a failed IPO
The long-awaited IPO of FB has come and gone.
The stock opened late, due to a NASDAQ computer snafu. It almost immediately gave up its initial gains. It closed a mere 25¢ a share above its $38 offering price–and that only due to “stabilization” (read: price-fixing) efforts by the underwriters in the final hour of trading.
It’s been falling since.
a successful offering??
One interesting aspect of the fiasco is that many commentators–as well as many retail participants in the offering, and apparently also the CFO of Facebook–are basically clueless about how the IPO process is supposed to work.
In particular, I’ve heard media proponents of the tooth-and-claw school of capital markets trying to burnish their Darwinian credentials by claiming that Morgan Stanley actually did a good job with the offering. Explicitly or implicitly, they point to the poor trading performance of FB as evidence that the bankers achieved the highest possible price for FB.
I think this is crazy talk. When FB conjures up in investors minds words like “overpriced,” “disaster,” and “huge losses,” that’s not good. Nor is it when retail investors feel they were tricked into buying more stock than they wanted …or when the lead underwriter is being investigated for disclosing negative opinions about FB only to a few customers. And, of course, none of the money from selas of extra shares went to FB itself.
An IPO is supposed to go up!
Not necessarily by 100%, but maybe 20% or so. Why?
Psychologically the company is associated with success when its stock rises. Retail investors, who will buy/use the company’s products and loyally support management, feel good about themselves and the stock they own. This positive association lays the groundwork for the market to absorb more stock when lockups expire and when employees want to cash in more of the stock that’s a key part of their compensation.
A failed IPO, in contrast, generates questions–well-founded or not–about the stability of the company and about the trustworthiness and competence of its management.
what went wrong?
As I see it, there were two separate problems:
1. The main one is that FB issued too much stock all at once. Up until a week ago, the plan had been to sell 388 million shares at a maximum price of $34 each. That’s $13.2 billion. Which is enough money to buy all of the stock of Sony or Omnicom or Applied Materials or Ralph Lauren or Limited Brands, at yesterday’s closing prices.
Last Wednesday the amount of stock was increased by 25% to 485 million shares and the offering price was upped to $38. So the total take from the IPO went up by 40% to $18.4 billion. That would be enough to buy Marathon Oil or Kellogg or Yahoo–or to pick up Whole Foods or Charles Schwab and have a couple of billion left over.
This decision had two negative effects:
–it took $5.2 billion out of investors’ pockets that might have gone into buying FB in the open market after the launch.
–worse, the underwriters were unable to find happy homes for all that extra stock.
In any “hot” IPO, institutions routinely place orders for many times the amount of stock they actually want, in the hope that this will influence the underwriters to give them larger allocations than they’d get otherwise. You want 250,000 shares so you ask for a million.
I don’t think this tactic works, since the parties know one another very well. But people do it anyway. Maybe it makes them feel good. Occasionally the move backfires and the institution gets more stock than it wants. Maybe it gets 500,000 shares.
When this happens, the message is clear–the issue is in trouble. The institution probably decides to stay on the sidelines rather than buy more. Or it turns into a seller.
Lots of retail investors seem to have been playing the same game with FB. Institutions have battle scars and regard being burned like this as a cost of doing business. But for a retail investor, finding 5,000 share of FB in you account last Friday when you expected 500 must have come as an incredible shock. That’s enough to turn you from a greedy buyer into a panicky seller.
2. NASDAQ had a computer meltdown. The details aren’t clear. My broker, Fidelity says it still doesn’t have complete execution information on buy and sell orders it placed for clients during the first few hours of FB trading last Friday. This doubtless raised the level of panic individuals have been feeling.
Just as important, I think the NASDAQ mess also had the effect of transferring some selling from last week into this–prolonging the period of trading turmoil.
who decided to up the offering size?
Normally it’s the underwriter, who, after all, is the one in continual contact with potential buyers. If so, Morgan Stanley and the others had exceptionally tin ears.
In this case, my reading of stray media comments says that the Facebook CFO made the final decision. At the very least, he seems to be the one being thrown under the bus. I’ve never seen comments like this before. My inclination is to say this means they’re true–and that the underwriters don’t like David Ebersman very much. Let me amend that–they don’t think they’ll need to be doing business with him again.
who benefits from the pricing decision?
The underwriters, of course, whose fees are determined by the size of the offering.
Company officers other than Mark Zuckerberg are still listed as making no sales. Mr. Zuckerberg remains as seller of 30 million chares, which he notes will go to pay taxes.
The largest chunk of extra stock, 54 million out of the 97 million added, is listed in a catch-all category of people who have given voting rights to Zuckerberg. Their sales go from 71 million shares to 125 million. The rest of the shares come from venture capital investors.
To me, this says the company FB had nothing to gain by raising the offering size.
what to do
This is still the same company, with the same prospects, as before. If you liked it at $38, you’ve got to like it more at $32. I don’t know the company well enough to have an investment opinion. The stock does seem to be starting to trade more normally today, though.
