Archive for the 'book value' Category

the two (possibly three) flavors of value: with and without a catalyst for change

As you know if you’ve been reading this blog for a while, I’m a growth investor.  But I started out my career as a value investor and spent over half my working years in shops that had either a value orientation or a substantial value presence.  For an outsider, then, I think I have a reasonable grasp of what value investors think and do.  I’m also laying the groundwork in this post for writing tomorrow about the titans of the personal computer industry, AAPL, INTC and MSFT.

how all value investors operate

Value investors like to invest in companies whose stocks are trading at very low ratios of price to book value (shareholders’ equity), price to cash flow, price to earnings and/or price to assets.  Many times such companies have gotten to low valuations because their managements have made strategic missteps.  Sometimes, though, the environment in which they work is highly cyclical and the cycle has turned against them.  Or it may just be that the industry in which the company operates is boring and seldom catches investors’ eyes.

In their pursuit of very cheap companies, value investors hold to two ground-level beliefs, namely:

–you can’t fall off the floor, and

–everything reverts to the mean, sooner or later (but mostly sooner).

The first dictum suggests that if a company’s stock is already all beaten up, at some point it just won’t go any lower.  So if buyers can locate and act at around this level, they have limited downside risk.

The second idea is that the company will eventually overcome the mistakes it has made–either with present management, new leadership, or as a division of a larger company.  In any of these events, the stock will go up …or the business cycle will turn in the company’s favor …or investors may just spontaneously wake up one morning and find the company’s industry much more fascinating (maybe as the first market entrant is taken over).

In any of these cases, the severe negative market emotion that has driven the stock to extremely low levels will dissipate and the stock will return to a more normal valuation–that is, one more in line with its past trading and with what companies with similar financial characteristics in other industries sell at.

All value investors believe this.

What sets them apart from one another?

For one thing, different investors may use somewhat different metrics.  One may be deeply convinced that he should only pay attention to price/book.  Another may be equally committed to price/cash flow.  A third may want to have another company in the same industry that’s very well run, whose (higher) margins may give a strong clue as to how good things might one day get.

In the final analysis, however, I don’t think these differences mean all that much.  Where I see the big divide for value practitioners is between those who want to see some catalyst that will encourage/force favorable change in the firm being analyzed before they’ll buy it, and those who don’t.

no catalyst

I understand the argument that the “no catalyst needed” camp makes.  They say that when things start to go bad for a company, investors can (and usually do) have a violent negative reaction that far exceeds anything that the (deteriorating) fundamentals justify.  The stock gets battered in a way it never will again, once the sellers are able regain a bit of their self-control.  Therefore, by buying when the blood is flowing the thickest in the streets, you get by far the best prices. You’re more than compensated for the risk early buying entails.

I understand the argument, but temperamentally I could never just look at the price/book (or whatever other metric) screens and jump in.  What if the stock turned out to be GM, or Enron, or Global Crossing?  As a result, I’ve never tried to investigate whether the approach works.  Unfortunately, I have seen it fail, though.

catalyst required, please

The second camp of value investors are those who insist on being able to see some sign, or catalyst, that convinces them that change for the better is under way.  It may not have to be much.  The retirement of a CEO and the appointment of a more capable successor might be enough   …or an activist investor approaching another laggard in the same industry   …or indications that the business cycle is changing in the company’s favor.  Although I’m not that interested in a regular diet of value names, I’m much more comfortable with this second approach.  But that’s just me.

where does GARP stand?

There is a third style that stands on the border between growth and value.  It’s called Growth at a Reasonable Price, or GARP.  I’ve often had colleagues describe me as a GARP investor, mostly, I think, because I don’t see a compelling reason to live exclusively on the bleeding edge of growth (with emphasis on bleeding).  But I’m not a GARP investor in the way value players would understand it.

As growth, GARP means having a forward PE that’s equal to or lower than the forward growth rate.  As value, in contrast, being a GARP investor means that you determine a forward PE level, say, 15x, above which you refuse to make a purchase, no matter what you think the forward growth rate will likely be.

For example, I have no problem paying 22x earnings for a company that will grow earnings at a 28% annual rate for at least the next few years.  In fact, I’d consider myself lucky to have discovered the stock before the PE rose further. I’d also be happy to pay 40x for a company that could grow at a 50% rate.

A value-oriented GARP investor, in contrast, would have drawn a line in the sign in the sand, probably between 15x-20x–certainly no higher, and would refuse to buy either.

That’s it for today.  Tomorrow, let’s apply this to INTC and MSFT.


the curious case of David Sokol and Berkshire Hathaway

The case of David Sokol, late of Berkshire Hathaway, has been widely reported over recent days.  The facts, as I understand them, are as follows:

Sokol’s behavior…

1.  One of Warren Buffett’s chief lieutenants and touted as a potential successor to the Sage of Omaha, Mr. Sokol had the task of finding a suitable target for the merger and acquisition “elephant gun” Mr. Buffett proclaimed last year he had primed to fire.  There may have been others looking as well, but Mr. Sokol certainly was one.

2.  Mr. Sokol decided to recommend Lubrizol to Mr. Buffett as a company that Berkshire should purchase.

3.  Prior to approaching his boss, Mr. Sokol bought $9+ million in Lubrizol stock for himself.

4.  In his presentation to Mr. Buffett, Mr. Sokol mentioned his own holding, but only in passing.  He apparently did so in a way that it didn’t highlight the relevant points of how recent or how large his purchase had been.

5.  Buffett decided to buy Lubrizol.  Sokol sold his stock for a $3 million personal profit.

6.  After this became know, Sokol resigned from Berkshire.  Buffett maintains that Sokol did nothing wrong and that the resignation has nothing to do with his Lubrizol stock purchase.

7.  The SEC is now investigating Sokol, with the focus of the inquiry on whether there are other instances of the same buy-for-yourself-then-recommend behavior.

…isn’t the issue on Wall Street.  Buffett’s is.

People buy Berkshire Hathaway stock because they regard Warren Buffett as a master investor and a person of absolute integrity.  His public appearances draw immense media attention for the same reasons.  Other investors parse each sentence he pens or utters for sophisticated investment insights.  Why, then, would such a hero defend a subordinate who appears to have taken advantage of Mr. Buffett’s trust and used his corporate position for personal gain?   …especially when this conduct appears to fly in the face of the fair-play rules every investment company must follow.

why do this?

No one outside Berkshire Hathaway knows for sure.  I have two observations:

1.  Imagine what Mr. Sokol’s defense against charges of failing in his fiduciary duty to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders might be.  If it were me, I’d argue along three lines:

a) First, I would say that Sokol is an industrialist working for a conglomerate, not a portfolio manager working for a regulated securities company.  Therefore, he’s not subject to the severe controls on the latter’s activities.

b)  I’d then say that Berkshire doesn’t have adequate compliance procedures that establish and monitor standards of conduct.  As as result of this corporate failure, he was ignorant of proper procedures.

c) Then I’d try to argue that his behavior was common practice at Berkshire.

In fact, it appears Sokol is already asserting that what he did is just the same as Charlie Munger (Buffett’s long-time associate and vice-chairman of Berkshire) holding shares of Chinese battery company BYD prior to Berkshire taking a large stake.

In the press, there has been no discussion of Berkshire compliance procedures.  Yes, Buffett wrote a letter on the subject all newly hired executives are required to state that they have read–but nothing else.  No one I’m aware of has written that Berkshire implemented the kind of strict controls over, and intense scrutiny of, personal trading that is mandatory for investment companies.  Nor is there talk of periodic compliance training that is also required for professional investors.  My guess is that, while these procedures may exist in the company’s insurance subsidiaries, there’s no company-wide effort.

Also, if it is correct that the thrust of an SEC investigation of Sokol is on a pattern of behavior rather than this one incident, this suggests that points a) and b) above have merit.

To sum up, at least in the very narrow sense of “can he be convicted?”, Mr. Sokol may actually have done nothing wrong.  Unethical, maybe, but illegal, no.  So there’s little Mr. Buffett can do other than to ask for Mr. Sokol’s resignation.

Ironically, if Berkshire were a regulated investment company, it may well be that Mr. Buffett’s supervisory failure to publicize and enforce the rules would be the main actionable offense.

2.  There could be a second reason for Berkshire wanting to put this incident behind it as quickly as possible.

The shock and outrage in the investment community over the Sokol affair illustrates Wall Street’s belief about what Berkshire is:  the investment company run by one of the greatest American investors of the twentieth century.

To defend itself, Berkshire would likely have to emphasize that Berkshire is a financial services/industrial conglomerate (Geico is its best-known brand), not a regulated investment firm.

What’s so bad about that?  The stock doesn’t trade at the discount to asset value that’s characteristic of multi-industry companies, insurance firms in particular.  Berkshire trades at a substantial, though slowly shrinking, premium to book.   Defense of Berkshire’s behavior regarding Sokol might well end up being an attack on that premium as well, and accelerate its decline.

 

Chinese mergers and acquisitions in Japan on the rise?

Bloomberg published an article yesterday in which it pointed out that merger and acquisition activity by mainland China and Hong Kong companies in Japan is up by more than a third so far this year, to $437.7 million.  (The same article gives the figures, but doesn’t do the math, to show that this amount is about 0.5% of the money Chinese companies have spent on m&a globally over the same period.)  Must have been a slow news day.

Is there anything of significance here, though?

Maybe.  …or maybe I’m just having a slow news day.  In any event:

1.  The targets are small companies.  Larger firms are effectively protected against foreign acquisition by legislation enacted during the first of Japan’s “lost decades,” the Nineties.  Unlike most other places, Japanese tax law (as I understand it) no longer regards all bids where the acquirer offers to exchange shares of his stock for those of the target as being tax-free exchanges.  Instead–but only in the case of a bidder offering stock in a non-Japanese corporation–people tendering their stock are subject to special punitive taxes.

One unintended result of this protection, I think, is that ex the auto companies many major Japanese firms have fallen farther behind their global rivals.

2.  American and European “activist” investors–hedge funds and private equity–have been stunningly unsuccessful at plying their trade in the small company arena in Japan over the past twenty years.

Western financial investors have been enticed by very attractive financial metrics (lots of net cash, how price to book, low price to cash flow) and the existence of bunches of “low-hanging fruit,” in the form of very inefficient work practices.

They’ve typically quietly acquired a substantial ownership stake in a target company and then approached management with proposals for change, including cost-cutting and layoffs.  Management refuses.

The westerner starts a proxy fight but gets no support from domestic institutions and loses.

The westerner tries to increase his stake, so he can force changes, but finds that the target’s customers and suppliers counter these efforts by buying up stock that will vote in favor of current management.

The net result:  the westerner is stuck in a highly illiquid position in a poorly managed company–and no one will buy his stock to allow him to exit.

3.  There’s little love lost between Japan and China.  The real issue, I think, is not recent territorial disputes between the two.  It’s the history of Japanese militarism in Asia in World War II and earlier.  …that and gestures like PM Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which suggest a lack of remorse for wartime atrocities.

4.  There is one big difference between the western approach to small Japanese firms and the Chinese one.

In the former case, financial investors wanted to change the Japanese operations of their targets in ways that were culturally unacceptable.

In the latter, investors may want to acquire either relatively low-tech craft skill–how to operate a retail chain in an environment with a complex web of distribution partners, how to deliver fresh food frequently to convenience stores.  Or the target may either have Asian distribution rights for western products, or options on those rights, or long relationships that will help substantially in securing those rights.

Chinese investors are willing to leave the Japanese operations of their targets to wither on the vine.  They want technology they can transfer to the mainland.

Investment implications?  No direct ones that I can see.  You certainly don’t want to fool around on the low-tech small-cap Japanese arena, in my opinion.  My guess is that we’ll see very rapid growth in the Chinese companies that benefit from Japanese craft skill.

Two things to note:  the targets are all involved in domestically oriented businesses, suggesting the transformation of the mainland economy in this direction may take place more rapidly than the consensus expects.  Also, it’s interesting that from a quality of life perspective, Chinese investors see the mainland and Japan as not being that dissimilar.

large realized losses (II): how to find out

don’t look in marketing materials

There are two ways for a mutual fund or ETF to have amassed large realized investment losses:

–they’ve had a very weak or very unlucky portfolio manager in charge of a fund, with the result that it has made losses in a benign investment environment, or

–the fund has simply existed during a period of great euphoria, when all the money flowed in, and a subsequent panic, when that money flowed back out at a loss.

The past several years have been such a period and have, by and large, produced the situation funds and ETFs are now in.

No one is going to advertise “Great news!!  We’ve lost billions since 2007, so you have a built-in tax shelter for future gains.  It’s so big your gains will be tax free for years.”

Quite the contrary.  A fund management company will provide this important information only when forced–that is to say, only in its official reports to shareholders and to the SEC.  You have to dig it out.

get the annual/semi-annual report

You can usually get the official reports on a fund company website.  You don’t want a summary report, or an abbreviated “fact sheet.”  That won’t have what you’re looking for.

Or you can go to the SEC’s EDGAR website.  Here’s the link.

On the Filings and Forms page, select the red “Search for Company Filings” link.  That will bring you to the search page.

Click on the red “company or fund name…” link.  That will bring you to an “Enter your search information” box, where you can enter either the fund name or its ticker symbol.  (This is the same search function you’d use for any publicly listed company.)

Clicking the “find companies” button will take you to a list of the fund’s SEC filings.

Look for the Certified Shareholder Report, form N-CSR, or semi-annual report, form N-CSRS.  That’s what you want.

inside the report

Go to the financial statements.  Note the date of the report, since all figures will be as of that date.

Statement of Assets and Liabilities

Find the “Statement of Assets and Liabilities.”

It will have three sections:  Assets, Liabilities and Net Assets.  Net Assets is the one you want.

There are two lines you should be interested in:

–”Accumulated undistributed net realized gain (loss) on investments and foreign exchange transactions.”  This is the figure you want! If it’s a loss, it will be in parentheses, like (2,345,678).  No parentheses if it’s a gain.

–”Net unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments and assets and liabilities in foreign currencies.”  This will show you whether the fund has an aggregate gain or loss stored up in the securities it still holds and has not yet sold.  This is a nice-to-know number, but it needs further refinement (see below).

schedules/tax footnote

There are two more pieces of information you should have.  There’s no standard place to find them, so you may have to do some poking around for yourself.  They are most likely either in a schedule immediately after the Statement of Assets and Liabilities or in a tax footnote.

The first item is when the tax losses expire.  This must be disclosed if it’s relevant, but need not be if it isn’t.  What I mean by relevant is, say, that the fund has unrealized gains of $250 million and accumulated losses of $2 billion that expire in December 2010.  In this case, the tax losses will likely expire unused.

The second is the gross unrealized gains and gross unrealized losses.  A fund may have $250 million in net unrealized gains, but that may be composed of $500 million in unrealized gains and $250 million in unrealized losses.  The gross unrealized gains show the real ability of the fund to generate gains that will use up the realized losses.

how to use this information

The first, and obvious, comment is that the foremost criteria for selecting a fund are its suitability for you, given your goals, risk tolerance and financial situation.  Tax benefits are nice to have, but they’re a second- or third-order consideration.  Better to have a fund run by a skilled manager inside a firm with strong dedication to good performance, with no tax losses, than one with tons of tax benefits but a weak manager and a deficient corporate culture.

In most cases, the losses funds have today have been caused by the market action of the past few years.  It’s possible, though, that in some cases losses have been generated by bad management (I know. I’ve been hired more than once to clean up a mess someone else has made).  These turnaround situations can have, I think, great profit potential.  But with so many funds with strong management being in a loss position that has significant value, I see no reason to take the extra risk.

A fund example: I was looking at a mutual fund the other day as I was preparing for these posts that had roughly the following characteristics:

Assets:  $2 billion

Accumulated realized losses:  ($1.8 billion)

Unrealized net gains:  $700 million, consisting of $1 billion in gross unrealized gains and $300 million in gross unrealized losses.

A rough calculation of the value of these losses:

Assuming a federal tax rate of 15% on capital gains and (in my case) a state tax of 10%, the ability of (my share of) $1.8 billion in losses to shelter realized gains from being distributed to me as taxable income would be worth (my share of) $1.8 billion x .25 = (my share of) $450 million, or 22.5% of (my share of) the net assets of the fund.  That’s a lot.

This raises two other points:  don’t forget to include state taxes in your calculation; at this point it looks as if capital gains taxes will be going up for individuals with more than $250,000 in yearly income.  That would make a fund like I describe more valuable to the wealthy.

what can go wrong?

The worst problems would come from selecting a fund with poor management.  Let’s exclude this issue.  There are still potential pitfalls.

1.  The stock market stays in the doldrums.  As a result, it remains difficult for any manager to make gains to use up the tax losses before they expire.

2.  The fund manager doesn’t “get” the value of the tax losses.  Normally a manager sensitive to tax efficiency tries to avoid short-term trading.  When you have a big loss position, a somewhat greater trading orientation–provided you have the temperament and skills–is appropriate.

3.  Investors pour tons of new money into the fund you select, either because they realize the value of the tax losses or for some other reason.  The issue is this:  in the example above, the net assets of the fund are $2 billion.  If I put even $1 million into the fund, that represents only .05% of the fund assets, so portion of the tax losses that existing shareholders are entitled to is basically unchanged.  But if another $2 billion in new money comes in, then the entitlement of each existing share is cut in half.

How likely is this “unfavorable” outcome?  It’s hard to tell.  In my experience, only one thing will attract new shareholders–sharp price gains.  But that will also trigger outflows from existing shareholders who have decided to hold on to underwater shares until they’re back at breakeven.

4.  Your fund is merged into another one.  Fund companies will many times merge funds that are perceived to have weak records, or which can’t seem to attract new money, into other “healthier” funds.  The rules on what happens to tax losses in this case are complex, but the basic idea is that the ability of the successor fund to use the losses is severely restricted.  So not only do you have to share the losses with the holders of the other fund, but their present value is diminished.  It’s of course possible that the fund you’re merged into will have a bigger tax loss position that yours, but I wouldn’t count on it.

As a practical matter, I think #4 is the biggest risk.  Fund boards may have no understanding of the value of the tax losses.  And they generally tend to go along with the wishes of the fund management company.

On the other hand, if you have a choice between two roughly equivalent funds, one with large realized tax losses and one without them, I think the decision is a no-brainer.



Book Value (II)–where it doesn’t work so well

As I mentioned in my prior post on book value, using it as a valuation tool works best when the company in question has plain-vanilla assets, and where assembling capital to be able to purchase productive assets–whose worth is accurately shown on the balance sheet–is a key part of its ability to compete.

It stands to reason, then, that problems will arise when this condition isn’t met.

Examples:

Companies with powerful brand names or distribution networks. This was Warren Buffett’s essential insight a half-century ago.  If  for twenty years a company spends 3% of sales each year on advertising a given product, it will in all likelihood have established customer awareness of its brand.  The brand may not be Tide or Cheerios or Lexus (although it may be), still the brand probably has a considerable value.  But not only doesn’t that expense not show up anywhere on the balance sheet, it has reduced profits, and therefore the shareholders’ equity account, for all that time.  Takeover bids for companies with brand names almost always come at a sizable premium to book for this reason.

One of the great retailing stories of the last fifty years has been the demise of the department store, department by department, by specialty retailers, who distributed in highly focused, single-purpose stores in suburban locations.  Toys R US, Limited and Bed, Bath & Beyond are only a few examples.

Almost no one has heard of Child World or Lionel’s Kiddie City. That’s because they lost the race to establish the first national toy store chain to Toys R Us.  But even as TOY crossed the finish line first, dooming the others, their books values weren’t that dissimilar.

In today’s world, one might argue that the difference between Barnes and Noble and Borders is the former’s superior internet distribution.  Amazon beats them both for the same reason. Yet this difference is more one of management decision than balance sheet construction.  At .6x book value, it’s not clear to me that BGP is cheap.

2.  natural resources companies. This is really a specialist topic that I’ll eventually write more about.  This is the version done with crayons.

In the simplest terms, resource reserves are defined as what can be produced at a profit using today’s extraction technology.  As prices go up and as technology gets better the amount of economically recoverable oil, gas, gold, copper…a company has rises. But the company’s balance sheet list them only at the (depreciated) cost of finding the deposits.  That may have been fifty or even a hundred years ago.

As a result, the balance sheet metrics that apply to non-mining companies may have little relevance.  ExxonMobil, for example, carries its oil and gas reserves on its balance sheet at $67.6 billion but lists the present value of it reserves, calculated using the SEC method, at $86.0 billion.  In my estimation, this is an extremely conservative number.

Other mining companies typically only “prove up,” i.e., formally document and establish, reserves they may need to collateralize bank borrowing.  They may only be a small section of a huge orebody, but if the entire extent hasn’t been drilled to establish the mineral composition, the undrilled portion is technically not “reserves”– and therefore reported only as unexplored acreage.

3.  service companies. That is, companies that don’t manufacture goods, but provide services instead.  Software companies like Microsoft are a good example.  MSFT, which now trades at about $28 a share–in its heyday, it was as high as $60–has a book value of about $4 a share.  The price is 7x book.

But there’s nothing on its balance sheet for its brand name, or its domination of personal computer productivity software and operating systems.  It’s research and development expenditures are by and large expensed rather than put on the balance sheet.  So, like the case of advertising expense above, they reduce rather than add to book value.  Price/cash flow is probably a better measure here.

4.  companies that issue new stock. This could be to fund internal capital expansion or the purchase of a rival.  The stock issuance can change book value significantly.

Assume a company has 100 shares outstanding, book value of $10 a share and is trading at $20 a share.  If it issues 100 shares of new stock at $20 (yes, an issue this large is unlikely, but it illustrates the point), then it has book value of $1000 from the initial shares and book of $2000 from the new shares.  In other words, it’s new book value is $15.

5.  auditors’ practices in writing assets up or down. Most auditors, in my experience, are loathe to insist on writedown of impaired assets beyond the extent that company managements are content with.  Auditor practices vary, I think, as do management tolerances for writedowns.  As a result, so too do writedowns.  This is something to at least consider when doing company to company comparisons.

In addition, some countries–not the US–suggest/require that companies write their  assets up to fair market value periodically.  This sometimes makes book value comparison of companies domiciled in different countries, but with similar assets, problematic.

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