2Q14 results for Wynn Resorts (WYNN) and Wynn Macau (HK: 1128)

it’s been same old, same old for the big casino operators…

I haven’t written about WYNN and its subsidiary Wynn Macau (1128) for a while.  That’s mostly because I perceive the company to be in a holding pattern.  It has two casino operations:  Las Vegas and Macau, the latter through 72%-owned Wynn Resorts.

–In Las Vegas, all the major casino resort operators, WYNN included, upped their operating leverage by opening big new casino and hotel capacity in 2007-08, just as the recession was unfolding.  Demand dropped through the floor.    Profits disappeared faster.  Results since have been consistently weak as the casinos wait for demand to pick up and/or for weaker entries to close up shop.

–In the Macau market, which is now many times the size of Las Vegas, 1128 has been capacity constrained for some time.  Its next expansion, the Wynn Palace, isn’t slated to open until early 2016.

…until now

Las Vegas

For WYNN, the near-term story is Las Vegas.  And the change is for the better.  Room revenues in 2Q14 were up by 7.3% year-on-year in the quarter.  Average room rates rose to $283, up from $268 in 2Q13.  Occupancy increased from 88.4% from 86.9%.  To my mind, the room rate rise is a particularly important indicator of increasing demand.

In addition, the amount bet at WYNN’s Las Vegas tables was up by almost 15%, year-on-year.  The company’s win percentage was an unusually high 27.4%. vs.  the company’s expected range of 21% – 24%.  In all likelihood, the “extra” win from this quarter will be offset by sub-par “luck” in coming periods.  But, again, the more interesting number is the sharp jump in table games betting.

Slot machines were flat.

Management said on the earnings conference call that the 2Q strength was continuing into 3Q.

Macau

In Macau, the individual pluses and minuses for 1128 may be a little different, but the near-term profit profile–flattish–remains the same.

Overall market growth in Macau has slowed as an economic lull in China and Beijing’s anti-corruption campaign have tempered VIP’s  enthusiasm for high-stakes gambling.  This has been offset by a sharp jump in visits by the mass affluent, who–unlike their high-roller counterparts–are more concerned with being entertained than at winning a lot at baccarat.  They also want to eat, shop and go to shows.  So from the casinos’ point of view, they’re great customers.

While it waits for the new capacity the Wynn Palace will bring, 1128 is refurbishing its existing hotel and casino spaces.  It’s also raising salaries considerably, both to reinforce its reputation for superior service and to retain staff.  While these actions may make profits a bit weaker than they would be otherwise, it makes sense to use the current lull to set the stage for stronger growth in a year or two.

my take

WYNN has a market cap of $22 billion.  Its stake in 1128 is worth $16 billion, meaning that Wall Street is valuing the Wynn name, Las Vegas operations, royalties from Macau and the potential of future casino development in, say, Japan, at $6 billion.  That’s roughly 25x earnings.

WYNN shares yield 2.3%, 1128 about double that.

Last year, I sold the 1128 I had held since just after the IPO, partly because my casino holdings had become too large a part of my portfolio, partly in anticipation of the current fallow time.  I’m beginning to think about buying it back.  But I’d prefer to do so in the mid- to high-HK$20s.  Rightly or wrongly, I think I have time before the market begins to discount the opening of the Wynn Palace–with a presumed strong profit upsurge–in 2016.

I bought a lot of the WYNN I hold during the market collapse in early 2009.  I may be influenced by the tax I’d pay if I sold (I hope not, because this is virtually always a bad way to think), but I’m content to collect the dividend while I wait for Las Vegas to recover and the Wynn Palace to open.  To me it sounds as if the first may already be happening, which would be good news for WYNN shares.

What would I do if I owned nothing in this sector?

The least risky thing to do would be to buy a small amount of either WYNN or LVS and try to add on weakness.  LVS has the better near-term profit profile; WYNN has the better management, in my view.  Their valuations are similar, although their business models are a bit different.  LVS runs convention hotels; WYNN focuses on the high-roller niche.  (I own both.)

The most attractive firm I see at the moment is Galaxy Entertainment.  It’s a Macau-only operator and trades either in Hong Kong, or on the pink sheets–so it’s riskier than the other two.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the Macau gambling market contracted by 3.7% in June!

The recently released monthly report from Macau’s Gambling Information and Coordination Bureau (DICJ) showed that aggregate casino win (the amount gamblers lost in the casinos last month) amounted to MOP 27.2 billion, or about US$3.4 billion.  That’s a 3.7% year-on-year drop, the first red figure I can remember for the SAR, and the only one on the DICJ website, which contains comparisons going back to 2010.

Yes, the figures might have been slightly in the black if not for the World Cup keeping potential gamblers glued to their TV sets at home rather than being at the casino tables.  And it has been clear that the yoy comparisons would get progressively tougher as 2014 unfolded.  That’s because 2013 results got stronger as the VIP market returned to normal after the mainland Chinese Communist Party leadership transition.

There are two more important reasons for the flattening out of the Macau gambling market, however.  Both are temporary, I think.

–the continuing anti-corruption crackdown by Beijing, which has VIP gamblers adopting a lower profile, and

–lack of junket operator credit (junket operators typically borrow, at rates of 1%+ per month, funds that they advance to VIPs), in the wake of the apparent disappearance of a prominent organizer with US$1 billion – US$1.3 billion of his company’s funds.  This has understandably made lenders reluctant to back any junket operator as fully as before.

Interestingly, the Macau gambling stocks, which have been very weak performers since early this year, rallied on the DICJ report.

What to do?

My guess is that the VIP segment of the Macau market will be at best flat for the rest of the year. That will make it hard for the aggregate gambling market in the SAR to show significant advances.  However, the real story of Macau is below the surface.  It’s the rapid shift away from VIPs and toward the mass affluent that’s now going on.  The latter, which already account for the bulk of the SAR’s win, are also big spenders in the casinos’ food, entertainment and shopping venues (remember, non-gambling activities can account for half a casino’s income, and they’re just getting started in Macau).

The Hong Kong-traded casino stocks, which have been very weak performers since early in the year, seem to me to have already discounted the negative developments I’ve described above.

In my view, the worst hurt by the VIP slowdown will be the traditional casinos run by the Ho family.  The least affected will be Sands China, Wynn Macau and Galaxy Entertainment (I own Galaxy and the parents of the two others).

I’m not rushing to add to my exposure (although I think I may have missed the bottom in Wynn Macau a couple of weeks ago), but i have no desire to sell, either.

 

 

Macau gambling, May 2014

The day before yesterday, the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (DICJ) posted the total monthly gambling “win” (the amount lost by gamblers) for the SAR’s casinos during May.  The results were below analysts’ expectations, causing a selloff in the US gambling stocks with Macau presence, and a minor negative ripple in the Hong Kong-traded Macau casino stocks themselves.

The year-to-date DICJ results are:

Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2014 and 2013
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2014 2013 Variance 2014 2013 Variance
Jan 28,739 26,864 +7.0% 28,739 26,864 +7.0%
Feb 38,007 27,084 +40.3% 66,746 53,948 +23.7%
Mar 35,453 31,336 +13.1% 102,199 85,284 +19.8%
Apr 31,318 28,305 +10.6% 133,517 113,589 +17.5%
May 32,354 29,589 +9.3% 165,871 143,178 +15.8%

Source: Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau

What’s going on?

First of all, and least important, the market had been expecting a 10%+ year-on-year gain in aggregate casino win, based on weekly reports of business results provided by the casinos.  The falloff during the last few days of the month is most likely a random variation in the casino luck factor, one that will eventually be reversed.

More generally, the so-so rate of yoy gain in win is the result of two opposing factors.  On the one hand, increases is betting by mainland high-rollers, the almost exclusive focus of the Macau market over the past decade, have slowed to a crawl.  On the other, affluent mass-market gambling is rising sharply.  Mass market gamblers bet smaller amounts, but lose a much higher percentage of the amount bet than VIPs (who are more or less professional gamblers).  Mass market patrons want entertainment, not necessarily gambling profits, so they don’t watch what they’re doing so closely.  They also spend a lot more on things like restaurants, shows and shopping.  We’ll know more about non-gambling when June financial reports are released by the casinos, but non-gambling profits have been rising sharply from a small base.  It’s important to remember that in the salad days of Las Vegas, non-gambling amounted to half of casino industry profits.  So growth in Macau has potentially a long way to grow.

The overall Macau market is facing capacity constraints that will only begin to easy next year.  In a sense, the current lull in new capacity additions is ending up being luckily timed, since it coincides with a slowdown in the VIP market.

All in all, it seems to me that the March-May gains in casino win are more indicative of what the rest of the year will be like than January-February.

The related stocks have sold off by about 20%–more than I would have expected–in a flat Hong Kong market over the past few months.  Stocks like Sands China and Galaxy Entertainment, which have little VIP exposure and lots of mass market, have declined at least as much as Wynn Macau, which is in the opposite position.

I find the Macau stocks hard to figure out.  It’s not their profit potential, it’s the way they trade in the Hong Kong market.  The current situation of little capacity addition was well-known a year ago.  The VIP slowdown could equally well have been anticipated.  I think the mass market and non-gambling profit development has been much more positive this year than the consensus expected.  In other words, the negatives are no worse, and the positives are a lot better.  Yet the stocks went up last year and have sold off so far in 2014.

My take?  I’m in this for the long haul.  I sold my Wynn Macau quite a while ago and have been looking for a reentry point.  Not yet, though.  I continue to own Galaxy Entertainment and would own Sands China as well, if it were easier for a US citizen to buy.  I’m looking to add to my holdings, but am in no rush.

Macau casinos, after their stock market decline

a weak few months

Macau casinos, and their foreign parents, have been bludgeoned in the stock market over the past couple of months.  Several reasons:

–general worry about stocks that had gone up a lot

–the Ukraine situation, which has unnerved European investors

–fear that the the current anti-corruption/anti-excessive consumption drive by Beijing will hurt the VIP business which has been the heart of Macau casino profits, and

–the possible proliferation of casino openings elsewhere in China, or in other Asian countries like the Philippines or Japan.

what, me worry?

Every portfolio investor acts on small amounts of imperfect information.  That’s why we don’t put all our eggs in one basket (Bernard Baruch to the contrary).   From where I sit, a lot of the negative things now being said about Macau seem to be (mistaken) attempts to explain the stock price drops.   I don’t think they have much factual basis.  Of course, even the best stock market investor is wrong 40%+ of the time.

For what it’s worth, here’s my take:

–So far there’s no hard evidence so far that Beijing’s anti-corruption campaign is having any negative effect on the VIP gambling business in Macau.

–More important, the Macau gambling market is no longer being driven solely by VIPs.  The new sweet spot is the mass affluent, a market segment that’s now the source of most of the SAR’s growth.  How so?  VIPs bet huge amounts, but they’re semi-professional gamblers.  They lose on average about 3% of the amount they bet; the casino rebates half of that, either to the high roller himself or to the middlemen who has brought him there.  So margins are razor-thin.  The mass affluent, on the other hand, are seeking entertainment.  At table games, they make much smaller bets, but they lose about a quarter of what they wager–and they don’t care that much.   A mass affluent pataca bet is worth 15x-20x in casino operating profit what a high roller pataca is.  Hordes of them are now descending on Macau.  (There’s also a shift among winners and losers within the market, but that’s another story.)

The mass affluent also want non-gambling entertainment.  In the salad days of Las Vegas, shows, concerts, restaurants…brought in just as much profit as the casino operations.  In Macau, this business is still in its infancy.  But I see no reason why Macau in the end will be any different.

–Transportation links are still being built to allow more far-flung areas of China to reach Macau, meaning market saturation is still years off.

–It makes no sense to me to believe both (1) that Beijing’s crackdown is aimed squarely at casinos and (2) that the government will give permission for more casinos to open in other areas of China.  But this is what some bears are saying.

–Macau has critical mass and lots of amenities.  Chinese is the dominant language.  Kidnapping high rollers isn’t an issue.  Japanese casinos, whatever they may eventually look like, are years away.  Singapore has already been up and running for a considerable while–and Chinese junket operators aren’t welcome there anyway.  Some VIPs will certainly try out the Philippines or other venues.  I just don’t see this as a big deal.

 

Yes, I trimmed my Macau exposure significantly last year–because my position size was much too large.   At this point, I’m a potential buyer, not a seller.

 

China the largest economy in the world? ..that’s what the World Bank is saying

The World Bank has just released the findings of its International Comparison Program, derived from analysis of world economic data from 2011.  This is an update of the ICP results from 2005.

The data show that three years ago the US economy was only about 8% larger than China’s.  Given that China is growing by at least 7% per year while the US is barely expanding at all, the implication is that sometime in 2014 China will seize the #1 crown the US has worn since 1872 (according to the Financial Times).  That’s when the US surpassed the UK.

Generally speaking, the report shows the increasing prominence of emerging economies, especially in Asia.  That’s really no surprise, since that continent is home to two giants, China and India (#3 in the world).  In fact, the only news in the ICP report is timing.  Prior to this, and based on the earlier ICP data, most economic observers had expected China to pass the US within a few years.

Two caveats:

–the figures are based on total GDP.  Per capital GDP is still much higher in the US than in China, but the latter has over 4x as many people.

–the numbers are calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), not conventional GDP measures.

The difference?

Up until about a quarter century ago, economists took local currency GDP figures for each nation and converted them into a common currency, usually the US$, for comparison.   They used market exchange rates to do the conversion.  In the 1980s, however, people began to notice that this method was giving out crazy results.  China, for example, was growing at maybe triple the rate of the US at that time–but conventional GDP showed it shrinking relative to the US.

That’s how economists realized that measuring GDP through the ability to purchase internationally traded goods (which is, after all, what the exchange rate shows) wasn’t good enough.  So PPP, which measures the cost of purely domestic goods and services–like haircuts or movie tickets–as well, was born (you can find more detail in this post).

Significance?

It’s probably more social and political than directly relevant to the stock market.  On the other hand, it reinforces the fact that the health (or not) of the Chinese economy is of crucial importance to the rest of the world.  As investors, China is too big, and too fast-growing, not to try to have some exposure to.  The clear way to do so, in my mind, is through Hong Kong, which is the destination of choice for legitimate Chinese firms seeking a listing that will attract non-mainland investors.  My impression is that not many US investors have been willing so far to put in the time and effort needed to learn about it.

 

Tomorrow Keeping Score returns, after a month’s hiatus.