the US Census Bureau on immigration (and GDP growth)

gauging GDP growth potential

Over the years, I’ve found that there’s a very simple and effective rule for quickly gauging a country’s GDP growth potential.  Here it is:

Output can rise in one of two ways:

–either more people are at work, or

–workers are more productive.

My first boss in the financial markets was as close to a nineteenth-century capitalist as I’ve ever encountered.  He maintained that increasing productivity is solely a function of employees spending more time at their desks.  Although this suited his penny-pinching mentality, it’s not true.  Productivity gains come primarily from the employer investing in better equipment, and from better worker education/technical training.

If we pluck a number out of the air and say that a country can achieve a constant 1% increase in worker productivity per year (I’m not trying to be precise; I want to get a simple picture that gets the general idea.  Also, a 1% annual gain is a pretty good number), then a country’s ability to grow economically becomes a direct function of one thing   …the expansion of its population.

the Census Bureau Annual Population Projections

That’s what makes the Census Bureau’s latest population assessment so interesting.

Two days ago the Bureau, an arm of the Commerce Department, issued its 2012 Annual Population Projections.  It says that in the US, net births/deaths are currently adding about 0.75% annually to the population.  By 2030, that figure will drop to 0.50%.  By 2050, it will shrink to about 0.35%.

Two reasons the figure is so low:  as people become more prosperous, they tend to have fewer children, and people are living longer.

projecting US GDP

So, what’s the trend growth rate of GDP in the US, according to my simple rule?   …2%- per year, or about what we have now.

how to make growth higher

Can we make the economic picture brighter?

Yes, in two ways–both of which, unfortunately, are questions of policy coming out of Washington.

–We can allow foreigners to come to the US to work, either permanently or by increasing the number of work visas awarded to highly skilled foreigners who want employment in the US for a period of time.

Republicans oppose the first,  Democrats the second (for reasons that escape me).

–We can attract productivity-enhancing capital investment to the US.  This is primarily a function of tax policy, which neither party in Washington appears to want to change.

We can also make out schools better.

implications

This isn’t really new news, but thinking about long-term GDP growth suggests, to me, two investment conclusions:

–investors anticipating a rapid expansion of GDP from the current level are likely to be disappointed (look for that in Asia, or from exposure through US-based multinationals), and

–superior earnings growth–and stock performance–will come from companies that have unique products or services that are in high demand.  In other words, the environment favors growth stock techniques rather than value.

(Note:  I realize that it’s not really the population that counts.  It’s the workforce.  But looking at the workforce introduces complications that I don’t think change the overall picture, but which can easily obscure it.  Stuff like:  the influence of the Baby Boom, the decline in female participation, long-term unemployed…)

 

 

 

where is the stock market headed?: Wall Street strategists vs. analysts

 Factset:  what Wall Street thinks

Last week I got a press release from Factset, a financial data collection and analysis service, on the topic of where the S&P 500 is headed over the coming twelve months.  The short answer from Factset:  brokerage house analysts think the market is going up a little bit, strategists think the market is going down–again by just a touch.

I’m going to write about this over the next few days.  My short answer:  if history is any guide, neither outcome is likely.  The market seldom drifts along.  It either goes up a lot, or down a lot.

strategists vs. analysts

Who are these people?

First of all, they’re both sets of “researchers” who work for brokerage houses.  Now, they don’t call brokers the “sell-side” for nothing.  The number-one job of any sell-side researcher–analyst or strategist–is to persuade customers to do their trading business with their firm.  In other words, they’re primarily salespeople.  That’s important because it means that at least to some degree they both tailor what they say to fit what their buy-side audience wants to hear.

strategists

Strategists are typically economists or statisticians by training, although they are also sometimes former portfolio managers (snide pms would probably say failed portfolio managers).

Strategists normally work “top down.”  That is, they use data about the macroeconomy to make forecasts about GDP growth and  the course of interest rates.  They then derive expected future earnings growth for the overall stock market and the price earnings multiple at which they think the market will trade.  That gives them a forecast of the future stock market price.  For the S&P over the next year, Factset says the strategists’ consensus is down, but my less than 10%.

Based on their analysis, strategists also recommend sector- and industry-based portfolio structure.  In conjunction with analysts, the may also suggecst individual stock holdings.  They may also help set policy–like the official forecast of the oil price–that analysts more or less adhere to in making their company earnings forecasts.

Strategists are normally much more conservative than sell-side analysts.  Their earnings growth projections are almost always lower than analysts’.  Clients occasionally permit strategists to be bearish, and–as is the case now–to say the market is headed south.  But a prolonged bearish tilt is almost like buying a ticket for the unemployment line.

analysts

Analysts are specialists in specific industries or economic sectors.  They may have academic training in engineering or other subjects pertinent to the industry they cover.  They may have worked in the industry, often in strategic planning or M&A.  They’re invariably deeply knowledgeable about company financials and about the competitive dynamics of their coverage. They often also have privileged access to the top management of the firms they analyze.

That access usually comes at a price.  Analysts can come under considerable pressure not to deviate–either up or down–from the official earnings guidance announced by these firms.  A “sell” recommendation can sometimes trigger a violent reaction from the company in question.

Many investors–childishly–don’t like to hear bad news about the companies they own.  At the same time, the analyst won’t earn much if he doesn’t have good things to say about at lease some firms in his industry.  As a result, analysts tend to err very substantially on the side of optimism.  They turn bearish, even for a short time, at their peril.

year-ago predictions

Industry analysts make projections of earnings growth and set stock price targets for the companies they cover.  They don’t make projections for the S&P.  Factset gets an implicit analyst forecast for the market by aggregating the analyst projections for each company in the S&P 500.

Getting a strategist forecast is much more straightforward.  Factset just takes a median.

Anyway, in April 2012 the implied analysts’ forecast for the S&P was much more bullish than the strategists–at +11.9% vs. +2.6%.

No surprise there.

What is a surprise (“shock” may be a better word), however, is that the analysts were a lot closer to the actual S&P 500 results of +13.8% (capital changes only).

year-ahead projections for the S&P

That’s tomorrow’s topic.

S&P’s defense in the government’s anti-fraud lawsuit

the lawsuit

According to the Wall Street Journal, both S&P and its parent, McGraw-Hill, have filed responses in federal court in Los Angeles to the Justice Department’s recent civil lawsuit against S&P.  The suit accuses S&P of fraud by giving too-high ratings to mortgage-backed securities that later imploded during the financial crisis.  Among the victims cited are Citibank and Bank of America, who created some of the securities and paid S&P to rate them.

the defenses

McGraw-Hill has two points:

–it can’t have defrauded Citibank and BofA, who were in the kitchen making the toxic messes and knew what they were doing much more intimately than any outsider ever could, and

–other ratings agencies, like Moodys and Fitch, issued identical opinions bu aren’t being charged (of course they didn’t reduce their AAA rating of Treasury bonds, the way S&P did).

S&P has a more humorous defense:

–it points to two prior court rulings that the company’s claims for its ratings–that they are independent and objective–are just subjective opinions that no reasonable person would take seriously.  That casts the claims as sort of like the Kia commercials that have sock puppets or giant rodents piloting company cars through time and space.   Not very flattering–particularly to anyone who claims to have taken the ratings as either independent or objective.

my take

1.  We all know as a matter of principle that there’s no free lunch–anywhere.  Yet, every few years salesmen of financial products tout some new “miracle” of financial engineering that subtracts the risk from risky investments, leaving only super-high returns.  Bernie Madoff is an extreme example.  But junk bonds were originally marketed as having all the rewards of stocks but with the safety of bonds.  In the early 1990s, short-term European bond funds were sold as being “just like” domestic money market funds, but with 3x the yield.

When these products implode, as they invariably do, the most common reaction is not to blame one’s own bad judgment, but to point a finger at the seller of the product.   Or in this case, to the seller’s front man.

2.  In the case of professional investors, it’s inconceivable to me that any buyer relied on S&P ratings as the sole, or even one of several, important reasons for purchasing a security.  At best, the rating is a gross screening factor (bad rating = don’t buy).  Everyone is aware that S&P is paid by the issuer of the securities it rates, and that it only gets paid if the rating is high enough to let the offering take place.

Every buy-side credit analyst knows he’s a lot better than anyone at S&P.  And the buy side knows that, unlike S&P, it has to live with the consequences of its buy decisions.  While it’s easy to blame S&P when an investment goes wrong, the real fault lies with the independent credit analysis done by the buyer.

3.   Why choose a bit player like S&P to sue?   …why not the banks who issued the toxic securities?

Other than the army, I’ve never worked for the government, so I have no special insight into the Justice Department’s mindset.

My guess is that S&P is the easiest for someone who has no practical experience in financial markets to understand.  The case itself is modest in scope.   It may not raise the thorny issues of how regulators could have been so deeply asleep at the switch, or why laws were changed in the 1990s to permit banks to brew their toxic concoctions.  And of possible targets, S&P likely has the fewest political and financial resources to defend itself with.

If the WSJ is correct, though, part of S&P’s defense is that the government has already lost this case once before.  Odd.

commodities cycles

commodity rhythms

agricultural

The co-owner of one of the smaller investment companies I’ve worked for was a farmer.  He made me realize that there are no long cycles for most agricultural commodities.  If prices for a particular crop are high, farmers will plant more–usually a lot more–the following season.  That virtually guarantees that prices will either level out, or more likely fall.  The opposite happens–supply falls, and prices subsequently go up–if prices are currently low.

Considering that many crops have two or three growing seasons in a year, price adjustment comes swiftly.

metals

Metals mining, especially base metals mining, is just the opposite.  Mines tend to be gigantic projects, costing billions of dollars and designed to last 20 years or more.  Most of that money is spent up front:  for the mine itself, for all the drilling machines and other earth moving equipment, for the ore processing plants, for the roads or rails to tap into a country’s established transport infrastructure, and maybe even for new sources of electric power.

Because the optimal project size is “humongous,” mines tend to spew out very large amounts of output when they open.

Because–unless you’re very unlucky–the running costs are low relative to the initial investment, projects seldom shut down once they’re up and running.  They normally don’t even consider doing so unless the output price falls below out-of-pocket extraction costs.  And even then a mine may not shut down.  Miners always identify pockets of especially rich ore that they set aside for a rainy day.  So the first response to weak pricing it to turn to these high-grade areas in order to keep going–and spewing even more price-depressing output on the market.

In addition, some emerging countries run their mines to create employment and get foreign exchange.  Because whether they make money or not is a secondary concern, such mines almost never shut down.

The result of all this is a supply/demand dynamic somewhat like the farm one I sketched out above.  When times are good and metals prices are high, miners generally spend their cash developing new mines.  This creates periodic overcapacity when supply outstrips global industrial demand as all the new mines open at once.  But, unlike the case with soybeans or corn, excess capacity doesn’t disappear come winter.  Instead, it can stay for a decade.  What cures the oversupply is the eventual expansion of the world economy to the point where it can use all the raw materials being produced.

an example

I was a starting-out analyst when a supply-demand imbalance sent base metals prices skyrocketing in 1980.  I remember copper briefly hitting around $1.40 a pound and bringing previously loss-making capacity back onstream.  The price almost immediately fell back.  It took nine years for demand to expand to the point where it absorbed all available supply–and for the price to regain that 1980 high ground.

Another wave of new capacity pushed the price back down in the mid-1990s, where it stayed again until sharply climbing demand from China absorbed all the new output.  The price began to rise again in 2003.

For most metals, this pattern of feast and famine is common.  It’s not alone.  Chemicals and shipbuilding are the same way.  The common threads are:  commodity industry; long-lived assets with most of the capital in up front; capacity additions coming in large chunks.

Try to find a copper chart that goes back to the 1980s.  It isn’t that easy–suggesting to me that commodities traders aren’t as up on their history as they should be.

investment significance

I think that for base metals, and maybe for gold as well, we’re deep in the end-game transition from fat years to lean.  It has less to do with the state of demand in China than the state of supply among mining companies.  If I’m correct, time–and the accompanying gradual world economic expansion–is the only cure.

J C Penney (JCP) just borrowed $850 million…why?

the 8-k

Yesterday, JCP announced in an 8-K filed with the SEC that it has borrowed $850 million on its newly expanded $1.8 billion bank credit line   …even though it doesn’t really need the money right now.  It also said it’s looking for other sources of new finance, which I interpret as meaning finding someone to purchase new bonds or stock.

My guess is that as the company needs seasonal working capital finance it will borrow more on the credit line rather than deplete its cash balances, which should now amount to around $1.8 billion.  This despite the fact that paying the current 5.25% interest rate on the $850 million will cost the company $44.6 million a year.

Why do this?

We know that the Ackman/Johnson regime inflicted terrible damage on JCP.  Part of this is actual–the stuff about lost sales and profits that we can read in the company’s financial statements.  Part of it is psychological–we don’t know how deeply JCP is wounded, how long it will take for the company to heal, nor even how much healing is possible.

a psychological plus

By borrowing the money now, JCP is in a sense buying itself an insurance policy on the psychological/confidence front by establishing several things:

– it now has enough cash to be able to weather two more ugly years like 2012, rather than one.  This gives it much more breathing room to negotiate any asset disposals, to say nothing of getting customers back into the stores.

–it has lessened the possibility that its banks will withdraw or reduce the credit line if sales continue to deteriorate.  After all, they now have their $850 million that’s in JCP’s hands to protect.

–it demonstrates to suppliers that the company has ample cash to pay for merchandise.  JCP will likely get better payment terms with the money on the balance sheet than without it, although it’s not clear to me that payables still won’t shrink this year.   More important, in my view, is that suppliers won’t restrict either the quantity or selection of merchandise they deliver to JCP for fear they won’t be paid.

–it avoids the negative publicity (see my 2011 post on Eastman Kodak) that would likely have been generated were JCP to wait until it genuinely needed the funds, or until its banks might be getting cold feet.

so far, so good

So far, Wall Street is taking the move in stride.  The stock showed no adverse effect from the announcement.  And in pre-market trading today, it’s up.

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