a strong 1Q13 from Las Vegas Sands (LVS)

the report

After yesterday’s close, LVS reported 1Q13 earnings results.  Revenues came in at a record $3.3 billion, up 19.5% year-on-year.  Earnings per share were $.71, up a penny from the 1Q12 EPS, but $.04 higher than the Wall Street analysts’ consensus.

The results are actually much stronger than the raw numbers would suggest.  As regular readers will already know, casinos count as revenue only the amount that patrons lose when they gamble, not the amount they bet.  Over long periods of time, gamblers losses adhere to highly predictable patterns.  Over short periods, however, they can fluctuate a lot from the “house advantage,” based mostly on random “luck” factors.  To get a clear picture of how a casino company is doing, we have to adjust for this.

In LVS’s case, luck made 1Q12 revenue (and operating profit) look $177 million better than it should have; luck made 1Q13 revenue look $25 million worse.  Adjusted for these differences, income for LVS was up by about 30%.

why so good?

Macau

–Chinese gamblers elected to keep low profiles during the recently completed leadership change in Beijing.  Now they’re returning to the baccarat tables in Macau.

–better transportation and streamlined border controls mean more visitors can easily reach Macau

–unlike, say, WYNN, LVS has ample spare capacity to accommodate new customers, so it’s benefiting disproportionately from the market upturn.

Singapore

–mainland Chinese gamblers, whose patronage of the Marina Bay Sands has been more highly economically sensitive than their visits to Macau, are coming back

–so too, gamblers from Indonesia

US

–Las Vegas was flattish, with strength in non-casino operations

–Bethlehem, PA continues to perk along

Asian retail mall operations

In response to an analyst question about why LVS had not yet sold any of its Macau or Singapore retail operations as previously planned, management said the businesses were still growing much more quickly than anticipated.  The company thinks the Asian malls may ultimately be worth $8 billion – $10 billion, or around 20% of the company’s market cap.

For the first time, LVS is providing segment detail about these operations.   1Q13 operating profits were $68 million, up 23.4% yoy.

a special dividend?

Management also said it’s considering borrowing in the US, à la AAPL, to fund either a special dividend or a share buyback.

my take

LVS isn’t wart-free. It’s involved in a number of lawsuits.  And its long-time auditor has just parted ways.  Still, by my calculations, the Asian operations explain more than the entire market cap of LVS.  I don’t think either Hong Kong or Wall Street has appreciated the potential of the Asian retail malls.  LVS is the only way to get exposure to Marina Bay Sands and the easiest way to participate in Sands China.  I’m not in a great rush to buy more today but I’m very happy to hold.

AAPL’s 2Q13–some answers, still some questions

the report

After the New York close yesterday AAPL reported its 2Q13 earnings results (AAPL’s fiscal year ends in September).  Revenues were $43.6 billion, up 9% year-on-year.  EPS, however, were down 18% yoy, at $10.09.   The latter figure was slightly ahead of the Wall Street analyst consensus of $9.97, a number that been ratcheting down in recent weeks.

The company guided to flattish sales in 3Q13, with mild margin contraction.

It announced a 15% increase in the quarterly dividend to $3.05 a share, meaning a current dividend yield of just over 3%.

APPL also intends to buy back $60 billion in stock before the end of calendar 2015.  That would be 15% of the company at current prices.  AAPL now has $147 billion in cash, of which $104 billion is held outside the US.  It won’t touch the foreign holdings for the buyback.  Instead, it will issue bonds in the US to get the money it needs.

This piece of financial engineering will have two impacts.  It will boost the growth rate of EPS by at least an additional 5 percentage points per year.    And the financial leverage will increase AAPL’s return on equity from its already heady 25%+.

The stock was initially up about 5% on this news.  Then, during the conference call, AAPL management said it won’t have its next new product launch until fall.  The gains evaporated and were replaced by a slight loss.

what’s going on

Two factors:

margin erosion

1. smartphones

As I see it (remember, AAPL is pretty opaque), the emergence of Samsung as a competitor in the high end of the smartphone market,where AAPL makes its biggest profits, has caused that segment to mature faster than AAPL had expected.  Unit volume growth is now coming mainly from emerging markets, where the price of AAPL’s cutting-edge phones is too high.  The company is selling older models (iPhone4s) there, at discount prices–and therefore reduced margins.

2. tablets

A year ago, it looked to me like 2/3 of AAPL’s tablet volume was from its newest model iPads.  Today, unit volumes are much higher, but less than a quarter are the newest 10″ iPads.  The rest is a combination of iPad minis (a runaway success) and bulk sales of iPad2s to institutions.   Both of the latter are at lower margins.

My guess is that we’re at or near a gross margin low point now.

continuing PE multiple contraction

The maturing of the smartphone market has been actively discussed in the financial community for a couple of years.  In my view, worry about this possibility is the main reason that, despite booming sales and earnings, the price earnings multiple on AAPL’s stock had contracted from the high teens to around 12 by the second half of last year.  Relative to the market, the multiple went from a premium of 25% to a discount of 25% over the same time period.

Unpleasant for holders, maybe, but understandable.

Over the past 6-8 months, however, the multiple has contracted further, both in absolute terms (to under 10) and relative (to a discount of more than 40%).  In fact, yesterday’s Wall Street Journal had an article comparing AAPL with HWP and DELL.  That’s kind of like comparing night and day–the single thing I can see that ties AAPL to these two truly terrible companies is the similarity of their price earnings multiples.

Yes, when fast growers begin to slow down, the PE contracts, often violently.  And because a good portion of the contraction is an emotional thing, the multiple shrinkage is usually greater than one would expect.  But even seeing this process over and over, I didn’t imagine that a fundamentally sound company like AAPL could be trading at 9x in a market trading at 15x.

where to from here?

Note, first, that I’ve been wrong about the stock for a while.

I think the stock buyback makes economic sense, and it will probably at least stabilize the AAPL stock price.  I don’t think the addition of debt to the capital structure will have any effect.

It may be a big stretch, but to me the 15% dividend increase says that’s what AAPL’s board expects its earnings growth rate over the next few years to be, financial engineering aside.  I think that’s a reasonable assumption, and could be conservative.

AAPL management would do the most for its stock by being more forthright with investors about current business challenges and how it plans to deal with them.  That’s not likely, however, if the 2Q13 earnings call is any indication.

That leaves holders waiting for new product announcements–and subsequent earnings acceleration–at summer’s end.

 

Intel’s 1Q13–another transition quarter

the report

Intel (INTC) reported 1Q13 earnings after the close on Tuesday.  Revenue came in at $12.6 billion, down 2.5% year-on-year.  EPS, however, were $.40, down 25% vs. 1Q12.  The latter figure was slightly below the Wall Street consensus of $.41.

INTC believes this is a low point for its business, expecting revenues to show slow but steady improvement as the year progresses.  It expects earnings to advance at a faster rate.  Brokerage house analysts as a group are a bit more cautious, projecting 2Q13 EPS of $.39.

Consensus earnings per share for the full year are $1.88, a number I have no quarrel with.  INTC’s dividend yield is just over 4%.

What I find most interesting is that INTC shares, one of the worst performers of 2012, have been rising since the company’s earnings report, in an overall shaky market.

How so?

I think it’s because INTC is now a qualitative “big picture” stock, not one that will be driven by near-term earnings.

details

First, some housekeeping stuff from the report.

Servers, which comprise about 20% of INTC’s business, were a strong point.  High-end and cloud models are growing at 30%+.  Generic corporate servers, purchases that rise and fall with GDP, are up a little.  Overall server revenues were up 7.5% yoy during 1Q13.

PC chip sales were down 6% yoy.  INTC’s customers have continued to work down their PC inventories from already lean levels, so end user demand is a bit better than INTC’s sales would indicate.  At some point, one would expect PC makers to rebuild inventories to more normal levels.

The transition away from old school heavy, clunky laptops–epitomized by DELL or HWP offerings–toward ultrabooks and other “post-PC” devices (think: Samsung or Asus) is going faster than INTC had expected.  This has several consequences for the company:

–older chip-making machinery is going out of service faster than anticipated, meaning extra depreciation charges,

–clients are asking for larger numbers of test models for INTC’s newest chips, where production isn’t still super-efficient, again meaning higher costs, and

–some older machinery can be reconfigured for use in cutting-edge chips, saving INTC $1 billion in capex this year.

The first and second items non-recurring.  Together, they’re the reason for the 1Q margin deterioration that led to the sharp decline in operating earnings on only a very small decrease in revenues.  As I mentioned earlier, INTC believes the worst on this front is behind it.

the big picture, according to INTC

INTC thinks that the chips it’s starting to ship this quarter will spark a quantum shift in the market for mobile computing devices.  By next year, we’ll have more powerful, touch-screen ultrabooks with better graphics and longer battery life selling for around $500.  Don’t need sleek or instant-on?   …then $400.

Tablets will see big power improvements and  maybe a $300 price for an iPad clone.

New form factors will emerge, too.

The disappearance of the huge price gulf between ultrabook and tablet will shift demand toward the former. That’s good for INTC.  Chips that use less power and generate less heat mean INTC has a chance to be a real presence in the tablet category for the first time.

can this happen?

Yes.  I think it will, and maybe even in time  for the holiday selling season this year.

The only real question is whether INTC can maintain its dominant market share in PC-like devices and displace ARMH offerings in some tablets (smartphones are only a possible INTC story in, say, 2016).  I like INTC. I hold the stock.  I think they have a very good shot at doing what they say.

as an investor…

…I think the rewards outweigh the risk that INTC finds itself the odd man out in an ARMH-dominated mobile world.

Why?  It’s valuation.

–arguably, INTC’s server business as a stand-alone is worth than the current market cap of the entire company.

– INTC has by far the best chip manufacturing operations in the world.  They’re certainly better than TSMC’s, the king of the third-party foundries.  Ignoring its intellectual property, were INTC valued solely for its manufacturing capabilities on the same basis as TSMC, INTC shares would be well over $30 (yes, gross margins would be lower, but so too would R&D and marketing expenses).  TSMC also has a much more cyclical earnings record).

So I’m content to wait.

Ron Johnson out at J. C. Penney (JCP): implications

Yesterday, only a few weeks after major shareholder Bill Ackman gave Ron Johnson a ringing endorsement as CEO of JCP, Mr. Johnson is out.

Former CEO, Mike Ullman, who was unceremoniously dumped not that long ago to make room for Johnson, is back in.

Wow!

What can we make of this?     …quite a lot, I think.

1.  The change comes right after monthly sales results for JCP in March, the second month of the company’s fiscal year, would have been available.  Presumably they’re really bad (the Wall Street Journal is reporting that quarter-to-date sales are down at least 10% year on year).

This is a big problem.  JCP marks up merchandise by about 50% over what it pays.  It uses the gains from sales, called gross income, to cover the costs of running the store network (like advertising, rent, utilities, salaries…).  What’s left over is profit.

JCP’s sales in fiscal 2010 were $17.6 billion;  its pre-tax profit was $581 million.

In fiscal 2012, sales were $13.0 billion, or 26% lower than in fiscal 2010.  My back of the envelope calculation is that JCP lost just under $800 million from retailing last year–offset by a number of non-recurring gains (see my post).

To my mind, the largest factor in the profit decline is the loss of sales.  The March figures suggests sales may not have bottomed out yet.

2.  Since the company was quick to boot Mr. Ullman not so long ago, he’s probably not the company’s first choice as the new CEO.

I can see two possibilities:

–he may be the only experienced executive willing to take the job, or

–JCP may have been pressured into making the change quickly and Mr. Ullman was available on short notice (I’ve heard he was first contacted last weekend).

Neither possibility is encouraging.

3.  Where would outside pressure come from? The two main sources, as I see it, would be:

–suppliers.  Last year JCP generated $140 million in cash by getting suppliers to agree to wait longer to be paid. As the perceived riskiness of dealing with JCP rises, the standard response by suppliers would be to rethink a decision like this.  In a more extreme situation, suppliers would start to reconsider the amounts and types of merchandise they send to a customer.

–banks.  In its 4Q12 earnings conference call, JCP highlighted the fact that it had negotiated a $500 million increase in its bank credit lines, to just over $2 billion.  The message from this seemed to me to be that JCP had ample funds to weather any problems it might encounter in 2013.  Again, the standard response to continuing deterioration in sales would be for banks to reassess their exposure.  All it would likely take to reduce a credit line–something that would doubtless have adverse effects for JCP–would be one credit committee meeting.

There’s no direct evidence that either suppliers or banks have started down this road.  It’s conceivable, though, that one or both told JCP they’ll have to change their thinking if sales don’t perk up soon.  That might have been the final straw for Mr. Johnson.

Alcoa (AA) opens the 1Q13 earnings report season

earnings season again

It’s quarterly earnings season again, the time when every growth stock investor gets a report card on whether he’s picked fast growers or not.

…as usual, AA is first out of the blocks, reporting after yesterday’s New York close.

…as usual, talking heads reach into their bags of clichés and dub AA as a bellwether, or setter of the overall market trend.

…as usual,  the media will interview metals analysts who will “confirm’ the bellwether status of AA.  But, hey, they make their living by having people pay them for their expert knowledge of aluminum.  What else are they supposed to say?   …that it’s a niche industry you can easily live without?

…as usual, the reality for AA is far different, as even a casual glance at a stock chart of AA shares over the past decade would reveal.

the AA report

Alcoa earned $.11 a share in the March quarter, up from $.06 in the year ago period.

–Severe production cutbacks by aluminum producers have brought the supply of aluminum into better balance with demand and improved pricing.

–China’s use of aluminum will grow by around 10% this year; Europe will be down mildly, with beverage cans showing the only plus sign; the US will be up a tiny bit.

–Aerospace will grow by 10% or so globally, non-residential construction by half that.  Everything else–motor vehicles, beverage cans, turbines and housing– is in the +2% – +3% range.

Analysts think AA will post full-year earnings of around $.50 a share this year and $.85 a share next.

All in all, a good report by a very well-managed company in a tough industry.  If the 2014 number is even close to correct, the stock may be mildly undervalued, in my view.

The report also shows that things are ok, but not great, in the industrial sector.  But, to my mind, the report illustrates, too, why metals, and aluminum in particular, are not the place to be overweight in a portfolio right now.

the bellwether thing?

Let’s hope not.

Just look at a chart of AA.  At the top of the market–and of the housing construction boom–in 2007, AA was a $48 stock.  Today, with the S&P reaching new all-time highs, AA is $8 and change.  In fact, except for a brief period in 2007-08, AA has been a serial underperformer for over a decade.

Why?

AA has a highly skilled management, but it’s in a highly business cycle-sensitive industry.  Like almost any mining-based activity, it’s also subject to extended periods of depressed prices as gigantic new mining/fabrication projects–years and years in the planning–get opened, usually just as the business cycle is turning down.

A generation ago, conventional wisdom was that world GDP grew in lockstep with the availability of base metals supplies.  In those days, AA was indeed a bellwether.  But the rise of the knowledge worker, to say nothing of the internet, shows how wrong that thinking has proved to be.

 

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