKG) and the last (ARKK) an umbrella innovation portfolio which will apparently hold what it considers the best of the other three portfolios.
What really caught my ear in the interview was Ms. Wood’s discussion of the domestic automobile market (summary research available on the ARK website). Most cars lie around doing nothing during the day. What happens if either ride-sharing services like Uber or the Google self-driven car, which make more constant use of autos, catch on as substitutes? According to Ms. Wood, until these innovations reach 2.5% of total miles driven (based on the idea that on a per mile basis ride-sharing costs half what owning a car does), there’s little effect. But at 5% penetration, the bottom falls out of the new car market. New car sales get cut in half!
Who knows whether this is correct or whether it will happen or not …but I find this a very interesting idea.
about the ETFs
The top holdings of ARKW are: athenahealth, Apple, Facebook, Salesforce.com and Twitter. These comprise just under 25% of the portfolio.
For ARKQ, the top five are: Google, Autodesk, Tesla, Monsanto and Fanuc. They make up just over 24% of the portfolio.
Both will likely be high β portfolios. Both have performed roughly in line with the NASDAQ Composite since their debut.
The perennial question about thematic investors (I consider myself one) is whether the high-level concepts are backed up by meticulous company by company financial research. This is essential. In addition, it’s important, to me anyway, that the holdings be arranged so that they’re not all dependent on a single theme–the continuing success of the Apple ecosystem, for instance.
I’m not familiar with Ms. Wood’s work, so I can’t say one way or another (Fanuc and ABB strike me as kind of weird holding for ARKQ, though). But I think her research is worth reading and her ETFs worth at least monitoring. For us as investors, the ultimate question will be whether Ms. Wood can outperform an appropriate index. The NASDAQ Composite would be my initial choice.
As even casual readers of the financial press know, Bill Gross, the bond guru, recently left PIMCO, the firm he founded, for smaller (everything is smaller than PIMCO) rival Janus. Two aspects of his departure strike me as particularly noteworthy:
–Gross has been saying very emphatically, both at PIMCO and Janus, that he has absolutely no intention of retiring or of ceding any measure of control over his portfolios to colleagues. This is despite an extended period of poor performance. If he’s thinking at all about the impact of his statements on clients, he surely believes he is reassuring them. However, it seems to me that the opposite is most likely the case.
What clients are likely hearing is that although he’s been charting a losing course for his portfolio for an extended period, he refuses to consider any changes or even to take any input from his 700+ professional colleagues. The way he’s delivering his stay-the-course message also makes him sound like an adolescent having a tantrum. It’s hard not to connect this unusual behavior with the fact of extended underperformance, raising further issues about his temperament and his judgment. This it’s-all-about-me attitude is very scary for anyone how has bet on Gross’s management prowess.
–PIMCO as a firm clearly made a terrible strategic mistake in making the idea of continuous outperformance by a single manager the exclusive focus of its marketing to clients for so many years. Yes, the message is powerful and simple to understand, but one that’s also very risky and that invests a huge amount of power in a single individual.
PIMCO would probably have imagined any possible parting of the ways with Bill Gross to be somewhat akin to Derek Jeter’s final season as a Yankees. …that is to say, a nostalgic feel-good farewell tour for a player who may be a shadow of his former self, but which validates both personal and institutional brands and generates large profits for both sides. What PIMCO got instead was the unflattering glare of tabloid coverage of a messy divorce.
Bad for PIMCO. But bad for Gross, too, I think.
As a client, how eager are you going to be to hitch your star to an apparently erratic 70-year-old who has weak recent performance, no longer has access to PIMCO’s extensive information network and whose assets under management are too tiny to have much clout in the brokerage community? The default reaction of the pension consultants who advise institutions seems to be: PIMCO without Bill Gross isn’t good enough; Bill Gross without PIMCO isn’t good enough. It seems to me that PIMCO has a much better chance of changing consultants’ minds than Bill Gross does–it already has infrastructure, other managers with strong records and huge assets under management.
If I’m correct, absent a return to his form through the long period of interest rate declines, Mr. Gross appears to be in a much more difficult position than his former firm. Much of this is his own doing.
In June 2012, Stockton, CA entered bankruptcy, burdened, as one would expect, by two types of obligations it was unable to meet: debt service on borrowings, and funding of pension/health care plans for city employees.
The city’s initial reorganization plan called for employee pension obligations to be met in full–as California state law mandates. This meant most of the restructuring losses would be borne by lenders, with some suffering virtually total losses. Naturally, these lenders, or their insurance companies complained, arguing that such treatment violated fairness provisions of the federal bankruptcy code.
Yesterday, Judge Christopher Klein, the federal judge presiding over the bankruptcy proceedings, ruled that the lenders are right. To my layman’s eye, he seems to be saying that because it legislated a strict set of criteria that a town must meet before being allowed to seek bankruptcy, California was also implicitly releasing a bankruptcy-qualifying town from having to comply with the state law on municipal pension integrity.
The judge’s opinion is a little more complicated than that, since it also involves the position of CalPERS, a state-wide organization that administers pension plans for both the state and municipalities in California. But it follows a similar ruling in the Detroit bankruptcy.
This is a complex and controversial topic. And we’re still in the earliest stages of the journey toward it resolution. But from an investment point of view, I can’t imagine that these ruling will do anything to increase spending by Baby Boomers who are state/local employees or retirees. Another reason to think harder about Millennials.
Late last week, bond guru Bill Gross, founder and public face of PIMCO, resigned from that firm to go to work for a much smaller rival, Janus. This has led to speculation that the departure of Gross, who crafted the superior long-term record of the PIMCO flagship Total Return bond fund, would cause the loss of as much as 30% of the $1.8 trillion PIMCO has under management.
I don’t think the outflows will be anywhere near this bad, for a number of reasons:
1. PIMCO deals in load funds, meaning that retail investors must pay a fee to buy them. Two consequences:
–owners find the fact of the fee, not necessarily the size of it, a psychological barrier to sale.
–the load-fund client typically places a sell order through his broker. The fact he can’t just go online in the middle of the night and redeem is another barrier to sale. When called, the financial adviser can make reasoned arguments that persuade the client to hold on. The broker may also convince the client to move to another bond fund in the PIMCO family, so that money leaves the Total Return fund but stays in the group.
What’s to stop a broker from using the Gross departure to call all his clients and tell them to take their money from PIMCO and place it with a different family of load funds–thereby generating another commission for him/her? Generally speaking, such churning is illegal. The transactions might even be stopped by the broker’s own firm. Worse yet for the broker, this kind of call is pretty transparent as a fee grab. It might also invite questions about where the broker was when the Gross performance began to deteriorate.
2. My experience in the equity area is that while no-load funds can lose a third of their assets to redemptions in a market downturn. Under 5% losses have been the norm with the load funds I’ve run. Even smaller for 401k or other retirement assets.
3. Money has already been leaving PIMCO for some time.
–Bill Gross’s performance has been bad for an extended period.
–He’s been acting like a loose cannon.
–Mohamed El-Erian’s leaving PIMCO was particularly damaging. I think most people recognize that Mr. El-Erian is a professional marketer, not an investor. But he was being paid a fortune to replace Gross as the public face of PIMCO. Why leave a sweet job like that ..unless the inside view was frighteningly bad?
At some point, however, PIMCO will have lost all the customers who are prone to quick flight.
PIMCO will try hard to get clients to stay. It will presumably concede that it waited much too long to rein Mr. Gross. But, it will argue, a seasoned portfolio manager at PIMCO, Dan Ivascyn, has now taken over the Total Return fund. Supported by the firm’s broad deep research and investment staff of more than 700 professionals, Ivascyn will stabilize performance. So the worst is now over. In fact, Gross’s departure may have been a blessing in disguise.
4. Arithmetic. About $500 million of PIMCO’s assets come from its parent, Allianz. Presumably, none of that will leave. Third-party assets total about $1.3 trillion. A loss of 30% of total assets would mean a loss of over 40% of third-party assets. That would be beyond anything I’ve ever seen in the load world/
5. Although individuals are prone to panic, institutions act at a more measured pace. It would certainly be difficult to persuade institutional clients to add more money now, but it should be easier to persuade them to allow the assets they now have at PIMCO to remain, while keeping the firm on a short leash.
In sum, I can see that in the wake of the Gross departure, PIMCO could easily lose 10% of the third-party assets it has today. I think, however, that the high-end figures are being put out for shock value and without much thought.
Bill Gross is the (until recently) extraordinarily successful lead portfolio manager for the bond titan PIMCO, which he co-founded and which he sold to the European financial conglomerate Allianz in 2000.
Late last week, Gross abruptly resigned from PIMCO to join Janus Capital, a much smaller, equity-oriented firm with a checkered history. The apparently hasty departure seems to have come after Gross learned he was about to be terminated.
1. The PIMCO brand has been built on two ultimately unsound pillars:
–a customer should buy PIMCO products because they would always
outperform every other alternative, and
–the brilliant portfolio manager, Bill Gross would supply the returns..
2. The problems with this brand strategy have certainly become apparent to Allianz in recent years:
–although retail investors don’t think of age as an issue with a portfolio manager, institutions do. They worry that once a manager reaches, say, 60–and certainly when he/she reaches 65–that the manager will soon leave, that either retirement or illness will force a change. So for institutions a key question is who the star manager’s successor will be. It seems to me that, despite a deep, talented bench at PIMCO, Mr. Gross never permitted a successor to be designated.
–Mr. Gross’s string of stellar performance years appears to have come to an end at around the same time interest rates reached their lows. Since then, my cursory observation is that Gross upped the risk level of his flagship fund, in an attempt to boost returns. The strategy hasn’t worked, but it has added another level of worry.
3. Allianz addressed the succession issue, not by selecting a skilled insider with a strong performance record, but by bringing in marketing celebrity Mohamed El-Erian as Mr. Gross’s successor. This was a weird choice. Yes, Mr. El-Erian had once been a PIMCO employee …but he had limited portfolio experience and no public record of successful management.
It’s unclear to me whether Allianz did so because it didn’t know any better or whether the-appearance-of-a-successor-without-there-actually-being-one was all Gross would accept. The idea may have been that El-Erian would take over many of Gross’s marketing duties, leaving him more time to concentrate on his portfolio.
4. Mr. El-Erian resigned from PIMCO early this year. It’s unclear why, although I can imagine several reasons:
–he was unsatisfied with his role as spokesmodel for PIMCO,
–he realized he would be held to blame for PIMCO’s continuing underperformance, even though he had no power to influence it, and
–Allianz came to understand–perhaps with help from PIMCO’s senior investment staff–that Mr. El-Erian was not a particularly good pick to become PIMCO’s lead portfolio manager. It’s interesting to note that Mr. El-Erian, although still on the Allianz payroll, plays no role in the post-Gross restructuring.
5. My guess is that the leadership transition at PIMCO has been completed with the appointment of a skilled veteran PM to lead PIMCO, and that the outcome is a lot better than it could have been. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Gross can reestablish his performance record at Janus.
I’m convinced that studying the behavior of Millennials –and in particular how it differs from previous generations’–will ultimately produce a treasure trove of equity investment ideas.
So my ears perked up when I began noticing recent reports of continuing failure of toll road investment projects that had been in vogue ten years or so. Many were packaged by Australian investment bank Macquarie and/or Spain’s Ferrovial.
Chapter 11 filings have been attributed in the media to a sharp slowdown in total miles driven by Americans since 2007 (“…largest decline since World War II,” said one article). Millennials’ aversion to autos and the suburbs are the supposed causes.
A quick check shows that’s not exactly right.
The Federal Highway Administration’s monthly Traffic Volumes Trends indicates that total miles driven by Americans has fallen from the peak of 3.03 trillion miles in 2007. But the present level is still 2.98 trillion, a seven-year decline that totals only 1.65%. Yes, this is a change from the pretty steady rise of just over 1% annually during the prior couple of decades. But it’s hard to image that worst-case planning didn’t allow for a flattening out of traffic volume.
Two other characteristics of these deals stand out to my, admittedly cursory, glance, as being much more important:
–they’re very highly financially leveraged, and
–they contained a ton of derivative protection against rising interest rates–which backfired horribly, adding significantly to the already-high debt burden.
The deals also appear to have suffered from wildly overoptimistic projections of future road usage, although these were likely less linked to project survival and more to the possibility of above-average gains.
In any event, my main point is that this is not a story of differing Millennial behavior. It’s all about bad project design and mistaken derivatives overlays.