death of Kim Jong-il: investment implications

North Korean media announced overnight that its “Supreme Leader,” Kim Jong-il, had died at age 70.  He will be succeeded by his third son, Kim Jong-un, a twenty-something with little experience and limited visibility, even in North Korea.

Asian stock markets sold off on the news.  That was on the worry, I think, that the North Korean government would stage a military provocation to “demonstrate” Kim Jong-il’s leadership ability–as it did when he was being introduced as heir.

investment implications

Other than in national intelligence agencies (which don’t share their information), the outside world knows very little about North Korea.  It’s an unruly client state of China, formed artificially at the end of the Korean War–separation along social and cultural lines would have been east vs. west.  It’s very poor.  It has big armed forces, but little industry.  It has nuclear weapons–and missiles capable of delivering them at least as far as Tokyo.

I think the most likely outcome from the leadership transition–temporary saber-rattling aside–is continuation of the status quo.

It is possible, however, that the absence of a dictator fully in control of the country will prompt a push in North Korea for reunification with South Korea.  This is something that both sides have talked about, off and on, for twenty years.  And there would be some pressure in the South for reuniting communities that have been apart for half a century.  Having seen the decade of economic stagnation that followed the reunification of the former East and West Germanies, however, I think Seoul would regard this as at best a mixed blessing, or as the best of a number of unfavorable choices.

This is the only outcome from Kim Jong-il’s death that I can see as having major investment implications.

I’ve always found South Korea a difficult place to invest in.  Lots of local quirks, including sprawling family-owned conglomerates (chaebols) with opaque operating procedures, and unpredictable (to me, anyway) intrusions of government into company operations.  So I’ve only occasionally owned companies like Samsung Electronics or Hyundai Motor, despite the excellence of their products.

I don’t think reunification would change government or corporate behavior at all.  Nevertheless, it would likely spawn enormous construction projects in the North, as well as the shifting of labor-intensive industrial production away from the South and the expansion of low-end Southern retail concepts there.  These moves could generate huge profits for the companies involved and would last a long time.

This prospect would most likely merit making the research effort to identify the beneficiaries.  In fact, the economic positives of reconstruction would probably be so powerful that a less-than-level playing field for foreigners might not matter that much.

 

Coach’s new Hong Kong Depository Receipts

Hong Kong Depository Receipts (HDRs)

I didn’t know until I was reading the Wall Street Journal this morning that Hong Kong had depository receipts (DRs).  But COH just issued one.

Sure enough, checking with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website, HDRs have been permitted in that market since mid-2008.  Not many takers so far, however.  The HKSE lists Vale, the Brazilian iron ore company, with two HDRs; SBI, a Japanese internet-based financial, has one.  And now there’s COH (6388 is the Hong Kong ticker symbol).

what they are

The basic idea behind a DR is to provide a simple way for a domestic investor to buy a foreign stock without having to set up a brokerage account in the foreign country or to deal with foreign exchange, either in buying and selling or in receiving dividends.

The buyer doesn’t actually get a share of stock, however.  Instead, he gets an IOU (the receipt) from some financial entity, usually a bank, that holds the real shares in a depository account.  The bank handles all the necessary administrative details, like foreign exchange and the sometimes messy business of meeting the foreign country’s securities and tax regulations.

ADRs

The company whose stock underlies the DR may use the DR issuance to raise capital in a new market, where investors may well pay a higher multiple for shares than would be possible in the home market.  In the biggest DR market, the US, I’ve found this often the case–and regard it as a bad sign.  In my experience, seeing a mature company launch an ADR means it has lost its allure for more knowledgeable home market investors.  (Another important factor in ADR issuance in particular is that it circumvents the more stringent disclosure and reporting requirements that the SEC has for US-based companies.)

In the COH case, however, the firm has not created 6388 to raise new funds–after all, operations are generating $1 billion in annual net cash.  It has created a DR to raise its public profile in Greater China.

their Achilles heel

The bane of DRs, in my opinion, is low trading volume and potentially Grand Canyon-wide bid-asked spreads.  I’ve found the problem especially acute in cases, like this one, where the operating hours of the home and DR exchanges don’t overlap.  According to the HKSE website, trading in 6388 over the past five days has only totaled about US$11,000.  The bid-asked spread shown is about 2% (my experience in the US is that the spread for a stock like this could be more like 10%).  December is usually a dreary month for investors, so January will probably give a better read on volume.

worth watching

Nevertheless, COH has probably gotten more publicity in China through the HDR listing than it would have been able to buy with the money it spent to create its HDR.  The phenomenon itself it worth watching, as well.   Two reasons:

–we may ultimately reach a tipping point where having a HDR acquires a cachet that exerts a positive influence on the home market security price, and

–pioneers like COH may have a leg up on obtaining an eventual listing on a mainland exchange.

China: infrastructure spending will boost Western growth. We’ll help.

CIC investing in Western infrastructure

Today’s ft.com contains a commentary from Lou Jiwei, chairman of the mainland sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation.  In it, Mr. Lou argues that global economic recovery can’t come from developing countries alone.  Developed nations must expand as well.  To help this latter effort along, the CIC is preparing to participate in Western infrastructure projects as  “investor, developer, operator and contractor.”  Projects could be in “energy, water, transport, digital communication, waste disposal…”  The CIC’s first stop will be the UK.

In a companion article, the FT says that a proposed high-speed rail line between London and northern England has caught China’s eye.

Why?

Why do this?  …and why the UK, of all places?  After all, it isn’t that long ago that China was demonizing the UK for invading China in the mid-eighteenth century to force the mainland to accept opium imports from British colony, India.

I can see several reasons for the CIC proposal, aside from the salutory effect infrastructure spending may have on Western economies:

–infrastructure projects can provide higher returns for China’s massive foreign currency holdings than government bonds will.  China is such a super-size investor that liquidity may not be that different,

–successful infrastructure upgrades can buy public goodwill and political influence,

–reversal of the “normal” flow of equity investment funds from developed to developing is a sign of China’s increasing importance in the world economy,

–Chinese industrial and service companies may have a greater chance to win contracts for such projects than they might otherwise,

–the UK is small enough that Chinese spending can have a significant, highly visible impact,

–the UK may be a showpiece.  It could provide entrée into the Eurozone and ultimately to the US,

–the UK is apparently willing to accept Chinese money and not raise spurious “national security” objections to prevent mainland investment.

investment considerations

CIC-backed projects could provide a mild–mostly psychological–boost to the UK.  It’s possible that private investors may be allowed to invest side-by-side with the CIC, as well.

Better transport… alternatives could take business away from direct competitors.  Better rail links, for example, might be bad for commuter airlines or for delivery trucks.

On the other hand, better overall infrastructure support could lure industrial or service businesses from elsewhere in the EU.

So far, however, we don’t have enough information to act on.

thinking out loud about Euroland (III)

It’s possible that we’ll see prolonged economic and political stagnation in Europe of the type we’ve experienced in Japan since 1990 as the continent tries to decide whether the EU project will survive.

My conclusion, based on the prior two posts on this topic, is that–like Japan–Europe by itself is too small in the global terms for its problems to derail economic progress elsewhere.  Market volatility, yes; global recession, no.

In a nutshell, that’s my base case.

 

Nevertheless, even an investor who is not directly involved in Europe nor compelled by customer mandate to invest there faces two issues:

–the fact of continuing European selling of equities, both in Europe and abroad, as EU investors rebalance their portfolios and make themselves more liquid in response to developments there, and

–the possibility that the European financial situation is much more dire than we now suspect and/or the global banking system will transmit part of that damage to the rest of the world.

what to do?

I’m writing under the assumption that we’re not yet anywhere near either the end of the EU crisis, even though it has been dragging on for more than a year.  Nor am I willing to bet that we’re at or near the low point in stock market terms.

These are very important assumptions.   As a result of them, I want to protect myself from bad news coming out of Europe  I don’t think we’re at the equivalent of late-March 2009 for Europe.  So I don’t want to bet against the prevailing sentiment and hold already severely beaten-down beneficiaries of the dissipation of storm clouds.  But–as with everything in the stock market–I could easily be wrong.  So I’ve got to keep these assumptions in the forefront of my mind.

Three cases:

–a professional equity investor with a US-style mandate from institutional clients to remain fully invested.  Here the portfolio composition is straightforward.

One choice is to “neutralize” the EU by looking exactly like the index and trying to achieve outperformance elsewhere.

That’s the conservative choice.  My personal preference would be to underweight Europe, avoid the banks and choose stocks that are listed in the EU but which have the largest part of their operations in other parts of the world.  I’d look for growth names and avoid companies that depend on a robust worldwide economy.

–an EU-based balanced (i.e., a portfolio of stocks +bonds) investor, maybe with predominantly high net worth individual clients.  This investor will have a strongly European focus.

He is probably being required by the rules set up in his contracts to sell stocks because his bond losses have made his equity allocation too big.  He’s probably also being bombarded by negative news–and by customer inquiries about whether his strategy (no matter what it is) is too aggressive.  So he’s feeling the need to become increasingly more defensive.

He is probably selling stocks in peripheral markets, especially if they have done well; selling smaller capitalization stocks to buy larger; selling growth names to buy defensives like utilities and consumer staples. He is probably heavily tilted toward large cap names in northern European markets.  He probably has raised some cash (this may give him emotional satisfaction, but won’t affect his returns unless he’s raised a huge amount).

I think much of the selling in places like Hong Kong, and even the US, is emanating from Europe, and from the kind of professionals I’ve just described.  I think such selling will prove to have been the wrong move, but I suspect that I would be doing some of the same if I were in the position of this investor.  Ideally, I’d have the same strategy here as in my first case.

The world may also have to wait for this guy to run out of stuff to sell before markets take on a healthier tone.

–you and me.  …or rather, what I’m thinking/doing now in my own portfoli0.

The sound bite form of my central case is, as I wrote above, that Europe is the new Japan. That’s probably too pessimistic, but it’s going in the right direction.  Once the market settles down, there’ll be the opportunity to pick stocks (I do own one individual stock in Europe now through an ADR–IHG).  But there’s no rush.  In the meantime, I’m content to watch from the sidelines.

My guess is that worries about contagion through greater exposure by US banks to Europe than we now know about–or that bank hedging won’t work at all–is wildly overblown.  But I’ve never been a fan of banks in any case–and I know very little about financials, so I’m happy to continue to avoid them.

I’ve begun to take some profits on big multi-year winners and reinvest the proceeds into semi-defensive stocks.  DeNA (2432:JP) and WYNN are examples of the former; INTC and (believe it or not) LVS are instances of the latter. Part of this is pure tactics, not strategy.  Part of this is that the slow growth emphasis I’ve had for a couple of years has worked too well for too long, so I should probably reduce my heavy emphasis.

These are only changes on the margin, however.  I still think that we’re in a slow-growth world where there isn’t enough demand to satisfy all the firms in a given industry.  This means the important distinctions to make are between best of breed vs. the rest, and between niche players that serve hot spots of demand vs. everybody else.

I think continuing troubles in Europe will offset the good news coming from the US economy, at least until the situation in Italy and Greece develops further.  Therefore, the overall environment hasn’t changed much, in my opinion, other than short-term volatility is increased.  And, unless there’s a very compelling counterargument, everything in Europe is now in the minus column.  But most of it was already there, anyway.

 

 

 

thinking out loud about Euroland (I)

recent trading

During this latest iteration of the Eurozone existential crisis, we’ve dropped from 1350 on the S&P 500.  We’ve visited 1074 and seen 1284, both within weeks of one another.  We now seem to be generally moving sideways, but bouncing between 1215 and 1270.

What is the market saying?  This trading pattern says to me that the market is highly emotional but no one has a clue to figuring out what’s going on in the Eurozone.

thoughts on Euroland

As a first step toward developing a (hopefully) intelligent stance to take toward the Eurozone in building an equity portfolio, I thought I’d try to list the points I feel confident about.  That may be enough for me to use;  at the very least, I may be able to highlight what other information I really need to know.

Here goes:

1.  Matters would be worse on Wall Street if the US economy weren’t recovering.  While not thrillingly optimistic, the view of Jim Paulsen, Wells Fargo’s chief investment strategist, is an interesting–and, to me, a completely plausible one.  He terms the current sluggish recovery as normal for the US in today’s world.  It only looks bad when we compare it with recoveries from thirty or forty years ago, when economic circumstances were very different.

2.  The Eurozone won’t be generating much economic strength for years, I think.  If so, as investors we should regard Europe as a special situations market and be very choosy about what stock we own.  If we take it as given that we don’t want much exposure, our biggest concern has to be that the economy there gets bad enough that it punches a hole in the bottom of the world’s economic boat.

Why do I think European prospects are dim?

–Japan hid the banking problems that resulted from its late-1908s speculative bubble for a decade.  Its economy stagnated during that time.

–The US fixed the worst damage to its banks almost immediately and the economy began to perk up 18 months later.

–Euroland?  So far, it has followed the Japanese example.  The result has been little growth and creation of the only negotiating chip places like Greece and Italy have.  Even if the EU recapitalized its banks tomorrow, we wouldn’t see the positive economic effects until 2013, at the earliest.

3.  Euroland’s investment importance comes from the accumulated wealth its citizens hold, not its size or growth prospects. 

How so?

Look at the Eurozone’s (small) size.

Using Purchasing Power Parity calculations from the World Bank (I got them on Wikipedia), global economies break out as follows:

Brazil, Russia, India, China         25% of the world

US, Canada, Mexico          23%

Eurozone          15%

rest of EU          5%

Japan          6%

everybody else          26%.

I draw two conclusions from this list:

–Euroland isn’t that big in world terms any more.  The fate of the “other” 85% is hugely more important than what happens in Europe.

–One possible outcome for the Eurozone is that it fades into insignificance in the way that Japan has during the past two decades.  I’m not sure this is the most likely outcome, but it’s a good possibility.  After all, the EU has many of the same cultural rigidities that have helped to sink Japan, and it hasn’t fixed its banking system.  Japan’s economic collapse didn’t stop the 1990s from being a very profitable decade for investors elsewhere.

4.  The worry isn’t a deep recession in Europe–it’s uncertainty about unanticipated consequences.  At least, I don’t think it should be about Eurozone recession.  According to the Conference Board, a US-based economic consultant, the world is likely to grow by about 3% in real terms (that is, after subtracting inflation) in 2012.  The agency thinks  the EU is most likely to grow by 1%;  its “pessimistic” scenario has the area little better than flat for the next half-decade.

What does Europe mean for overall world economic expansion, in the Conference Board’s view?  Realistically, nothing.  In the base scenario, the EU chips in .15% to world growth–more or less a rounding error.

Let’s assume that somehow the bottom falls out of Europe next year and the Eurozone has a horrible recession where output shrinks by 5% in real terms.  That would subtract .75% from world expansion.  The globe would still grow, but by 2%+ instead of 3%.

 

That’s it for today.  More on this topic tomorrow.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 97 other followers