Macau gambling results for August 2010

After suffering a temporary slowdown in June, as gamblers stayed home to watch the World Cup, the Macau gambling market has bounced back vigorously over the past two months.  Here are the figures:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec

Source:  DICJ, Macau SAR

my thoughts

1.  Of the large world gaming markets where information is publicly available–Macau, Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Australia–Macau is at present much more of a high roller market than the others.  Is that important?  Ultimately what counts is the profit return that the physical capital of the casino generates.  But one salient characteristic of the high roller, table games segment vs. the average gambler, slot machine segment is that the law of large numbers (that is, the odds balancing out) works for periods of time as short as a quarter.  In the high roller arena, on the other hand, one or two unusually lucky or unlucky gambler’s results can affect the bottom line even over a three month period.

What counts as gross revenue in the table above is the amount “held”, or won, by the Macau casinos, not the (much, much larger) amount bet.  If gamblers are unusually lucky in a given month, then the DICJ number will be correspondingly low–and vice versa.

2.  So far this year, the Macau market has growth by 63% vs. the comparable period in 2009.  This number is much more important than shifts in market share among the various market participants.  When the market matures, the relative market shares will become much more crucial.

In addition, share figures can vary substantially as new capacity opens, or as gamblers try out different venues before establishing more regular patterns of patronage, or as a given casino’s win percentage varies randomly.

3.  The Macau government has been critical to the success of the gambling market there.  It issued the licenses that permitted new blood to open up in the former Portuguese colony.   It has prevented the weaker casinos to initiate severe price competition that would have hurt everyone in Macau.  And it has slowed down the pace of new construction to try to match capacity more closely with demand.  All these moves have greatly enhanced the profitability of the gaming industry in Macau.

4. In the simplest terms, it seems to me that the publicly traded Macau casino stocks divide into two groups.

–One consists of 1128 and 1928, which are American controlled firms trying to apply the upscale casino/resort experience model they developed in Las Vegas to Macau.  Their weakness is their relatively limited knowledge of China.  The open question in investors’ minds is whether the American model will work in the Pacific.

–The rest of the market consists of firms with much stronger local Pacific contacts and experience.  Their potential weakness is that they haven’t run the upscale American model.  Also, it’s not clear that some managements would be permitted to operate in the US–although so far this fact does not appear to have been a key factor for Asian investors.

Las Vegas Sands: an interesting June 2010 quarter

LVS 2Q2010 results

LVS reported 2Q2010 results after the close yesterday.  On a GAAP basis, the company was just slightly below breakeven vs. a loss of $.34 a share in the second quarter of last year.  Operating income was $166.8 million for the three months vs. a loss of $171.3 million in the comparable period of 2009.  Removing non-recurring items, net income was $129.3 million or $.17 per share vs. $8.8 million, $.01 per share, in the year-ago quarter.

The biggest reason for the improvement was the huge increase in income from the company’s casinos in Macau, where the overall market revenues in the first half grew strongly enough to eclipse the full-year 2007 results, with only about a 10% increase in the number of slot machines and table games.  LVS was also helped by the opening of its Singapore casino during the quarter.

my takeaways

I don’t have an investment opinion about LVS.  It’s a complex, highly financially leveraged company, with a lot of moving parts, and I haven’t studied it enough.  My thumbnail sketch:  LVS is a highly competent casino operator, with an emphasis on middle market and convention business.  The company overstretched itself in expanding aggressively–in Las Vegas, Macau, Singapore and Bethlehem, PA–going into the recent economic downturn and was hurt badly by that decision.  Conversely, although risky, it stands to be an outsized beneficiary of economic recovery, as it progressively gets its debt under better control.

Because of its geographical diversity, LVS can give good insight into global gaming trends.  That’s what I’m writing about today, based on the 2Q financials and the earnings conference call.

1.  The Singapore gaming business is off to a better start than expected.  The mass market is very strong, thanks in part to the efforts of LVS’s competitor in the market, Genting.  The highroller business is showing a greater geographical reach, and better credit experience, than LVS thought it would. The company is attracting gamblers from Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, as expected, but also from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and Korea.  It’s still early days for this market, but so far, so good.

2.   In Macau, LVS’s high roller business was good and its stores sold a lot.  The mass market segment lagged, though.  Despite its two main casinos posting operating income up 155% and 44% year on year, LVS seems to think it should be doing even better.  Recently, LVS fired its Macau chief executive, Steve Jacobs.  Commenting on this in the conference call, LVS CEO Sheldon Adelson said he would “opt for him to go to a direct competitor.”  The company also said the Macau “problem” was not in the layer of staff below Mr. Jacobs.  The Hong Kong market reaction to the Sands China earnings was muted.  Despite opening up about 4%, 1928 closed down HK$.04.

3.  Convention business is beginning to revive in Las Vegas.   Demand from groups for convention/meeting space is strong.  The biggest issue is that there’s so much overcapacity in Las Vegas that rates remain depressed.  (LVS, WYNN and MGM all launched major expansions just as the downturn was beginning.  The last of these, MGM’s mammoth City Center, only opened late last year.)

WYNN reports tonight.  We already know from offering documents for a proposed bond refinancing that WYNN’s results in Las Vegas were weaker in the second quarter of this year than last.  Hotel occupancies were up but rates were down.  It will be interesting to compare the Macau results of WYNN with those of LVS< however.

MGM Mirage’s choice: leave Atlantic City rather than sever ties with “unsuitable” Pansy Ho

Why the New Jersey Casino Control Commission is important

The New Jersey Casino Control Commission came into prominence as the most vigilant of the state government agencies overseeing legalized gambling in the Seventies, when Atlantic City was establishing itself as a gaming destination.

At that time investors generally avoided what publicly traded casino companies there were, fearing that the industry had associations with organized crime that would express themselves in money laundering, underreporting of profits or other illegal activities.   But the rigorous application process established by the Commission and the careful screening by its Enforcement Division were, I think, the main vehicles in reversing investor opinion to its present, casino-friendly state.

What it decided about MGM

MGM entered the Macau gambling market through joint venture.  The original concept was to have Stanley Ho as a partner, but even typically less rigorous US regulators voiced strong opposition, given Mr. Ho’s links with organized crime in Asia.  So the company decided to do a deal with Pansy Ho, one of Stanley Ho’s daughters, instead.

This change was enough to allow MGM to get the approval from Nevada regulators for the expansion into Macau–but not from New Jersey.

The local Trenton newspaper, the Trentonian, has a good summary of the New Jersey Casino Control Commission’s findings.  The 70+ page report from the Commission’s Division of Gaming Enforcement–released with the most sensitive data edited out–also has interesting information, although the reading is a bit tedious.

The Gaming Enforcement findings:

1.  Stanley Ho is “unsuitable” to hold a casino license in New Jersey because ” numerous governmental and regulatory agencies have referenced Stanley Ho’s associations with criminal enterprises, including permitting organized crime to operate and thrive within his casinos.” , and

2. “upon concluding that it could not partner with Stanley Ho or entities under his control, and without conducting adequate due diligence on her suitability, MGM simply substituted Pansy Ho as its joint venture partner despite her financial dependence upon Stanley Ho and his companies.”  In other words, Ms. Ho was little more than a figurehead representing her father’s interests.  In addition, the top management of MGM also seemingly “forgot” to supply the regulators or its own internal compliance department with negative suitability information they learned about Ms. Ho.

The Casino Control Commission’s decision

The Commission, in a decision rendered last May but just made public this week, told MGM to either sever its ties with Ms. Ho or it could no longer operate a casino in the state.

MGM’s response?

It has decided to sell its 50% interest in the Borgata casino and leave New Jersey.  I assume that this is a purely commercial decision–based on the idea that MGM’s Macau interests are more profitable and have better growth prospects than its Atlantic City holdings.

about Stanley Ho

He’s never been indicted for, or convicted of, any offense relating to his asserted underworld connections.  There’s no proof that he ever was, or is now, a triad member.  Of course, given Mr. Ho’s advanced age, initiation rites might have been three-quarters of a century ago.

It seems to me that this is a taboo subject among securities analysts in Hong Kong.  In twenty-five years of watching that market, I’ve never read an analyst report or met privately with an analyst where the subject of triad links ever came up.

On the other hand, gaming authorities in Australia, Singapore and the United States are convinced enough about Mr. Ho’s associations that they have made it clear that no one associated with Mr. Ho will receive a casino license.

In response to the release of the New Jersey report, Mr. Ho has denied any triad involvement.

Why, then, would MGM partner with the Ho family in Macau?

In the initial round of concession-granting, the Macau government selected Mr. Ho, the incumbent, plus WYNN and LVS.  MGM submitted an application but reportedly finished fifth.  One might reasonably defend this decision by pointing out that WYNN, a specialist in high-end gambling, and LVS, a specialist in conventions, both have more focussed skills than MGM.

In the second round of concession-granting, which involved sub-concessions being issued by the original three, MGM elected to partner with Mr. Ho rather than one of its Las Vegas rivals.  I imagine that MGM regarded this as purely a commercial decision to select the lesser of two evils, since Mr. Ho has no (and can have no) competing Las Vegas interests.  I disagree with the choice.

Investment implications: Continue reading