“the emerging equity gap”: McKinsey on financial markets in 2020 (I)

the McKinsey financial markets report

The McKinsey Global Institute just published a research paper titled: “The emerging equity gap:  Growth and stability in the new investor landscape.”

The paper is the product of research by McKinsey consultants, in conjunction with “distinguished experts” from the academic world, government and private financial companies.  No actual bond or equity market investors appear to have been asked to help with the work, with the possible exception of the head of index products for a UK insurer.

its conclusion

The study’s conclusion:  by the end of this decade there could be a shortfall of $12.3 trillion between the amount of equity capital global firms will need to fund their operations and the amount that global investors will be willing to offer on current terms.  To put this figure in perspective, total world financial assets are projected by McKinsey to be $371 trillion.

If this is correct, companies may:

–borrow more, thereby increasing their vulnerability to cyclical economic downturns ( a company always has to service its debt, but can reduce or omit dividends without triggering a default)

–issue equity on less favorable terms to the firms,

–use capital more efficiently, or

–expand more slowly.

I’m going to write about the McKinsey study in two posts.  Today’s will outline the McKinsey argument.  Tomorrow’s will have my thoughts.

the McKinsey argument

1. qualitative

Throughout its analysis, McKinsey divides world financial markets into those in the developed world (the US, Europe and Japan) and in the emerging.

the developed world

aging

A key starting point for McKinsey is the demographic fact that the US and Europe are old–and aging.  This list of median ages (from the CIA) illustrates this point.  Starting with Monaco, the Florida of Europe, median ages by country range as follows:

Monaco     49 years old

Germany     45

Japan     45

Italy     44

Sweden     43

UK     40

Spain     40

US     37

China     36

world median     28

Indonesia     28

India     26

Many African and Middle Eastern countries fall in the late teens or early twenties.

Why is this important?

As people become older they gradually shift from wanting to increase their assets to being happy to preserve the wealth they already have.   This increasing risk aversion means they are less willing to buy equities.

pension plan shifts intensify this trend

In the US, corporations have pretty much completed the process of transferring the risk of paying for retirement from themselves to their employees.  They’ve done this by substituting defined contribution pension plans for defined benefit ones  This shift is now under way in Europe.  Individuals tend to put a smaller proportion of their retirement assets into equities than the defined benefit mangers would have.  In addition, corporations tend to shift the assets in their residual defined benefit plans into bonds to limit their risk exposure.

the emerging world

Although emerging economies will provide most of the growth in the world over the next decade, and have relatively young populations, they are unlikely to generate widespread–and increasing–domestic interest in equities.  Two reasons McKinsey thinks so:

–most citizens are too poor to want to take the risk of holding equities, and

–most emerging markets have low standards of financial disclosure, are badly regulated and exclude foreigners.  So they’re not places you’d really want to put your money.

2.  quantitative

In the report, McKinsey attempts to estimate, on a country by country basis:

–how much equity money corporations will need through 2020, and

–the amount that investors are likely to allocate to equities over that period.

equity needs

McKinsey addresses the first task by trying to project what the total market capitalization would be for each country, based on the assumption that each can obtain all the equity funding it requires to fuel growth.

It assumes that aggregate assets and earnings will grow in line with nominal GDP.  It applies a valuation multiple to them that’s derived from a two-stage present value model.  McKinsey then adds the results of IPO stock issuance, which it extrapolates from past relationships between IPOs and GDP.

investor allocations

This is a complex process that McKinsey only describes in outline, even it the appendix to the report.

Basically, the consulting firm projects, country by country, future disposable income.  It assumes that in the emerging world that individuals continue to put the same fraction of their disposable income into investments and that their allocation between stocks and fixed income remains constant.  For the US and Europe, on the other hand, it shrinks the equity portion progressively–citing age as the rationale.

the results?

McKinsey estimates that investor demand for equities will grow by $25.1 trillion between now and 2020.  However, worldwide corporate demand for equity financing will rise by $37.4 trillion, creating a $12.3 trillion “equity gap.”

According to the analysis, the US will have a slight funding surplus, despite a gradually waning interest in equities by Americans.  Europe will face a funding deficit of $3.1 trillion.

The real potential problem is in emerging markets.  China is in the worst shape, facing a potential financing deficit of $3.2 trillion.  Other emerging markets face a total funding deficit of $7.0 trillion.

That’s it for today.  My thoughts tomorrow.


ICI mutual fund data: old habits resurface

individuals’ fund buying patterns over the past four years

Perhaps the one constant in the behavior of individual investors in the US during the recession and subsequent bounceback has been their fervent embrace of bonds and equally ardent shunning of stocks. Within that overall orientation, it’s clear that individuals have preferred taxable bonds to municipal ones and foreign stocks to their domestic counterparts.

True, there were several months of pure panic after the Lehman collapse in September 2008.  At the fund-flow nadir, in October of that year, individuals withdrew over $128 billion from mutual funds and put the money into federally-insured bank deposits.  Less than a third of that amount, however, came from bond funds.

during the bull market

By June of 2009, investors were settling into the pattern that has marked their behavior through most of the entire spectacular rise in stocks of the past two years:   net investment of around $40 billion each month, $30 billion of that into bond funds, the rest into stocks–virtually all the equity money going into foreign securities.

late 2010

As 2010 was coming to an end, two significant departures from this norm emerged:

1.  As the big problems state and local governments are having with their finances became better known, individuals started a steady stream of withdrawals from tax-free bond funds, and reinvestment of that money in taxable fixed income.  That continues. to the present.

2.  January and February 2011 saw $32+ billion of new purchases of stock funds, the largest allocation of money to equities since early 2007.  At the same time, investors, quite uncharacteristically, put the lion’s share of their equity money into domestic securities.

At the time, I remember asking myself how to interpret the fact that an investor class that happily watched a near-doubling of stocks without showing a flicker of interest suddenly started piling in–and in a big way.

In this case, would it be unfair to characterize individuals as the “dumb money”?  …no.  Was it a good sign that they’re beginning to buy?  …not at all, since having the last bear capitulate is usually a sign of the top.  On the other hand, US stocks were still cheap then, in my view. (For what it’s worth, I think they remain so.)  My conclusion was to worry a little more, but not alter my pro-cyclical portfolio stance.

the past two months

In this context, the most recent data on individual investor actions from the Investment Company Institute are very interesting:

–municipal bond withdrawals continue

–taxable bond funds are receiving net additions of $3+ billion weekly

–money flowed out of equities in March, although April has seen modest inflows resume

–investor preference for foreign equities has returned.  In five of the past eight weeks, money has been withdrawn from domestic funds.  More than 100% of the net new equity money stock funds have received in March and April has gone to non-US funds.

In other words, we’re back to the pattern of equity avoidance that has characterized individual behavior during the best of the bull market.  Interestingly, the S&P has continued to go up in March-April, although at a more sedate pace than during January-February.

what to make of this

Theory says that as people get older and richer they become more risk-averse.  I think that’s true.  What I don’t get is why individuals, who are usually a shrewd lot, think at today’s prices and in today’s economic circumstances that bonds are a low-risk investment.

Exhibiting the perverse mindset that characterizes much of Wall Street’s thinking, I’m kind of relieved that individuals have lost interest in stocks.  That probably means that the S&P 500 still has legs.

(even) more on hedge funds

The Financial Analysts Journal

The Financial Analysts Journal is the flagship publication of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts.  The ICFA is a trade association of financial professionals that focuses on academic theories of the financial markets.  Although the FAJ has an occasional piece by a professional money manager, it contains mostly the kind of journal articles that university professors need to write for each other so they’ll get tenure.

the January/February 2011 issue

The lead article in the January/February 2011 issue is called “The ABCs of Hedge funds:  Alphas, Betas and Costs.”  The authors divide the hedge fund universe into nine different strategies and analyse the returns of each strategy over a long period of time.  They conclude that for each of the eleven years ending in 2009, every one of the strategies produced “positive alpha,” that is extra returns for investors above their benchmark indices.  These extra returns remained even after deducting management fees and after adjusting for the risks (like financial leverage) that the investors were taking.

This is a stunning result.  It’s by far the most positive assertion I’ve ever heard about the hedge fund industry.  A more usual observation would be that you would have been better off since 2003 by holding an S&P index fund than by giving your money to the typical hedge fund manager.  What’s also remarkable is that there are not just a select few outperforming managers.  According to this study, just about everybody is a hero.

What’s also a bit surprising, given the academic bent of the publication, is that this result flies in the face of the academic dictum that sustained outperformance, year after year, is impossible–and the FAJ makes no fanfare about this.

too good to be true?

Turning to the real world, my personal experience is that what the article says can’t be done.  I’ve known a few managers who’ve strung together long series of outperforming years.  Invariably, they stray from their professed styles or take hugely concentrated positions (say, 20% of the portfolio in one stock) that conventional risk measures don’t capture, to keep their strings intact.  In one (amusing) case, the manager got his clients to agree to a defective benchmark, one that 95% of the entrants in his category could consistently beat.

my opinion:  yes!

I think that what the article says is just too good to be true.  True, I’m not a hedge fund fan.  Maybe I’m jealous of the high fees hedge fund managers get to charge.  But as a group they remind me of the oil and gas tax shelter purveyors I analyzed (among other things) in my first stock market job.   Those vehicles appealed to the egos of the limited partners, who could brag that they had a tax problem, but had lots of snake oil and little investment merit.

Other than pure prejudice, the one observation I’d make about the ABCs study is that it uses returns that are voluntarily reported by the hedge funds themselves and not independently verified.  I’ve written about this practice before.  Basically, it seems hedge funds often inflate their returns when they report them to consultants.

In fact, the February 2010 issue of the CFA Digest, a very handy publication, also from the ICFA, that summarizes important academic articles, cites research published in the Journal of Finance in a piece titled “Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns?  Evidence from the Pooled Distribution.”  Short answer:  YES. The same issue cites a second article, this one from the Review of Financial Studies. It’s called “How Smart Are the Smart Guys?  A Unique View from Hedge Fund Stock Holdings?”  Its conclusion:  hedge funds outperform mutual funds in stock selection but subtract all that extra value, and more, through higher fees.

That’s more like the hedge funds we all know and …well, that we all know.  (What was the FAJ thinking?)

 

portfolio manager skill: is coin flipping a good analogy?

A few days ago I posted about the equity market views of well-known portfolio manager Bill Miller.  I knew that he had been  suffering through hard times after having beaten the S&P 500 every year for over a decade.   Still, when I looked up his recent record will writing the earlier post, I was taken aback by the extent of his underperformance over the  past several years.

Finance professors would have no trouble explaining this development.  In fact, as efficient markets adherents they might relish the prospect of talking about the stumbles of a renowned practitioner.

The standard academic argument runs as follows:

Take a large number of people (say, 1024) and put them all in a (big) room together, each armed with a coin to flip.  Start them all flipping their coins together on command.  At the end of round one, 512 of them will have flipped heads.  At the end of round two, 256 will have flipped two heads in a row.  At the end of round three, 128 will have flipped three heads in a row….At the end of round ten, 1 lucky individual will have flipped ten heads in a row.

Is he a coin-flipping genius?  No.  He’s just been lucky.  He’s the one in a thousand twenty-four that the laws of chance predict there will be.

Conclusion:  that’s all the “skill” of apparently successful investment professionals is–dumb luck, plus their clients’ lack of knowledge of basic facts about probability.

As an explanation, this is, of course, ludicrous.  It might be the basis of a good joke if the academic community didn’t actually believe it is a valid explanation.

Let’s try it out on AAPL.

AAPL was on the verge of bankruptcy when Steve Jobs was rehired.  But Steve is not a superior manager.  It was just dumb luck  that he launched the iPod.  Then he accidentally started opening Apple Stores, which enhanced the image of Apple and provided another distribution network for APPL products.  Then, through more dumb luck he created the iPhone, which doubled the size of the (now larger) company again.  After that, through even more luck the company has begun to sell the iPad.

Maybe Barry Bonds, or Mark McGuire or Sammy Sosa could hire a few finance professors to improve their public images.  The academics could explain that they didn’t grow those big bodies and hit all those prodigious home runs because they were juiced on steroids.  Instead, it was just but  dumb luck that they happened to repeatedly place their bats in just the right position to hit the pitched ball out of the park.  They had as little to do with the home runs as the coin flipper who repeatedly tosses heads had to do with his streak.

Nevertheless, if Mr. Miller is someone of unusually high skill in equity investing, how can we explain his recent extended fall from grace?

This is what I think happens: Continue reading

The Fed’s Narayana Kocherlakota: FRB can’t change construction workers into manufacturing workers

When I updated Current Market Tactics yesterday, I mentioned the August 17th speech of the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota.  I thought I’d elaborate on it a bit today.

First, Mr. Kocherlakota.  He went to Princeton (1983) as an undergraduate, and got a PhD in economics at U Chicago (1987).  He taught at a number of places, the  last being Stanford and U Minnesota, before being appointed President of the Minneapolis Fed last year.

Mr. Kocherlakota says the speech contains his own views, and not necessarily those of the rest of the Fed.  But the Fed routinely uses occasions like this to provide background about its actions or to air its thoughts in a way that can’t draw Congressional ire in the way an “official” position might.

As I read it, the speech has several main points:

1.  An economic rebound is under way, although the recovery is unusually slow and accompanied by an unusually low amount of inflation.

2.  The labor market is responding only sluggishly to very stimulative money policy. How so?

The Bureau of Labor Statistics has been keeping a tally of job vacancies since December 2000.  Older, but less detailed data, are available from the Conference Board for the years 1951 onward.  Robert Shimer, an MIT-educated economist teaching at UChicago, has studied the relationship between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate, publishing the results in an article frequently discussed by the Fed and cited in the printed version of  Mr. Kocherlakota’s speech.

Anyway, there’s a stable, inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate–the higher the unemployment  rate the smaller the number or unfilled jobs and vice versa–until mid 2008.  Then the relationship breaks down.  Over the past year, for example, the number of unfilled jobs the economy has created has risen from 2.34 million (the low point, last July) to 2.94 million this June.  But the unemployment rate went up during this time, despite the extra 600 thousand extra open jobs.

The unemployment rate should have fallen to 6.3% over the past twelve months as these new jobs were filled.  Why not?  Mismatch.  ”Firms have jobs, but can’t find appropriate workers,” as Mr. Kocherlakota put it.  Mismatch can come in different forms:  a worker can live in Nevada but the job can be in Florida and the worker may be unable/unwilling to sell his house or otherwise reluctant to move; the worker may be only comfortable with pencil and paper, but the job may require computer literacy; or the worker may hope against hope that his old job will magically reappear rather than starting to retrain himself.

The headline grabber of the speech is the statement that “the Fed does not have a means to transform construction workers into manufacturing workers.”  I interpret this as being a strong statement about what it thinks is the problem.  But it could equally well be that the Fed just doesn’t want to make specific policy recommendations about, say, housing.

3.  The recent Fed decision to reinvest proceeds from mortgage-backed securities into Treasuries accidentally scared the securities markets. The reason the Fed is buying Treasuries is not that the economy is in worse shape than commonly thought, but that mortgage prepayments have been larger than anticipated (because low interest rates have prompted lots of refinancing).  Because of this the Fed’s holdings of government securities have dropped below the intended level.

4.  The Fed will likely begin to raise rates before the consensus thinks it’s appropriate. Standard economic theory says that money policy actions can have short-term real effects on an economy but that over time the economy adjusts to restore the pervious real status quo.  The way this is usually expressed is that an inappropriate drop in interest rates can temporarily boost economic activity in a country but that growth soon moderates and the country is in the same place as before, but with higher inflation.

Mr. Kocherlakota’s point is that the long-term real rate of return on cash-like securities is around 1% annually.  If the Fed holds the policy rate at effectively zero after the economy is restored to health, the economy will adjust to restore the real rate to 1%.  It can only do this through deflation–by making real prices decline by around 1% a year.  Sounds kind of wacky, until you think that this is a good description of what Japan has been doing for the past twenty years.

It seems to me the speech does several things:

–it provides an answer to critics who say that money policy is still too tight, by pointing to the large number of unfilled jobs available.  The passage of time will eventually cure the mismatch.  Government programs may speed the process up, but looser money policy will just create more unfilled vacancies.

–it implicitly criticizes the notion that more “shovel ready” projects will do any good.  Again, Japan’s experience over the past twenty years is a cautionary tale.  in 1990, a startlingly high 10% of Japan’s work force was employed in construction.  Rather than allow/force a transition to other occupations, Tokyo launched wave after wave of make-work pork barrel public construction projects.  The government also used formal and informal means to preserve the status quo in other sectors, in order to keep the unemployment rate low.  What did all this get Japan–twenty years (so far) of economic stagnation, chronic deflation, a crippling amount of government debt and a tendency to rue the day that the black ships arrived at its shores.

–it signals to academic critics that it understands the negative implications of keeping the fed funds rate at zero too long.

All in all, the speech is a lot more interesting, and revealing, than the single sound byte.

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