News Corp’s proposed split-up

the NWS split

Monday evening the Wall Street Journal  reported that News Corp (NWS) will be considering splitting the company in two at its next board meeting.  The movie and television units would be placed in one publicly traded company, and the newspaper and publishing divisions in another.   Presumably both new companies would retain the current dual share structure, which ensures effective control by the Murdoch family.  Given that NWS owns the WSJ, the report should be considered highly reliable.

not a new idea

Dividing a conglomerate into smaller, more focused pieces isn’t a novel idea.   But it’s one that has so far been opposed for NWS by family patriarch, Rupert Murdoch.  Maybe he worries that doing so would dilute the extraordinary political influence NWS has been able to wield in the countries where it has operations.

why now?

The rationale for considering a separation now is doubtless the negative political and regulatory fallout from the cellphone-hacking scandal that has engulfed NWS’s newspapers in the UK.  The affair has foiled the company’s plans to acquire complete ownership of BSkyB.  It might also ultimately result in NWS being forced to divest its current controlling interest in the satellite broadcaster.

Demonstrating that its BSkyB equity is held in a corporation completely separate from the Murdoch newspaper operations may be a pivotal consideration in staving off this outcome.  True, the regulators may regard the move as simply a ruse, especially if the successor companies have basically identical boards of directors.  But NWS’ allies in the British government must either think the move has a reasonable chance of success, or that without it the negative outcome for NWS is a foregone conclusion.

the move makes stock market sense

Reorganizing a conglomerate into a number of smaller companies may not always make economic sense.  This is especially true for a firm run in effect as a privately-held firm.  There may be complex borrowing and tax planning arrangements that need to be unwound, for example.  There may be jointly-owned computer control systems that need to be separated.  And what happens, say, to any book deals with Harper Collins that personalities on Fox News may have?

here’s why

But it almost always makes stock market sense, for several related reasons:

1.  In the case of NWS, the publishing/newspaper arm makes very little of NWS’ operating profit.  On the plus side, then, it’s almost inconsequential.  But bitter experience has taught every portfolio manager that when such “inconsequential” businesses lapse into loss, they can punch a huge hole in the bottom of the boat.  That’s one reason for the PE multiple discount at which virtually all conglomerates trade.

2.  Professional equity portfolio managers like to build their own portfolios.  I may decide I want to overweight the media industry, for instance.  Within media, I want to overweight film and TV, and severely underweight newspapers.  This is harder to do with NWS than with “pure” film and TV companies.  Another reason for the conglomerate discount.

3.  Professionally managed equity portfolios are increasingly “style”-oriented, displaying either growth or value attributes.  This is partly a function of the psychological makeup and training of the managers, partly a marketing constraint forced on them by the pension consultants who recommend them to institutional customers.  Film/TV is arguably a growth industry.  Newspaper/publishing is clearly a value one.  So some managers may want one part, some the other.  But none want the entire bundle.  Conglomerate discount again.

In theory, then, and almost always in practice, the sum of the values of the two post-split pieces will be noticeably higher than the two were together.  That’s the reason the announcement has sparked a rally in the stock.

Often, it happens that operations in each of the pieces become sharper and capital allocation becomes more efficient when they are run by experts in their fields rather than generalists.  It’s unclear whether these favorable developments will also occur, given that the Murdoch family will be fully in control of both sides.  But they may.  And this isn’t the main reason the stock is going up, in any event.

calculating fair value

How to get a fair value for the decoupled pieces?  Compare each with its peers.  I’m not a NWS fan (although I’ve watched the company grow from its Australian roots since the mid-1980s), so I’m not going to do the work.  But it’s a pretty straightforward task, however.  Value Line, which you can probably find in the local library, should give you all the relevant metrics.

Apple, book publishers and the Justice Department

the investigation

Media reports yesterday indicate the US Justice Department is investigating five of the top six book publishing firms (Random House is the exception) and Apple for price-fixing in the e-book market.  Settlement talks aimed at avoiding litigation are apparently going on, at least with some of the publishers.  A parallel investigation by EU regulators seems to be happening, as well.

what’s at issue

It’s all about trade books.  Publishers have traditionally wholesaled physical bestsellers to bookstores at 50% of the suggested retail price.  The store owners then figured out how much to mark them up–or whether to sell them as loss leaders.  A hardcover with a retail price marked on it of $25, for example, would be sold to a bookstore for $12.50.  The store might retail it for, say, $16–or for $10, if they so desired.  Stores could return unsold copies for a refund.

As little as two years ago, publishers were following the same procedure in the nascent e-book market.

This created a potential problem, however.

AMZN was aiming to become the dominant seller of e-books, to be read on its proprietary Kindle device.  It was taking every e-book it paid a publisher $12.50 for and retailing it for $9 or $10.  Yes, the company lost around $3 a book.  But short-term profits have never been an AMZN concern.  And the company was shifting avid readers in droves from being physical book buyers to becoming Kindle aficionados.

Publishers began to hear the giant Perot-ish (Perotian?) sucking sound of their physical book distribution network disappearing into cyberspace.  How to respond?

AAPL, which was just about to launch the first iPad, came along with a proposal.  Publishers shouldn’t necessarily wholesale e-books to e-retailers.  Instead, they should (technically, anyway) remain owners of the e-books (with no physical inventory, what difference would it make?) and hire companies like AAPL as commission-earning agents to put buyer and seller together…kind of like the way real estate agents sell houses.  That way, publishers could set retail selling prices themselves. This wasn’t an entirely new idea.  Publishers already had similar deals with some small independent bookstores.

AAPL proposed to charge a fee of 30% of the proceeds for each sale.  And, oh…by the way…publishers would also agree not to allow their e-books to be sold anywhere else at a lower price.

Publishers said okay and then broke the news to AMZN.  No more selling e-books at a loss.  E-books had to be priced at the publisher-determined price of around $13-$14; AMZN had to take 30% of the proceeds.

AMZN said no.  The five publishers now being investigated immediately responded by revoking AMZN’s permission to sell their e-books.  AMZN took the books off its website.  But a few days later, AMZN caved and agreed to the publishers’ terms.

consequences

Saying what might have been is a little like writing an alternate history, which is rightly classified as a branch of science fiction.  Nevertheless, here’s my take on the effects of APPL/publisher deal:

–imposing what amounts to the agency model on AMZN broke the company’s momentum in the e-book business and slowed the growth of the medium.

–this gave the publishers time to try to figure out how to support the physical book distribution network.  I don’t know what good that’s done.  It certainly didn’t save Borders

–it caused AMZN to refocus its competition strategy on the price/quality of the reader

–it gave BKS time to perfect the Nook and allow it to emerge as a viable competitor to the Kindle

–it gave APPL another selling point for the iPad, although the device seems to me to be much better for magazines, scholarly journals and textbooks than for regular trade fiction/non-fiction.

what would a settlement mean?

I’m assuming that the main result of any settlement would be to allow AMZN to set the retail price of e-books wherever it wants.

Under today’s rules, a newly-released bestseller in e-book form sells for about $14.  Sale proceeds are split, with $9.80 going to the publisher and $4.20 to the retailer/agent. AMZN might reduce its e-book bestseller price to $9.99.  I think that’s an easy decision.  That was its desired price point two years ago–and one which, at least at that time, proved to be a powerful psychological motivator for customers to choose an e-book over a physical one.  Unlike the situation in 2010, AMZN could pay the publisher $9.80 and have $.19 left over.

What about $7.99?  That would put AMZN back into roughly the same the loss-leader position it had adopted a few years ago.  To my mind, this would be a vintage AMZN move.  But is it necessary?  Given the much larger size of the e-book market today relative to the physical book market, are the losses this strategy would produce manageable?

Maybe a smaller form factor iPad would make AAPL a bigger player in the bestseller book business, but as things stand now AAPL doesn’t need trade e-books to spur iPad sales.

What about Barnes and Noble (BKS)?  The company seems to me to be the obvious loser if AMZN is able to lower e-book prices.  That would accelerate the demise of the BKS bricks and mortar bookstores.  Having a competitor sell e-books at cost would also appear to diminish the chances of the Nook ever becoming a profit-making device.

On the other hand, the AMZN move would likely increase pressure on BKS to sell its Nook name and technology.  GOOG has been rumored as a possible buyer, which, I presume, is the reason BKS has a market cap north of $750 million–and has been rising since the price-fixing investigation was leaked to the press.

The real question, of course, is the price someone like GOOG would be willing to pay.  I have no clue.  I also don’t have any confidence that I’d be able to come up with a meaningful estimate.  That’s okay with me, though.  As an equity investor, you’re in this position a lot. It just means I won’t get involved with the stock.

 

 

 

 

 

AAPL’s 4Q11: another strong quarter

the results

AAPL reported 4Q11 results after the close of trading in New York yesterday.  The company earned $6.6 billion ($7.05 per share) over the three months, on revenue of $28.2 billion.  This is an advance of 52% in eps, year on year, on sales growth of 39%.  Although the company exceeded its guidance of $5.50 per share handily, it failed to beat the Wall Street analysts’ consensus, $7.39 a share, or the first time in a long while.  (The StarMine consensus of analysts who have historically been the most accurate forecasters–which in this case may simply have been the most aggressive–had been $7.51.)

EPS for the full fiscal year 2011 (ended September 24th) were $27.68, or 82% better than results for fiscal 2010.

AAPL also gave guidance for the holiday quarter we’re in now.  APPL’s 1Q12 will have 14 weeks in it instead of the normal 13.  This is an adjustment companies who organize themselves on a “weeks” basis rather than a “months” basis must make every six years or so to make sure their fiscal year remains aligned with the calendar year.  Anyway, AAPL’s guidance for 1Q12 is eps of $9.30.  My rough guess is that this equates to a “normal” quarter of $8.50,  which would be a gain of about a third over the $6.43 AAPL reported in 1Q11.

As a result of its earnings “miss,”  AAPL shares are down about 6% in pre-market trading as I’m writing this.

details

iPhone

Let’s get straight to the heart of the earnings “shortfall,” if that’s the right word to describe a quarter that’s up more than 50% year on year.  It comes in the iPhone.

AAPL sold 17.1 million iPhone units in 4Q11.  That’s up 21% year on year, and an all-time record for a September quarter, but down 16% from the record 20.4 million the company sold in 3Q11.  There were two reasons sales weren’t higher, both related to the introduction of the new iPhone 4s.

–AAPL decided not to add any new carriers to its iPhone network in the September quarter; and

–consumers slowed down purchases of the iPhone 4 in anticipation of the new model they expected to debut during 4Q11.  As demand waned toward quarter end,  carriers slowed down purchases of iPhones from AAPL.  Apple Store sales of iPhones were particularly weak.

APPL has since reported that the iPhone 4s has sold over 4 million units during the first three days of its launch in early October, more than double the rate at which the original iPhone 4 left the warehouses when it first came to market.  At $645 each, those sales amount to $2.6 billion, or about $.85 a share.  They could just as easily have occurred in 3Q11 if AAPL had moved the launch date of the 4s back to late September rather than early October.

How good is the iPhone business today? “In our wildest dreams we couldn’t have gotten off to a start as great as we have on the 4s,” says CEO Tim Cook.  Cook also noted that AAPL had anticipated a much larger reduction in telecom purchases of the original iPhone during the quarter than what actually occurred.

iPad

AAPL sold 11.1 million units during the quarter, an all-time record.  That’s up 20% quarter on quarter and 166% year on year.  AAPL finally seems to have obtained enough manufacturing capacity to keep up with demand.

Macs

Unit sales were up 37% year on year and 30% quarter on quarter.  That’s also an all-time record.  AAPL sees some cannibalization of the Mac business by iPads, but is still producing growth much greater than the PC industry.

iPods

Once half the company, iPods are now less than 10% of AAPL’s revenue.  Unit sales were 6.6 million during the quarter, down 27% year on year and 12% sequentially.

my thoughts

Even with an extra week to work with, I don’t think AAPL’s profits can be up 82% again this fiscal year.  Suppose they “only” reach $35, with (to make the arithmetic easy) $1 of that coming from the 53rd week.  Organic growth would then be in the low 20% range, which I think is easily doable.  It could be very much higher.

At a $400 stock price, AAPL would be trading at a forward multiple of under 12x on my low-ball figure.  Subtract out the $86 a share in cash (remember, AAPL has no debt) on the balance sheet from the stock price and the multiple shrinks to about 9x.  Even factoring in a substantial maturing of AAPL’s businesses, of which there’s no credible evidence yet, AAPL shares seem very cheap to me.

 

the Silk browser on the Kindle Fire

what a browser does…

A web browser is a software program that finds web pages for you and renders them on your computer.  It locates the page you want and then reads and follows the HTML instructions it finds there.  The instructions may require the browser to travel to separate locations so it can get detailed–and sometimes complex–formatting instructions, or favicons, or to call up images that belong to the page.

…takes time and effort

All this can mean lots of round trips communicating between your browser and the page you’ve asked it to look for.  Once you’re on a given page, you’ll most likely want to follow links to other pages, either to watch a video, read an article or get more details about a possible purchase.  That’s a bunch more round trips.  Yes, we’re talking milliseconds (1/1000 of a second) for each one, but even milliseconds eventually add up if there are enough of them.

how AMZN makes Silk “super-fast”

Most of this has to do with the massive “cloud computing” infrastructure AMZN has built in becoming the online department store to the world.

In particular,

–AMZN links directly to the internet backbone.  So it can connect Silk to “outside” web pages up to 20x faster than other services.

–AMZN maintains continuous connections to the “top sites on the web,” eliminating the need for initial introductions between you and the page you want.

–AMZN has a big web hosting business, so lots of sites are inside the AMZN cloud already; AMZN caches others.  No need to go hunting for them.

–for the most popular destinations, AMZN cuts through the back-and-forth between browser and web page and starts to send information it knows you need, even before your browser asks for it.

–AMZN studies how people generally behave on a given page.  Based on its conclusions, it pre-loads content on your browser that it anticiates you may ask for next.

pretty impressive–

In fact, AMZN’s description sounds an awful lot like AOL back in the heady days when dial-up was king and the AOL server farms were all the internet many people ever used.

one caveat

Anyone using the Silk browser may well spend most or all of his time inside the “walled garden” of the AMZN cloud.  This means that, like AOL decades ago, or GOOG or AAPL today, AMZN will be able to see–and analyze–large chunks of the internet life of any such customer.

This stands to give a tremendous marketing advantage to AMZN, in two ways:

–in all likelihood, AMZN will “own” the Silk customer in the way AAPL “owns” users of its app store, and

–AMZN will be able to collect huge amounts of new data about consumer behavior.

Will customers balk at giving so much personal data to AMZN?  …not at all, in my opinion.  But AMZN will have to walk a finer line than before between using customer data for marketing analysis and respecting the privacy of users.

4 points about the Kindle Fire

1. Thank book publishers for the Kindle Fire.

AMZN’s initial strategy for e-books was to compete on price.  In fact, it started out offering e-books as a loss leader.  It was paying the publishers $12.50 for a new release and selling it as an e-book for $10.

The book industry didn’t like this one bit, however, because it feared the tactic would destroy the independent bookstore distribution channel.    So it forced AMZN, by threatening not to sell books to the company, to charge $13-$15 an e-book for new releases and keep 30% for itself (see my posts on Kindle economics for more details).  Take that, AMZN!

As I pointed out then–nothing requiring much insight, only having watched Jeff Bezos operate over the years, I thought AMZN would likely shift to using its hardware as a loss leader to build up sales volume.  The process took a little longer than I anticipated, but the Kindle Fire is the result.

According to iSuppli, the components in the Fire and their assembly cost AMZN about $210 a unit, meaning the company gets no recovery of its research and development costs, and loses $10+ for each unit sold, to boot.  If AMZN marked up the Fire the way AAPL does the iPad, it would sell for $275-$300.  Vintage Bezos.

Presumably, though, the early devices have a lot of redundancy built in (what a disaster if the first ones broke a lot).  But component prices will fall, and the device will gradually be simplified.  My guess is that AMZN will cross the breakeven line in the second half of next year.

2.  Fire is the star, but there’s a mini-explosion of regular Kindles as well. 

Along with the 7″ color-screen Fire, AMZN is introducing a new 6″ e-ink Kindle with audio and text-to-speech.  The latter comes in touch screen and physical keyboard models.  With 3G connectivity, they cost $189.  They’re $40-$50 less with wi-fi only (which is what the Fire has).  You can knock another $30-$40 off is you’re willing to accept advertising.

And, of course, there’s still the original 6″ Kindle at $109 and the jumbo-size 9.7″ Kindle DX at $379.

3.  AMZN is already offering Fire extras.

For example, there’s:

–a two-year extended warranty, that also covers three instances of accidental damage, for $44.99,

–a cover for, $24.99-$44.99, and

–streaming of TV shows and movies through Amazon Prime–which costs $79 a year and also gets you free two-day shipping on all AMZN purchases.

4.  AMZN’s formidable cloud computing capabilities back the Fire, too

AMZN is promising super-fast internet browsing with the Silk browser every Fire comes equipped with.

How so?

AMZN’s on-line retailing operations require massive server banks.  Because the company has to have enough capacity to handle surges in demand during peak selling periods, it can often be left with as much as 90% of its servers idle.  Years ago, it turned to providing cloud computing services to third parties as a way of using this asset better.  Its careful study of its customers’ behavior while on the Amazon site has also given it the ability to anticipate their needs–meaning it will be able to pre-load onto a Fire device likely next pages even before the user tells the browser to request them.

More about this tomorrow.

my thoughts

Fire may not have the upscale cachet of the iPad.  But the price is right at the level where surveys of US consumers suggest they’re willing to buy a tablet.  It’s small, weighs less than a pound and has a battery life that AMZN puts at 8 hours of active use. 

It seems to me the Fire will prove very attractive to consumers on the go, just as the early netbooks drew traveling businessmen for their light weight and essential functionality.  I doubt the form factor will stagnate in the way that netbooks did, though, and I don’t expect the iPad will move downmarket to challenge.  AMZN could easily be a very big winner with the device.