Archive for the 'Entertainment' Category



Macau market gambling results for September 2011

Macau gaming results for September

On October 4th, while the Hong Kong stock market was closed, Macau’s Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau announced total gambling “win” for the SAR’s casinos for the month of September.  Brokerage house analysts in Hong Kong had hinted broadly that the number would be weak, due to supposed financial reverses being suffered by affluent mainlanders.  There was also the negative effect of Typhoon Nesat, which forced a shutdown of schools, businesses and most transportation (but not the casinos themselves) in Macau on September 29th, to consider.

Nevertheless, the reported figure was another excellent one, as can be seen from the chart below:

Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2011 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2011 2010 Variance 2011 2010 Variance
Jan 18,571 13,937 +33.2% 18,571 13,937 +33.2%
Feb 19,863 13,445 +47.7% 38,434 27,383 +40.4%
Mar 20,087 13,569 +48.0% 58,521 40,951 +42.9%
Apr 20,507 14,186 +44.6% 79,028 55,137 +43.3%
May 24,306 17,075 +42.4% 103,334 72,211 +43.1%
Jun 20,792 13,642 +52.4% 124,126 85,853 +44.6%
Jul 24,212 16,310 +48.4% 148,337 102,163 +45.2%
Aug 24,769 15,773 +57.0% 173,106 117,935 +46.8%
Sept 21,244 15,302 +38.8% 194,350 133,237 +45.9%

If we adjust the figures for the negative effects of the typhoon, on the idea that Macau lost a day’s gambling business (I think two days might be more realistic), then the gross gaming revenue for the SAR in September would be MOP 21.977 billion, and the year on year gain would be 43.6%.

massive selling ahead of the report

There has been huge selling of the Hong Kong-listed Macau gaming stocks since a report from a prominent analyst at Deutsche Bank predicted that a sharp slowdown in the growth of the Macau gaming market was imminent.  Even though Las Vegas Sands was quoted in the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times on October 2nd as saying that the company saw no signs of weakness in September, selling in Hong Kong seems to have reached a crescendo on October 3rd.  On that day, most Macau gaming stocks fell over 10%; SJM, whose casinos generate about a third of Macau’s total gaming revenue, lost 25% of its market value.

Yes, this was a little (more than a little, in my view) crazy.  The only sense I can make of the sharp declines is that short-term traders feared weak revenue numbers would be released by the Macau DICJ while Hong Kong was closed on October 4-5.  Maybe they had no time to read the papers.

where to from here?

It seems to me that the recent selling in world equity markets, including Hong Kong, has been driven by fears of an implosion in the EU financial system, leading in Lehman-like fashion, to a freezing up of world trade and a consequent severe global economic turndown.  However unlikely this scenario may be, a turn in the mood of short-term traders will probably require concrete evidence that this won’t happen.  Hence the focus of eyes and ears on Germany and France.

For the Macau casino stocks, the idea that a substantial downshift in gambling by affluent mainlanders is “just around the next corner” is a difficult one to disprove, no matter how many corners are successfully negotiated.  In addition, the market participants who dumped out casino shares at, say, 5x normal volume and at prices 25% below today’s prices will have a hard time convincing either themselves or their clients that they should buy the stocks back any time soon.

So the bearish mood surrounding these stocks may remain for a while.

On the other hand, the companies seem to me to have excellent long-term (and short-term) prospects and to be trading at unusually low valuations.

4 points about the Kindle Fire

1. Thank book publishers for the Kindle Fire.

AMZN’s initial strategy for e-books was to compete on price.  In fact, it started out offering e-books as a loss leader.  It was paying the publishers $12.50 for a new release and selling it as an e-book for $10.

The book industry didn’t like this one bit, however, because it feared the tactic would destroy the independent bookstore distribution channel.    So it forced AMZN, by threatening not to sell books to the company, to charge $13-$15 an e-book for new releases and keep 30% for itself (see my posts on Kindle economics for more details).  Take that, AMZN!

As I pointed out then–nothing requiring much insight, only having watched Jeff Bezos operate over the years, I thought AMZN would likely shift to using its hardware as a loss leader to build up sales volume.  The process took a little longer than I anticipated, but the Kindle Fire is the result.

According to iSuppli, the components in the Fire and their assembly cost AMZN about $210 a unit, meaning the company gets no recovery of its research and development costs, and loses $10+ for each unit sold, to boot.  If AMZN marked up the Fire the way AAPL does the iPad, it would sell for $275-$300.  Vintage Bezos.

Presumably, though, the early devices have a lot of redundancy built in (what a disaster if the first ones broke a lot).  But component prices will fall, and the device will gradually be simplified.  My guess is that AMZN will cross the breakeven line in the second half of next year.

2.  Fire is the star, but there’s a mini-explosion of regular Kindles as well. 

Along with the 7″ color-screen Fire, AMZN is introducing a new 6″ e-ink Kindle with audio and text-to-speech.  The latter comes in touch screen and physical keyboard models.  With 3G connectivity, they cost $189.  They’re $40-$50 less with wi-fi only (which is what the Fire has).  You can knock another $30-$40 off is you’re willing to accept advertising.

And, of course, there’s still the original 6″ Kindle at $109 and the jumbo-size 9.7″ Kindle DX at $379.

3.  AMZN is already offering Fire extras.

For example, there’s:

–a two-year extended warranty, that also covers three instances of accidental damage, for $44.99,

–a cover for, $24.99-$44.99, and

–streaming of TV shows and movies through Amazon Prime–which costs $79 a year and also gets you free two-day shipping on all AMZN purchases.

4.  AMZN’s formidable cloud computing capabilities back the Fire, too

AMZN is promising super-fast internet browsing with the Silk browser every Fire comes equipped with.

How so?

AMZN’s on-line retailing operations require massive server banks.  Because the company has to have enough capacity to handle surges in demand during peak selling periods, it can often be left with as much as 90% of its servers idle.  Years ago, it turned to providing cloud computing services to third parties as a way of using this asset better.  Its careful study of its customers’ behavior while on the Amazon site has also given it the ability to anticipate their needs–meaning it will be able to pre-load onto a Fire device likely next pages even before the user tells the browser to request them.

More about this tomorrow.

my thoughts

Fire may not have the upscale cachet of the iPad.  But the price is right at the level where surveys of US consumers suggest they’re willing to buy a tablet.  It’s small, weighs less than a pound and has a battery life that AMZN puts at 8 hours of active use. 

It seems to me the Fire will prove very attractive to consumers on the go, just as the early netbooks drew traveling businessmen for their light weight and essential functionality.  I doubt the form factor will stagnate in the way that netbooks did, though, and I don’t expect the iPad will move downmarket to challenge.  AMZN could easily be a very big winner with the device.

slumping casino stocks

a China-related selloff

In yesterday’s trading in New York, MPEL, a pure play on Macau casinos, fell steadily during the day end ended down 9.3%.  WYNN, down more than 10% intraday, closed with a loss of 7%+.  LVS, which had fallen almost 8% during the afternoon, closed down 5.3%.  MGM, the third Las Vegas/Macau conglomerate–but a company with other issues–shed a “mere” 3.3% of its value.

That was just a warmup act for Hong Kong overnight.  Wynn Macau fell more than 17% overnight and Sands China 14%.  The “best” of the Macau casino performers among Hang Seng stocks was SJM Holdings, which lost 8.4%.

All these issues have given up about a third of their value in the past couple of months–although almost all remain strong year-to-date outperformers.

Why?

The ostensible reason is that growth in China may be slowing–maybe even to the point where, at the bottom, the country will be posting only a 5% GDP advance in a year or two.  Casinos weren’t the only decliners on this worry.  TIF fell almost 7% yesterday, after having been down over 10% intraday.  In contrast, Signet Jewelers, which has only US and UK operations, rose slightly.

my thoughts

It seems to me that there’s no rational basis for the declines.  Affluent Americans haven’t stopped buying at TIF, for example, despite the fact that the US economy is barely north of zero.  Quite the opposite.  Jewelry comps throughout the industry are at 10%+–and rising.  So I don’t see the logic to the argument that because affluent Chinese citizens will have “only” 20% more income next year rather than being up 35%, their consumption patterns will change markedly.

Two caveats:

Bad markets aren’t rational.  They’re emotional.  In hindsight, they may make little sense.  But that’s cold comfort if you get run over by a runaway locomotive barreling down a track where nothing logically should be.

The depth of these declines has got to suggest to a growth investor like me that I might be wrong in my assessment of future earnings.

what to do

A value investor would add to his positions.

A growth investor who owned none of these stocks would buy a little–and then watch for a while.  A growth investor like me, who has a large enough holding in this sector already, tries to take the point of view of the seller to try to discover what he knows that I don’t.

On that score, I’m coming up empty so far.  For me, then, the best course is to stay on the sidelines.

The next important data point will be the release of September Macau gaming revenue by the SAR government, possibly over the coming weekend.

 

Netflix and the art of raising prices

NFLIX, from  afar

I don’t know NFLX well, other than as a user of its products.  I’m still annoyed at myself for not having bought it two years ago.  But I haven’t been motivated to do the work I’d need to own it, so I mostly just watch the price as a barometer of the market’s feelings about growthy, techy consumer stocks.

Clearly, the recent plunge from the $300+ high to the current $130 runs sharply counter to the experience of most consumer-oriented secular growth names (more about this tomorrow).

the recent price increase…I know that the company has other issues.  I have no opinion, positive or negative, about the stock.  I just want to make a comment about the mess that the company made about the price increases it recently announced.  My take is that the move is actually a good thing.  The way NFLX went about it, however, shows a stunning lack of basic management skill.

…is a good thing…

Why good?  Yes, there are some cases where consumers actually want to pay more for an item–like buying an $8,000 Hermès handbag– to display their wealth or sophistication.  This isn’t one of them.  So for NFLX raising prices inevitably means losing customers.  There’s no way around that.

If the early returns are reliable, however, upping prices by 15% has lost the company 4% of its subscribers.  Revenues are still at least 10% higher than they would otherwise have been.  And NFLX can presumably build from there. Also, customer defections, relative to the company’s expectations, have been concentrated in users of DVDs only, the segment that NFLX wants to de-emphasize.

…done in awful fashion

Top management of most consumer companies spend a great deal of time thinking about prices.

They know that there are tipping points where regular customers of the products/services may dramatically slow down usage if the price exceeds a certain level.  They also know that these points are virtually impossible to predict in advance.  In the casual restaurant business, for example, a venue with a $17 per person average check may have diners lining up all around the block.  An $18 per person check-less than a 6% difference, on the other hand, may translate into lots of empty tables.

They also know that any really visible price rise–one that forces the consumer to think about how much he’s actually paying in total–is particularly perilous.  As NFLX has found out the hard way, $8-$10 a month isn’t that significant for its customers.  An extra $2, or the choice of remaining at the old price for a lower level of service, is.  It focuses attention on the fact that NFLX can cost $150 or more a year.  And, of course, there are probably a certain number of people who don’t use the service but have forgotten to remove the fee from the recurring payments on their credit cards.

As well, higher prices not only can spur customers to look for substitutes; they can provide a pricing umbrella under which rivals can prosper.

Also, techy things typically don’t go up in price.  They either stay the same for a new model that’s a lot better, or they go down.  As a result, for NFLX  any price rise comes as a shock.

NFLX appears to have been completely clueless.

what could NFLX have done instead?

Remember, I haven’t studied NFLX closely, but there are a at least a couple of tried-and-true marketing tactics that companies use to raise prices.  For example:

new and improved.  Companies often offer additional features–better content, preferred access, faster access, a wider selection, other stuff you may not need/want–as at least a psychological justification for customers paying more.

a program of small but steady price rises.  To eliminate sticker shock.

a public relations campaign in advance, interviews in the media, or communication with customers, to explain the economic necessity for raising prices.

–more conservative guidance.  This may simply have transferred the negative Wall Street reaction to the earlier point in time when NFLX gave guidance, rather than when the company lowered it.  But it would have suggested that NFLX has a better feel for its customer reaction to higher pricing.

where to from here?

The Wall Street analysts’ earnings consensus for NFLX for 2011 is about $4.50 a share, meaning that the stock is trading at slightly under 30x current profits.  While the stock doesn’t appear cheap to me, the company does appear to be growing at a pace much faster than 30%, even after its current stumble.

I think a buyer has to believe two things:

–that NFLX will continue to grow profits at 30%+ for as far as the eye can see, and

–either that management has made an isolated mistake, or that having sharp people at the top isn’t crucial to the company’s success.

The company is presenting at a conference today.  We may get more input from that.

WYNN/Wynn Macau (HK:1128)’s new Cotai casino gets government okay: implications

the WYNN Cotai project

Last Monday in Hong Kong, Wynn Macau announced that it had received a 25-year concession from the government of the SAR to develop a new casino in Cotai.  The concession consists of 51 acres of land.  1128 will pay a land premium of US$193.4 million and annual rent of US$771,738.

The planned casino, which WYNN has been talking about for the past six months, will likely cost US$3.0-$3.5 billion and will probably debut in 2014 (the concession requires the casino to be in operation within five years).  Given that 1128 already has about US$ 1 billion in cash on the balance sheet and will probably earn another US$2 billion from its existing Macau casino operations before the new venue opens, financing the project will not be a problem.

market implications

I think there are four:

1.  Macau, which I think has done an excellent job of developing the casino industry in the SAR, has been very careful in recent years grant new casino concessions slowly enough that supply doesn’t outpace demand.  The WYNN concession indicates that it believes strong demand from the mainland will continue for at least the next several years.

2.  There had been speculation in Hong Kong that Beijing was upset at the relatively greater success of US casino groups in Macau vs. the incumbent Ho family.  The WYNN concession shows me that this isn’t the case.  All along I’ve believed that the SAR has actually been eager to have US casino operators (why else give an initial concession to WYNN?), for two reasons:  to get the convention/resort expertise of Las Vegas, and to break the power of the triads in the market.

3.  The Hong Kong stock market has apparently begun to worry about what happens to the casino industry in Macau after the concessions granted to current operators end in 2022.  I think these worries are silly–as if Macau would set onerous new terms that would compel operators either to leave or to run their casinos to extract capital rather than expand.  That would turn the SAR from the Las Vegas of China into its Atlantic City–an outcome that would be disastrous both for the casino operators and for Macau.

For those who think that pieces of paper are more important than common sense in these matters, the WYNN Cotai concession agreement requires the company to remain in Macau and run a casino for the next twenty-five years.

4.  There have also been market worries that, because current concessions end in about ten years, western banks won’t finance casino expansion.  For the incumbent operators, this is not a big issue.  For one thing, casinos are so cash generative that a company like 1128 won’t need financing.  For another, mainland Chinese banks are likely the preferred lenders to the casinos.

thoughts on WYNN and 1128

Both WYNN and Wynn Macau have been spectacular performers, year to date.  I don’t think anything is “wrong” with either stock.

WYNN hasn’t participated in the market rebound of the past few days, mostly, I think, because it resisted the preceding downdraft.  1128 is suffering from (misplaced, in my opinion) jitters in the Hong Kong market about the possible rapid deceleration of growth of the Macau gambling market.

For the moment, the US market is, understandably, concentrating on stocks that have been severely beaten down in the market’s fall.  I expect investor interest will return to WYNN soon enough (although I have written October $170 calls on a small part of my holding).

1128, which I also hold, is a more difficult situation to assess.  To US eyes, it’s a fabulous stock.  It’s trading on well under 20x forward earnings, with easily 25-30% earnings growth is prospect–much more if the Macau gambling market remains as strong as I think it will. And there’s the capacity expansion in a couple of years, as well.  Yet Hong Kong investors, who will make or break the market in the stock, appear unwilling so far to differentiate 1128 from its much weaker competition.  And they’re clearly worried about a possible downturn in Macau gambling.  More patience may be required here.

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