Tag Archives: China

Macau casinos

September 18, 2014 By in Asian economic development, Casinos, China, economics, Entertainment, Industry Analysis, Macau, Stock ideas Tags: , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Talk about an unloved group.

Casinos with Macau exposure have been pummeled over the past six months.  Late summer has been an especially bad period.   Wynn Macau (HK: 1128) has lost a third of its value over the past half year;  its parent, Wynn Resorts (WYNN) has lost a quarter of its market cap.  The only issue to escape relatively unscathed is MGM, a former near-death experience that has apparently turned the corner.

The reason?

…an anti-corruption campaign by the government in Beijing has had high roller baccarat players from the mainland trying to keep a lower profile.  As a result, the overall casino win, the total amount lost by patrons of the SAR’s casinos, has been showing small year-on-year declines for the past three months.  There’s no reason to believe this trend won’t continue for a while yet.  There’s more, but this is the basic story.

I also think, although I have no evidence for this, that institutional investors have generally decided that they want to participate in the upcoming Alibaba IPO but that they don’t want to increase their aggregate exposure to China-related stocks.  So they’re jettisoning a growth story gone cold for one with more obvious signs of life.

Overnight (i.e., this morning in Hong Kong) I bought a small amount of Wynn Macau.

I have no idea if this is the near-term bottom for the Macau gambling market or for 1128.  But the stock is trading at 15x earnings and yielding 5%+.  I think the long-term story for Macau–that it is turning itself into a (much larger) clone of the Las Vegas Strip, that is, a resort destination for the Chinese middle class–is still intact.  I think it’s still early days for tourism in the SAR.  I also expect the current slowdown will increase the competitive distance between the firms I view as the ultimate market winners, Wynn, Sands China, and Galaxy vs. the former monopoly casino operator, SJM Holdings.  SJM still has the largest market share, but is handicapped by its connection to the Ho family.

 

For the moment I’m going to wait, watch and collect the dividend.  If 1128 declines further, however, I’ll probably buy more.

This isn’t an idea for the very risk-averse, since the Macau gambling market ultimately depends on the good will of Beijing, whose mood is difficult to assess.  The extent and duration of the current crackdown on lavish consumption has so far taken even veteran China hands by surprise.  Still, a 5% yield makes up for a lot of warts.  And using a discount broker like Fidelity makes getting in an out easy and inexpensive.

 

 

 

 

2Q14 results for Wynn Resorts (WYNN) and Wynn Macau (HK: 1128)

July 30, 2014 By in Casinos, earnings conference calls, Entertainment, Hong Kong, Industry Analysis, Japanese development, Macau, Stock ideas Tags: , , , , , Leave a comment

it’s been same old, same old for the big casino operators…

I haven’t written about WYNN and its subsidiary Wynn Macau (1128) for a while.  That’s mostly because I perceive the company to be in a holding pattern.  It has two casino operations:  Las Vegas and Macau, the latter through 72%-owned Wynn Resorts.

–In Las Vegas, all the major casino resort operators, WYNN included, upped their operating leverage by opening big new casino and hotel capacity in 2007-08, just as the recession was unfolding.  Demand dropped through the floor.    Profits disappeared faster.  Results since have been consistently weak as the casinos wait for demand to pick up and/or for weaker entries to close up shop.

–In the Macau market, which is now many times the size of Las Vegas, 1128 has been capacity constrained for some time.  Its next expansion, the Wynn Palace, isn’t slated to open until early 2016.

…until now

Las Vegas

For WYNN, the near-term story is Las Vegas.  And the change is for the better.  Room revenues in 2Q14 were up by 7.3% year-on-year in the quarter.  Average room rates rose to $283, up from $268 in 2Q13.  Occupancy increased from 88.4% from 86.9%.  To my mind, the room rate rise is a particularly important indicator of increasing demand.

In addition, the amount bet at WYNN’s Las Vegas tables was up by almost 15%, year-on-year.  The company’s win percentage was an unusually high 27.4%. vs.  the company’s expected range of 21% – 24%.  In all likelihood, the “extra” win from this quarter will be offset by sub-par “luck” in coming periods.  But, again, the more interesting number is the sharp jump in table games betting.

Slot machines were flat.

Management said on the earnings conference call that the 2Q strength was continuing into 3Q.

Macau

In Macau, the individual pluses and minuses for 1128 may be a little different, but the near-term profit profile–flattish–remains the same.

Overall market growth in Macau has slowed as an economic lull in China and Beijing’s anti-corruption campaign have tempered VIP’s  enthusiasm for high-stakes gambling.  This has been offset by a sharp jump in visits by the mass affluent, who–unlike their high-roller counterparts–are more concerned with being entertained than at winning a lot at baccarat.  They also want to eat, shop and go to shows.  So from the casinos’ point of view, they’re great customers.

While it waits for the new capacity the Wynn Palace will bring, 1128 is refurbishing its existing hotel and casino spaces.  It’s also raising salaries considerably, both to reinforce its reputation for superior service and to retain staff.  While these actions may make profits a bit weaker than they would be otherwise, it makes sense to use the current lull to set the stage for stronger growth in a year or two.

my take

WYNN has a market cap of $22 billion.  Its stake in 1128 is worth $16 billion, meaning that Wall Street is valuing the Wynn name, Las Vegas operations, royalties from Macau and the potential of future casino development in, say, Japan, at $6 billion.  That’s roughly 25x earnings.

WYNN shares yield 2.3%, 1128 about double that.

Last year, I sold the 1128 I had held since just after the IPO, partly because my casino holdings had become too large a part of my portfolio, partly in anticipation of the current fallow time.  I’m beginning to think about buying it back.  But I’d prefer to do so in the mid- to high-HK$20s.  Rightly or wrongly, I think I have time before the market begins to discount the opening of the Wynn Palace–with a presumed strong profit upsurge–in 2016.

I bought a lot of the WYNN I hold during the market collapse in early 2009.  I may be influenced by the tax I’d pay if I sold (I hope not, because this is virtually always a bad way to think), but I’m content to collect the dividend while I wait for Las Vegas to recover and the Wynn Palace to open.  To me it sounds as if the first may already be happening, which would be good news for WYNN shares.

What would I do if I owned nothing in this sector?

The least risky thing to do would be to buy a small amount of either WYNN or LVS and try to add on weakness.  LVS has the better near-term profit profile; WYNN has the better management, in my view.  Their valuations are similar, although their business models are a bit different.  LVS runs convention hotels; WYNN focuses on the high-roller niche.  (I own both.)

The most attractive firm I see at the moment is Galaxy Entertainment.  It’s a Macau-only operator and trades either in Hong Kong, or on the pink sheets–so it’s riskier than the other two.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The financial crisis and the renminbi

June 16, 2014 By in Asian economic development, China, economics, emerging markets, reserve currency, securities markets, Stock ideas Tags: , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

As I apparently never tire of writing, the financial crisis that came to a head five years ago has resulted in an extended period of emergency ultra-low interest rates.  The tried-and-true idea behind this is to give economic activity a boost by making loans carrying negative real interest rates readily available.  “Free” money should make anyone with a pulse willing to borrow and spend.

In the past, these low-interest periods engineered by the Fed lasted at most a year.  We’re now into year six of the current episode.

One result of this extremely long emergency period is that fixed income investors are currently lapping up low-coupon Italian, Greek…even Iraqi..sovereign debt.  And crazy (in my view) fixed income products like contingent convertibles, no-covenant junk bonds and pik (payment in kind) junk bonds, where interest is paid in new bonds, not cash, are all finding eager buyers, as well.

Another is that savers living on interest payments (increasingly Baby Boomers), who are in effect subsidizing the financial rescue, are suffering.  In fact, Millennials have just surpassed Boomers as the most important single demographic force in the US economy.

All of this is well-known.

Another development, though, which may turn out to be the most important in the long run, has escaped notice so far.  It’s the increasing acceptance of the Chinese renminbi in world trade and in investment.

Fifteen, or even ten, years ago, China was content with the fact that all of its trade was effectively done in dollars.  Beijing let Treasury bonds pile up in its coffers, to the point where it rivaled–and the surpassed–Japan as the largest creditor of the US.  It had become uneasy about this situation even before the financial crisis.  Stunned by the meltdown of 2008-09, China decided to offer its currency as a substitute for the dollar.

Until the past year or so, the renminbi has drawn pretty close to zero interest.   This is partly because at first it wasn’t easy for either foreigners or Chinese parties to use the renminbi in trade.  Also, foreigners can’t spend “offshore” renminbi in China itself.

Yes, the renminbi is easier to use today.  But I think a big reason the renminbi is suddenly extremely popular now is the very low-interest rate environment we’re in.  Multinationals with Chinese operations can save 3% – 5% by settling Chinese trade transactions in renminbi.  In other circumstances, this might not be worth the hassle.  But if your cash balances are earning effectively zero and if you have to buy a pik bond or Iraqi debt to get a 5%+ yield, then switching from dollar to renminbi trade settlement is a relative bonanza.

This movement seems to be feeding on itself.  It’s causing very rapid growth in renminbi use, admittedly from a low base.  I don’t think this development has any important immediate investment consequences.  But it could end up making a profound (negative) impact on the dollar and the euro if it continues–as I expect it will.  The ultimate result would be to make renminbi earners much more attractive as investments than they currently are.

The big investment question is when the inflection point will come, when the renminbi will begin to be regarded as a viable alternative to the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.  Perception will likely precede reality by a long stretch   …although I don’t think the tipping point will come this year or next.  I view this as something important to keep in mind, however, so we can recognize what’s happening if this trend develops faster than I now think it will.

 

Macau gambling, May 2014

June 5, 2014 By in Casinos, China, Entertainment, Hong Kong, Macau, Stock ideas Tags: , , , Leave a comment

The day before yesterday, the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (DICJ) posted the total monthly gambling “win” (the amount lost by gamblers) for the SAR’s casinos during May.  The results were below analysts’ expectations, causing a selloff in the US gambling stocks with Macau presence, and a minor negative ripple in the Hong Kong-traded Macau casino stocks themselves.

The year-to-date DICJ results are:

Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2014 and 2013
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2014 2013 Variance 2014 2013 Variance
Jan 28,739 26,864 +7.0% 28,739 26,864 +7.0%
Feb 38,007 27,084 +40.3% 66,746 53,948 +23.7%
Mar 35,453 31,336 +13.1% 102,199 85,284 +19.8%
Apr 31,318 28,305 +10.6% 133,517 113,589 +17.5%
May 32,354 29,589 +9.3% 165,871 143,178 +15.8%

Source: Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau

What’s going on?

First of all, and least important, the market had been expecting a 10%+ year-on-year gain in aggregate casino win, based on weekly reports of business results provided by the casinos.  The falloff during the last few days of the month is most likely a random variation in the casino luck factor, one that will eventually be reversed.

More generally, the so-so rate of yoy gain in win is the result of two opposing factors.  On the one hand, increases is betting by mainland high-rollers, the almost exclusive focus of the Macau market over the past decade, have slowed to a crawl.  On the other, affluent mass-market gambling is rising sharply.  Mass market gamblers bet smaller amounts, but lose a much higher percentage of the amount bet than VIPs (who are more or less professional gamblers).  Mass market patrons want entertainment, not necessarily gambling profits, so they don’t watch what they’re doing so closely.  They also spend a lot more on things like restaurants, shows and shopping.  We’ll know more about non-gambling when June financial reports are released by the casinos, but non-gambling profits have been rising sharply from a small base.  It’s important to remember that in the salad days of Las Vegas, non-gambling amounted to half of casino industry profits.  So growth in Macau has potentially a long way to grow.

The overall Macau market is facing capacity constraints that will only begin to easy next year.  In a sense, the current lull in new capacity additions is ending up being luckily timed, since it coincides with a slowdown in the VIP market.

All in all, it seems to me that the March-May gains in casino win are more indicative of what the rest of the year will be like than January-February.

The related stocks have sold off by about 20%–more than I would have expected–in a flat Hong Kong market over the past few months.  Stocks like Sands China and Galaxy Entertainment, which have little VIP exposure and lots of mass market, have declined at least as much as Wynn Macau, which is in the opposite position.

I find the Macau stocks hard to figure out.  It’s not their profit potential, it’s the way they trade in the Hong Kong market.  The current situation of little capacity addition was well-known a year ago.  The VIP slowdown could equally well have been anticipated.  I think the mass market and non-gambling profit development has been much more positive this year than the consensus expected.  In other words, the negatives are no worse, and the positives are a lot better.  Yet the stocks went up last year and have sold off so far in 2014.

My take?  I’m in this for the long haul.  I sold my Wynn Macau quite a while ago and have been looking for a reentry point.  Not yet, though.  I continue to own Galaxy Entertainment and would own Sands China as well, if it were easier for a US citizen to buy.  I’m looking to add to my holdings, but am in no rush.

China the largest economy in the world? ..that’s what the World Bank is saying

May 1, 2014 By in Asian economic development, China, Hong Kong Tags: , , , , , , 1 Comment

The World Bank has just released the findings of its International Comparison Program, derived from analysis of world economic data from 2011.  This is an update of the ICP results from 2005.

The data show that three years ago the US economy was only about 8% larger than China’s.  Given that China is growing by at least 7% per year while the US is barely expanding at all, the implication is that sometime in 2014 China will seize the #1 crown the US has worn since 1872 (according to the Financial Times).  That’s when the US surpassed the UK.

Generally speaking, the report shows the increasing prominence of emerging economies, especially in Asia.  That’s really no surprise, since that continent is home to two giants, China and India (#3 in the world).  In fact, the only news in the ICP report is timing.  Prior to this, and based on the earlier ICP data, most economic observers had expected China to pass the US within a few years.

Two caveats:

–the figures are based on total GDP.  Per capital GDP is still much higher in the US than in China, but the latter has over 4x as many people.

–the numbers are calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), not conventional GDP measures.

The difference?

Up until about a quarter century ago, economists took local currency GDP figures for each nation and converted them into a common currency, usually the US$, for comparison.   They used market exchange rates to do the conversion.  In the 1980s, however, people began to notice that this method was giving out crazy results.  China, for example, was growing at maybe triple the rate of the US at that time–but conventional GDP showed it shrinking relative to the US.

That’s how economists realized that measuring GDP through the ability to purchase internationally traded goods (which is, after all, what the exchange rate shows) wasn’t good enough.  So PPP, which measures the cost of purely domestic goods and services–like haircuts or movie tickets–as well, was born (you can find more detail in this post).

Significance?

It’s probably more social and political than directly relevant to the stock market.  On the other hand, it reinforces the fact that the health (or not) of the Chinese economy is of crucial importance to the rest of the world.  As investors, China is too big, and too fast-growing, not to try to have some exposure to.  The clear way to do so, in my mind, is through Hong Kong, which is the destination of choice for legitimate Chinese firms seeking a listing that will attract non-mainland investors.  My impression is that not many US investors have been willing so far to put in the time and effort needed to learn about it.

 

Tomorrow Keeping Score returns, after a month’s hiatus.