Macau gaming in February 2012: important signs of market strength

Macau gaming results

Yesterday, the Macao Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau released its report of Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune for the SAR’s casinos during the month of February.  Results were:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2012 and 2011
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2012 2011 Variance 2012 2011 Variance
Jan 25,040 18,571 +34.8% 25,040 18,571 +34.8%
Feb 24,286 19,863 +22.3% 49,325 38,434 +28.3%

Source: Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau

The monthly figures require a little interpretation, since the important New Year holiday, which prompts a surge in casino visits, fell in January this year vs. February in 2011.  Sure, bears were apparently saying, January looks good.  But that’s only because of the holiday.  Wait until you see how ugly February will be.

Now February is in.  Despite the difficult comparison, gambling revenue grew 22%+.  Looking year to date, and thereby avoiding the issue of the timing of the New Year holiday, the Macau market is growing at 28%+, almost 3x the rate the gloomier analysts in Hong Kong had been predicting.

stock market reaction

The biggest stock market beneficiaries of the Macau government announcement have been Wynn Resorts in the US and Wynn Macau in Hong Kong.  This, despite the uncertainty–and the negative publicity–stemming from the break between Steve Wynn and Kazuo Okada.

The market moves do make some sense.  1128 is the main source of WYNN’s profits, so what’s good for the subsidiary is good for the parent.  And the continuing rapid growth of Macau suggests for 1128 that:

–regulators may approve its application to build in new casino in Cotai more quickly, since possible oversupply of gambling space is less of a worry, and

–the clear appeal of rivals just-opened casinos–just to see them, if nothing else–won’t mean that 1128 will struggle to find customers of its own.

NOTE:

Earlier today, WYNN filed an 8k saying that it had, in effect, received Macau government approval for a proposed new casino to be built in Cotai.  WYNN almost immediately retracted the filing, saying only that it had been made in error.  The stock, which had risen about 7%, was suspended for almost two hours for dissemination of the retraction news.  It hit a new intraday high after reopening but is sagging a bit as I’m writing this.

My guess is that the retracted 8k will prove to be factually correct, but that WYNN’s agent jumped the gun on making the announcement.  If so, what’s most striking to me would be how quickly the approval would have come after Kazuo Okada was removed from the WYNN share register.  Of course, it’s also possible that the approval has been prompted by the absence of the market slowdown Deutsche Bank analysts have been predicting for some time.  It could be that the timing is just coincidence, but I’m not sure that’s the right way to roll.

Las Vegas Sands: strong 4Q11…and beyond

results

LVS reported 4Q11 and full-year 2011 results after the close of New York trading on Thursday February 1st.  Quarterly revenue for the company was $2.3 billion, up 26.3% year on year.  Net income was $460.9 million, or $.57 a share.  That was up 38% year on year.  EPS exceeded the average analyst estimate by about $.03.

For 2011 as a whole, LVS posted $9.4 billion in revenue, up by 37% from the %6.9 billion taken in in 2010.  EPS more than doubled to $2.02 vs. $.98 in the prior year.

details

Sands China in Macau took in $1.33 billion in revenue during 4Q11.  Ebitda (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) was $430.1 million.  These figures were up 22% and 29% year on year, respectively.  3Q11 ebitda was $388.3 million, meaning 4Q results were up 10.7% qonq.

Marina Sands in Singapore had revenues of $806.9 million for the quarter and ebitda of $426.9 million, aided by an unusually high win percentage at table games.  These were yoy increases of 44% and 40%.  3Q11 ebida was $413.9 million, so the qonq gain was 3%.

Las Vegas operations had revenues of $339.5 million and ebitda of $80.9 million.  Revenue was up 9% yoy, ebitda was about flat.  3Q11 ebitda was $94.3 million.  Qonq, 4Q ebitda was down 16%.

my thoughts

earnings

Let’s assume US operations will be flat year on year in 2012, ex management fees from Singapore and Macau.  I think there will be some small gains, but the main issue is not the economy.  It’s the severe overcapcacity of hotel rooms and gambling space in Las Vegas.  Dividends from Sands China will probably add close to $1 billion–covering the parent’s dividend payout.

HK: 1928 will soon be opening the first phase of its newest Macau casino, Macau Cotai Central, shortly.  In a market that will likely expand by 25% this year, 1928 will likely easily grow by 30%–probably considerably more.

I don’t know any good way to estimate growth for the MS Singapore.  The casino hasn’t been open that long, for one thing.  For another, after posting continuous increases in ebitda since opening, income seems to have flattened out in 4Q11.  Is this seasonal?  …or something else?   No one knows.  If we assume no organic growth but that the casino continues to generate revenue at the 4Q11 rate throughout 2012, ebitda would grow by 15% yoy.

Repayment and restructuring of debt at lower interest rates will chip in, as well.

Put all this together and I think the analysts’ consensus of $2.50 in eps for this year is a reasonable guess.  We’ll be able to tell more when the official year-end financials are published.

asset value

At today’s level, the market value of LVS is about $38 billion.

Its ownership interest in publicly traded Sands China (1928:HK) is worth around $21 billion.

If we assume that wholly-owned Marina Sands should be valued at 80% of 1928′s ebitda multiple–because of less clear near-term growth prospects–then MS is worth $24 billion.

If so, Macau and Singapore are together worth $7 billion more than the market cap of LVS–implying that, in the mind of Wall Street, the $424 million in annual US ebitda subtracts a ton of value.  That’s silly.  LVS would need to rise above $60 a share in order for the stock price to reflect no value for the US operations.

dividend

Both LVS and 1928 have declared initial dividends and signaled their intention to sustain them at at least the current level.  LVS will be paying $1 a share annually, meaning a yield of slightly below 2%.  1928 will be paying HK$1.16, a 4% yield.

Three implications:

–dividends are supposed to be paid from profits.  Both LVS and 1928 are saying they expect to remain at least as profitable as they are now.

–both companies believe they’ll be generating enough free cash flow to sustain the payout

–the companies’ lenders (LVS has about $10 billion in debt) are satisfied that they’ll be repaid and have okayed the dividends.

conclusions

LVS  isn’t the best casino operator in the world.  That’s WYNN, in my opinion.  But at the moment I think it’s the best casino stock.

Management is highly competent.  And the company is nearing the end of a very ambitious (read: risky) multi-year, multi-billion dollar Asian expansion.  The financial crisis came at the worst possible time for LVS.  Nevertheless, the company has completed its plans.  It’s now entering a period of potentially immense free cash flow generation that will transform the financial structure of the firm over the next two or three years.  I don’t think Wall Street has worked this out yet, as shown by the undervaluation of LVS on a sum-of-the-parts basis.


Shaping a portfolio for 2012 (III): China

China

In assessing China, I think it’s important to distinguish carefully between the course of the mainland Chinese economy and the fortunes of China-related stocks.

the economy

background

The foremost goal of the Beijing government is to keep the ruling Communist Party in power.  This translates into the economic objective of avoiding possible social unrest by keeping employment high and unemployment low.  That’s quite a trick when you’re managing the transition from a rural, agriculture-based society to a more urban and manufacturing-oriented one.

In addition, China dedicated itself to creating a Western-style market-based economy in the late 1970s when it realized the country was too complex for central planning to work.  Again, hard to do when three-quarters of your industrial base was zombie-like state-owned corporations, when being a businessman was a felony and where citizens preferred to bury chuk kam gold trinkets in the back yard rather than use banks.

Complicating the situation further is the fact that high corporate or local/national government officials are Party officials whose chances for personal promotion are directly related to aggressively growing the areas they control, whether doing so makes long-term economic sense or not.

results

At the same time, all the mid-level national economic officials I’ve met–who actually implement policy–have been highly sophisticated, well-trained (mostly from the US or UK), competent and dedicated to creating healthy and balanced growth.

Given the large size of the Chinese economy and the paucity of tools to make economic policy, the best they’ve been able to do is to lurch between two extremes, overheating and stalling (the latter meaning unemployment is rising–a combination of new entrants to the labor force and layoffs)–and gradually lessen the amplitude of the cyclical swings.

where we are now

When the developed world appeared to be coming apart at the seams in 2008, China allowed a particularly strong domestic lurch to the upside.  For the past two years or so, Beijing has been trying to force an economic slowdown to rein in that expansionary impulse.

Policymakers have most recently been signalling their belief that slowdown has gone far enough and it’s time for faster expansion again.

China stocks

By and large, non-citizens can’t buy or sell stocks in the domestic market.  I’m not sure it makes much economic difference whether the local bourses go up or down.

Hong Kong is the natural market where the best and brightest of the mainland list their shares.

Over the past six months, Hong Kong stocks have sold off much more heavily than, say, the S&P 500, in response to worries about the Eurozone and potential global economic slowdown.  Since bottoming in early October, they’ve only rallied back in line with the S&P.  As I see it, so far there’s no anticipation of a better mainland economy this year in Hong Kong stock prices.  Many stocks there look cheap to me.

what to do

Personally, I think it’s important for all but the most risk-averse investors to have some exposure to the Chinese economy.

The most conservative way to do so is to hold companies listed in the US or Europe that have significant businesses in China.  Luxury goods retailers like LVMH, Tiffany or Coach are possibilities.  Casino companies like Wynn and Las Vegas Sands make all their money in Asia.

Discount brokers like Fidelity offer international trading services that allow foreigners to buy stocks in Hong Kong directly and cheaply.  Most investors will likely find it easier not to do research themselves, however, and buy an ETF or an actively managed mutual fund that specializes in Hong Kong or Greater China.

Price action in December and early January is often hard to read because of tax-related selling–losers in December, winners in early January.  Still, I’ve been a bit surprised that Hong Kong stocks haven’t done better than they have, given that the most recent economic news out of China, the EU and the US has virtually all been positive.

I don’t think this means that the positive case for the Chinese economy and for Hong Kong stocks is incorrect.  It may just take more time for negative emotion–from investors located in Europe, I think–to exhaust itself.  I’ve always thought that “buy on weakness” is pretty lame advice.  But it’s probably the right approach in this case.

 

 

“the emerging equity gap”: McKinsey (II)

Yesterday I outlined the McKinsey argument that a substantial “equity gap” will emerge in developing economies between the demand for stock financing for capital expansion and the money that investors are willing to make available to the firms that need it.

I believe the qualitative story

To recap:  The qualitative argument the consultant makes starts with the idea (which I think is correct) that stock markets in almost all emerging nations are hazardous to investors’ wealth.  The companies listed may be the politically connected dregs of the local economy, not the stars.  Financial statements may not be reliable.  Corporate management may not have shareholder welfare as a primary goal.  The regulatory playing field is probably heavily tilted toward insiders.  It’s ugly out there.

Firms may not find it easy to raise money under these conditions.  Foreigners are unlikely to help, either, since in the developed world an aging investor base isn’t likely to have risk assets to spare.

Therefore, emerging economies will only fill the potential we all believe they have if their governments make substantial changes in their stock markets.  Otherwise, companies in these countries will come up $12.3 trillion short of their equity funding needs by 2020.

This is a problem, not only for these countries but also for any investors who have bought emerging markets index funds or ETFs banking on emerging economies to flower fully.

I agree.

…the quantitative?

It’s the quantitative stuff that I have problems with.  Specifically,

1.  starting with a quibble…

McKinsey projects that global financial assets will be worth $371 trillion in 2020.  It’s not $370 trillion.  It isn’t $372 trillion, either.  The precision of the figures implies that McKinsey can forecast the state of financial markets almost a decade ahead with an accuracy of +/- .25%.  All the empirical evidence is that no one can forecast with this degree of accuracy even one year ahead.  Stock market participants know the limitations of forecasts, because the real world beats them over the head with their misses every day.  Why isn’t McKinsey aware?

…or maybe not

The “equity gap” McKinsey forecasts amounts to $12.3 trillion (not $12.2 trillion…).  That’s 3.3% of projected financial assets in 2020.  How much of the “gap” would remain if McKinsey didn’t stick with overly precise point forecasts?

2. using local GDP to forecast corporate profits

McKinsey assumes that the profits of publicly listed companies in a given country will rise in line with nominal GDP.  Three reasons why I think this is a mistake:

–many parts of the local economy may not be represented in the stock market.  On Wall Street, for example, autos, housing and real estate–all pretty sick sectors at the moment–have virtually no stock market representation

–in the US and UK, at least, publicly listed firms tend to represent the best and the brightest of the local economy.  Private equity and trade acquisitions winnow the elderly and the infirm from the herd.

–in the developed world, foreign sales and profits make up a considerable portion of the stock market’s total.  In the UK, for instance, maybe 75% of the earnings of the FTSE 100 come from outside that country–explaining its dominant stock market size in the EU, despite not being the largest economy.  In the US, the best guess of S&P is that foreign earnings make up about half the total.  The figure is rising.

My conclusion(s):  the method McKinsey uses will understate corporate profits, and thereby the size of future equity market.  This is not new news.  Wall Street has been actively discussing the increasingly non-US nature of S&P profits for the past two decades.  In other markets, it’s been a key subject for much longer.

3.  we live in a post-internet world

It isn’t just the internet, either.  Other key factors as well have conspired over the past couple of decades to substantially decrease the capital intensity of business. 

–development of sophisticated supply chain control software, combined with internet communication and the rise of specialized logistics/transport firms, means everyone holds smaller inventories

for many industries, today’s capital spending = servers and software, not machine tools and buildings.  The rise of technology rental, software-as-a-service, for example, means decreasing capital intensity

e-commerce has vastly decreased the requirement for repeated expensive advertising campaigns and ownership of physical retail outlets as tools to make potential customers aware of a product or service. 

the separation of design and manufacture that the internet allows means that companies use less capital intensive processes to make products in low labor-cost countries

in developing economies, too

There’s no doubt that emerging nations will still need a lot of development in capital intensive areas, like power generation, chemicals, water, roads, ports and related infrastructure.  But there’s no reason to believe that these economies won’t also avail themselves of the same capital-saving devices in other areas that developed nations now do.  For instance, eastern China is already outsourcing some manufacturing operations to lower labor-cost countries.

My point:  in projecting the future capital needs of publicly trade firms the McKinsey assumption that companies will be as capital intensive as they have been in the past is the simplest one.   I don’t think it’s right, though.  In fact, the more I think about it, the odder it sounds.

A final thought on this subject:  as prices change, behavior adjusts.  If the cost of equity capital were to begin to rise, companies will rethink their spending plans and economize/substitute.


Coach’s new Hong Kong Depository Receipts

Hong Kong Depository Receipts (HDRs)

I didn’t know until I was reading the Wall Street Journal this morning that Hong Kong had depository receipts (DRs).  But COH just issued one.

Sure enough, checking with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website, HDRs have been permitted in that market since mid-2008.  Not many takers so far, however.  The HKSE lists Vale, the Brazilian iron ore company, with two HDRs; SBI, a Japanese internet-based financial, has one.  And now there’s COH (6388 is the Hong Kong ticker symbol).

what they are

The basic idea behind a DR is to provide a simple way for a domestic investor to buy a foreign stock without having to set up a brokerage account in the foreign country or to deal with foreign exchange, either in buying and selling or in receiving dividends.

The buyer doesn’t actually get a share of stock, however.  Instead, he gets an IOU (the receipt) from some financial entity, usually a bank, that holds the real shares in a depository account.  The bank handles all the necessary administrative details, like foreign exchange and the sometimes messy business of meeting the foreign country’s securities and tax regulations.

ADRs

The company whose stock underlies the DR may use the DR issuance to raise capital in a new market, where investors may well pay a higher multiple for shares than would be possible in the home market.  In the biggest DR market, the US, I’ve found this often the case–and regard it as a bad sign.  In my experience, seeing a mature company launch an ADR means it has lost its allure for more knowledgeable home market investors.  (Another important factor in ADR issuance in particular is that it circumvents the more stringent disclosure and reporting requirements that the SEC has for US-based companies.)

In the COH case, however, the firm has not created 6388 to raise new funds–after all, operations are generating $1 billion in annual net cash.  It has created a DR to raise its public profile in Greater China.

their Achilles heel

The bane of DRs, in my opinion, is low trading volume and potentially Grand Canyon-wide bid-asked spreads.  I’ve found the problem especially acute in cases, like this one, where the operating hours of the home and DR exchanges don’t overlap.  According to the HKSE website, trading in 6388 over the past five days has only totaled about US$11,000.  The bid-asked spread shown is about 2% (my experience in the US is that the spread for a stock like this could be more like 10%).  December is usually a dreary month for investors, so January will probably give a better read on volume.

worth watching

Nevertheless, COH has probably gotten more publicity in China through the HDR listing than it would have been able to buy with the money it spent to create its HDR.  The phenomenon itself it worth watching, as well.   Two reasons:

–we may ultimately reach a tipping point where having a HDR acquires a cachet that exerts a positive influence on the home market security price, and

–pioneers like COH may have a leg up on obtaining an eventual listing on a mainland exchange.

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