Archive for the 'Purchasing power parity (PPP)' Category

are South Korea and Taiwan emerging markets?: implications for index mutual funds/ETFs

Korea and Taiwan aren’t emerging economies…

Korea has been a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the association of developed nations, since 1996.  Taiwan would presumably be a member, too, if it were not for China’s insistence that Taiwan is not a separate country, but a prodigal province of the mainland.

On a GDP per capita basis, Korea and Taiwan rank #33 and #37 in the world, respectively, just above the Czech Republic, which is also an OECD member.  On a Purchasing Power Parity basis, the two rank #25 and #20 by their per capita GDP–around the same level as the UK, France and Japan.

Looking at their place in world trade, neither is an exporter of raw materials or agricultural products in the way Australia or New Zealand (both classified by index compiler MSCI as developed countries) are.  Instead, both sell advanced technology and machinery products, like computers and smartphones.

…but their stock markets aren’t well-developed.

My experience is that company financial statements aren’t reliable in either country.  Neither governments nor company managements in either country care to have foreigners as shareholders, and treat them poorly.  There’s also a significant amount of intrusion into market workings by politically powerful entities in both.  The fact of this interference isn’t the issue; that happens everywhere.  It’s the extent–and maybe my lack of familiarity with the local rules–that bothers me.  In this regard, both Taiwan and Korea seem to me like Japan, only on steroids.

Every one of these factors is characteristic of emerging markets, not developed ones.

is MSCI about to reclassify both stock markets as developed?

There’s nothing new about what I’ve written above.  It’s been the situation for at least a decade (in stock market terms, it was worse before).

What is new, however, is that both the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times have published recent feature articles suggesting that the MSCI will reclassify both Korea and Taiwan as developed markets later this month.

that might be an issue for holders of emerging markets index funds/ETFs

I’m most familiar with these entities in the US, but I think what I’m saying holds true for EU funds/ETFs as well:

Mutual funds/ETFs are both instances of a special type of corporation that is exempt from corporate tax.  It gains this exemption by, among other things, distributing all income (net of expenses) and realized capital gains to shareholders–who must pay tax on them.  Typically, distributions are made once annually, shortly after the tax year for the fund/ETF ends.

Together, Taiwan and Korea make up about a quarter of the MSCI Emerging Markets stock index (the largest other index constituents are China and Brazil).  If both countries are reclassified, index funds/ETFs will be required by their charters to sell all their Taiwanese and Korean holdings and reinvest the proceeds back into the revised Emerging Markets index.  That will presumably generate a large capital gain to be distributed to shareholders.

four quirks about a possible distribution

1.  It’s a fact of life about funds/ETFs that the holder who pays tax on a fund’s capital gain is the person who receives the distribution–not necessarily the person who enjoyed the rise in price of the stock that’s been sold.  If you buy a fund/ETF share today and receive a massive capital gains distribution tomorrow, you’re on the hook for any tax due, not the holder of the share while the capital gain was being amassed.

2.  Any distributions are net of any accumulated realized losses.  In the case of the Vanguard emerging markets index fund, which I hold, it had unrealized gains of $7.5 billion on April 30, 2011, the date of the most recent semi-annual report, but accumulated losses of $2.4 billion.

3.  Distributions are usually made at the same time every year.  For US funds, which typically have an October tax year, distributions come most often in late November or early December.  But a distribution can be made earlier–and often is, if the fund manager fears shareholders intend to sell their holdings to avoid receiving a large taxable distribution.  In other words, a Taiwan/Korea-related distribution could come as early as in July.

4.  Virtually everyone who buys a fund/ETF signs up for automatic reinvestment of distributions, so that the distribution itself results in almost no outflows. Only anticipatory sales, made to avoid a distribution, do that.

fund groups aren’t talking

I called up Vanguard the other day to ask about this issue.  My own back-of-the-envelope reckoning is that a distribution from the Vanguard emerging markets fund, if any, will be small (25% of the accumulated unrealized gains of $7.5 billion would be $1.9 billion, less than the $2.4 billion in accumulated losses).  And I own my fund shares in an IRA, so a distribution doesn’t affect me, in any event.  But I was curious.

My Vanguard representative was aware of the issue, but said everything depended on what MSCI does later this month.  I asked for the April 30th tax situation for the fund, but she wasn’t able to find it.  I looked it up online after I hung up.

relevant tax data are easy to find

Look for the latest annual/semiannual/quarterly report for your fund/ETF.   It will have a list of holdings and their market value (but not their individual cost basis).  At the end of the list, there’ll be aggregate cost and market value data.  In a section following right after that, the fund will show its accumulated realized losses.

2008 is a key year

The emerging markets index lost over half its value that year.  Although there’s no way of being certain with any individual fund, twenty some years of managing this type of money tell me that all the redemptions that created Vanguard’s accumulated losses came at the bottom or shortly after–probably in large part from people who bought shares in 2007.

Any fund/ETF that’s large now but was just getting started in 2008 probably has little in the way of accumulated losses to offset realized capital gains.  Entities like this are where the risk of a large taxable distribution are highest, in my opinion.  We’ll know more on June 21st, when MSCI does its next revision of the index.

 

G-7 intervention to stop the yen’s rise: will it work?

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Will G-7 intervention work?

Yesterday, the G-7 group of major industrial countries announced plans for coordinated intervention in the foreign exchange markets in order to halt the rise of the yen against the currencies of other developed nations.  In the wake of last week’s earthquake and tsunamis, the yen had risen by about 5% against the dollar.  Will the G-7 be successful?

The short answer is “…most likely, no.”

How so?

The main reason is that the major international commercial banks, who are the main forces in the global currency markets, are far larger and have greater financial resources than national governments do.  That might not have been true twenty-five or thirty years ago, but it is today.  Even the G-7 nations acting together don’t have the financial firepower to oppose a concerted move by the banks.  In the past, it hasn’t helped either that governments have typically tried to defend currency values that were politically attractive but economically unsound.

Japan the most skillful government player

I’ve been watching the currency markets as a global investor for over twenty-five years.  Over that time, the country that, to my mind, has the best record in influencing the direction of its currency is the Japan.  Understanding it can’t oppose the banks directly, it has waited until a wave of speculation has almost exhausted itself and then applied enough pressure to send the yen in the opposite direction.

Japan’s present stance is a curious one, though.  The current administration in Tokyo, the Democratic Party of Japan, came into office with the intention of reversing the long-standing (and very outdated) policy of the Liberal Democratic Party of always aiming to weaken the yen in order to help the prospects of export-oriented industries.  Nevertheless, when the original DPJ finance minister tried to enforce the new policy, he was replaced with someone more willing to cater to the Keidanren.  The new minister immediately began selling the yen in what I saw as simply a wasteful attempt to establish his pro-industry bona fides.  That was Naoto Kan, who is now the prime minister.  Who knows what he’ll do now.

A second curious aspect of the situation today is that there’s no good reason for the yen to be a strong currency.  The country’s workforce is shrinking.  The government is ineffective and heavily in debt.  The budget is in deficit.  And the country hasn’t shown any real growth in over twenty years.  Japan’s most “positive” feature  vs. the euro or the dollar is that it’s a known quantity and has less near-term potential for negative economic developments than the EU or the US.

Why has the yen been rising, then?  After the Kobe earthquake in 1995, Japan repatriated large amounts of money invested abroad.  Insurance companies needed funds to pay claims.  Parties–individual or corporate–who had no third-party insurance needed money to rebuild.  this activity drove the yen up by about 20% against the dollar in the months following the earthquake.  It’s probably too soon for this to be happening again.  The yen probably started to rise early this week as speculators began to bet the same thing would happen again.

Interestingly, the yen gave back almost all its gains as soon as the G-7 announced its plans and Tokyo was seen selling the yen aggressively in the currency markets.  To me, this suggests that the big players in the market haven’t decided what to do yet.  In the end, though, it will be the banks, not the G-7, that decide whether the yen strengthens or not.

investment implications

What’s the significance of a rise in the yen for investors?

An appreciating currency has two effects:

–it slows economic growth in local currency terms, and

–it reorients what economic energy there is–away from export-oriented industries, and toward domestic-oriented firms and importers.

If you were investing in Japan and thought the yen would rise, you would overweight domestic firms and underweight exporters and other companies with large foreign-currency exposure.  But the most sensible thing for most people to do, as I suggested a couple of days ago, is just to stay away.  (I own two social networking stocks in Japan, DeNA and its smaller competitor, Gree.  For now, I’m keeping them both.  These are youth-culture special situation stocks that are growing very fast, so I think they’ll be relatively unaffected by problems in the overall economy.  But I wouldn’t advise anyone to follow my lead.)

I’ve just updated Current Market Tactics

Here’s the link–or you can just click the tab at the top of the page.

China’s GDP bigger than Japan’s: that’s not the real story

China’s #2…

Yesterday morning, the government in Tokyo announced its June quarter GDP totaled $1.28 trillion, slightly below Beijing’s previously announced $1.33 trillion for the same period.  By surging ahead of Japan, China has become the number two economy in size in the world, after the United States, relegating Japan to third place.

This was headline news in financial newspapers and websites around the world–except for the Wall Street Journal, which carried an article about criminals’ use of underwear with secret pockets in it on its website instead.

…at $5+ trillion of GDP

Annualizing China’s second quarter GDP would mean full-year economic value creation of $5.3 trillion, or a little more than a third of what the US will achieve in the coming 12 months.

Conventional measures undervalue developing countries’ economies

International economists have known for a long time that there’s something wrong with the conventional way of comparing GDPs between countries, however.  It isn’t just that the renminbi isn’t freely traded and might be, say, 15% against the dollar if it were–and that therefore Chinese GDP could be almost a trillion dollars higher than the amount reported.  Nor is it that the yen has shot up agains the dollar by about 10% over the past few months, making Japanese GDP a tenth higher than it would otherwise be.

Purchasing Power Parity GDP

The real issue is that the conventional comparison uses currency market exchange rates to convert GDPs into a standard form (US$).  This is a reasonable way to measure the relative value of sectors whose output is traded internationally.  But it’s not a very good method, especially when dealing with developing countries, to assess the value of economic output in non-traded parts of an economy.  You get a better measure of relative size of economies using purchasing power parity GDP, a topic I’ve written about in detail in another post.

Using purchasing power parity GDP, China had a $8.8 trillion economy in 2009 vs. $4.2 trillion for Japan.  In other words, China is already twice the size of Japan, surpassing the latter six or seven years ago.  The Middle Kingdom is not a third the size of the US, but almost two-thirds as big.  And, on the PPP GDP measure, China will surpass the US to become the largest economy on the globe around 2020, not 2030, as forecasters think China might do using the traditional GDP calculation technique.

the real story

What is the real story then?  It’s that the China GDP story is front page news.  To me, it means that US and Europe continue to underestimate the size of the developing economies, and of China in particular.

Both the IMF and the CIA do purchasing power parity calculations, and come up with almost precisely the same results.  According to both, total world GDP last year was about $70 trillion.  The largest economic entities were:

BRIC countries     $16.4 trillion     (23.4% of the world)

EU          $15.0 trillion      (21.4%)

US     $14.3 trillion     (20.4%)

The Eurozone, that is, countries actually using the €, had GDP of $11 trillion (15.7%) last year.  As mentioned above, China had GDP of $8.8 (12.6%) trillion.  NAFTA had GDP of $17 trillion (24.3%).

conclusion for investors

Looked at from the PPP perspective, the world consists of three large economic blocs, all of about equal size:  NAFTA, BRICS and the EU, in that order.  The BRICs, by far the fastest-growing of the three groups, will probably pass NAFTA this year.

Why is this important?

Investors should realize that the MSCI World Index is constructed using the following approximate country weightings:

US + Canada    45%

EU     26%

Japan     8%

Australia, Korea, Taiwan     7.5%

the rest     12.5%.

That looks an awful lot like the conventional-GDP view of the world.  You get a heavy dose of the US, EU and Japan with the traditional indices, but very little of the really fast-growing 25% of the world.

The EAFE index, the standard international index for Americans, is even more skewed than the MSCI World.  Its country weightings:

Europe ex UK     42%

UK     21%

Japan      23%

Australia  9%

everything else     5%.

Again, a heavy dose of the most mature markets, with little else.

What I’ve just written is substantially correct, but a few caveats are in order.

–Most stock markets in developed countries have a healthy number of multinationals, which have established beachheads in the developing world to benefit from the growth opportunities they offer.  So the skewing away from the developing world is not so severe as the country allocation suggests.

–Some developing markets aren’t open to foreigners, mostly out of legitimate concern that their developed market cousins will buy the nations most prized assets on the cheap–which of course is what we’re trying to do.

–Some developing markets can be highly illiquid, as well as requiring a large amount of local “street smarts” for you to be an active stock picker in.

where to get developing markets’ exposure

There are specialized mutual funds with good track records, like the Matthews China Fund, or ETFs, that can give you the exposure you might want.  Remember, though, that these are higher than average risk/reward investments, so be sure you’re willing/able to assume the greater chance of loss.

What are Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Purchasing Power Parity GDP?

Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a name that covers a number of loosely related ideas.  The most important, I think, are:

–PPP as a theory of predicting long-term exchange rate equilibria, and

–the calculation and comparison of country GDPs using PPP.

In the first sense, PPP answers the question of  what exchange rate would prevail in an ideal world where workers in different countries all have equal compensation.  In the second, PPP says what country GDPs should really be if the value of non-traded goods were factored into the calculation–not just traded goods.

PPP and currency values

PPP is a labor theory of value.  The basic idea is that the average worker, no matter what country he works in, should earn enough money to buy stuff that will give him the same standard of living as a worker in any other part of the world.  This is the equilibrium condition.  If, at any given time, this condition does not hold, currency exchange rates will realign themselves so that equilibrium is established.

I first encountered PPP as a practical thing when it came into vogue in the mid-Eighties, a period of great instability in exchange rates.   It was for a while the preferred method of currency forecasting.  It didn’t work very well, however.   Apart from the more general question of whether value of a good in trade is determined by the amount of labor expended in its making, there were three practical issues:

1.  tastes may differ from culture to culture, so determining “equal” baskets of goods and services across countries isn’t as easy at it sounds,

2.  in the real world, prices subject to local cartels or government regulation may change only very slowly, and

3.  other factors, like the emergence of substitutes or a significant change in the price level (think:  Japanese deflation in the Nineties) can do the work ascribed in this theory to currency movements.

Purchasing Power Parity GDP

GDP calculated under PPP is a different matter.  The issue first arose, I think, in connection with the rapid growth of the mainland Chinese economy during the Eighties, when it averaged double-digit annual expansion of real GDP.  This compares with the US, which averaged, say, 3%.    Whatever imprecision there may have been in the actual numbers reported by the two countries, it was clear that China had grown much, much faster than the US during the decade.

The conventional way to compare countries’ GDP is to take the local currency number for each economy and translate the result into come reference currency, typically the US$.  The common sense result guess for the Eighties would have been that China had doubled in size relative to the US during the decade.  But when the conventional calculations were done, China had actually shrunk in relation to the US.

The problem?–the conventional calculation uses market exchange rates, which express the relative price relationships among traded goods, like cars, and uses that relationship as a proxy for the value of all goods in an economy.  That doesn’t work well.  In an emerging economy, a haircut, a bus ride, even cellphone service will typically be much cheaper than in a developed economy.

Seeing the US/China result was enough to prompt the World Bank to attempt to make GDP calculations that included non-traded goods as well.  These are the 2008 World Bank figures.  The results are startling, though less so than they would have been two or three years ago, when Brazil, India and Russia would have had their approximate PPP rankings but would have been out of the top ten in the conventional ones:

—————–rank   % of world GDP         —–  rank    % of PPP GDP

US                         1                 23.4%                       1              20.3%

Japan                  2                    8.1%                        3               6.2%

China                 3                  7.1%                        2               14.3%

Germany             4                     6.0%                     5               4.2%

France                 5                     4.6%                     8               3.0%

UK                        6                     4.3%                     7                3.0%

Italy                      7                    3.8%                   10               2.6%

Brazil                  8                     2.6%                     9                2.9%

Russia                9                     2.6%                      6                 3.3%

Spain                10                     2.6%                    12                 2.0%

Canada             11                      2.3%                   14                1.7%

India               12                     2.0%                     4                 4.9%

Mexico             13                     1.8%                      11               2.2%

Note that China and India are together about the same size as the US as a percent of world GDP when measured by PPP, vs. less than 40% of the US when measured conventionally.


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