Archive for the 'Getting financial advice' Category

Recent Investment Company Institute statistics: what they show

Yesterday I wrote about the mutual fund cash position data that the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the mutual fund trade association, provides on its website.  Today’s post is about the general market situation that the overall ICI data portray.

A continuing (and mistaken, I think) quest for safety

The data show very clearly the effects of the market downturn, and the differing impacts of the financial crisis on stocks and bonds.  They demonstrate that fund holders are very focused (closing the barn door long after the livestock have escaped, in my opinion) on preserving the value of their capital rather than thinking about enhancing their wealth or achieving capital gains.

Stock funds

Investors began to take money out of stock funds in June 2008 and continued to do so every month–except for January 2009–through the bottom of the market in March of last year.  Redemptions were the largest in September-October 2008.  Aside from those two months, the heaviest withdrawals occurred at the absolute bottom in February-March 2009.  This, unfortunately, is the usual pattern for many individuals: in at the top, out at the bottom.

Five months of net inflows followed, almost replacing the dollar amount taken out in February-March.  Since then, the pattern has been one of mild redemptions, again excepting January, a month when many retirement plans make significant contributions.

domestic vs. foreign

Since the market turn, the pattern of money flows has been very different for domestic and foreign stock funds.  Foreign funds have had ten straight months of money inflow (February looks to be #11, but final data aren’t in as I write this).  US-only funds, on the other hand, had inflows through July but have seen pretty steady redemptions since then.

Bond funds

The bond fund story makes much better reading, for fund management companies at least.  Bond funds, too, had redemptions in 2008.  But they lasted only four months, from September through December.  Only one of them, October, saw large outflows.  And even during this month, outflows were far less than withdrawals from stocks.

Since then, bond funds, both taxable and municipal, have enjoyed large inflows every month.

The dynamics of stock fund flows

ICI also provides information on the gross movements of money in and out of stock fund, in addition to the net data I’ve written about above (similar data aren’t available for bond funds, though.).

This under-the-hood look shows that the stock fund situation is more complex than the net data suggest.

In December 2009, for example, stock funds had net outflows of $3.5 billion.  But this was comprised of $95.6 billion of inflows and $97.9 billion of outflows.  There were also $13 billion of exchanges into stock funds from other types of investments under the umbrella of the same mutual fund organization, and $14.1 billion of exchanges out.

My take on what’s happening

There aren’t enough data from the ICI to have a lot of confidence in any interpretation.  We know three things for certain, however:

–there’s a substantial shift by investors away from domestic-oriented stock funds toward foreign or global (US + foreign) funds,

–there’s also a shift going on away from mutual funds toward ETFs,  and

–there’s immense churn by investors of their stock mutual fund assets.  At the moment, stock fund gross redemptions are running at a yearly rate of about a quarter of the total assets.  That’s about twice the rate I would regard as normal.

Why is that?

I think we’re going through a period of major disillusionment with mutual funds and mutual fund companies.  This may be an event parallel to what happened after the crash of the stock market in October 1987, after which investors made a substantial shift in preference away from individual stocks and toward mutual funds.

What prompted this was that in the aftermath of the decline, NYSE “specialists” (that is, monopoly market makers) seemingly abandoned their obligation to promote market liquidity and started making much less attractive bid-asked spreads.  Individuals placing market orders would receive executions that could easily be 5% away—invariably in an unfavorable direction–from the last trade they saw before placing the order.  People blamed their brokers for these trading losses.  I think the resulting atmosphere of distrust triggered a decades-long shift away from investing in broker-recommended individual stocks–and toward mutual funds.  Of course, there were other reasons along the way–high fees, poor service, conflicts of interest–but I think the essential break came after Black Monday.

Today’s disillusionment is a bit more benign–not that mutual funds and mutual fund advisors aimed to do harm, but that they didn’t make money for their clients, or protect them from losses, like they were supposed to.  This realization is at least partly behind the high level of redemptions and the shift to ETFs.

I also think Baby Boomers are just starting to come to grips with the fact that they haven’t been paying much attention to their retirement planning.  The recent market decline has brought home to Boomers the fact, unlike our parents, we do not have the support of defined benefit retirement plans, so what our 401ks and IRAs earn really count for a lot.

We have not only taken on the risk of funding our own retirements, but are also responsible for how our retirement assets are invested.  Few of us know the first thing about what to do.  All we as a demographic have figured out so far is that we don’t want the status quo.  So we’re changing what we own.

That’s not much of a strategy.  The next step is to take responsibility for your own investment outcomes and start educating yourself about stocks and bonds.  In other words, I guess, read my blog.

2.  A more technical note:  I’ve been hired a couple of times to turn around mutual funds that have had substantial periods of underperformance.  One of the major things I’ve learned from these experiences is that when investors in a stock fund are deeply under water, they are so traumatized by the experience that they invariably redeem their shares.

Some do so quickly, to make use of the resulting tax loss, and reinvest in similar assets.  Most, however, will hold on doggedly until they return to breakeven.  Then they’re gone forever.  Yes, this latter behavior makes no economic or financial sense.  But it’s what people do.   And that’s what I suspect is also partly behind the churn in stock mutual fund purchases and sales—a 70% rise in stocks over the past twelve months has brought investors who bought in 2004 or 2005 back to breakeven and they’re cashing in their chips.  Where are they going?  if the aggregate numbers are a good guide, to bond funds–a move whose logic escapes me.

Mutual fund cash levels: what they mean

The Investment Company Institute, the trade association for mutual fund management companies, just issued a periodic report on mutual fund inflow and outflows.  Among other things, it shows that the percentage of cash held by equity fund managers–with both international and US-only mandates–dropped over the past year from 5.7% to 3.6%.  This is a shrinkage in dollar terms from $210 billion to $173 billion, despite a rise in overall assets during the twelve months.

Bloomberg, citing Wall Street strategists, says this is a bad thing.  Why?  In their view, it’s because a low cash percentage signals an impending market decline.  Noting this, investors stop aggressively buying stocks.  Huh?

I don’t think this is right, for several reasons. Continue reading ‘Mutual fund cash levels: what they mean’

I’ve just updated Odds and Ends

Here’s the link–or you can just click the tab at the top of the page.

Do senior citizens make bad investors?

A soon to be published study of age-related investor behavior

A forthcoming article in the Review of Economics and Statistics by Alok Kumar of the University of Texas at Austin and George Komiotis of the Federal Reserve says older investors are indeed bad.  According to Kumar and Komiotis, a sharp, progressive deterioration of cognitive abilities that begins for most people around the age of 70 overwhelms the positive effects of superior experience.  The result is ever worsening active management performance.There’s a summary of the article, with useful investment tips, in this past weekend’s Wall Street Journal.

The research has actually been around for a while, and was also written up in the New York Times in 2005.

Aging is an issue

I think that aging is a real issue for investors, although not for the reason–age, per se–that the authors cite.

As we age, we become more susceptible to physical and mental diseases that absorb our time and energy, reducing our ability to concentrate on investments.

But also I  think we all underestimate the intense socialization inherent in modern work, especially white collar jobs.  When we retire, it’s like we’re professional athletes who have just broken ties with the team.  No more three hours a day of physical training, no three hours of practice.   No more big games, teammate pressure to perform, no mental training–concentration, visualization.

The intense atmosphere that we’ve become accustomed to and don’t consciously perceive is gone.  Some of us decide we’d prefer going fishing to continuing to train our brains.  And without the social atmosphere and the associated competition, it’s hard to reach the peak performance we achieved easily before.  In what seems the blink of an eye, we’re like the retired athlete who’s no longer a greyhound, but has gained 50 pounds of unsightly flab.

I’ll come back to this later, but first to the study.

How the study worked

The researchers got a discount broker to give them access to data for 62, 387 customers over six years, from 1991-1996.  They looked only at common stocks and common stock trading.

The average account had 4 stocks in it, with a combined value of $35,629.  The median account had 3 stocks in it, worth $13,869.

The study used zip code data to estimate income, education and ethnicity.  Average income, which didn’t vary much across age groups below 60 was $90,782.  Mean wealth was $268,909.  Therefore, the portfolios studied represented about a third of yearly income and 13% of estimated wealth.

About 27% of the accounts were of California residents.  The study looked at both total and ex-California results, which showed no differences.

The conclusions:

–no one beat the S&P 500

–relative performance by age group rose steadily from twenty-somethings to peak with people in their mid 40s.  Performance began a decline that really accelerated after 70.

–High income, better educated clients did better than average.  Low income, less educated and minority group clients did worse.

Where I think the study goes wrong

1.   A quibble. In any endeavor like this, you study the characteristics of a small group that you then argue is representative of the population as a whole.  In this case, the argument is that the traits of clients of the unnamed discount broker are indicative of investors throughout the US.  We already have reason to suspect that this isn’t true here, since California makes up 12% of the US population but 27% of the accounts studied.

2.  The dollar amount of stocks studied is very small.  More important, although the study’s authors argue that the stocks in question don’t represent “play money” or afterthoughts to the account holders, they have no way, other than information from account applications and zip codes, to determine this.

For younger investors, their main source of wealth is most likely their human capital, that is, their professional skills and educational investment in themselves.  Older investors will likely own real estate, pensions, IRAs or 401Ks or stock (or some other ownership interest) in the company where they work.  I don;t think this has ben factored into the wealth estimates.

3.  Financial information in a client’s initial brokerage application can be seriously out of date. Also, the wealth and income data can be seriously understated.  As any financial advisor will tell you, clients can be very reticent about revealing the true extent of their wealth, for fear they will be pressured to shift assets from elsewhere to the broker in question.

4.  I don’t think conventional risk adjustments address the situation of the older investor.  At some point, an investor’s goal changes from trying to accumulate more wealth to trying to preserve the wealth he has.  Beating the S&P 500 goes out the window and preserving income walks in the front door.

In addition, the more cautious attitude an older investor may have will likely be reinforced if he has a financial advisor.  Besides the client’s financial health, the advisor also has to consider the possibility that he may be sued by the client’s heirs if the investments have gone down in value.  Remember, customers of traditional brokers often have discount brokerage accounts as well, where they do trading based on the “full service” broker’s advice.  Why?  …to avoid the high fees the latter charges, and that the client thinks are out of line with the value of the advice received.

In other words, underperformance vs. the market may be a function of increased risk aversion, not cognitive decline.

What I think is important

I usually don’t like newspaper articles about investing, but I thought the Wall Street Journal one was pretty good.

1.  Simplify your investments, so that you are able monitor them in the time you are willing to devote to this.

2.  Have a backup plan for if you become sick or otherwise unable to spend time on investing–in other words, how do you get from where you are now to total indexing.

3.  Have records that allow you, or some one else, to determine things like cost basis.  Be especially careful if you have (as many people do) brokerage accounts you’ve closed but which contain cost data for stocks you’ve transferred elsewhere.  If you hold actual physical stock certificates, make sure that you have a separate list of what you own, in case the certificates become lost or damaged.


State Street’s Limited Duration Bond Fund: an ironic name for a cascade of poor judgments

The demise of hedge fund investment pools

I’ve been watching the demise of hedge funds over the past few years with what one might call a morbid mix of horror and fascination at the potent mix of marketing savvy, personal arrogance, snake oil and stunning technical incompetence the principals involved have displayed.

…and then there’s State Street

The case of State Street and its Limited Duration Bond Fund is an odd one.   The fund was sold as the equivalent of a money market fund, but ended up making speculative investments (which it misled investors about) using large amounts of leverage. It lost 80% of its value in the last twelve months it was in operation.

State Street recently settled SEC and State of Massachusetts charges by paying fines and reimbursing investors.

It’s rare in today’s world to see a large company, particularly one that projects an image of all-American values and stodgy reliability, to show itself to have no internal moral/ethical compass–nor, it would seem, either a compliance department or any deep knowledge of securities laws.  Also, no one seems to care.

The New York Times article

I first read about State Street’s settlement with the SEC and the state of Massachusetts in an article in the New York Times, titled “State Street Gave Some of Its Clients Better Data.” Huh?  Maybe its reporter/reader fatigue.  Maybe the blowup of a sub-prime mortgage investment pool isn’t news any more.  Maybe a disaster has to be big enough to bankrupt a company–which this wasn’t–to get any attention.

I find three things surprising:

–top management either had no clue about what was going on in the investment management business, or turned a blind eye;

–no one involved in the affair–no portfolio managers, compliance people, supervisors, marketers…stood up at any point and said “What we’re doing is wrong.” (you’ll see what I mean if you read the details below); and

–State Street got a slap on the wrist, and nothing more, from the regulators.

Here’s the story:

..or at least my summary version of it.  (You can get the full details from the State of Massachusetts consent order or the SEC “cease and desist” order.)

1. In 2002 State Street began offering the Limited Duration Bond Fund to institutional investors as an “enhanced cash fund.”  The marketing pitch was that it had all the safety of a money market fund, but with higher returns.  It could do this because it was investing in short-term asset-backed securities and some derivative instruments.  The fund might have some day-to-day volatility.  But it would remain widely diversified, more so than the typical money market fund, would restrict itself to high-quality credits and would use only “modest” leverage, if any, to achieve its goals.

(The idea of a “free lunch” is probably as old as investing itself.  People love it.  Invariably, I think, the investment strategy is based on a market anomaly that gradually disappears.  Then the concept blows up.)

As time passed, the fund increased its exposure to sub-prime mortgages, apparently figuring this was the only way it could generate yield. By the end of 2006, sub-prime had become the majority of the fund’s investments.

Shareholders, however, continued to be informed that the fund was widely diversified and involved only with high-quality credits.

(Where were the compliance people, the internal regulators who are supposed to make sure something like this can’t happen?  How could any responsible person sign the letters to shareholders?)

2. In 2005, State Street changed the way it disclosed portfolio contents to clients.  Previously it had shown the amount of leverage employed by having the portfolio contents add up to a number higher than 100%.  So if the portfolio was 115% invested, for example, that would mean that its market exposure was equal to 115% of the assets under management.  The extra 15% would be achieved through option-like derivatives.

From that point on, however, it showed the funds weightings only as a percent of the total market exposure, without reporting the amount of leverage in the fund.  All investors saw was market exposures adding to 100%.

According to the SEC, by 2007 the fund was no longer using “modest” leverage.  Routinely, 150%+ of assets were invested in sub-prime mortgages.  The new reporting format meant investors couldn’t see this change.

(Compliance?  Management?  who doesn’t see the red flag? could the change to less disclosure have merely been a coincidence?)

3. At some point, State Street decided to allow other internal finds to invest up to 25% of their assets in Limited Duration.  Through contact with the common trading room, membership on the firm’s investment committee and special detailed in-house reports not made available to outside clients, these internal customers learned the true situation with Limited Duration.  As a result, a number withdrew their funds during the summer of 2007.

State Street did not tell outsiders that insiders were selling.   Instead, it continued to assure them that nothing was wrong.  At no time, however, did it reveal the extent of the fund’s sub-prime holdings or its high leverage.  In fact, some external client contact agents told regulators that they were unaware there was any sub-prime exposure.

In one case where an external client withdrew money and then sued, State Street blamed the client for creating the losses by panicking out of the fund at the wrong time!

(Being a fiduciary means taking care of your client before you take care of yourself.  New concept for State Street.)

4. To add insult to injury, when State Street withdrew its internal money, Limited Duration portfolio managers used the most liquid securities to pay them–leaving the least liquid assets for the trusting outside customers.

(Maybe they had no choice, although the SEC says the investment committee discussed how to raise cash to meet anticipated redemptions.  Normally, a portfolio manager works first on selling the least attractive, less liquid assets.  This is partly because selling may take longer, but it’s mostly to avoid the outcome of being stuck with only unsaleable assets in the portfolio.)

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