speculative stocks: the gold mine paradigm

speculative stock behavior

Speculative stocks of all stripes are often compared with gold mining stocks–not just any gold stocks but young companies with a potentially important strike but no history of profitable production.  Here’s why:

like gold mines

fraud?

In one sense, it’s because gold mining stocks have been fertile areas for fraud, in financial centers from Perth to Denver to Vancouver.  There was even a case in the US many years ago–a major scandal–where a mutual fund took large positions in junior Canadian miners that had fabulous financials indicating deep undervaluation.  When the portfolio manager went to visit the mining operations, however, he discovered they existed only in the imaginations of promoters who were happily churning out fake financial statements.

stock trajectory

Putting such cases to the side, the stocks of legitimate start-up companies often follow the same trajectory as gold miners as they approach the day when their first major development finally comes into production.

–the new strike is announced.  There’s limited exploratory drilling and little other information other than that the find is good enough to be commercially viable.  The stock goes up.

The lack of information itself opens the door to all sorts of speculation.  Analysts, who are always working from imperfect information in any event, may arrive at their preliminary estimates from an average of the productive capability of other mines in the area, or from the past experience of the geologists or the professionals associated with the project.

Even at this stage, analysts begin to jockey for position with each other by offering, in turn, increasingly more optimistic assessments of the find.  The stock goes up some more.

–financing is lined up.  Further drilling has been done to delineate the find and to justify a bank loan that will fund construction of productive facilities.  Getting a loan means a third party has examined, and signaled its validation of, the geological data and production plan.  This sets off another round of more positive speculative assessment of the find.  The stock goes up again.

–the mine and associated processing facilities are constructed.  As analysts can see the scope of the project, even more bullish reports are issued.  The stock goes up once more.

–the mine opens; production commences.  For most stocks this means reality intrudes on–and shatters–the reverie of stock market speculation.  Dream shifts into reality.  Analysts can no longer imagine extraordinarily high ore grade being processed at a world-record rate.  They have to deal with the facts of, say, ordinary grade ore being processed at pedestrian rates.  The stock plummets.

Almost always, the day that the mine opens is also the day that the stock price peaks.  

playing the Japanese stock market today is harder than it seems

how so?

No, it isn’t the frequent market holidays.

It isn’t the semi-visible, semi-not, zaibatsu/keiretsu business links that tie firms together with amazingly strong (to me, anyway) emotional bonds that foreigners find difficult to assess.

It isn’t the fact that for many Japanese company managements–to say nothing of institutional investors–one foot remains in the samurai world.

None of this helps a foreign investor.  But learning a market’s quirks is arguably part of the price of entry a newbie pays everywhere he goes.

the market structure…

No, the biggest problem for a foreigner today is the structure of the market–the selection of stocks available on the Tokyo Exchange.  Despite the fact that Japan is a wealthy nation and the second-largest advanced economy in the world, its market is dominated by the export-oriented manufacturers, plus the suppliers and distributors that support them, whose heyday (ex the autos) was thirty years ago.

…makes Japan look like an emerging country

The market structure is more like what you’d expect from China or India.  It’s also a little like the US circa 1980.  In the US since then, however, junk bond and private equity barons have taken many older, low growth firms private.  Conglomerates have broken up, or spun off their more glamorous parts, in strategies calculated to maximize their value.  Venture capital has brought a host of new firms into the public arena.  Not so Japan.  There are counterculture exceptions:  Uniqlo and the social networking firms come to mind.  But still…

None of this is exactly news.  But it’s the genesis of the dilemma foreigners now face in the Japanese stock market.

today’s problem:  a weakening yen

Newly initiated quantitative easing in Japan is weakening the yen.  That’s making life more difficult for domestic firms that use imported materials.  And it’s also a lifeline for exporters, who use yen-denominated inputs and sell their products abroad.  So Japanese institutions have been selling the former to buy the latter.  Again, no surprise.  It’s what they always do.

The issue for a foreigner is this:

Ex the autos, the exporters are not a particularly attractive picture.  Historically, they’re a pretty sorry lot in terms of making money.  They face intensifying competition from lower-cost rivals in emerging economies.  By and large, managements are hide-bound and unable to commercialize higher tech products they have.  Law and custom defend dysfunctional incumbents against any shareholder attempts at change .  (Think:  Olympus …or Sharp  …or Pioneer  …or Sanyo   …or Casio   …or Sony).

In addition, for a dollar-oriented investor, at least a part–and probably most–of any yen-denominated gains will be offset by currency losses.  Although my general rule is not to get involved in forex hedging, this is an exception.  Whether you like or not, you probably won’t make much money on your Japanese stocks unless you sell the yen.

…which brings up another potential worry.  Exporters usually run substantial currency hedging operations.  In my experience, they’re pretty good at it.  Nevertheless, it’s always possible that exporters have zigged when they should have zagged.

my bottom line

For a long time, I’ve regarded Japan as a special situations market.  Find an outstanding company; buy and hold.  Enduring the current flight from quality is just a cost of doing business.  I have no desire to chase export-oriented names, although while the yen is softening I think exporters will continue to be market stars.  If I were managing dedicated Japanese money, however, I’m sure I’d find myself under performance pressure to do just that.

exogenous events: how to deal with them

two preliminary points

stock market implications

Some exogenous threats/events have few.  For example:

–the Y2K worries that all the world’s computers would cease to function on January 1, 2000 turned out to be unfounded

–SARS was contained, and did not evolve into the worldwide pandemic some had feared

–I doubt French voters’ choice of a new president in upcoming elections will make a crucial difference in the way the Eurozone crisis will play out.

risk preferences

Let’s say that past market-moving exogenous events have depressed stock prices by 20% have taken six months to be fully discounted, just get a sense of possible loss.  I don’t think there is a “typical” exogenous event, however.  The two big oil shocks were a lot worse than that; after 9/1/2001, stock prices fell about 12% over a few days and then began to recover.

Still, the numbers allow me to frame a question.  If you thought a hard-to-analyze, but potentially negative, event might be coming down the road, would you change your allocation of assets to the stock market?  If you’re not okay with a (hopefully) temporary 20% loss in value, you should rethink where you have your money invested.

what makes an exogenous threat/event different?

1.  Exogenous events are typically all or nothing situations.  The event either happens or it doesn’t.  There are no shades of partly or maybe.  This makes it harder to hedge by arranging your stocks to benefit from a middle-of-the-road outcome.

2.  Their timing is very hard to judge.

3.  They typically occur in areas where understanding them requires knowledge outside the skills and experience of professional investors.  So they’re hard for investors to analyze and handicap.

4.  They can involve a relatively rapid (in macroeconomic terms, anyway) series of actions and counter-actions.  The exogenous threat of the moment–possible Israeli bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities–is an instance.  Will Israel bomb Iran?  If so, will Iran retaliate?…

my approach

When dealing with anything that’s important but hard to decide about, I think the ideal position for a portfolio to be in is one where the issue is irrelevant to performance.  In that way, you’re not forced to bet on something you have no insight into.  In the case of an exogenous event/threat, however, that may not be possible, particularly for a growth stock investor.

You can, and should, pay attention to two factors:  pre-event portfolio positioning, and having a reaction plan if/when the event occurs.

Let’s take the crisis du jour, an Israeli attack on Iran, as an example.

This is a highly emotionally charged and complex issue–one that I know little about.  The stock market fear is that Israel will bomb Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran will retaliate.  Oil prices will rise.  The world will be drawn into accelerating armed conflict in the Middle East.  Media reports suggest than any attack must commence before the end of 2012, by which time Iranian plants will supposedly be too heavily protected for an attack by Israel to be successful.

pre-event portfolio positioning

My guess is that an Israeli attack would produce a short, sharp drop in stock prices, similar to that after 9/11, followed by a period of assessment.

I don’t see any way of organizing a stock portfolio so that it wouldn’t be very sensitive to a selloff, other than to adopt a very defensive overall portfolio posture.  The problem with doing that is that it forfeits most upside from the time you put it in place.  Suppose the exogenous event doesn’t take place?  Or, suppose the market goes up by 10% before the event and then declines by 8% as it unfolds.  I thinks case, you’re probably still worse off from being defensive than you would have been by doing nothing.

What am I doing instead of this? …stuff I should be doing anyway, but I’m paying closer attention than usual.

–I’m combing through my portfolio for “iffy” stocks that have achieved most of the outperformance I’ve envisioned for them and which I’m holding onto partly from inertia, partly to maintain market exposure.  I’m starting to pare those positions back.

–I’m being more price conscious with anything I’m buying.

–I’m thinking about energy stocks, and US chemicals the use natural gas feedstocks–but I haven’t bought anything yet.

–I’d think twice about any companies I own that have plant and equipment in Israel (other than INTC, I have none that I’m aware of).

a reaction plan

This is at least as important as pre-event planning.  An awful lot depends on judging what’s going on while an event-related selloff is in progress.  But the general idea would be:

–to buy, rather than sell

–to search among the biggest losers for purchase candidates that have been beaten up without good reason

–to reverse the defensive moves you made in anticipation of the event.  In this case, this would mean selling energy producers and replacing them with energy users.

When to start such contrary moves depends as well.  When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in early August 1990, for instance, oil stocks hit a peak of relative performance about two months after, in late September-early October.  That was long before the US attack on Saddam the following January sparked a general market upturn.

After 9/11, in contrast, the faster one bought the better.

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