Economic Innovation Group: Distressed Communities Index

Last week, the Economic Innovation Group, a think tank backed by tech entrepreneurs, released a study on inequality in the US–something I learned about from a feature in the New York Times.

The most important conclusions of the study, as I see them:

–50 million  Americans, about a sixth of the total population, live in “distressed” zip codes

–in the distressed areas, 55% of the adults are not working and median income is 2/3 of the median level for that state.  27% of residents live in poverty.  25% of adults have less than a high school education.

–from 2010 through 2013, a period of strong recovery from recession, distressed areas lost 6.7% of their jobs; 8%+ of businesses there closed.

–distress in concentrated in a small number of areas that are suffering from long-term structural problems.  They are primarily in the South, the Southwest and the Rust Belt.  The recession didn’t cause the economic woes of these areas, but it certainly greased the downward-pointing skids.

Texas has 5.2 million people in distressed zip codes, the most of any state, and 20% of the population.  40% of the population of Mississippi lives in distressed zip codes, the largest percentage of any state.

–just as distress is concentrated in small enclaves, so too is prosperity.  The median zip code showed just a 2.3% annual increase in income, or less that half the 5.6% national average.  The median zip showed zero growth in businesses.

In contrast, in the top 20% of zip codes, jobs grew by 17.4% and businesses by almost 9%.

–sharp differences in economic health often exist side by side.  Well-off cities like New York or San Francisco exhibit little economic difference from zip code to zip code.  In contrast, in the most “spatially unequal” cities, as the report puts it, namely San Antonio, Phoenix and Columbus, “nearly adjacent neighborhoods live worlds apart.”

My point in all this?

This is a counterpoint to the glowing comments from Warren Buffett in his most recent letter to shareholders.  Yes, residents of distressed zip codes who can are voting  with their feet and leaving for more favorable climes–often in different neighborhoods in the same city.  As a result of such movement, one might take a very long view and argue that the economic issue dissipates with time.  But although the current plight of 50 million may not be so visible from Nebraska, their situation may turn out to be a social and political issue of some consequence in the meantime.  Very likely, it already is.

 

Warren Buffett on the US economy

On pages seven and eight of his thirty page-long annual letter to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffett takes issue with politicians who are emphasizing the supposed weakness of the US economy.

After arguing, reasonably, that even 2% real GDP growth (more than double the growth of the population) is something Americans should be happy about, he says:

“Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes…

The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve…My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.) For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America…”

I’m sure this is at least directionally true.  But it’s also a view from the sunny “winning” side of the struggles for a bigger slice of an expanding pie.  From the “losing” side, however, the picture is increasingly nineteenth century Dickens-ugly.  It’s also debatable whether a very poor family with a flat panel TV is that much better off than a generation-ago family with a radio.

The plight of people left behind by rapid structural change may present much more of a political and social problem than Mr. Buffett is able to see.  Whether such issues become stock and bond market problems as well remains to be seen.

More tomorrow.

the weird relationship between stocks and oil

Over the past several months, there’s been a strong correlation between the movement of the crude oil price with the movement of stock prices around the world.  Oil goes up, stocks go up; oil goes down, stocks go down.

Until last week, there has been a certain logic to the link–a logic I think is incorrect, but a logic nonetheless.  Traders seem to be observing, correctly, that when economic activity is weak the demand for oil declines, both because consumers economize and industry uses less.  When that happens, the price of oil falls.  Therefore, traders say (incorrectly), the sharp drop in the oil price over the past 20 months is evidence that the world economy must be weaker than we think.  So low oil price = sell, or short, stocks.

 

Two problems with this line of thought:

–this is a little pedantic (actually, just skip over this paragraph), but logically “weak economy ⇒ falling oil price” doesn’t imply the converse, “falling oil ⇒ weak economy”.  It implies “not weak economy ⇒ not falling oil price.”  It’s like if you’re standing out in the rain, you get wet.  But if you’re wet, it doesn’t mean you’ve been standing out in the rain.  You may have been taking a shower.  Put a clearer way, the fact that a falling oil price is a symptom of economic weakness doesn’t mean it causes it.

–global demand for oil is, in fact, rising, not falling, according to the International Energy Agency.

 

Nevertheless, whether it makes sense or not to me, oil and stocks have been going up and down in lockstep.  So it makes sense to someone else–actually, a lot of someone elses.  And, like when it makes no sense but you see the train is barreling down the track at you, the best course of action is to step off the rails and out of the way.

That’s not the real weirdness.  Here’s where that comes in:

Over the past few days, oil and stocks have been going up on the rumor that a number of big oil producers, including OPEC and Russia, are talking about cutting back their production in order to prop up prices.

This would obviously be good for them.  If they’re getting $30 a barrel now and can move the price to $40 by reducing output by, say, 10%, their revenue goes up by 20%.  If the price got to $50, they’d be 50% better off than today.

However, this doesn’t make the world as a whole better off, nor does it stimulate the global economy.  It’s a transfer of money from oil consumers to oil producers.  It’s good for Saudi Arabia, Russia et al, but it’s bad for the US, Europe, Japan and China.  In the parts of the world the S&P 500 represents, it helps about 10% and hurts the other 90%.  So a rising oil price caused by cartel manipulation is a big net minus for the S&P.

Despite this, stocks soared yesterday, in robotic fashion according to the rule that stocks move in the same direction as oil.  Go figure.

segmenting Millennials

I got an e-“book” from NPD, the retail data and analysis people, the other day that argues we as investors shouldn’t look at Millennials as a coherent group, but rather segment them by age ( I wrote “book” because it’s ten pages long).  Here’s what it says:

general

Millennials are an important demographic group in one sense because they’re the largest segment in the US by age, having recently passed the Baby Boom in size.  More important, they’re in the ascendant economically, while Boomers are gradually fading into retirement, with attendant lower incomes and weakening propensity to spend.  In addition, 13.8% of those 18 -29 are either unemployed or out of the workforce.  This suggests that this group will show better than average income–and spending–growth as Boomer retirement and economic expansion make more jobs available.

Millennials are projected to account for a third of total US retail spending within the next five years.

segmenting

NPD divides Millennials into younger (18 – 24) and older (25 -34).

Older Millennials:

74% white

40% married (44% have been married at least once)

40% have children

have more money

are less optimistic

favor Donald Trump.

 

Younger Millennials:

68% white

10% married (20% have been at least once)

10% have children

have less money (many are still in school)

are more optimistic

favor Bernie Sanders

 

Differing retail habits on Friday.

 

 

Japan in recession …again

Assuming we take the simple, but commonly accepted, definition of recession as two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth as our measure–and there’s no real reason not to, I think–Japan slipped back into recession during its last fiscal quarter.  The reason:  in Groundhog Day-like fashion, the Tokyo government tightened fiscal policy prematurely earlier in the year, producing the same negative result for the third time in recent memory.

Three observations:

–the Japan experience is the reason Janet Yellen is so wishy-washy about raising interest rates in the US

–in a certain sense, technical recession isn’t as bad a thing for Japan as it wold be for, say, the US or China.

How so?

GDP growth comes from two sources:  having more people working, or having existing workers perform their jobs more efficiently.  Unlike the view (often) expressed by one of my Depression-era former bosses, productivity increases don’t come from imposing sweat shop working conditions.  They come from investment in education, training and productivity-enhancing equipment.

In Japan’s case, the domestic working population peaked around 1995 and has been falling by about 0.5% per year since.  One obvious solution to this problem would be to allow foreign workers to immigrate.  But, although there has been some slight movement lately, Japan’s borders remain rigidly closed to outsiders.

Productivity?   From 1950 – 19980, Japan was a productivity wonder.  However, Japan has struggled to keep up with the more intensive pace of change since then.  Why?  I think the rigidly hierarchical nature of company social interaction in traditional Japanese companies stifles the voice of innovation from younger employees.

Let’s say, though, that somehow Japan achieves productivity increases of +1% annually despite the “no comments; just follow orders” attitude of top managements.  I think that’s too much, but let’s go with it.  If so, the overall economy needs half that figure to overcome the decline in the workforce.  Real GDP growth has a trend ceiling of +0.5%.

So, the maximum sustainable rate of GDP expansion in Japan is barely north of zero.  It shouldn’t be surprising, then, if that figure spends considerable time south of breakeven.  As long as the numbers don’t get too negative, Japan will continue to stumble along on its journey to economic insignificance.

–what makes Japan important, interesting …and scary for the US and the EU is that we’re seeing a possible future for us in the Japan of today.

More on this tomorrow.