what is a carried interest?

Mitt Romney’s taxes

Mitt Romney’s partial disclosure of his tax situation has reopened debate on the issue of how private equity managers and some hedge funds use carried interest as a device to shelter their earnings from tax.

Since Mr. Romney left the private equity business a decade ago, it seems to me that he isn’t currently using carried interest as a tax shelter.  In all likelihood, it’s some combination of itemized deductions, like charitable contributions or state and local taxes paid, and the favorable treatment of long-term gains on investments that’s producing his low tax rate.  But he was a prominent figure in the private equity community, so the press–and his political opponents–have made the connection anyway.

Powerful lobbying efforts by the private equity industry have defeated repeated attempts to close the tax loophole it uses to lower its executives’ tax burden.

I wrote about this topic in mid-2010.  But I haven’t read anything, wither in the current discussion or in the past, that explains exactly what a carried interest is.  Hence this post.

carried interest

A carried interest is a participation in an investment venture where the holder gets a share of the cash generated by the project (profits or cash flow) without having to contribute anything to the venture’s costs.  The holder of such an interest is “carried” in the sense that the other venture participants pick up the burden of his share of project expenses.

Carried interests aren’t just a private equity phenomenon.  They’re very common in the mining industry, which is where I first encountered them thirty years ago.  But they also occur in lots of other industries, particularly those where highly specialized experience or skills, or possession of crucial physical resources are key to a project’s success.  In the extractive industries, holders of mineral rights may be carried.  The fund raisers or organizers of any sort of projects may be carried, as well.  So, too, famous actors or holders of key intellectual property.

variations on the theme

As with everything in practical economic life, there are myriad variations on this basic idea.  For example,

–a party may not be carried for the entire life of the project, but only up to a certain point–say, when cash flow turns positive.

–the other parties may be entitled to recover the “extra” costs they’ve paid to subsidize the carried interest before the carried interest receives a dime (there are also lots of variations on the cost recovery theme), or

–the carried interest may only be paid if the project exceeds specified return criteria.

In plain-vanilla projects, the carried interest receives a portion of the recurring revenue that the venture generates.  This is ordinary income and taxed as such.  The private equity case is different.

private equity and carried interest

Private equity raises equity money from institutions or wealthy individuals, arranges financing of, say, 3x -5x that amount, and uses the assembled war chest to make acquisitions.  It targets mostly badly run companies.  It spruces them up and resells them a few years later.  There’s no conclusive evidence that this process adds any economic value, although it certainly sets the process of “creative destruction” in motion in the affected company–but that’s another issue.

Private equity companies appear to me to act as a blend of business consultants and managers of a highly concentrated (and extremely highly leveraged) equity portfolio.  What’s really unique about them is their pay structure.

Private equity charges its clients a recurring management fee of, say, 2% of the assets under management plus a large performance bonus if the turnaround projects they select are successful.  This bonus is structured as a carried interest (an equity holding) in each individual project.  Because the projects last several years and result in an equity sale, the bonus payments are capital gains, not ordinary income.  This means the private equity executives’ tax bill is much less than half what it would be if the payments were income.

my thoughts

You’ve got to admit that turning investment management income into capital gains is a clever trick.  Should the loophole be closed?  When I first wrote about this I thought so.  I still do.  But I’d prefer to see more comprehensive tax reform that achieves this result rather than specific legislation that targets the private equity industry.  I also find it somewhat disturbing that private equity political contributions and lobbying allow them to “own” this issue in Congress, despite the fact that private equity’s taxation is clearly different from other investment managers’, from management consultants’ and from corporate executives’ for basically the same activities.

the SEC is looking at hedge fund performance claims

the new approach

Today’s Wall Street Journal tells about current SEC efforts to scan the hedge fund universe in search of  potential civil fraud.  The idea is to use computer analysis to identify hedge funds whose results are too good to be true–where the operators rarely, if ever, have a down month, or where aggregate results are sensationally good.  This new direction apparently comes as a result of the agency’s failure to detect the gigantic Ponzi scheme that Bernie Madoff ran for many years–despite being supplied continuous evidence of the fraud by investigator Harry Markopolos.

Markopolos, a financial analyst, was asked by his employers to “reverse engineer” Madoff’s returns and create a duplicate it could market to clients.  A quick look at the numbers was enough for Markopolos to suspect fraud.  It took him less than a day to develop conclusive proof, which he then tried in vain to present to the SEC for close to a decade.

The new SEC interest in hedge funds appears to mimic the Markopolos methods.  The agency is also extending its scrutiny to mutual funds and private equity.

it’s about time

For years, academic studies have concluded that the returns hedge funds report to the public are at best implausible, and most likely false.

My favorite is one led by NYU professor Stephen Brown.  He analyzed investigations done by a hedge fund due diligence firm, HedgeFundDueDiligence.com,  which was hired by potential institutional customers to check out new managers.  It turns out that about a fifth of the hedge funds misled HFDD.com, despite the fact they knew their assertions would be checked.  It also turns out that customers generally hired the dishonest hedge fund managers, despite the due diligence warnings.  Go figure.

The biggest reasons for falsifying returns, in my view, is that reporting is voluntary and that the databases which collect the numbers make no attempt to check the figures.

an example

The WSJ article cites the case of the now-defunct ThinkStrategy Capital Management.  TSCM reported a return of +4.6% for 2008 in its Capital Fund-A, a year in which the fund actually lost 90%.  Chetan Kapur, who ran TSCM, also reportedly inflated his assets under management in reports to shareholders and wrote about non-existent team of analysts supporting him.  Kapur also continued to manufacture and report performance numbers for Capital Fund-A, even after the fund was shut down.

The article says there are lots more where TSCM came from.

I believe it.

 

 

raising capital… (III): crowd funding

Wikipedia has a good rundown of the history of crowd funding.

what it is

Crowd funding, in the sense I think Washington is talking about it, has several elements.  It intends to raise large amounts of money by:

1.  obtaining small amounts of money

2.  from large numbers of people

3.  using the internet as a device for information, solicitation, and payment, and

4.  giving an equity or creditor interest in a company or project in return for money received.

There’s also a sense in the name of counterculture and of a group of like-minded people banding together to get a common project accomplished.

examples

Fundraising by any non-profit cultural or religious organization fulfills criteria 1 through 3.  So, too, does President Obama’s fundraising during his first election campaign.

The Green Bay Packers’ recent $63 million stock offering fits the crowd raising bill pretty well, although as I understand it you had to stand in line at Lambeau Field to buy a share for $250.

The Wikipedia article referenced above contains accounts of a number of fundraisings by bands or movie makers.

plusses

Crowd funding is very cheap., especially compared with investment banking fees in the US.

Management doesn’t lose control of the company/project, as it would in venture capital funding.

In an IPO, shares end up in the hands of the favored clients of the investment banking syndicate.  The issuer may prefer that the shares be sold instead to people who are committed to the products/services of the company or to its corporate culture.  This may only be a philosophical preference, or it may be the belief (well-founded, in my experience) that individual shareholders will become dedicated customers and will strongly support management in any corporate votes.

The company may be able to get a higher price for stock by avoiding the conflict of interest an investment banker has between the company (which wants a high price) and its brokerage clients (who want a low one).

There’ll be less obligatory disclosure of corporate strategy and of financial condition–meaning both less corporate expense and less leakage of information the company considers proprietary.

minuses

from the issuer’s point of view

1.  SEC regulations limit the amount of money a company can raise, its asset size and the number of shareholders it can have, without complying with the agency’s reporting requirements.  These rules were created after the stock market collapse of the late 1920s and are intended to protect investors from fraud.

There are also a multitude of state laws to comply with.  Some deal with the dissemination of information across state lines, so they’re a particular concern for any firm wanting to use the internet as its distribution channel (meaning everyone).

2.  Without a clear commitment to an IPO, a company may not be able to recruit the most talented staff.  This may change, however, if the crowd funding route shows itself to be equally lucrative.

for investors

1.  It’s not clear how investors will get reliable information about a company both before they invest and while they are shareholders.  Companies having an IPO create a registration statement/prospectus that must contain all material information about the firm.  The underwriting syndicate has (more or less) professional securities analysts who prepare periodic reports on the firm that they distribute to clients.

Private deals, on the other hand, typically have a large “trust me” element to them, at least in my experience.  Hedge funds are an interesting example because a lot of academic research has been done about them.  The general finding is that a considerable number of them falsify reports of their assets under management, their performance results and/or their managers’ qualifications.

2.  A second main concern is the creation of a secondary market in the securities.  This is also an area of heavy regulatory concern, again in order to prevent fraud.

3.  We know that fraud occurs even in the highly-regulated public markets.  Enron, for example, is a name everyone remembers.  Less information, less regulation and unclear penalties all suggest that the danger of fraud in crowd funding securities may be very high.

Congress

Right now, any company with more than $10 million in assets and with more than 500 shareholders has to file financial statements with the SEC.  This is a plus for shareholders, since they can find out stuff about company operations, but a considerable cost for tiny companies.  The thrust of legislation now circulating in Congress is to stimulate small business growth by creating exceptions to this rule.

The initial proposal is the Entrepreneur Access to Capital bill, reviewed in the Securities Law Professors blog.  It has already been passed by the House.  It allows companies to raise $1 million per year without having to file financial statements with the SEC.  Each investor would be limited to sending in the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of his income.  The limit would be $2 million yearly if the firm files financials with the SEC.  Issuers would have to use a crowd funding website (details = ?).

So far there have been tweaks to the idea that would, for example, limit investments to $1,000 per person and the total raised to $1 million.

At this point, it’s only clear to me that something will happen in Washington to allow some sort of SEC-exempt crowd funding.  My guess is that, absent widespread fraud, the law that is passed will simply be a foot in the door.  Larger exemptions will follow.

my thoughts

Crowd funding may come to nothing.  On the other hand, it may well be the latest example of the internet destroying a traditional distribution network–in this case the existing venture capital and IPO apparatuses.  The obvious strategy for VCs and investment bankers is to seize control of the crowd funding movement by providing their own crowd funding networks.

Cannibalizing your own business is always preferable to having someone else do it to you.  But internal advocates of the (lucrative for them) status quo will typically fight this strategy tooth and nail. In bad firms, the latter will win.

No investment conclusion yet, other than that I think the whole movement bears watching.

buying a “hot” IPO stock

recent new issues

There are three recent or current IPOs that I find potentially interesting:

–Chow Tai Fook Jewelry  (1929: HK), a  Hong Kong-based jewelry chain that specializes in chuk kam (pure gold) gold jewelry, but which is expanding its offerings to include Western-style fine jewelry as well,

–Nexon (3659: JP), the Korean company that started the casual gaming craze with Kart Rider–and who, oddly enough, just listed in Tokyo, and

–Zynga (ZNGA), the creator of the Facebook game Farmville (although my interest is mostly in the fact that it’s going public at close to 100x historic earnings).

how to buy them

Suppose you want to buy one of these–or shares in any “hot” IPO.  How do you go about it?

Let’s take it as given that no ordinary retail investor is going to get an allocation of stock in the IPO itself.

Those shares normally go to the most important customers of the brokers who take the company public, not to retail investors or small institutions.  In fact, unless you’re very close relatives or friends of the top management of the company going public–and they use their influence to direct shares your way (how likely is that?)–being offered shares in an IPO in the US as a retail investor is probably a red flag.  It suggests no one higher up in the food chain wants them.  So, to mix metaphors a bit, the underwriters are forced to reach down to the bottom of the barrel to get the deal sold.  In other markets, Hong Kong, for example, there can be special tranches of stock reserved for retail investors.  But the amount of stock you will receive in a “hot” IPO is likely to be very small.

So, to participate we have to buy shares on the open market.

my rules

While every situation is a little different, I’ve found that the rules I developed for myself while I was running a tiny mutual fund in the 1980s (too tiny to get many IPO allocations) have served me well over the years.  They are:

1.  Read the offering documents carefully and try to calculate the rate of growth of future profits.  this is how you decide what price is reasonable to pay. Like any other kind of investment, understanding valuation is by far the most important factor in success.  For a US investor trying to buy a foreign stock this can be a problem, since the documents won’t be available to you (even on the internet) until after the IPO.

2.  If the stock goes down on day 1 (as ZNGA is doing while I’m writing this), that’s a very bad sign.

3.  First day trading can be very volatile.  Use limit orders, not market orders.

4.  Don’t buy the entire position on day 1.  Three reasons, two relating to attempts by institutions to game the IPO system to get better allocations of future issues:

–retail investors may place market orders, driving up the stock price

–some institutions want to be seen by the underwriters as buying stock on the first day.  They think this establishes them as serious long-term shareholders and not “flippers” (people who only want to make a quick profit on getting an IPO allocation and who dump the stock on the market as fast as they can).  Underwriters generally hate flippers, since a large amount of flipping threatens to depress the stock price on day 1, making the issue seem less successful.  So, rightly or wrongly, buying institutions hope they’ll get larger allocations of future issues as a reward.

institutions that want to be seen as regular supports of an underwriters IPOs (i.e., they’ll take anything) and as long-term holders of everything may start to sell after a week or two, when they think underwriters won’t notice, thus preserving their A-list status.

3.  A week or two after the initial trading day, after the IPO hoopla is over and when the institutions I describe in my last point above begin to sell, there may well be a chance to buy the stock at a lower price than on day 1.

4.  Keep a list of interesting stocks you might like to buy but think are too expensive now.  Every so often–too often nowadays, in my opinion–stock markets get frightened and sell off in a crazy way.  Everything goes down; small stocks can go down a lot.

I’ve found these to be excellent times to buy the formerly hot IPO stocks.

 

 

 

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