Archive for the 'Trading' Category

developing competence as an equity investor

Zen…

The teachers of many sports or craft skills use a Zen-like scale to rate students on their progress toward mastery of their specialty.  The scale typically has four levels, that are often expressed as:

–unconscious incompetence

–conscious incompetence

–conscious competence

–unconscious competence.

…and investing

I think these classifications have some relevance for us as individual investors.  Here’s my take on each–

1.  unconscious incompetence.  This is where everyone starts out.  You know you’re smart–certainly smarter than most of the people you see on stock market cable shows.  You’re successful at your career.  You’re informed about economics.  You read the financial press.  You look at stock prices every day.  You think that’s enough.

People at this stage misunderstand two related things (at the very least I did):

–investing is a craft skill.  Almost every concept is easy to understand.  Complexity comes from the way simple ideas are repeated and combined into intricate and less-than-obvious structures.  Here, experience is more important than having a stratospheric IQ.

–the person on the other side of the trade knows much more than you suspect.  Typically, it’s someone who has served a five-year apprenticeship under an experienced professional investor and has maybe ten years of experience working on this own.  That translates into 50 hours a week gathering information about stocks.  More than that, the person probably spends most of that time focusing on a single stock market sector–or even a single industry, or a subsection of that industry.  Yes, some of these professionals actually have two years experience 7.5 times (meaning they’ve been spinning their wheels for most of their careers–thank goodness for that).  But even so, that’s 5000 hours studying the stocks they tend to buy and sell.  How good is the hot tip from your buddy Charlie in comparison?

2.  conscious incompetence.   Some people remain in stage one forever.  They either don’t evaluate their investment performance vs. their objectives or a benchmark, or their underperformace doesn’t register because it doesn’t square with their self-image.

Others–here I’m much more familiar with what starting-out professionals do that with ordinary individuals–begin to understand that this activity, like almost any other where professionals are involved, is harder than it seems.  They react to the situation in two ways:

–they stop doing the things that lose them the most money, and

–they begin to work harder at learning the ropes.  If they can, they find a successful investor who is willing to teach and who will take them as an apprentice.

3.  conscious competence. At this stage, an investor knows:

–enough accounting to read company financial statements with ease and understands the important financial variables in a company’s success

–enough microeconomics (which is mostly common sense, in my view) to evaluate a firm’s competitive strengths and weaknesses

–how to create a detailed spreadsheet to estimate future earnings (or to forecast other relevant metrics)

–from reading 10-Ks or elsewhere, the financial history of the companies and industries he’s interested in

–that his research process, and his plan for monitoring the key variables his research has uncovered, generally lead to success.

4.  unconscious competence.  This is the Zen stuff.  In sports, it’s the idea that after you’ve done enough conscious practicing, you’ve engrained knowledge deeply enough that you can/should cultivate “the zone.”  You try to stop thinking out what you intend to do and let your unconscious run the show.

In the most literal sense, I don’t think there’s a place for this in investing.  The reason?  –the activity is much more complex than any sport, so accumulated experience isn’t enough to rely on.

Nevertheless, there is something analogous.  For example:  you may encounter a new investment idea.  You know it will easily take a month or more to do the research you need to make an informed decision to buy or not (for me, it usually takes me over a year to become completely comfortable with a stock).  On the other hand, you see that the stock is already beginning to outperform as others become aware of it.  What do you do?

At some point I think every seasoned professional develops a sense of what research tasks are crucial and which amount to crossing the ts and dotting the is, and can be done after buying a small position in the stock.  In effect, you develop a feeling of confidence that a stock has a chance to be an outstanding performer that’s based in part on unconscious processing of information that you aren’t yet able to articulate consciously.

Some veteran investors (me among them) consider this a competitive advantage.  They rarely, if ever, talk about this.  On the other hand, some use “hunches” as a substitute for doing basic research work.  That’s very bad.  If investors like this are not “managed” by their subordinates–analysts or portfolio managers–they threaten to bring down whole investing operations.  Still others shy away from the idea of unconscious thought completely, and remain at stage 3.  I think it’s foolish not to use all the tools at your disposal, but such investors may simply be recognizing their limitations and acting accordingly.

buying a “hot” IPO stock

recent new issues

There are three recent or current IPOs that I find potentially interesting:

–Chow Tai Fook Jewelry  (1929: HK), a  Hong Kong-based jewelry chain that specializes in chuk kam (pure gold) gold jewelry, but which is expanding its offerings to include Western-style fine jewelry as well,

–Nexon (3659: JP), the Korean company that started the casual gaming craze with Kart Rider–and who, oddly enough, just listed in Tokyo, and

–Zynga (ZNGA), the creator of the Facebook game Farmville (although my interest is mostly in the fact that it’s going public at close to 100x historic earnings).

how to buy them

Suppose you want to buy one of these–or shares in any “hot” IPO.  How do you go about it?

Let’s take it as given that no ordinary retail investor is going to get an allocation of stock in the IPO itself.

Those shares normally go to the most important customers of the brokers who take the company public, not to retail investors or small institutions.  In fact, unless you’re very close relatives or friends of the top management of the company going public–and they use their influence to direct shares your way (how likely is that?)–being offered shares in an IPO in the US as a retail investor is probably a red flag.  It suggests no one higher up in the food chain wants them.  So, to mix metaphors a bit, the underwriters are forced to reach down to the bottom of the barrel to get the deal sold.  In other markets, Hong Kong, for example, there can be special tranches of stock reserved for retail investors.  But the amount of stock you will receive in a “hot” IPO is likely to be very small.

So, to participate we have to buy shares on the open market.

my rules

While every situation is a little different, I’ve found that the rules I developed for myself while I was running a tiny mutual fund in the 1980s (too tiny to get many IPO allocations) have served me well over the years.  They are:

1.  Read the offering documents carefully and try to calculate the rate of growth of future profits.  this is how you decide what price is reasonable to pay. Like any other kind of investment, understanding valuation is by far the most important factor in success.  For a US investor trying to buy a foreign stock this can be a problem, since the documents won’t be available to you (even on the internet) until after the IPO.

2.  If the stock goes down on day 1 (as ZNGA is doing while I’m writing this), that’s a very bad sign.

3.  First day trading can be very volatile.  Use limit orders, not market orders.

4.  Don’t buy the entire position on day 1.  Three reasons, two relating to attempts by institutions to game the IPO system to get better allocations of future issues:

–retail investors may place market orders, driving up the stock price

–some institutions want to be seen by the underwriters as buying stock on the first day.  They think this establishes them as serious long-term shareholders and not “flippers” (people who only want to make a quick profit on getting an IPO allocation and who dump the stock on the market as fast as they can).  Underwriters generally hate flippers, since a large amount of flipping threatens to depress the stock price on day 1, making the issue seem less successful.  So, rightly or wrongly, buying institutions hope they’ll get larger allocations of future issues as a reward.

institutions that want to be seen as regular supports of an underwriters IPOs (i.e., they’ll take anything) and as long-term holders of everything may start to sell after a week or two, when they think underwriters won’t notice, thus preserving their A-list status.

3.  A week or two after the initial trading day, after the IPO hoopla is over and when the institutions I describe in my last point above begin to sell, there may well be a chance to buy the stock at a lower price than on day 1.

4.  Keep a list of interesting stocks you might like to buy but think are too expensive now.  Every so often–too often nowadays, in my opinion–stock markets get frightened and sell off in a crazy way.  Everything goes down; small stocks can go down a lot.

I’ve found these to be excellent times to buy the formerly hot IPO stocks.

 

 

 

(for the first time in a long while) I’ve updated Odds and Ends: Georgiou and Corzine

I’ve just updated Odds and Ends.  If you’re on the blog, you can just click the tab at the top of the page.

a former MF Global CEO is now managing NYC pension investments

in the Wall Street Journal

In an odd article at the top of the front page of  the December 1st Greater New York section of the Wall Street Journal, the newspaper heralds NYC’s hiring of Kevin Davis, a former CEO of MF Global, who was replaced there in late 2008.  Mr. Davis has been overseeing commodities investments for the city’s Bureau of Asset Management for about three months.   Lawrence Schloss, himself a former director of MF Global, selected Mr. Davis for the job, saying he has 26 years of experience and was the best candidate to apply.

details

The article goes on to to relate, without analysis or comment, that:

–Mr. Davis is earning a salary of $175,000–which is less than 1% of his compensation during his last full year at MF

–MF Global’s stock lost over 90% of it value during his tenure

–MF was subsequently sued by pension funds for misrepresenting its risk management practices, a case that MF recently settled by paying $90 million.

any significance?

There’s nothing in the article, other than its prominent placement, to indicate that there’s anything amiss with the hire.  And the placement may be more the result of political differences between the city Comptroller and News Corp than of anything else.

Two things strike me, however:

1.  NYC, like many government bodies, seems to be an advocate of the penny-wise-pound-foolish school of investment manager compensation.  A competent commodities person would make many times what the city is offering.  Mr. Davis may have been the only candidate to apply.

2.  The event that ultimately led to Mr. Davis’s demise at MF was discovery of $141 million in losses from unauthorized wheat trading by a broker in MF’s Memphis, Tennessee office.  According to theFinancial Times, the trader wasn’t a “rogue” who evaded management controls; the company’s computer systems weren’t programmed correctly.

Two years later, we’re finding again that MF Global’s computer recordkeeping systems are inadequate.  In fact, the records are in such a shambles that no one has been able to figure out how much customer money is missing from the firm–other than it’s a lot–or where it went.  I doubt Jon Corzine found top-notch recordkeeping systems when he arrived at MF and dismantled them (for what it’s worth, he doesn’t strike me as the kind of guy who would have looked in the first place).  My hunch is that they’ve been inadequate for a long time and that no one investigated properly, or extensively enough, after the 2008 trading losses.  There may well be much more to the MF Global story today than deficient computers.  But I think anyone using the in-house systems should have immediately realized their inadequacies and at least insisted they be fixed.

a post-Thanksgiving addendum to Current Market Tactics

I’ve just wrote a post-Thanksgiving update to Current Market Tactics.  If you’re on the blog, you can also click the tab at the top of the page.

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