Archive for the 'emerging markets' Category



China: infrastructure spending will boost Western growth. We’ll help.

CIC investing in Western infrastructure

Today’s ft.com contains a commentary from Lou Jiwei, chairman of the mainland sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation.  In it, Mr. Lou argues that global economic recovery can’t come from developing countries alone.  Developed nations must expand as well.  To help this latter effort along, the CIC is preparing to participate in Western infrastructure projects as  “investor, developer, operator and contractor.”  Projects could be in “energy, water, transport, digital communication, waste disposal…”  The CIC’s first stop will be the UK.

In a companion article, the FT says that a proposed high-speed rail line between London and northern England has caught China’s eye.

Why?

Why do this?  …and why the UK, of all places?  After all, it isn’t that long ago that China was demonizing the UK for invading China in the mid-eighteenth century to force the mainland to accept opium imports from British colony, India.

I can see several reasons for the CIC proposal, aside from the salutory effect infrastructure spending may have on Western economies:

–infrastructure projects can provide higher returns for China’s massive foreign currency holdings than government bonds will.  China is such a super-size investor that liquidity may not be that different,

–successful infrastructure upgrades can buy public goodwill and political influence,

–reversal of the “normal” flow of equity investment funds from developed to developing is a sign of China’s increasing importance in the world economy,

–Chinese industrial and service companies may have a greater chance to win contracts for such projects than they might otherwise,

–the UK is small enough that Chinese spending can have a significant, highly visible impact,

–the UK may be a showpiece.  It could provide entrée into the Eurozone and ultimately to the US,

–the UK is apparently willing to accept Chinese money and not raise spurious “national security” objections to prevent mainland investment.

investment considerations

CIC-backed projects could provide a mild–mostly psychological–boost to the UK.  It’s possible that private investors may be allowed to invest side-by-side with the CIC, as well.

Better transport… alternatives could take business away from direct competitors.  Better rail links, for example, might be bad for commuter airlines or for delivery trucks.

On the other hand, better overall infrastructure support could lure industrial or service businesses from elsewhere in the EU.

So far, however, we don’t have enough information to act on.

thinking out loud about Euroland (III)

It’s possible that we’ll see prolonged economic and political stagnation in Europe of the type we’ve experienced in Japan since 1990 as the continent tries to decide whether the EU project will survive.

My conclusion, based on the prior two posts on this topic, is that–like Japan–Europe by itself is too small in the global terms for its problems to derail economic progress elsewhere.  Market volatility, yes; global recession, no.

In a nutshell, that’s my base case.

 

Nevertheless, even an investor who is not directly involved in Europe nor compelled by customer mandate to invest there faces two issues:

–the fact of continuing European selling of equities, both in Europe and abroad, as EU investors rebalance their portfolios and make themselves more liquid in response to developments there, and

–the possibility that the European financial situation is much more dire than we now suspect and/or the global banking system will transmit part of that damage to the rest of the world.

what to do?

I’m writing under the assumption that we’re not yet anywhere near either the end of the EU crisis, even though it has been dragging on for more than a year.  Nor am I willing to bet that we’re at or near the low point in stock market terms.

These are very important assumptions.   As a result of them, I want to protect myself from bad news coming out of Europe  I don’t think we’re at the equivalent of late-March 2009 for Europe.  So I don’t want to bet against the prevailing sentiment and hold already severely beaten-down beneficiaries of the dissipation of storm clouds.  But–as with everything in the stock market–I could easily be wrong.  So I’ve got to keep these assumptions in the forefront of my mind.

Three cases:

–a professional equity investor with a US-style mandate from institutional clients to remain fully invested.  Here the portfolio composition is straightforward.

One choice is to “neutralize” the EU by looking exactly like the index and trying to achieve outperformance elsewhere.

That’s the conservative choice.  My personal preference would be to underweight Europe, avoid the banks and choose stocks that are listed in the EU but which have the largest part of their operations in other parts of the world.  I’d look for growth names and avoid companies that depend on a robust worldwide economy.

–an EU-based balanced (i.e., a portfolio of stocks +bonds) investor, maybe with predominantly high net worth individual clients.  This investor will have a strongly European focus.

He is probably being required by the rules set up in his contracts to sell stocks because his bond losses have made his equity allocation too big.  He’s probably also being bombarded by negative news–and by customer inquiries about whether his strategy (no matter what it is) is too aggressive.  So he’s feeling the need to become increasingly more defensive.

He is probably selling stocks in peripheral markets, especially if they have done well; selling smaller capitalization stocks to buy larger; selling growth names to buy defensives like utilities and consumer staples. He is probably heavily tilted toward large cap names in northern European markets.  He probably has raised some cash (this may give him emotional satisfaction, but won’t affect his returns unless he’s raised a huge amount).

I think much of the selling in places like Hong Kong, and even the US, is emanating from Europe, and from the kind of professionals I’ve just described.  I think such selling will prove to have been the wrong move, but I suspect that I would be doing some of the same if I were in the position of this investor.  Ideally, I’d have the same strategy here as in my first case.

The world may also have to wait for this guy to run out of stuff to sell before markets take on a healthier tone.

–you and me.  …or rather, what I’m thinking/doing now in my own portfoli0.

The sound bite form of my central case is, as I wrote above, that Europe is the new Japan. That’s probably too pessimistic, but it’s going in the right direction.  Once the market settles down, there’ll be the opportunity to pick stocks (I do own one individual stock in Europe now through an ADR–IHG).  But there’s no rush.  In the meantime, I’m content to watch from the sidelines.

My guess is that worries about contagion through greater exposure by US banks to Europe than we now know about–or that bank hedging won’t work at all–is wildly overblown.  But I’ve never been a fan of banks in any case–and I know very little about financials, so I’m happy to continue to avoid them.

I’ve begun to take some profits on big multi-year winners and reinvest the proceeds into semi-defensive stocks.  DeNA (2432:JP) and WYNN are examples of the former; INTC and (believe it or not) LVS are instances of the latter. Part of this is pure tactics, not strategy.  Part of this is that the slow growth emphasis I’ve had for a couple of years has worked too well for too long, so I should probably reduce my heavy emphasis.

These are only changes on the margin, however.  I still think that we’re in a slow-growth world where there isn’t enough demand to satisfy all the firms in a given industry.  This means the important distinctions to make are between best of breed vs. the rest, and between niche players that serve hot spots of demand vs. everybody else.

I think continuing troubles in Europe will offset the good news coming from the US economy, at least until the situation in Italy and Greece develops further.  Therefore, the overall environment hasn’t changed much, in my opinion, other than short-term volatility is increased.  And, unless there’s a very compelling counterargument, everything in Europe is now in the minus column.  But most of it was already there, anyway.

 

 

 

thinking out loud about Euroland (I)

recent trading

During this latest iteration of the Eurozone existential crisis, we’ve dropped from 1350 on the S&P 500.  We’ve visited 1074 and seen 1284, both within weeks of one another.  We now seem to be generally moving sideways, but bouncing between 1215 and 1270.

What is the market saying?  This trading pattern says to me that the market is highly emotional but no one has a clue to figuring out what’s going on in the Eurozone.

thoughts on Euroland

As a first step toward developing a (hopefully) intelligent stance to take toward the Eurozone in building an equity portfolio, I thought I’d try to list the points I feel confident about.  That may be enough for me to use;  at the very least, I may be able to highlight what other information I really need to know.

Here goes:

1.  Matters would be worse on Wall Street if the US economy weren’t recovering.  While not thrillingly optimistic, the view of Jim Paulsen, Wells Fargo’s chief investment strategist, is an interesting–and, to me, a completely plausible one.  He terms the current sluggish recovery as normal for the US in today’s world.  It only looks bad when we compare it with recoveries from thirty or forty years ago, when economic circumstances were very different.

2.  The Eurozone won’t be generating much economic strength for years, I think.  If so, as investors we should regard Europe as a special situations market and be very choosy about what stock we own.  If we take it as given that we don’t want much exposure, our biggest concern has to be that the economy there gets bad enough that it punches a hole in the bottom of the world’s economic boat.

Why do I think European prospects are dim?

–Japan hid the banking problems that resulted from its late-1908s speculative bubble for a decade.  Its economy stagnated during that time.

–The US fixed the worst damage to its banks almost immediately and the economy began to perk up 18 months later.

–Euroland?  So far, it has followed the Japanese example.  The result has been little growth and creation of the only negotiating chip places like Greece and Italy have.  Even if the EU recapitalized its banks tomorrow, we wouldn’t see the positive economic effects until 2013, at the earliest.

3.  Euroland’s investment importance comes from the accumulated wealth its citizens hold, not its size or growth prospects. 

How so?

Look at the Eurozone’s (small) size.

Using Purchasing Power Parity calculations from the World Bank (I got them on Wikipedia), global economies break out as follows:

Brazil, Russia, India, China         25% of the world

US, Canada, Mexico          23%

Eurozone          15%

rest of EU          5%

Japan          6%

everybody else          26%.

I draw two conclusions from this list:

–Euroland isn’t that big in world terms any more.  The fate of the “other” 85% is hugely more important than what happens in Europe.

–One possible outcome for the Eurozone is that it fades into insignificance in the way that Japan has during the past two decades.  I’m not sure this is the most likely outcome, but it’s a good possibility.  After all, the EU has many of the same cultural rigidities that have helped to sink Japan, and it hasn’t fixed its banking system.  Japan’s economic collapse didn’t stop the 1990s from being a very profitable decade for investors elsewhere.

4.  The worry isn’t a deep recession in Europe–it’s uncertainty about unanticipated consequences.  At least, I don’t think it should be about Eurozone recession.  According to the Conference Board, a US-based economic consultant, the world is likely to grow by about 3% in real terms (that is, after subtracting inflation) in 2012.  The agency thinks  the EU is most likely to grow by 1%;  its “pessimistic” scenario has the area little better than flat for the next half-decade.

What does Europe mean for overall world economic expansion, in the Conference Board’s view?  Realistically, nothing.  In the base scenario, the EU chips in .15% to world growth–more or less a rounding error.

Let’s assume that somehow the bottom falls out of Europe next year and the Eurozone has a horrible recession where output shrinks by 5% in real terms.  That would subtract .75% from world expansion.  The globe would still grow, but by 2%+ instead of 3%.

 

That’s it for today.  More on this topic tomorrow.

Macau market gambling results for October 2011

Last week, the Macau Gaming Inspection and coordination Bureau posted, as usual, the monthly total for the SAR’s gambling revenue.  At 26.8 billion patacas, the take was an all-time high–and a 42.3% year on year gain.  The figures for this year and last are as follows:

Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2011 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2011 2010 Variance 2011 2010 Variance
Jan 18,571 13,937 +33.2% 18,571 13,937 +33.2%
Feb 19,863 13,445 +47.7% 38,434 27,383 +40.4%
Mar 20,087 13,569 +48.0% 58,521 40,951 +42.9%
Apr 20,507 14,186 +44.6% 79,028 55,137 +43.3%
May 24,306 17,075 +42.4% 103,334 72,211 +43.1%
Jun 20,792 13,642 +52.4% 124,126 85,853 +44.6%
Jul 24,212 16,310 +48.4% 148,337 102,163 +45.2%
Aug 24,769 15,773 +57.0% 173,106 117,935 +46.8%
Sept 21,244 15,302 +38.8% 194,350 133,237 +45.9%
Oct 26,851 18,869 +42.3% 221,200 152,106 +45.4%

Interestingly, Hong Kong-based analysts didn’t take this as an unambiguously good result.  They point out that, although Golden Week in early October was a rip-roaring success this year, the year on year growth of the market for the month as a whole was the lowest since January.  That’s obviously correct.

They conclude from this that Macau’s wealthy Chinese customers are feeling the pinch of the mainland’s efforts to slow economic growth, and are gambling less as a result.  A corollary, not so clearly spelled out, is that casinos are posting gambling winnings as revenues today that will ultimately have to be written off as uncollectable receivables.  That may also be true, although the bond rating agency Fitch says there’s no evidence of any of this so far. Fitch, in fact, estimates that the Macau gambling market will grow by at least 20% next year, double the rate that the more pessimistic analysts are calling for.

One notable feature of recent months’ results is the market share shift toward the companies with newer casinos, located in Cotai.  This suggests there’s gambling space in other, older casinos that is going unused.  There are any number of explanations for why this may be happening, like transportation bottlenecks that prevent visitors from reaching Macau, or casinos turn away “iffier” credits.  But it’s also possible that we’re reached a phase of market maturity where simply getting to Macau and gambling anywhere isn’t enough.  Some gamblers may be choosing not to go to Macau unless they get a minimum level of service.

If so, we should expect a more sedate rate of growth than the 45% or so we’re experiencing now.  But the more important investment issue may well be to separate winners from losers.  That’s certainly been the case so far in 2011, as Galaxy and China Sands have left other casinos in the dust–especially SJM and MGM.

 

the 10th Bain luxury goods study, October 2011(II): trends

Yesterday, I wrote about prospects for the luxury goods industry this year.  Today’s post is about trends in the business.

areas of current strength

Bain’s estimates current growth prospects by category as follows:

hard luxury (jewelry, watches)     +18%

accessories          +13%

luxury goods in general     +10%

apparel          +8%

perfume/cosmetics          +3%

art de la table          +3%

cyclical forces…

As you’d expect, more expensive items, those sold through wholesalers (who stop buying, period, in recession and turn all their efforts into converting their existing inventory into cash) and those with a large percentage of aspirational buyers all fare the worst in an economic downturn.  Luxury watches are the prime example.  Anything sold through department stores might also qualify.

Men’s apparel is also highly cyclical.  For whatever reason, women continue to buy luxury goods during a downturn.  True, they may trade down a bit and space their purchase farther apart.  But men tend to stop dead in their tracks.  One reason is that big traditional men’s categories like business suits and formal wear are expensive and easily postponable purchases.  Another is that women control the purse strings in most households around the world.

So it’s no surprise that this year watches, expensive jewelry and men’s apparel are all doing extremely well.

Maybe the unusual strength of luxury goods indicates there’s some pent-up demand being met.  In any event, luxury buyers are clearly signalling with their wallets that, for them,  the economic downturn is a thing of the past.

…and secular

who

The traditional picture of a luxury goods buyer is: female, older, from either Europe or Japan.

That’s changing.  Increasingly, customers are younger, more casual,  and male.  These may be trends in many geographies.  However, the main reason theses attributes are appearing on the radar screen is that they describe the Chinese luxury goods consumer.  At 20% of the market, Chinese buying is already very big, and it’s growing very quickly as well.

where

For at least the past decade, makers of luxury goods have been upping their own retail presence.  They are doing this so they can capture the wholesale-to-retail markup.  It also gives them greater control over their brand image and their inventories.

Nevertheless, the luxury goods industry is still predominantly wholesale.  But Bain thinks that the percentage of industry sales through wholesale channels will have shrunk in 2011 to 72% of the total from 75% just two years ago.  This comes despite the business cycle strength of department stores.

online

Internet sales comprise only 3% of total luxury sales at present.  But the category is expanding very rapidly.  Bain thinks online sales will be up by 25% this year, to €5.6 billion.

Online has two segments:  full price and off-price.

Full price is is growing faster than overall luxury sales and comprises about two-thirds of all internet business.  But it’s being left in the dust by off-price, which is one-third today but which amounted to only 20% of online sales four years ago.  Private “flash” sales are the fastest growing part of off-price.

outlets

Off-price non-internet sales amount to about €10 billion, or 5% of the overall luxury market.

Outlet sales grew by 22% last year.  Bain projects them to expand by another 13% in 2011.  That’s faster than the overall luxury goods market, despite the return to health of the full-price market and the consequently smaller amount of unsold merchandise sloshing around in the system.  (Although Bain doesn’t talk about it, part of the answer to this apparent contradiction is that luxury goods companies also produce low-end “outlet only” merchandise.)

This isn’t news.  Outlets are a long-standing, mature channel in the US and Europe.

What is noteworthy is the rapid growth–around a +30% clip–that’s just starting in off-price sales in Asia and Latin America.

brand proliferation, company consolidation

Over the past ten years, the market share of the top five luxury brands has shrunk from 26% of the market to 21%.  In contrast, the share of the top five luxury goods companies has risen from 30% to 35%.

To me, this means market power is shifting from the owners of iconic individual brands to companies that are sophisticated enough provide a common platform–supply chain, support for in-house retail, dealing with consumer preferences in many different geographies–on which a group of disparate brands can operate in an increasingly complex global environment.

More and more, these technology and management factors will be the keys to success.  This also implies that these factors will increasingly be the selling points used to convince acquisition targets to join a luxury conglomerate.  The recent sale of Bulgari to LVMH is a case in point.

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