Tesla (TSLA) or Solar City (SCTY)–which to choose

TSLA and SCTY are terrestrial companies run by Elon Musk.  TSLA makes electric-powered cars; SCTY generates electric power with solar cells.

what they have in common

Both are publicly traded.

Both are speculative stocks, in the sense that assessing their value involves projecting results far into the future.

Both are trying to transform staid industries that have been around for a long time.

Both are big users of capital.

Both face substantial regulatory barriers to their success.

–For TSLA, it’s the regulations in many states that prohibit a car manufacturer from selling its products direct to the consumer.  Instead, the carmaker has to use an independent dealer network.

–Because at present they generally have no ability to store power on-site, SCTY clients generally sell the power generated by their solar panels to the electric utilities and purchase power from the grid as they need it run their electrical devices.  Utilities would, naturally, like to buy at 2 and sell at 4.  Regulations, however, force them to trade both ways at the same price, but only so long as solar is a tiny percentage of their business.  In addition, electric utilities are the ones who inspect any local power storage batteries that a household/firm may install.  The utilities aren’t falling all over themselves rushing to do this.

I have small positions in both.

how they differ

Personally, I find SCTY the more conceptually interesting company.

On the other hand, I feel much more comfortable with TSLA.

Why?

It isn’t the industry or the capital structure.

It’s the gigantic battery factory that Musk is in the process of building.

Both TSLA and SCTY can be seen as different ways to create demand for highly sophisticated batteries.  Both are certainly radically dependent on having cutting-edge battery technology.  Arguably, batteries are the main source of value in the products of either firm.

But who owns the battery factory?  TSLA.  To me, this means that Elon Musk’s main economic interest likes in TSLA, not SCTY.  History says an investor wants to have his money in the same place as the entrepreneur he’s betting on.

 

ARK Investment Management and its ETFs

ARK

I was listening to Bloomberg Radio (again!?!) earlier this month and heard an interview of Cathie Wood, the CEO/CIO of recently formed ARK Investment Management.  I don’t know Ms. Wood, although we both worked at Jennison Associates, a growth-oriented equity manager with a very strong record, during different time periods.  Just before ARK, she had been CIO of Global Thematic Strategies for twelve years at value investor AllianceBernstein.  (As a portfolio manager I was a big fan of Bernstein’s equity research but I’m not familiar with her Bernstein output.)  She’s been  endorsed by Arthur Laffer of Laffer Curve fame, who sits on her board.

ARK is all about finding and benefiting from “disruptive innovation that will change the world.”

Ms. Wood was promoting two actively managed ETFs that ARK launched at the beginning of the month, one focused on industrial innovation (ARKQ) and another the internet (ARKW).  Two more are in the works, one for genomics (ARKG) and the last (ARKK) an umbrella innovation portfolio which will apparently hold what it considers the best of the other three portfolios.

What really caught my ear in the interview was Ms. Wood’s discussion of the domestic automobile market (summary research available on the ARK website).  Most cars lie around doing nothing during the day.  What happens if either ride-sharing services like Uber or the Google self-driven car, which make more constant use of autos, catch on as substitutes?  According to Ms. Wood, until these innovations reach 2.5% of total miles driven (based on the idea that on a per mile basis ride-sharing costs half what owning a car does), there’s little effect.  But at 5% penetration, the bottom falls out of the new car market.  New car sales get cut in half!

Who knows whether this is correct or whether it will happen or not   …but I find this a very interesting idea.

about the ETFs

The top holdings of ARKW are:  athenahealth, Apple, Facebook, Salesforce.com and Twitter.  These comprise just under 25% of the portfolio.

For ARKQ, the top five are:  Google, Autodesk, Tesla, Monsanto and Fanuc.  They make up just over 24% of the portfolio.

Both will likely be high β portfolios.  Both have performed roughly in line with the NASDAQ Composite since their debut.

The perennial question about thematic investors (I consider myself one) is whether the high-level concepts are backed up by meticulous company by company financial research.  This is essential.  In addition, it’s important, to me anyway, that the holdings be arranged so that they’re not all dependent on a single theme–the continuing success of the Apple ecosystem, for instance.

I’m not familiar with Ms. Wood’s work, so I can’t say one way or another (Fanuc and ABB strike me as kind of weird holding for ARKQ, though).  But I think her research is worth reading and her ETFs worth at least monitoring.  For us as investors, the ultimate question will be whether Ms. Wood can outperform an appropriate index.  The NASDAQ Composite would be my initial choice.

 

 

 

 

 

“To the People of New Jersey”: from Elon Musk

Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, wrote a blog post last Friday giving details of the circumstances of the revocation of Tesla’s licences to sell cars in the Garden State.  The post was apparently also sent to every New Jerseyan on the Tesla mailing list.  It follows a post three days earlier by Mr. Musk, “Defending Innovation and Consumer Choice in New Jersey,” in which he alerts readers to an about-face by the Christie administration.  After months of negotiations, during which Tesla believed the question of its licences would be put to legislative vote, Musk says the governor decided to have the Motor Vehicle Commission declare that cars in New Jersey can only be sold through third-party dealer networks.  The rationale?  …”consumer protection.”

Musk is considerably less than amused by this development.  At one point in his long post on the 14th, he manages to allude to mafia influence and to the traffic obstruction scandal Mr. Christie is embroiled in, both in the course of a sentence or two.

Musk also derides the notion that anyone would consider car dealerships to be paragons of consumer protection.  He points out as well that the MVC is “protecting” citizens against the vehicle that has achieved the highest ratings Consumer Reports has ever given to any car.  He also cites business publication polls in California, North Carolina and Texas in which overwhelming majorities favor the direct car sales over sales through dealerships.

More substantively for investors, Musk also outlines the difficulties Tesla would face in trying to sell through third-party dealer networks.  This model calls for dealers to sell large numbers of cars, and to make the bulk of their profits through (expensive) aftermarket services.  Tesla’s electric cars don’t require much servicing, however.  At least some of that can be done through software updates over the internet.  In addition, the fact that Tesla will likely sell only 35,000 cars worldwide this year (that would be 0.25% of the US car market if they were all sold here) means Tesla can’t be a significant part of any dealer’s business.  So the dealer might use the Tesla name to get customers onto his lot, but he’s likely to try to steer the client toward more profitable brands.

It’s also striking that, as Musk points out, every independent electric car maker who has tried to sell through existing third-party auto dealers has failed.  Musk says the last successful independent in the US was Chrysler a century ago,

On to Ohio, where the next Tesla vs. dealers battle is being fought.

Tesla (TSLA) bids adieu to the Garden State

Tesla (TSLA) is an interesting, multi-dimensional company.  It took a gigantic step forward, in my view, a short while ago when it raised $2 billion+ to help fund the “gigafactory” it plans to build to make to build batteries that will feed the needs of the Elon Musk empire.  The money came through a convertible bond issue whose buyers accepted ultra-low coupons in return for the right to buy TSLA stock at around $350 a share.

direct to consumer

One of the firm’s key profit strategies is to sell its electric cars direct to the consumer, bypassing third-party auto dealers.  This is potentially very important.

The typical traditional car company has an operating margin of around 12%.  Publicly traded car dealers mark the vehicles they purchase from manufacturers by another 10%-15% in selling them to the end-user.  If TSLA is able to achieve the performance metrics of the typical auto manufacturer (it may be aiming higher), capturing the wholesale-to-retail markup would potentially double TSLA’s per unit profit.  In addition, the current sales volumes for TSLA are extremely low–TSLA’s goal of selling 35,000 cars in 2014 would give it 0.2% of the domestic car market if it sold them all in the US.  So it makes no sense for TSLA to set up its own dealerships.  And what terms would a third party demand for a dealership that might initially sell only 100 cars a year?

traditional car dealer opposition

The biggest stumbling block for TSLA in direct sales is the obvious one:  the auto dealers don’t like this, and they form an immensely powerful lobby in local politics.

For the dealers, TSLA itself isn’t that important. They  see TSLA as the thin edge of the wedge–that if TSLA is able to sell direct to the consumer, sooner or later Toyota, Ford and GM will be doing the same.  After all, their profits potentially double.  There goes the traditional car dealership business.

In many states, there are already laws on the books that enshrine car dealers.  They compel auto purchases to be made through traditional dealers and prohibit car manufacturers from obtaining dealer licenses.

That hasn’t quite been the case in New Jersey, where the Motor Vehicle Commission has allowed TSLA to operate   …until this week.   On Wednesday, the MVC revoked the previous permission it had granted TSLA and ruled that it can’t sell cars itself in the Garden State.  TSLA must establish a third-party franchisee network to sell in the state.

The decision has been unpopular with both conservatives and liberals.  The press is pointing out that the NJ change or heart follows very large political contributions to Governor Christie by car dealers.  The result remains, however:  no more TSLA sales in New Jersey, effective April 1.

This story is still evolving.  The next chapter will be written in Ohio, where TSLA is fighting a similar battle against auto dealers.  The lost sales in each state where TSLA is forced out will likely be negligible, although whether they amount to something in the aggregate is another question.

I’m not sure many holders of the stock believe the direct sales effort was anything more than tilting against windmills, given how deeply politically connected traditional car dealers are.  I suspect the most lasting damage done may be in TSLA’s image.  Its outlets in high-profile retail space help identify it as the choice for potential buyers of electric cars.  If they gradually go away, does the cachet that gives TSLA one of its current sales advantages gradually fade away?

 

the Tesla (TSLA) convertible issue

The new TSLA convertible issue came to market yesterday.  Demand was so strong that the company raised an extra $400 million in seven-year notes (yield = 1.25%), bringing the total amount raised, before underwriting fees, to $2.0 billion.  That breaks out into $1.2 billion in seven-year notes + $800 million in five-year (yield = 0.25%).

The conversion premium is a whopping 42.5%!

If the underwriters exercise their overallotment, the total will rise to $2.3 billion.  (The underwriters actually sell more securities to their customers in an offering than the headline amount.  They use this extra to absorb any selling by buyers who intend to “flip,” or sell quickly.  The idea is to stabilize the issue price during the period immediately following the offering.  Sounds weird.  Yes, it’s price manipulation.  Yes, it’s legal.  In this case, the overallotment is $300 million.)

Clearly, no one is in this issue for the interest payments.   It’s all about possible capital gains if the TSLA price can rise by more than 42.5% before the bonds mature.

Tells you something about what bond managers think the prospects for straight bonds are.

At the same time, the issue proceeds take TSLA’s gigafactory–which will ultimately enable the company to sell 500,000 cars, it says–out of the realm of pie in the sky.  Say the company can make $2,000 in profit per car (a number I plucked out of the air).  That would mean that TSLA could be earning $1 billion a year by, say, 2020 – 2021.  At a price of $250, TSLA is currently trading at 30x that figure.  To me, this means two things:  buyers must have a rosier future than this in mind for TSLA, and academics who insisted that at $80 a share TSLA was priced for perfection (>10x earnings at maturity) had no idea what they were talking about.

As a practical matter, anyone who thinks the company will make $5000 per car would at least be content to hold.  Is that possible?  I don’t know.  As I mentioned yesterday, if I hadn’t sold too soon, I’d be selling now.