Archive for the 'How your broker gets paid' Category

Bill Miller and the Legg Mason Capital Management Value Trust mutual fund

Last week, Bill Miller of Legg Mason announced that he is stepping down as portfolio manager of that firm’s Capital Management Value Trust fund after 20+ years at the helm.

Mr. Miller was once the envy of equity portfolio managers everywhere for the fame and fortune his beating the S&P 500 for 15 years in a row brought hi.  In recent times, he has become the embodiment of very pm’s worst nightmares, however.

His previously hot hand–which had earned him designation by Morningstar as a “Manager of the Decade” turned icy-cold in 2006.  Ensuing weak performance erased the gains in relative performance his portfolio had made since “the streak” began in 1991.  The assets in his fund fell by almost 90% from the peak of $21 billion +.

my thoughts

I should say at the outset that I don’t know Mr. Miller and that I haven’t studied his portfolio composition carefully.  And I’m not interested enough to look up his past SEC filings to try to document my impressions.  With that warning, here’s what I think:

1.  It took Legg Mason a very long time–and the loss of the vast majority of Value Trust’s assets–before it made the change.  At the asset peak, the fund was generating management fees for LM at a $140 million annual clip.  It’s now generating under $20 million.

Why not act sooner?

Part of the reason is likely that after sagging in 2006-2008, the Value Trust outperformed in 2009.  More important, I think, is that the fund’s marketing has been all about “the streak” and the extraordinary investing prowess of Mr. Miller.   It’s a good story and an easy sell.  But it’s a risky strategy.  If it’s all about the numbers, and someone with even better results comes around–and invariably someone will–what do you do? You’ve already made the argument to your client to switch into the Value Trust because of the numbers; how can you now argue against numbers that tell him to switch out?

This selling direction also gives the manager himself a huge amount of power.  What’s the Bill Miller show without Bill Miller?  So if Mr. Miller wants to continue to run a concentrated portfolio with a strong emphasis on financials, despite steady underperformance, how do you stop him not to?

2.  I’ve never regarded Mr. Miller as a typical value investor, although he’s always described as one and the Value Trust (note the name) is classified with other value vehicles by rating services.  I have two reasons:

–Value investors are belt-and-suspenders kind of guys.  They run highly diversified portfolios, typically with 100-200 names–sometimes more.  Growth investors, in contrast, typically hold 50-60.  Looking up the Capital Management Value Trust on Google Finance told me it has only 46 names. (By the way, in my experience ratings services never pick up high concentration as a source of risk.)

–Both value and growth investors look for “undervalued” securities (only shortsellers want to find overvalued stocks).  That isn’t what the “value” in value investing signifies.  It means a certain approach to finding undervaluation.

Value investors look at the here-and-now.  Their holdings are typically asset-rich companies that have encountered temporary difficulties, which have been crushed by Wall Street and which are now trading at unduly depressed valuations as a result.  Growth investors, in contrast, look for companies whose future earnings prospects are being underestimated by the market.

In this sense, too, I don’t think Mr. Miller is a plain-vanilla value investor.  He has been happy to hold large positions in stocks like Amazon or AOL (in its heyday)–names I think other value practitioners wouldn’t give a second look because the whole story has been the rate of future earnings growth.

I have no idea how Mr. Miller squares this circle.  (The fund’s largest positions are now in technology, according to Google Finance.  But it’s not the same thing.  Today’s stocks are eBay and Microsoft.  Apple, the largest holding, is still a growth stock, unlike the others.  But AAPL trades at a very low PE multiple of current earnings.)

3.  Despite this flexibility, and the issue of heavy concentration aside, it seems to me that classic value behavior has been the Value Trust’s recent problem.  Relative to history, financials were trading at low price to book value (i.e., the balance sheet value of shareholders’ equity) ratios when Mr. Miller bought them.  In hindsight, that was a mistake.

There may have been a second.  If the stocks a growth investor buys underperform, he typically stops buying or lightens up.  Value investors tend to do the opposite.  They regard such stocks as being even cheaper than when they initially bought–and double up.  I suspect the latter is what Mr. Miller did.

two oddities

1. In the early part of my career, alternating cycles of outperformance by value and growth stocks were relatively brief.  Given a year, or two at the most, there would be little to chose between the numbers generated by one style or the other.  The 1990s, however, saw a multi-year value cycle in the early part of the decade, followed by a massive multi-year growth cycle–culminating in the Internet Bubble–at the end.  Despite the fact that the tide was running strongly against value during the latter years, Mr. Miller continued to outperform the S&P 500.  If he did so with value stocks, that’s his crowning achievement.

2.  After creating a strong business franchise under the Miller name, neither he nor Legg Mason did much to protect it.

 

 

brokers and standards of care: the SEC study

the report

Last Wednesday the SEC published the results of a study on the differing legal obligations of brokers and investment advisers to their clients.

The SEC’s bottom line:

–while customers are generally satisfied with the investment advice they receive, they don’t really know what standards of conduct their brokers or investment advisers are legally held to.  In addition, they sometimes mistakenly think brokers are required to perform to the same high standard as investment advisers.

–the standard of conduct for brokers should be raised to match that for investment advisers, “when providing investment advice about securities to retail customers.”

why the study?

One might think that it was driven by the realization that millions of Baby Boomers will be retiring in the US over the next decade or so.  The vast majority–government workers are the biggest exception–will not have the security of defined benefit pension plans backed by their former employers. Instead, they have the money they’ve saved in IRAs or 401ks, for which they will have investment responsibility, to support them in retirement.

That’s not the reason, though.  The SEC did the study because it was ordered to in the recently-passed Dodd-Frank Act.

broker or investment adviser:  what’s the difference?

in law…

Investment advisers are regulated by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 

Broker-dealers are regulated under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934.

Broker-dealers are specifically excluded from regulation under the Investment Advisers Act.

…and in practice

Investment advisers are fiduciaries.  In practical terms, this means three things:

–the adviser must do what’s best for the client

–the adviser must put the client’s interests ahead of his own, and

–the adviser has to make extensive disclosure of possible conflicts of interest.

Broker-dealers are not fiduciaries.  As a result,

–although brokers aren’t permitted to act in a way that harms their clients,

–they can recommend an investment that is less good than another but which provides a higher profit to the broker.

I’m not sure what the technical requirements for disclosure of conflicts of interest are for a broker.  My experience is that they are, at best, buried in the middle of large amounts of fine print and couched in language that only a specialist would understand. Goldman’s trading “huddles,” exposed in an article in the Wall Street Journal in 2009, are a recent example of differential treatment of institutional clients, not retail, but it’s still a good illustration of the broker mindset.

The huddles are weekly meetings of analysts and traders that ended up generating ideas, some of which go against Goldman’s official stock recommendations.  These trading ideas are communicated only to a few of the firm’s highest revenue-generating clients.  The official recommendations aren’t changed, so most clients continue to be told the opposite story.  (I just looked at a recent Goldman research report.  This practice is described in paragraph 25 of 30 paragraphs of fine print, covering three pages of the report’s total length of seven.).

if brokers are required to become fiduciaries, what changes?

It may be an exaggeration to say that this would radically change the fundamentals of the retail brokerage industry…but, on second thought, that may not be so far from the truth.  For example,

quality of fund recommendations

1.  Some retail-oriented brokerage houses have their own in-house fund management groups.  In many cases, the records of such proprietary funds is mediocre at best.  Yet brokers are encouraged to sell these funds to clients.  In my view, the main factor–other than the underperformance clients experience–is their greater profitability of in-house funds to the firm. If brokers were fiduciaries, presumably they would have to point out that third-party funds have better track records, or to disclose their financial interest.

2.  Brokers might have to disclose that in general no-load funds sold by Vanguard or Fidelity are a better deal that the load funds brokers sell.

3.  When you go into a brokerage office to have an asset allocation analysis done, it may be that the mutual fund recommendations that the computer spits out come only from fund groups that have paid to have their names displayed to customers–or who have agreed to rebate to the brokerage a portion of the management fee earned on shares sold.  Fund groups that decline to pay get no exposure. In other words, the fund recommendations aren’t the objective assessment they appear to be.

A fiduciary couldn’t do this without clear disclosure.  Actually, I think a fiduciary who tried to do this would be run out of town.

4.  If an individual broker does enough business with a given fund group, he may qualify to bring himself and a guest to  an all expense-paid educational seminar (including nightly entertainment),  in, say, Las Vegas, or San Diego or Disneyworld.  Has any broker ever mentioned that possibility when recommending a fund to you?

quality of stock recommendations

5.  Institutional Investor magazine publishes a yearly ranking of brokerage house research and a list of All-American analysts in each industry.  If brokers were fiduciaries, I think they’d have to tell you if, as many have, they’ve laid off most of their experienced researchers during the recession.  So they have no ranked analysts anymore.  And the report you’ve just been handed recommending XYZ Corp as a “buy” was written by a replacement who only has six months experience, no formal training in securities analysis, and is learning to do research on the fly.

All of this would be a little like watching your meal being prepared in the kitchen of a restaurant that probably won’t pass health inspection.  Certainly, brokers don’t want to be forced to allow you this peek under the covers.

are any changes likely, based on the SEC findings?

I doubt it.  Opposition from “full service” brokerage houses would be too great.  It’s also interesting to note that, while the study was done by the staff of the SEC as Dodd-Frank mandated, its conclusions weren’t endorsed by the SEC.

But this did give me another chance to write about some of the less obvious practices of the retail brokerage industry.  So at least that’s something.

Trading: how valuable is it to do?

For professionals, very…

The short answer:  my experience is that competent professional trading supporting an equity portfolio manager can add one percentage point to annual returns.  Conversely, poor trading can subtract about the same amount.  Good trading, then, can take a third-quartile manager and put him in the second quartile; bad trading can do the opposite.

…for us, not so much

What about for you and me, though?

I think the key question for any individual investor is how much time is he willing to devote to investing.  A typical professional spends fifty hard–that is, not counting chatting in the coffee room with colleagues–at-the-desk working hours a week on his craft.  Even so, that’s not enough to keep pace with professional competition.  So the job of investing is usually split into three parts, one of which each professional in a firm will concentrate on.  The three are:  research, trading and portfolio management.

Realistically, we’re not going to work as hard as that, no matter what we tell ourselves.  So it’s essential for us to simplify and prioritize our activity so that we can do one or two things well, rather than do a half-baked job on several.

Committing our time to investing

As far as time commitment goes, I think the three parts break out as follows:

1.  portfolio management. Learning how to formulate a strategy takes the most time initially.  Once you actually create one, you’re thinking of it in odd moments most of the time, but your real work of testing, evaluating, trying to figure out what will come up next, is only done for short periods once or twice a month.  In terms of everyday effort, this most important part of managing your money takes the least time.

2.  securities analysis. Selecting the individual stocks, if any, for your portfolio requires a considerable initial effort to learn about he companies, their histories and their prospects.  Monitoring company developments and the stock’s price action takes daily attention if you want to do things right.

3.  trading. Trading can absorb your entire day, if you want it to.  After all, investment managers pay their traders hundreds of thousands of dollars yearly to do just that–to watch the markets, from overseas and pre-market activity to after-hours trading.    The question for us is whether, if we’re going to devote, say, 15 hours a week to our investments, becoming expert in this area is the most valuable use of our time.

(I probably should mention that I do have a  trading experience.  For about five years I ran a global fund where I was the manager and also did all the trading.  I won’t claim to be a really proficient trader, but I’m not that bad.)

Trading takes up a lot of time

An example:  one of my sons, a twenty-something, asked me recently to sell the (small amount of) PALM that he owned and put the proceeds into ATVI.  He had bought PALM, which I consider a really speculative stock (too much so for me), after a Bono-related investment vehicle had given the company an infusion of cash that would allow it to complete and launch the Pre. My son later became convinced that the Pre was going to be upstaged by the raft of Android phones now being released–which is why he wanted to sell.

Anyway, my son gave me a limit of $12 for PALM and none for ATVI.  I placed two limit orders online, one for PALM at $12 and another for ATVI about 2% below the previous close.  I thought the market was going sideways and both stocks were volatile enough intraday that the limits would likely hit.  I then did other things.

On day one, nothing happened.  On day two, prior to the open an analyst released a buy recommendation on PALM that pushed the stock up to $12.27 in early trade.  The stock faded as the day went on and closed at about $11.65.  Of course, I had sold at $12.  on day three, ATVI fell about $.05 below my limit intraday, before closing slightly above it.

Could I have done better?  Yes.  Speaking strictly about trading PALM, I could have spent all of day one and the first couple of hours of day two watching the market.  When I saw the new buy report on day two, I hopefully would have let the stock run and sold at, maybe, $12.20.

For us, it’s too much

But that would have meant spending eight or nine hours monitoring trading in PALM to get another 2%.  As one of my first bosses told me when I was talking about making a trade that might get me 10%–our job is to look for the 30%s and the 50%;  105 is too little to waste time and energy on.

To that, I’d add that if we’re going to allocate ten hours a week to investing, it’s better to spend that time trying to find the next AAPL rather than blowing a week’s worth of time looking for a 2% that may or may not be there for the taking.

Why do all the discount broker ads talk about trading, then?

Three reasons:

1.  The obvious one.  Trading is the service a discount broker offers.  The more you trade, the more money the broker makes from your account.  (See my posts on how your broker gets paid.)  The broker will also benefit if your account grows, but he will gain more from high turnover in an underperforming portfolio than from a low turnover one that outperforms.

2.  Trading tools are easy to provide.  You can even get them for free from Yahoo or Google.

3.  Offering trading advice is much simpler than offering investment advice.  Giving investment advice to a broad range of customers isn’t cheap or easy.  The broker opens himself to the risk of litigation if the investment advice proves unsound or if it is unsuitable for the economic circumstances of a given client.  So the discount broker has to have a research staff (which will end up costing the firm a lot of money) and representatives who will do risk tolerance and other suitability analysis.  Suddenly, the firm that does this not a discount broker any more.  It’s an old-fashioned “full service” broker.

Besides, discount brokers already offer back office services to independent financial planners.  So they would be competing against their own customers.

How your broker gets paid (II)–how the brokerage firm benefits

How your brokerage firm makes money

In my earlier post on broker pay, I wrote about how the individual broker is compensated.  This post deals with the broker’s firm, which also gets paid for its customers’ activity in several ways.  Please note that I’m writing about practices in the US.   My experience has been that it’s the same in other countries are similar, however, other than that foreign charges (ex IPOs) are generally much higher.

Let me count the ways:

1.  commissions/fees The broker’s firm keeps a percentage, 50%+ in the case of traditional brokerage firms, of the gross commission/fee income that an individual broker generates.  It pays the remainder to the broker.

2.  margin interest The brokerage firm may arrange for or provide loans itself to clients to buy stocks on margin.  Its cost of funds is now something around 1%.  But it will charge clients, say, 4%-7% interest on the loans, netting the difference as profit.

3.  stock lending In all likelihood, when you opened your brokerage account you signed an agreement giving your permission for the brokerage firm to lend the shares in your account to third parties, from whom it collects fees.

4.  trading fees Yes, you may pay a commission on many trades.  But your broker is doubtless a market maker for some of these securities and earns a bid-asked spread whenever he matches a buyer with a seller.  In the case of options or other derivatives, this spread can be 10% of the principal value of the transaction.  For an “active” trader, who moves in and out of securities frequently, these spreads can really mount up.

Your firm may also direct order flow for securities it doesn’t handle internally to third parties in return for a fee (there are rules to protect you from abuse, and fees are lower now than they once were, but this is still a source of income).

5.  distribution fees In addition to their trading activities, brokerage firms around the world are the predominant vehicle for distributing securities of all types.  In the institutional market, this means handling public offerings of stocks and bonds.  In the US, the typical fee a company pays to a broker for underwriting and selling a stock offering is 7% of the amount raised (much higher than in the rest of the developed world).  A broker can’t get an assignment like this without strong customer relationships.

The equivalent in the world of individual investors (I’m assuming that individuals normally only get the dregs of the IPO market) is distribution fees for mutual funds.   Just as in the institutional world, a strong distribution network, whether online or through registered reps in bricks-and-mortar offices, is a very valuable asset and isn’t given away for free.  So, just like a supermarket collects a stocking fee from companies wanting shelf space, a broker may collect a percentage of the mutual fund management fee in return for providing “shelf space” for that fund on its distribution platform.

Arguably, this is an issue between the broker and the fund company, since it’s about who gets the management fee you’re paying, not how much you pay.  It can be a matter of concern, though, if it turns out that when your broker runs an asset allocation analysis for you in his office, the only mutual fund recommendations that pop up are the ones who share the management fee.   They may still be the best funds, but in this case I think you have a right to know the brokerage firm’s interest.

Conclusion

For an investor, who will typically make a small number of focussed transactions each year, the commissions and fees he pays are the largest share of the compensation a brokerage house receives.  We’re not their favorite customers.  On the other hand, for “active” traders, who transact often, use margin and trade in derivatives, the commissions and fees are only the tip of the iceberg.  No wonder the TV commercials for discount brokers all focus on how cool and sophisticated rapid-fire trading is (there are more reasons for this tack than just it makes the most profit for the broker to encourage trading…but that’s a topic for another post).

How your broker gets paid (I)–the individual broker’s share

This isn’t really one question, but two:

1.  How is the individual you deal with compensated?, and

2.  How does the organization the person is a part of get profit from your business?

In this post, I’ll write about how the individual broker is paid.  In the following one, I’ll write about how the broker’s firm benefits from having you as a customer.

Ask your broker

The easiest way to find this information out is to ask the person you’ve selected to advise you.  After all, if you can’t talk openly with him/her about money, what will you be able to talk about?  And it would seem pretty foolish to purchase services of any type without knowing what the price for those services is going to be.  Despite this, it’s my impression that many customers are reluctant to ask.

I’m going to limit myself to writing about financial advisors who help you to develop a financial strategy (which may, or may not, have any investment merit) and to oversee its execution.  There are also advisors who specialize in the first task alone.  You go to them with your financial information, they develop a plan for a fee, but it’s up to you to execute the plan by investing the money yourself.  I’ve never met one, so I can’t comment.

The broker/financial advisor

two payment possibilities

A client typically can choose between two options in paying for investment advice:

1.  paying a commission on each transaction, or

2.  paying a continuing fee for all services.  The fee is usually a percentage of the assets the broker is supposed to be watching, typically between 1%-2%, although it’s sometimes higher.

Twenty-five years ago, the predominant choice was paying commissions.  As with everything else, there were ways to “game” the system.  The broker could recommend excessive trading, or “churn” the account.  He/she could also “forget” to tell the client about lower-commission ways to buy mutual funds (today’s computer systems won’t allow this sort of transaction to go through).  But it was probably the scandalous days of the late Eighties that persuaded the industry to emphasize the wrap fee business.  At that time, brokerage firms sold tones of gigantic-fee, no-value (something anyone who stopped to read the prospectuses–including clients–would have immediately found out) real estate and oil and gas tax shelters to their customers.  Not only did that destroy the brokers’ reputations, but subsequent lawsuits took back much of the money the brokers “earned.”

The percent-of-assets method is much more common today.  It, too, has its “gaming” potential.  In this case, though, it’s collecting the fee and providing little or no investment advice.  There has been mild regulatory questioning of why, for example, in an account that’s 100% in government bonds and where no trading occurs, the client is better off having his advisor deduct 2% of his assets from the account each year rather than pay a fee for each transaction.

gross fees vs. net

A broker working for a traditional brokerage house like Merrill Lynch or Smith Barney only receives a portion of the overall (gross) fees that his clients pay to the firm.  That percentage, called net fees, is typically 30%-50% of the gross, depending on the skill and client base of the broker in question.  The firm’s share goes to pay for office space, advertising (and maybe sales leads), administrative, regulatory and computer support, an investment research staff, plus a profit element.

At the other end of the spectrum, a financial planner or broker may elect to work independently or as part of a loose organization that provides trading and recordkeeping support.  The individual, however, provides his/her own office and administrative help.  In this case, the net commissions may be 80% or more of the gross.

Compensation your broker may not talk about

There are several other ways a broker benefits from clients’ business, namely:

“trailing” commissions, or 12b1 fees: The SEC allows mutual funds to pay a small portion of their assets, usually 25 or 30 basis points, for marketing.  The idea is that this gets more new money into the funds, thereby spreading administrative expenses over a larger asset base.  In practice, these fees are virtually always paid to the broker who sold the fund shares to a client, as an inducement/reward for the client continuing to hold the fund.  It’s not much of an inducement, though, since every fund group pays the same.  Still, it can mean $1000 a year or more for each client a financial advisor has.

“perks”: These would include an administrative assistant, a corner office–or even separate office space, a higher net commission percentage, access to analysts/portfolio managers that would normally denied to most brokers.

“educational” travel: Reward trips might be sponsored by the brokerage firm or by third-party asset managers.  Meetings are usually held at resort locations, with activities like golf available after formal sessions.  The sessions typically cover investment strategy, marketing techniques and the characteristics of the products the sponsoring organization offers.

broker hiring wars: This is a big one.  Brokerage house periodically try to rebuild/upgrade their sales forces by headhunting successful salesmen from their rivals.

The employment offers typically consist of three elements:

–a contract binding the broker to the new firm, usually for three or four years,

–a signing bonus, and

–an increased net commission percentage for the length of the contract.

The signing bonus is usually some multiple of the prior year’s compensation, verified by a W-2 form.  Over the years, signing bonuses I’ve been aware of have ranged from 50% of prior year’s pay to the 260% reported earlier this year by the Financial Times. This makes job-hopping the equivalent of the professional athlete’s free agency–the biggest payday of the broker’s career…until the next job hop.

(An aside:  years ago, brokerage houses encouraged their salesmen to concentrate on selling in-house funds.

Two reasons:

–they were more profitable for the brokerage and,

–more importantly, they tied the client to the firm.  Rivals’ computer systems weren’t set up to accept the in-house funds or to provide any strategy/holdings/performance information about them.  So clients literally couldn’t transfer their accounts if their broker left for another firm.  That amounted to having to leave a lot of existing clients behind, thereby making leaving hugely more difficult.

The broker response?–sell only third-party funds, which all firms’ systems could handle.)



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