Growth vs. Value: IV. International Issues With Both

In the US, I think the main difference between growth and value investors is one of individual temperament,  Obviously, investment objectives are slightly different and managers of each stripe will attract slightly different customers.  But I think the choice for an investor comes down to what types of companies he/she feels most comfortable studying and what level of volatility he/she is willing to experience.  Outside the US, however, the situation is a little different.

The overwhelming majority of growth stock investors work in the US market.  Maybe Americans are more happy-go-lucky than their foreign counterparts.  But, although Americans don’t think much about it, we live in a political and economic environment where growth-oriented companies can enjoy considerable success and are able to raise money in the the financial markets.  That’s not always true abroad.

 *In many foreign areas, capital is not as widely held as in the US but is in the hands of a relatively small number of wealthy individuals and companies.  These entities act as theory tells us they will–as they become wealthier, they become more risk averse.  In extreme cases, especially in less wealthy economies, investors view stocks as a risky kind of bond (as we did in the Thirties-Fifties).  So multiples are low and payment of a large cash dividend is expected.  So only mature companies can list.

*The US is unusual both for the high wealth level (relative to the rest of the world) of the average citizen and for its wide geographical expanse.  Many specialty retail concepts depend on this wealth for their sales and the ability to expand form one region of the country to another for the duration of their growth.  In, say, Japan, not only is consumer behavior different, but also total national penetration is probably a two or three-year phenomenon instead of ten years.

*In many foreign countries, there are very substantial formal and informal barriers to changes to the status quo.  These range from the “Licence Raj” in India to complex laws on locating retail stores throughout Europe and Japan.  Barriers can be informal, as well–from the power of the keiretsu or chaebol in Asia to behind-the-scenes maneuvering to control competition by governments and by groups of institutional investors.

This last point is perhaps the greatest obstacle for value investors working outside the US.  In some value strategies, the thinking is that if the present management and board of directors won’t use the company’s assets effectively, they can and will be replaced.  Of the larger markets, perhaps the worst is Japan, as many US value investors have learned to their sorrow, this is extremely difficult.  Laws make takeover by foreigners difficult and punitively expensive.  Even local value investors find that institutional shareholders refuse to vote for change.  Though not as extreme as in Japan, one can expect many of the same difficulties in continental Europe.

Growth vs. Value: III. Comparing the Two

A Brief Comparison of the Two Investment Styles:

Growth Value

stock volatility high                                   low

character aggressive                         defensive

upside high                                   limited

downside can be high                         low

firms have very bright future               cheap assets

outperforms bull market                         bear market

benefit from market greed market fear

(sell high)                           (buy low)

uncertainty extent of rise                       timing of rise

portfolio size 50 issues                             100

Performance History

During the Seventies and the Eighties, whether an investment manager practiced the growth style or value style made little difference to overall returns.  Decisions about size (market capitalization) or US vs. international were much more important, I think.  In a given year, growth investors might outpace their value rivals, but the following year the situation would likely be reversed.  At worst, the returns over a business cycle would be comparable.

This performance pattern changed markedly during the Nineties.   Continue reading

Thursday, March 12

Thursday had some of the hallmarks of the prior two days:  defensive groups were among the weakest, especially utilities and consumer staples; finance and technology were the strongest.    Healthcare was strong, though, acting against the pattern of  Tuesday and Wednesday.   Overall, medium-sized stocks did better than either very large or very small.

Other than Merck and Schering-Plough, big-name banks seemed to me to be the individual stars of the day.

 

Professional portfolio managers probably have several thoughts at this point:

*the combination of stock market declines and client withdrawals over the past six months has probably cut assets under management in half.  The resulting fall in management fees could cut equity division profits in 2009 by two-thirds (or more) vs 2008.  So it’s nice to see the markets going up for a change.

*this rally is at least three months too early, so it can’t last.  The big question is whether the market just drifts after it’s over or whether the sharp selling that has marked the past five months or so resumes.

*this rally shows, hoever, that given even a little encouragement, investors are willing to think bullish thoughts.  So there’s probably no percentage in maintaining a very defensive posture.  I should probably stick for now with high-quality names, but I should also shift within industry groups to stocks with somewhat more business cycle exposure.  If my industry composition is very defensive, I should become less defensive.  If I’m already tilted a bit toward aggressive sectors, I should stand pat and let my stock selection within industries do the work of preparing for the next up market for me.

NOTE:  I’m probably still having redemptions.  So I can do some of this work simply by shifting all of my selling toward the areas whose weighting I want to shrink.  If this isn’t fast enough, I’ve also got to sell more in defensive areas and buy in the more cyclical ones.

Today, March 11, 2009

Although NASDAQ was up 1% and the rest of the market was basically flat, the industry performance pattern from yesterday repeated itself again today.  The correspondence was perfect among the underperformers–utilities, healthcare, and services all fell in price.  Consumer staples were flat.  The outperformers changed up a little bit, though.  Technology and transportation were the strongest industries, joined by basic materials and consumer discretionary.  Financials were better than the market but not the stars they were yesterday.

Investors seemed a lot more selective today than yesterday.  Apple and Research in Motion outperformed their stogier brethren.  Goldman, Citi and JP Morgan were up,  GE was down.  Size didn’t seem to matter.  The EEM was flat.

Put the financials aside as a special case.  What strikes me about the past two days is the rotation away from defensives and into tech, transport and retailers.  At first blush, this shouldn’t be happening.  Other than reports of life out of tech companies in Taiwan, among them the semiconductor foundry TSMC–apparently some tech manufacturers went overboard in cutting orders in the final quarter of last year–the “best” economic news around seems to be that things aren’t getting much worse.  No hints yet of anything getting better.  

What could be happening is that investors are neutralizing some of their defensive exposure.  On the one hand, the past couple of months have shown the big weakness of consumer staples–exposure to the euro.  On the other, tech and consumer discretionary have fallen a very long way.  This doesn’t mean investors have turned positive on the economy or the market, just that they think there’s no more percentage in being as defensive as they have been.  

The rotation bears watching, though.  A few more days and it may begin to feed on itself.

Growth vs. Value: II. Growth Investing

Growth Investing

Growth investors are dreamers.  In their efforts to locate fast-growing companies, they’re always trying to imagine what the world will look  like two or three (or more) years, and what kinds of companies will be able to exhibit surprisingly strong earnings growth (stronger than the consensus expects) over that time horizon, growth that will persist for longer than the consensus believes.

In the ideal case, the company’s projected earnings growth profile will also have an open-ended quality to it, in two ways: Continue reading