In assessing China, I think it’s important to distinguish carefully between the course of the mainland Chinese economy and the fortunes of China-related stocks.

the economy

background

The foremost goal of the Beijing government is to keep the ruling Communist Party in power.  This translates into the economic objective of avoiding possible social unrest by keeping employment high and unemployment low.  That’s quite a trick when you’re managing the transition from a rural, agriculture-based society to a more urban and manufacturing-oriented one.

In addition, China dedicated itself to creating a Western-style market-based economy in the late 1970s when it realized the country was too complex for central planning to work.  Again, hard to do when three-quarters of your industrial base was zombie-like state-owned corporations, when being a businessman was a felony and where citizens preferred to bury chuk kam gold trinkets in the back yard rather than use banks.

Complicating the situation further is the fact that high corporate or local/national government officials are Party officials whose chances for personal promotion are directly related to aggressively growing the areas they control, whether doing so makes long-term economic sense or not.

results

At the same time, all the mid-level national economic officials I’ve met–who actually implement policy–have been highly sophisticated, well-trained (mostly from the US or UK), competent and dedicated to creating healthy and balanced growth.

Given the large size of the Chinese economy and the paucity of tools to make economic policy, the best they’ve been able to do is to lurch between two extremes, overheating and stalling (the latter meaning unemployment is rising–a combination of new entrants to the labor force and layoffs)–and gradually lessen the amplitude of the cyclical swings.

where we are now

When the developed world appeared to be coming apart at the seams in 2008, China allowed a particularly strong domestic lurch to the upside.  For the past two years or so, Beijing has been trying to force an economic slowdown to rein in that expansionary impulse.

Policymakers have most recently been signalling their belief that slowdown has gone far enough and it’s time for faster expansion again.

China stocks

By and large, non-citizens can’t buy or sell stocks in the domestic market.  I’m not sure it makes much economic difference whether the local bourses go up or down.

Hong Kong is the natural market where the best and brightest of the mainland list their shares.

Over the past six months, Hong Kong stocks have sold off much more heavily than, say, the S&P 500, in response to worries about the Eurozone and potential global economic slowdown.  Since bottoming in early October, they’ve only rallied back in line with the S&P.  As I see it, so far there’s no anticipation of a better mainland economy this year in Hong Kong stock prices.  Many stocks there look cheap to me.

what to do

Personally, I think it’s important for all but the most risk-averse investors to have some exposure to the Chinese economy.

The most conservative way to do so is to hold companies listed in the US or Europe that have significant businesses in China.  Luxury goods retailers like LVMH, Tiffany or Coach are possibilities.  Casino companies like Wynn and Las Vegas Sands make all their money in Asia.

Discount brokers like Fidelity offer international trading services that allow foreigners to buy stocks in Hong Kong directly and cheaply.  Most investors will likely find it easier not to do research themselves, however, and buy an ETF or an actively managed mutual fund that specializes in Hong Kong or Greater China.

Price action in December and early January is often hard to read because of tax-related selling–losers in December, winners in early January.  Still, I’ve been a bit surprised that Hong Kong stocks haven’t done better than they have, given that the most recent economic news out of China, the EU and the US has virtually all been positive.

I don’t think this means that the positive case for the Chinese economy and for Hong Kong stocks is incorrect.  It may just take more time for negative emotion–from investors located in Europe, I think–to exhaust itself.  I’ve always thought that “buy on weakness” is pretty lame advice.  But it’s probably the right approach in this case.

I didn’t know until I was reading the Wall Street Journal this morning that Hong Kong had depository receipts (DRs).  But COH just issued one.

Sure enough, checking with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website, HDRs have been permitted in that market since mid-2008.  Not many takers so far, however.  The HKSE lists Vale, the Brazilian iron ore company, with two HDRs; SBI, a Japanese internet-based financial, has one.  And now there’s COH (6388 is the Hong Kong ticker symbol).

what they are

The basic idea behind a DR is to provide a simple way for a domestic investor to buy a foreign stock without having to set up a brokerage account in the foreign country or to deal with foreign exchange, either in buying and selling or in receiving dividends.

The buyer doesn’t actually get a share of stock, however.  Instead, he gets an IOU (the receipt) from some financial entity, usually a bank, that holds the real shares in a depository account.  The bank handles all the necessary administrative details, like foreign exchange and the sometimes messy business of meeting the foreign country’s securities and tax regulations.

ADRs

The company whose stock underlies the DR may use the DR issuance to raise capital in a new market, where investors may well pay a higher multiple for shares than would be possible in the home market.  In the biggest DR market, the US, I’ve found this often the case–and regard it as a bad sign.  In my experience, seeing a mature company launch an ADR means it has lost its allure for more knowledgeable home market investors.  (Another important factor in ADR issuance in particular is that it circumvents the more stringent disclosure and reporting requirements that the SEC has for US-based companies.)

In the COH case, however, the firm has not created 6388 to raise new funds–after all, operations are generating $1 billion in annual net cash.  It has created a DR to raise its public profile in Greater China.

their Achilles heel

The bane of DRs, in my opinion, is low trading volume and potentially Grand Canyon-wide bid-asked spreads.  I’ve found the problem especially acute in cases, like this one, where the operating hours of the home and DR exchanges don’t overlap.  According to the HKSE website, trading in 6388 over the past five days has only totaled about US$11,000.  The bid-asked spread shown is about 2% (my experience in the US is that the spread for a stock like this could be more like 10%).  December is usually a dreary month for investors, so January will probably give a better read on volume.

worth watching

Nevertheless, COH has probably gotten more publicity in China through the HDR listing than it would have been able to buy with the money it spent to create its HDR.  The phenomenon itself it worth watching, as well.   Two reasons:

–we may ultimately reach a tipping point where having a HDR acquires a cachet that exerts a positive influence on the home market security price, and

–pioneers like COH may have a leg up on obtaining an eventual listing on a mainland exchange.

Macau gaming stocks began a late-August swoon when Karen Tang of Deutsche Bank, an influential securities analyst in the Hong Kong market, published a report on the casino stocks there.  In it, she predicted that a sharp and protracted slowdown in spending by high-rollers in the Macau gambling market would soon begin.  According to Reuters, she said that revenue growth would slow to +34% year on year in October 2011, +32% in November and +20% in December. Growth might shrink to as little as +10% during 2012.

her reasoning?

Affluent Chinese were no longer spending on European-made luxury cars.  She and the DB economics department felt that this was the harbinger of a widespread pullback in consumption by the wealthy.  Finally, they thought, the affluent were succumbing to the Beijing government’s attempts to rein in economic growth on the mainland.

does the argument make sense? 

In my opinion, no.   There’s been no sign of falloff in any other area of Chinese luxury spending.  Maybe the new cars were ugly, or the potential buyers had no garage space left.  I’m not saying that Chinese gamblers aren’t going to spend less in Macau in the coming months.  That could happen.  I’m only observing that I don’t think the luxury car situation is evidence in favor of this conclusion.

I think Ms. Tang would have been better off arguing that the Macau casino stocks were fully priced for the best possible outcome and therefore had no near-term upside.  That would mean that they could only go sideways or down–reason enough to take some profit in the sector.

Nevertheless, the Tang report was enough to drive the sector down very sharply in late August and throughout September.  At one point, some stocks had lost close to half their value before beginning to rebound.  …and then the Europe-related selling began.

what does all this mean for us today?

Well, the November Macau gambling market results were posted on the website of the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau on the afternoon of December 1st.  Here they are:

Source: Macau DICJ

As you can see from the bold figures, after being wildly wrong about October growth prospects, Ms. Tang seems to have predicted the November results reasonably accurately.

Is there any significance to the November prediction?  My guess is that there isn’t much meaning for the stock market, even if this turns out to be more than a lucky guess.  For one thing, the stocks are much cheaper today than they were when the original report came out.  For another, Beijing has just publicly signaled that it is reversing its money policy to favor GDP growth.  So stocks should now be beginning to discount a reacceleration of the gambling business in Macau–not a slowdown.

It will be interesting to see how the Hong Kong market evaluates this situation.  My hunch is that the mid-November lows will hold, but that the market will want to see at least the December market results before becoming more bullish.

TIF reported its 3Q11 (ended October 31st) earnings results before the start of New York trading yesterday morning.  For the three months, the company took in revenue of $821.8 million.  It earned $89.7 million, or $.70 per share.  This represents a 52% increase over the $.46 a share the company earned in 3Q10.  The 3Q11 figure handily beat the Wall Street consensus of $.60 a share, even exceeding the most optimistic estimate, which was $.67.

TIF also continues to buy back stock at around the $65-$66 level.

the guidance

TIF says it expects 4Q11 earnings to come in between $1.48-$1.58 per share.  This represents a (mere) 6.3% increase over the $1.44 per share the company posted for 4Q10.  This guidance falls near the bottom of the 4Q Wall Street analysts’ estimate range of $1.51 – $1.69.  The median estimate, which  may be revised down, has been $1.64.

Just for reference, a year ago TIF guided to eps of $1.29 and reported $1.44.  If we adjust management guidance for possible lowballing of the same magnitude, we arrive at a figure around $1.65.  That would be a year on year gain of 15% or so.

the details

3Q11 business was stellar.  By areas:

–the Americas, 47.9% of TIF’s sales (49.7% a year ago), rose by 17% yoy.

–Asia Pacific, 22.6% (19.6%), was up by 44%

–Japan, 18.1% (19.1), rose by 12%

–Europe, 11.4% (11.6%), was up by 19%.

Strength was in high-end merchandise.

Where’s the problem?

In its guidance, TIF alluded to “recent sales weaknesses” it has noticed in Europe (no surprise there–and it’s still a tiny part of TIF’s overall business) and in the eastern US.  In its conference call, the company said the western US remains strong and buying by foreign tourists continues to be a significant positive.  But it has noticed a slowdown in purchases by domestic customers in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states.  That’s the reason for its relative caution.

my thoughts

On the surface, the Boston-Washington corridor slowdown seems odd.  The just-released National Retail Federation survey (see my post) highlights the Northeast as an area where holiday spending is surging.  However, I’d already heard the same story as TIF’s from another (privately held) luxury retailer doing business along the East Coast.  I’d attributed that to company-specific problems, but it’s sounding like I’m wrong.

What could be the cause?  …pent-up demand from the recession being satisfied over the past year?  …lower bonuses on Wall Street?  …Newt Gingrich taking a lower spending profile (a joke)?

TIF is still projecting sales in the Americas to be up by 15%-20% yoy in 4Q11, but is now expecting the lion’s share of the sales growth to come from buying by foreign tourists.  This contrasts with the 50-50 split the company has seen in sales growth  between locals and foreigners during recent quarters.

TIF is currently earning at a $4 per share annual rate.  This means it’s now trading at a bit over 15x earnings.  That’s an unusually low multiple by historic standards.  It’s also where the TIF management sees considerable value, as evidenced by its stock buybacks.  In addition, Asia Pacific sales probably amount to about a third of revenues, if we factor in sales to tourists in the US and Europe.  Those sales alone seem to me to be enough to grow the entire company’s profits by at least 10% per year.

On the other hand, if US sales of luxury goods to domestic buyers are beginning to flatten out after an extraordinary burst of buying over the past year–and continue flat for a while–then earnings comparisons for TIF over the next few quarters will likely be lackluster.  Any potential bids from European luxury goods firms (I’ve regarded this possibility as very small, in any event) will likely stay on the shelf until the EU’s economic future is less cloudy.

All in all, I’m content myself to wait before adding to my holding.  If I owned no TIF at all, however, I’d be tempted to buy a small amount now and await further developments.

Interestingly, Hong Kong-based analysts didn’t take this as an unambiguously good result.  They point out that, although Golden Week in early October was a rip-roaring success this year, the year on year growth of the market for the month as a whole was the lowest since January.  That’s obviously correct.

They conclude from this that Macau’s wealthy Chinese customers are feeling the pinch of the mainland’s efforts to slow economic growth, and are gambling less as a result.  A corollary, not so clearly spelled out, is that casinos are posting gambling winnings as revenues today that will ultimately have to be written off as uncollectable receivables.  That may also be true, although the bond rating agency Fitch says there’s no evidence of any of this so far. Fitch, in fact, estimates that the Macau gambling market will grow by at least 20% next year, double the rate that the more pessimistic analysts are calling for.

One notable feature of recent months’ results is the market share shift toward the companies with newer casinos, located in Cotai.  This suggests there’s gambling space in other, older casinos that is going unused.  There are any number of explanations for why this may be happening, like transportation bottlenecks that prevent visitors from reaching Macau, or casinos turn away “iffier” credits.  But it’s also possible that we’re reached a phase of market maturity where simply getting to Macau and gambling anywhere isn’t enough.  Some gamblers may be choosing not to go to Macau unless they get a minimum level of service.

If so, we should expect a more sedate rate of growth than the 45% or so we’re experiencing now.  But the more important investment issue may well be to separate winners from losers.  That’s certainly been the case so far in 2011, as Galaxy and China Sands have left other casinos in the dust–especially SJM and MGM.

areas of current strength

Bain’s estimates current growth prospects by category as follows:

hard luxury (jewelry, watches)     +18%

accessories          +13%

luxury goods in general     +10%

apparel          +8%

perfume/cosmetics          +3%

art de la table          +3%

cyclical forces…

As you’d expect, more expensive items, those sold through wholesalers (who stop buying, period, in recession and turn all their efforts into converting their existing inventory into cash) and those with a large percentage of aspirational buyers all fare the worst in an economic downturn.  Luxury watches are the prime example.  Anything sold through department stores might also qualify.

Men’s apparel is also highly cyclical.  For whatever reason, women continue to buy luxury goods during a downturn.  True, they may trade down a bit and space their purchase farther apart.  But men tend to stop dead in their tracks.  One reason is that big traditional men’s categories like business suits and formal wear are expensive and easily postponable purchases.  Another is that women control the purse strings in most households around the world.

So it’s no surprise that this year watches, expensive jewelry and men’s apparel are all doing extremely well.

Maybe the unusual strength of luxury goods indicates there’s some pent-up demand being met.  In any event, luxury buyers are clearly signalling with their wallets that, for them,  the economic downturn is a thing of the past.

…and secular

who

The traditional picture of a luxury goods buyer is: female, older, from either Europe or Japan.

That’s changing.  Increasingly, customers are younger, more casual,  and male.  These may be trends in many geographies.  However, the main reason theses attributes are appearing on the radar screen is that they describe the Chinese luxury goods consumer.  At 20% of the market, Chinese buying is already very big, and it’s growing very quickly as well.

where

For at least the past decade, makers of luxury goods have been upping their own retail presence.  They are doing this so they can capture the wholesale-to-retail markup.  It also gives them greater control over their brand image and their inventories.

Nevertheless, the luxury goods industry is still predominantly wholesale.  But Bain thinks that the percentage of industry sales through wholesale channels will have shrunk in 2011 to 72% of the total from 75% just two years ago.  This comes despite the business cycle strength of department stores.

online

Internet sales comprise only 3% of total luxury sales at present.  But the category is expanding very rapidly.  Bain thinks online sales will be up by 25% this year, to €5.6 billion.

Online has two segments:  full price and off-price.

Full price is is growing faster than overall luxury sales and comprises about two-thirds of all internet business.  But it’s being left in the dust by off-price, which is one-third today but which amounted to only 20% of online sales four years ago.  Private “flash” sales are the fastest growing part of off-price.

outlets

Off-price non-internet sales amount to about €10 billion, or 5% of the overall luxury market.

Outlet sales grew by 22% last year.  Bain projects them to expand by another 13% in 2011.  That’s faster than the overall luxury goods market, despite the return to health of the full-price market and the consequently smaller amount of unsold merchandise sloshing around in the system.  (Although Bain doesn’t talk about it, part of the answer to this apparent contradiction is that luxury goods companies also produce low-end “outlet only” merchandise.)

This isn’t news.  Outlets are a long-standing, mature channel in the US and Europe.

What is noteworthy is the rapid growth–around a +30% clip–that’s just starting in off-price sales in Asia and Latin America.

brand proliferation, company consolidation

Over the past ten years, the market share of the top five luxury brands has shrunk from 26% of the market to 21%.  In contrast, the share of the top five luxury goods companies has risen from 30% to 35%.

To me, this means market power is shifting from the owners of iconic individual brands to companies that are sophisticated enough provide a common platform–supply chain, support for in-house retail, dealing with consumer preferences in many different geographies–on which a group of disparate brands can operate in an increasingly complex global environment.

More and more, these technology and management factors will be the keys to success.  This also implies that these factors will increasingly be the selling points used to convince acquisition targets to join a luxury conglomerate.  The recent sale of Bulgari to LVMH is a case in point.

After the close of New York trading on October 27th, LVS reported 3Q11 results.  Revenue was a record $2.41 billion, up 26% year on year.  Property EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization) was up 43.2% to $924.1 million.  EPS were $.55, a 61.8% boost over earnings in 3Q10.  The Wall Street consensus eps estimate was $.52.

LVS shares are up by about 4% in aftermarket trading as I’m writing this.

the details

In what follows, it’s important to remember that what a casino company reports as gambling revenue is not the total amount of money bet, but rather the portion of the money bet that it retains or “wins.”  Over a long period of time, the casino’s winning percentage is relatively steady.  In any given quarter, however, it can move away substantially from the long-run average.  In analyzing quarterly results, we should note any short-term deviations and at least mentally adjust for them.

Singapore

Year on year comparisons for the Marina Bay Sands aren’t that helpful, because the casino/resort complex is so new. I’m using quarter on quarter comparisons, instead.

Gambling activity continues to grow rapidly.  EBITDA, which was $413.9 million for 3Q11 vs. $405.4 million in 2Q11 doesn’t show this clearly, though.  That’s because the high roller winning percentage at Marina Bay was 2.99% in 2Q11 and 2.69% in 3Q11 (LVS thinks the normal range for quarterly win in the VIP segment, by far the casino’s largest, should be 2.8%-3.0%).  The q-on-q decline in winning percentage clipped about $35 million from 3Q EBITDA.  The real quarter on quarter growth rate is 10%+, not the 2%+ the accounts show.

VIPs bet an eye-popping $16.7 billion at Marina Bay during 3Q11.  This compares with $12.2 billion in 2Q11 and $10.2 billion in 3Q10–both breathtaking numbers in their own right.

Macau

Same story here.  EBITDA in 3Q11 was $388.3 million, down $3.3 million compared with 2Q11–at a time when market growth, quarter on quarter, was about 10%.  Adjusting Sands China’s winning percentage up to 2Q11 level adds $40 million to the EBITDA line.  This suggests that Sands China held its own in a growing market, despite not adding any casino space this year.

Sands China’s newest, 13.7 million square foot casino in Cotai is slated to open in five months.

US
I’m going to ignore Bethlehem, PA because it’s so small (EBITDA of $25.2 million in the quarter).

EBITDA in Las Vegas was $94.3 million for the seasonally weak 3Q, up slightly from $92.9 million in 2Q11 but up sharply from $58.3 million in 3Q10.   About $10 million of the increase on a year over year basis is due to higher royalty income from Macau and Singapore.  Most of the rest is a halving in the level of giveaways from the $40 million or so LVS needed last year to get customers to come to its Las Vegas properties.

In short, LVS is holding its own in the US and is making money hand over fist in Macau and Singapore.

valuation remains compelling, in my view

(Remember, I own LVS, WYNN and 1128 (if it weren’t for a software glitch Fidelity can’t find/fix, I’d own 1928, too)).

Look first at WYNN, which I consider to have the strongest gambling company management.  Its interest in 1128 is worth about $11.5 billion at today’s market price.  Therefore, the market is valuing the US interests of WYNN at about $5.5 billion.

Next, MGM, the weakest of the big firms.  Its interest in MGM China is worth $3 billion, implying its other interests, including its entanglement with Pansy Ho, are worth $2.7 billion.

What about LVS?  The market in Hong Kong values its interest in 1928 at $17 billion.  Arguably, Marina Bay should be valued at a premium to Sands China.  But capitalizing its earnings on the same basis as 1928 yields a value for the 100%-owned Singapore subsidiary of $25 billion.  This would mean the market values the rest of LVS–Las Vegas and Pennsylvania–at minus $9 billion.  LVS shares would have to be almost 30% higher just to get the needle out of the minus column.

is there a reason for the apparent undervaluation?

A friend who’s a regular reader of PSI asked about ongoing litigation involving LVS, based on a Wall Street Journal article a week or so ago.  I’ll write about this on Sunday.

The litigation may well be a serious issue.  I don’t know.  On the other hand, the stock price already seems to me to be discounting a very unfavorable outcome.

Also, arguably LVS’s leading position in two major Asian markets and its tourist/convention emphasis make it attractive to other countries interested in creating a tourism/gaming industry.  Both WYNN and LVS are seeing synergy effects in Las Vegas from their Asian exposure;  LVS is seeing this in Singapore.  One might therefore expect LVS to be trading at a premium to its competitors, not a steep discount.

WYNN reported 3Q11 results after the closing bell for trading in the New York market on Wednesday.  Revenues were $1.3 billion, up 30% from the comparable period of 2010.  EBITDA (a measure I don’t particularly like but which some investors use) was $381.1 million, up 39% year on year.  Eps were $1.05 vs. $.39 in 3Q10.

The report came as a disappointment to Wall Street, which had been expecting a tripling of earnings per share to $1.18.

details

Wynn Macau

Revenues for Wynn in the SAR were $951.4 million for 3Q11, up 42% year on year.  What disturbed the market, however, was not that eye-popping number, but the fact that the figure was down slightly from the $976.5 million Wynn Macau posted in 2Q11–in a market that was up about 10% quarter on quarter.

Win percentages for various games were within normal ranges, so Wynn being unusually unlucky wasn’t the reason it lagged behind the market.  Rather, it seems that at least some high rollers who might otherwise have visited 1128 were instead checking out the newer casinos that have opened this year.  To some degree, 1128 benefited from this tendency when the Encore opened.  Now the shoe is on the other foot.

Typically gamblers ultimately return to the venues where they feel most comfortable and get the best service–which means Wynn.  The company says it is seeing this happen in October.

Nevertheless, it’s also possible that 1128 is bumping up against the limits of its ability to take in money in Macau with the hotels and casino space it has now.  That amount will gradually rise, with economic growth in China and with inflation.  But if capacity constraints are an issue, comparisons may be pedestrian (+10% or so?) until 1128′s new casino in Cotai opens in 2014-15.

Wynn Las Vegas

On the 2Q11 earnings conference call, WYNN was very enthusiastic about prospects for 3Q11, which in normal times (which these are clearly not) would be a seasonal low point.  Hotel bookings were unusually strong and the company was musing that its table games win percentage might be permanently drifting northward.

I guess non-casino revenues turned out to be pretty much as anticipated, at $266 million.  That was up 11% year on year and down slightly from the 2Q11 figure of $276 million.  From WYNN’s tone three months ago, though, I’d expected a bit more.

Casino revenue for WYNN came in at $126.9 million for the quarter.  The compares with $158.3 million in 2Q11.  It was also slightly less than in the comparable period of 2010.  But the amount bet in the WYNN Las Vegas casinos’ table games was up sharply.

What happened?  The company was simply very unlucky at baccarat last quarter.  The company’s win percentage on table games for 3Q11 was 18.3%.  That’s sharply below the expected level of 21%-24%, and the 27.6% achieved during 2Q11.

If table games win for the quarter had been normal, eps would have been about $.20 higher than actually reported;  win at the 2Q11 rate would have meant eps about $.45 higher.

The company says that win percentages have returned to normal in October.

my thoughts

1128 has lost about a third of its market value on worries about the mainland economy, and on concerns that Wynn and Encore may lose customers to newer casinos.  I still think that 1128 has a shot to make $1.50 a share this year, and (worst probable case) $1.65 next.  Maybe the subsidiary will come in $.10 short for both periods, but not much more than that.  12x earnings seems much too cheap to me.

1128 represents two thirds of WYNN’s market value.  The remaining $5 billion is the Las Vegas operations, which though still anemic are showing progressively stronger results.  Cash flow generation in the US is running at about $400 million, and rising–meaning that domestic operations would be yielding 8% if considered as a stand-alone income vehicle.  The US operations aren’t being run simply to generate cash.  In fact, it sounds as if WYNN would welcome the opportunity to build a casino in Miami, if asked.  But looking at them as a quasi-bond suggests (to me) that they have considerably more value than the market is now awarding them.

All in all, I’m happy to hold the WYNN and 1128 shares I own.  At the moment, however, it’s hard to see where near-term earnings acceleration is going to come from.

In fact, an aggressive trader–which I’m not–might think of switching some money into LVS.  I don’t think LVS is as strong a company as WYNN, but it’s cheaper and it has more potential near-term earnings momentum–coming from Singapore and its soon-to-open new casino in Macau.  But market sentiment can be a funny thing.  It’s tide can quickly reverse.  Even news on possible resolution of EU financial problems might be enough to swing investor attention back toward the Wynn family of companies.  For me, I’m content to be patient with what I consider two undervalued issues.

It can take a surprisingly long time for a retailer to go from a hazy concept of what a store (or a chain) should look like for the holiday sailing season to seeing the shelves actually stocked with merchandise.

Let’s skip over the planning time it takes to figure out exactly what items, and in what quantities, the retailer wants to buy and start with what happens once he calls up a manufacturer or wholesaler and places an order.

Let’s also, for the moment, not focus on computer and consumer electronics items.  There, the issues are making sure enough components and manufacturing capacity are available.  That’s what takes months (a complex semiconductor, for example, may take three months to fabricate).  Actually assembling and testing a device takes a day or two; day three gets it to the plane; on day five, the Fedex truck is rolling to deliver the item.  So  …a week, more or less from manufacturing order to warehouse.

timing order flow from China

For, say, garments from China the story is completely different.  Assuming manufacturing capacity is available, it may take a week to manufacture/assemble a large order and get it to a port.  Pencil in another day for loading, two weeks for a container ship to reach Long Beach, California.  Add a day or two (or three…) for unloading there, and the better part of a week for the train the shipment is placed on next to reach the East Coast  Then there’s a trip to a company warehouse, where the goods are parceled out into smaller lots for delivery to the back rooms of retail stores.

That all adds up to about two months for an isolated rush order that sails through the system without any problems.

But problem-free order flow won’t always (ever?) be the case.  Rush orders cost extra.  And you can’t have all the merchandise arriving at the retail stores on the same day–no one has enough trucks or doorways that are wide enough.  So three months is probably a better figure.

using the data

What does this mean if we want to monitor port activity as a way of assessing retail plans for the holiday season?

Figuring merchandise should be in the stores in early November, look for a pickup in port activity in the area around Hong Kong in late July or early August, and an uptick in the ports around Los Angeles–LA and Long Beach–in late August or early September.

…so far?

So far there’s no pickup to be seen.  Hong Kong-area ports are flattish, and the southern California ports were down 5% year on year in August.  Li & Fung, the well-known Hong Kong-based logistics company, indicates in its latest monthly Chinese Purchasing Managers Index report that new orders in China are perking up a bit in September.  But these seem to be for domestic consumption, not exports–and stuff being made right now can’t get to foreign markets before yearend anyway.

investment implications

Hong Kong figures are doubtless depressed by the current situation of the EU.  Also, to the degree that they can (not much), importers have been avoiding Long Beach for years because of the port’s stunning inefficiency.  Therefore, there may be some room for a contrary bet that the upcoming holiday season will be better than dreary port figures suggest.  WMT, M or KSS might be ways to participate.

I have no desire to do so, right now at least.

The pluses would be that the stocks are trading at low PEs, and that expectations are low.  But I don’t know that well the mid-to-lower-end merchandisers who would be beneficiaries of a surprising Christmas spending surge.  So I’m certain to be the dumb money in this trade.

For another thing, I think we’re in for a luxury goods and gadget-driven holiday–jewelry, smartphones, tablets, e-readers and stuff like that.  So, as an investor I’m more comfortable betting on a continuation of the current haves vs. have-nots trend than on its reversal.

But I will be keeping an eye on the ports over the next few weeks for new data that might change my mind.

In today’s I’ll cover the general issue–how retailers figure out how much inventory to have on the shelves.  In Sunday’s I’ll cover what activity at the major ports in China and on the west coast of the US is saying about what retailers are doing this year.

the inventory problem

In its simplest form, the ground-level decision retailers make about how much stuff to buy to stock their shelves can be framed in terms of the two possible unfavorable outcomes.

They are:

–stock-out costs, meaning the opportunity loss a retailer suffers if a potential customer comes in to buy a specific item and is willing to pay full price, only to find that the store has run out.

This is a tragedy.

There’s some chance a good salesperson can persuade the customer to buy a substitute item that is available.  More likely, the customer goes elsewhere and the chance to grab a 100% markup over cost of goods is lost.

On top of that, the rival that makes the sale has a shot at becoming the customer’s first stop from that point on.  Also, too many empty shelves can create a “don’t go there” atmosphere akin to walking down a dark street in a bad neighborhood at night.  And a thoughtful shopper might construe the absence of certain product lines as a statement by their manufacturer about the retailer’s (low) status or creditworthiness.

The other side of the coin is:

–excess inventory, especially of seasonal items.  In this case, the retailer has the problem of how to dispose of the extra merchandise.

Three reasons for this:

the value of the inventory is eroding as time passes,

the merchant wants to recover the cash he sunk into buying the merchandise, and

he wants to create shelf space for more salable items.

Some things may be returnable to the manufacturer, whether the sales agreement, strictly speaking, allows this possibility or not.  Most, though, will go through a process of markdowns in the store, followed by sale (maybe even at a loss) into the extensive closeout network that crisscrosses the US.

Although the reality is that few retail purchases in the US are at full price, customers are put off if a store always looks like a fire sale is happening.  Branded goods manufacturers may also become very upset if retailers sell their wares at a discount or if they find their merchandise floating around in closeoutland.

True, some manufacturers are vertically integrated.  That is, they maintain retail doors themselves, as well as wholesale warehouses to serve both affiliated and non-affiliated customers.  In such cases, retailers can operate just-in-time by ordering periodically from local distribution centers.  This doesn’t eliminate the inventory planning issue, however; it just shifts it from the retailer to the distributor.  The tradeoff for the retailer is that he doesn’t capture the full markup from the factory door (as a rough rule of thumb, maybe half the total markup on any item goes to the wholesaler).

Over the past couple of decades, department stores, which still serve many of the needs of average Americans, have increasingly turned to house brands, with merchandise ordered more or less directly from the (usually Asian) manufacturer.  They may use an intermediary like Hong Kong-based Li and Fung for ordering or for design services, or they may go straight to the factory themselves.  In either case, their decision has been to increase their inventory-related risk in order to generate higher margins.

taking retail’s temperature

Generally speaking, small, lightweight, high-value items like laptops, tablets or cellphones, are delivered from Asia to the US by air. For most merchandise, however, speed isn’t essential and airfreight costs from Asia would take too big a chunk out of profits.  So this stuff travels by ship from, say, Hong Kong to California, and then by truck or rail to a distribution center.

Anyone can get a reasonable idea–with some caveats–of how retailers see the holiday season shaping up by monitoring the publicly available data on activity in the major import-export ports.

The message the ports are delivering is that despite relatively robust retail sales in recent months in the US, retailers are planning on at best a flattish holiday selling season.

More about this on Sunday.