a turning point for bond funds? …stocks, too?

I’ve been noticing commercials on financial TV and radio–why I turn on the functional equivalent of the WWE, I don’t completely understand–for gold.  They tend to go like this:  NOW is the time to buy gold!!!  Why?  …because it’s 4x the price it was ten years ago.

In other words, buy because prices are very high.  That’s crazy.

Bond funds have had a similar pitch over the past few years.  Faced with near-zero, emergency low, interest rates, which imply sky-high bond prices, bond fund managers invented a marketing pitch that became known as the “new normal.”  The thrust is that we are in a post-apocalyptic world, where the earth’s economy has been scorched and will be incapable of growth anywhere on its surface for, say, a decade.  Therefore, buy bonds, avoid stocks.

Interestingly, bond funds haven’t had much trouble popularizing this view.  Bonds, like gold, have performed much better than stocks for a long time.  So bond funds have collected lots of assets and are big advertisers in the media.  And, of itself, the fact that rich and successful people would be predicting a global “lost decade” is a newsworthy story.

As I’ve noted a number of times, one characteristic of this point of view is that it’s very self-serving for bond people.  It’s the only scenario I can think o of where it doesn’t make sense to rebalance your portfolio–to take money out of the strong-performing, high-priced asset, bonds, and put it into the weaker-performing, lower-priced asset, stocks.

Cynics would say that bond managers just told investors a story that would keep them from taking money out of bonds, thus reducing the managers’ income.  They’d probably also point out the quiet diversification of Pimco, the largest bond manager, into stock funds about a year ago.  But, however implausible the idea might have been, it’s possible that bond managers actually believed it.  After all, there’s a powerful psychological tendency, that professional investors have to constantly fight, to screen out facts that call into question the way your portfolio is set up.  And after twenty-five years of almost non-stop success, it must be very hard even to conceive that things might not go your way.

Four factors are beginning to call into question the new normal/by bonds thesis:

1.  Economic growth, which has been very strong in the emerging markets (40%+ of the world), is beginning to pick up in a meaningful way in the US as well.

2.  Stocks are starting to outperfrom bonds in a meaningful way.  According to Barrons, over the past year, actively managed bond funds are up 6%+and their US stock counterparts are up 18%+ (compared with the S&P 500 being up 12%+).

3.  Individual investors have stopped putting new money into bond funds.  For some time, they have been selling municipal bond funds on concerns about credit risk.  But the most recent data suggest withdrawals are spreading to taxable bond funds as well.

It’s not clear what people are doing.  Some data sources show funds beginning to flow into equities.  Others indicate most is being parked in money market funds.

4.  Last week, the Pimco Total Return Fund, perhaps the most famous bond fund in the world (as well as the home of the “new normal”), has announced it will change its investment guidelines so it can put 10% of its money into equity-linked securities, like convertibles.  According to Bloomberg, many other bond funds have been investing in equities for a while and ar leaving Pimco behind in the dust.

my thoughts

I think these developments are bullish for stocks.

In the counterintuitive way that Wall Street thinks, it’s a little worrisome to have the last great equity bear, Pimco, capitulate.  Still, stocks appear cheap, the US is growing again, and the flow of funds data don’t yet show a great deal of investor enthusiasm for equities. It’s not to soon to start to worry that the best may be behind us for this equity cycle (after all, we are about to enter year three of bull market), but it’s way too soon to act.

On a technical note:

If history is any guide, the current active manager outperformance of the S&P 500 can’t continue.  It would explain, however, why professional equity investors appear to have closed up shop for the year a couple of weeks earlier than usual.

I haven’t looked to see what kinds of equity-linked securities bond funds are buying.  But S&P companies typically don’t issue convertibles.  So the risk exposure the funds are taking on may be somewhat different (probably higher) than what one might expect.

MSFT is issuing an unusual convertible

the issue

Yesterday, MSFT announced it was selling, in a private (not registered with the SEC) offering, $1.15 billion in senior convertible notes, due (at a time not specified in the press release) in 2013.  The offering has the following terms:

–the notes are being sold at face value

–MSFT will pay no interest

the notes are convertible into MSFT stock at a price of $33.40 per share, a 33% premium to yesterday’s close

–under normal circumstances, the conversion feature can’t be used until March 15, 2013.

why do this?

a MSFT perspective

MSFT, a company I owned for more than a decade and have followed for over 20 years, is admittedly a quirky company.  But I can’t imagine that the idea for this deal originated with the firm.

As of the most recent 10-Q, MSFT has almost $40 billion in cash on the balance sheet.  It’s generating over $15 billion annually in free cash flow.

Yes, MSFT did try to buy YHOO for about $40 billion a few years ago, but thought better of it when YHOO was subsequently offered to it on a platter at about half that price.  MSFT seems to me much more careful with its money these days, so I don’t think a big acquisition is in the cards.  But even if it were, $1.15 billion–what the company earns every three weeks–would be just a drop in the bucket.  If motivated by the idea of a large purchase, the offer should have been a lot bigger.

I think MSFT sees the deal as free money, the equivalent of picking up a $100 bill you see on the sidewalk.

the buyer

My guess is that the buyer, whose name has not yet been disclosed–and who may remain anonymous–approached MSFT.  In all likelihood, it’s a professional investor who has contracts with some clients that require it hold only  fixed income instruments for them.  The holder forgoes a relatively small amount of interest income in return for the chance at a large capital gain if MSFT stock goes up more than 10% annually for the next three years.

To state the obvious, the buyer must:

–be very bullish about MSFT’s prospects, and/or

–think stocks will do relatively well and MSFT is a comfortable proxy for the S&P as a whole, and/or

–think making money from bonds will be hard over the next few years.

For its part, MSFT continues to buy back its own stock.  It will also try to offset potential dilution from the note offering through options.

oddity or harbinger?

It’s too soon to tell.  But I think it’s something to keep an eye on, as a potential source of support for stocks in general, and for bond-like stocks in the MSFT mold in particular.

Hybrid bonds and contingent convertibles

Investment banking “practical jokes”

Every upcycle, clever investment bankers devise exotic securities that they sell to gullible portfolio managers, who come to regret their purchase decision almost immediately.  They continue to rue their bull-market impulsiveness for the many months it takes them to find (if they can) some even more gullible person to sell them to.

One of my favorite issues of this type was a wildly oversubscribed issue made by Hong Kong property company New World Development in 1993, at the height of an emerging markets mania.  It was a zero-coupon bond, convertible into shares of a China subsidiary of New World that did not yet exist, except as a name on a certificate of incorporation.

The hybrid bond

This time around, a leading candidate for purchase blunder of the cycle is the hybrid bond, a type of security issued notably by financial institutions.

What made these securities hybrid?  They had terms of 40-60 years, or sometimes were perpetual, that is, principal was never returned–just like stocks.  Also, the interest payment could be reduced or eliminated without causing a default.

What made them bonds?  A good question. That’s what they were called on the front page of the prospectuses.  This naming made them eligible to be purchased by bond fund managers.  The inducement to purchase was a relatively high yield.  The instruments ranked below all other bonds, just above equities, in the pecking order in case of bankruptcy.

If bonds were food, I think the Food and Drug Administration would have been alerted to hybrids, just like it was when Aunt Jemima was selling “blueberry waffles” that had no blueberries in them.  In fact, some tax authorities or industry regulators do classify the hybrids as equity. But a couple of years ago, this was regarded as another beauty of the hybrids, because having regulators count them as equity bolstered the issuers’ capital ratios.

Fast-forward to the present

Lloyds Banking Group  of the UK has a bunch of these hybrids on its balance sheet.  It wants to swap them for a new type of securities, which it is calling contingent convertible bonds.

The idea is that under normal circumstances the securities will be bonds, paying interest and having a bond’s liquidation preference over equity.  But if Lloyds gets into trouble (again), the securities would convert automatically into equity, losing their bankruptcy advantage and presumably their income payment as well.  The trigger for conversion would be Lloyds’ tier 1 capital ratio falling below 5%.

Yes, this is kind of like having medical insurance that terminates if you get sick.  No, it’s not a joke.  On second thought, though, this could be a little more investment banking humor. Sometimes, it’s hard to tell.

I can’t imagine contingent convertibles finding any takers in an original issue, other than at the tippy-top of the business cycle.  But Lloyds and the EU are playing hardball with the conversion offer.   Unswapped hybrids are set to cease making interest payments after the swap period ends.

The offer situation isn’t as bad as it looks at first blush, however–it’s worse. Not taking it may be very difficult to do.  Depending on their current carrying value in portfolios, post-exchange, post-interest-elimination hybrids may have to be considered as further impaired and written down.   Also, it seems to me that any remaining hybrids have got to be much less liquid than they are now.  So they may be impossible to dispose of, thereby having to remain on the lists of holdings sent to clients for some time to come.

Moral to the story?

I’m not sure there is one.  If we consider hybrids and contingent converts as two parts to one story, the combo probably rockets to the top of my list of bull market follies.  My only other thought is that this is Liar’s Poker all over again.

An update from Nov. 22nd

Here’s the link.

Convertibles

What they are…

Convertibles are in a lot of ways vintage Wall Street.  They are securities that can be converted into, or exchanged for, something else.  Anything more than that is a function of the imagination of the issuers and the willingness to buy of potential holders.

Convertibles can be debt or preferred equity.  They usually convert into common stock of the issuer, but there have been instances where they convert into common shares of another company, or into something else..  To keep things simple, I’m going to assume in what follows that the convertible is exchangeable into common stock of the issuer.  I’ll say something about the unusual case of other kinds of conversion at the end. Continue reading

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