the Trump rally and its aftermath (so far)

the Trump rally

From the surprise election of Donald Trump as president through late December 2016, the S&P 500 rose by 7.3%.  What was, to my mind, much more impressive, though less remarked on, was the 14% gain of the US$ vs the ¥ over that period and its 7% rise against the €.

the aftermath

Since the beginning of 2017, the S&P 500 has tacked on another +4.9%.  However, as the charts on my Keeping Score page show, Trump-related sectors (Materials, Industrials, Financials, Energy) have lagged badly.  The dollar has reversed course as well, losing about half its late-2016 gains against both the yen and euro.

How so?

Where to from here?

the S&P

The happy picture of late 2016 was that having one party control both Congress and the administration, and with a maverick president unwilling to tolerate government dysfunction, gridlock in Washington would end.  Tax reform and infrastructure spending would top the agenda.

The reality so far, however, is that discord within the Republican Party plus the President’s surprisingly limited grasp of the relevant economic and political issues have resulted in continuing inaction.  The latest pothole is Mr. Trump’s refusal to release his tax returns–that would reveal what he personally has to gain from the tax changes he is proposing.

On the other hand, disappointment about the potential for US profit advances generated by constructive fiscal policy has been offset by surprisingly strong growth indications from Continental Europe and, to a lesser extent, from China.

This is why equity investors in the US have shifted their interest away from Trump stocks and toward multinationals, world-leading tech stocks and beneficiaries of demographic change.

the dollar

The case for dollar strength has been based on the idea that new fiscal stimulus emanating from Washington would allow the Fed to raise interest rates at a faster clip this year than previously anticipated.  Washington’s continuing ineptness, however, is giving fixed income and currency investors second thoughts.  Hence, the dollar’s reversal of form.


Absent a reversal of form in Washington that permits substantial corporate tax reform, it’s hard for me to argue that the S&P is going up.  Yes, we probably get some support from a slower interest rate increase program by the Fed, as well as from continuing grass-roots political action that threatens recalcitrant legislators with replacement in the next election.  The dollar probably slides a bit, as well–a plus for the 50% or so of S&P earnings sourced abroad.  But sideways is both the most likely and the best I think ws can hope for.  Secular growth themes probably continue to predominate, with beneficiaries of fiscal stimulation lagging.

Having written that, I still think shale oil is interesting   …and the contrarian in me says that at some point there will be a valuation case for things like shipping and basic materials.  On the latter, I don’t think there’s any need to do more than nibble right now, though.



United (UAL) and overbooking


Overbooking itself is an airline industry staple.  It’s also a sensible practice.

That’s partly because there’s always someone who doesn’t show up for a flight.  For example, business people who travel often may book seats on three or four different flights to their next destination on a given day.  No matter what time their morning client meeting ends they’ll be able to get away easily.  They just cancel the ones they won’t use as the day develops.

operating leverage = large profit for the last seats sold

A plane that takes off with unused seats is a lost revenue opportunity.  Like unused hotel rooms, there’s no way to sell them later on.  And both hotels and airlines have a ton of operating leverage–there’s maybe $10 in marginal cost associated with an incremental seat/room.  So the profit contribution left on the table from non-use is immense.

UAL’s overbooking algorithm

I’ve noticed with UAL, which I’ve used regularly for years, that all of the last half-dozen or so flights I’ve been on recently have been overbooked.  That’s after seeing maybe one overbooked flight in the prior year.

My (unscientific) guess is that UAL tweaked its overbooking algorithm a few months ago in an effort to squeeze a bit more profit out of its flights.

My experience is that when companies begin to operate by trying to figure out where the the line is that marks the minimum a customer will accept–and then tries to get as close to that line as possible without crossing it, disaster inevitably happens.

I first encountered this phenomenon with a former management at Marriott that later went on to wreak havoc at Disney and at Northwest Air.  Their idea was that no one would notice if they lowered the room ceilings on newly-constructed hotels by an inch or two and shrank the room square footage by, say, 5%.  Yes, construction costs were a bit lower.  But I remember those rooms as being vaguely unsettling when I entered.  Business customers, the heart of a hotel chain’s profits, fled in droves.

If I’m correct, the remedy for UAL is simple.  Just go back to the former algorithm.  If, however, the corporate culture at UAL is to provide customers with the minimum acceptable service–and, to be clear, I don’t know that it is–more trouble is likely brewing.


oil inventories: rising or falling?

The most commonly used industry statistics say “rising.”

However, an article in last Thursday’s Financial Times says the opposite.

The difference?

The FT’s assertion is that official statistics emphasize what’s happening in the US, because data there are plentiful.  And in the US, thanks to the resurgence of shale oil production, inventories are indeed rising.  On the other hand, the FT reports that it has data from a startup that tracks by satellite oil tanker movements around the world, which seem to demonstrate that the international flow of oil by tanker is down by at least 16% year on year during 1Q17.

Tankers move about 40% of the 90+million barrels of crude brought to the surface globally each day.  So the startup’s data implies that worldwide shipments are down by about 6 million daily barrels.  In other words, supply is now running about 4 million daily barrels below demand–but we can’t see that because the shortfall is mostly occurring in Asia, where publicly available data are poor.

If the startup information is correct, I see two investment implications (neither of which I’m ready to bet the farm on, though developments will be interesting to watch):

–the global crude oil supply/demand situation is slowly tightening, contrary to consensus beliefs, and

–in a world where few, if any, experienced oil industry securities analysts are working for brokers, and where instead algorithms parsing public data are becoming the norm, it may take a long time for the market to realize that tightening is going on.

It will be potentially important to monitor:  (1) whether what the FT is reporting proves to be correct; (2) if so, how long a lag there will be from FT publication last week to market awareness; and (3) whether the market reaction will be ho-hum or a powerful upward movement in oil stocks.  If this is indeed a non-consensus view, and I think it is< then the latter is more likely, I think, than the former.

This situation may shed some light not only on the oil market but also on how the discounting mechanism may be changing on Wall Street.




technical analysis in the 21st century

A reader asked last week what I think about technical analysis.  This is my answer.

what it is

Technical analysis in the stock market is the attempt to predict future stock prices by studying current and past patterns in the buying and selling of stocks, stock indices and associated derivatives.  The primary focus is on price and trading volume data.

Technical analysis is typically contrasted with fundamental analysis, the attempt to predict future stock prices by studying macro- and microeconomic data relevant to publicly traded companies.  The primary sources of these data are SEC-mandated disclosure of publicly traded company operating results and government and industry economic statistics.

what the market is

The stock market as the intersection of the objective financial/economic characteristics of publicly traded companies with the hopes and fears of the investors who buy and sell shares.  Fundamental analysis addresses primarily the companies; technical analysis primarily addresses the hopes and fears.

ebbing and flowing

To be clear, I think there’s an awful lot of ridiculous stuff passing itself off as technical “wisdom.”  The technical analyst’s bible (which I actually read a long time ago), the 1948 Technical Analysis of Stock Trends by Edwards and Magee, is now somewhere in my basement.  I’ve never been able to make heads nor tails of most of it.

On the other hand, in the US a century ago–and in markets today where reliable company financials aren’t available–individual investors had little else to guide them.

the old days–technicals rule (by default)

What individual investors looked for back then was unusual, pattern-breaking behavior in stock prices–because they had little else to alert them to positive/negative company developments.

I think this can still be a very useful thing to do, provided you’ve watched the daily price movements of a lot of stocks over a long enough period of time that you can recognize when something strange is happening.

the rise of fundamental analysis

Starting in the 1930s, federal regulation began to force publicly traded companies to make fuller and more accurate disclosure of financial results.  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 mandated minimum levels of competence in the management of pension plan assets, laying the foundation for the fundamentals-driven securities analysis and portfolio management professions we have today in the US.

past the peak

The rise of passive investing and the rationalization of investment banking after the financial crisis have together reduced the amount of high-quality fundamental research being done in the US.  Academic investment theory, mostly lost in its wacky dreamworld of efficient markets, has never been a good training ground for analytic talent.

The waning of the profession of fundamental analysis is opening the door, I think, to alternatives.

algorithmic trading

Let’s say it takes three years working under the supervision of a research director or a portfolio manager to become an analyst who can work independently.  That’s expensive.  Plus, good research directors are very hard to find.  And the marketing people who generally run investment organizations have, in my experience, little ability to evaluate younger investment talent.

In addition, traditional investment organizations are in trouble in part because they’ve been unable to keep pace with the markets despite their high-priced talent.

The solution to beefing up research without breaking the bank?  Algorithmic trading.  I imagine investment management companies think that this is like replacing craft workers with the assembly line–more product at lower cost.

Many of the software-engineered trading products will, I think, be based on technical analysis.  Why?  The data are readily available.  Often, also, the simplest relationships are the most powerful.   I don’t think that’s true in the stock market, but it will probably take time for algos to figure this out.

My bottom line:  technical analysis will increase in importance in the coming years for two reasons:  the fading of traditional fundamental analysis, and the likelihood that software engineers hired by investment management companies will emphasize technicals, at least initially.





Tesla (TSLA) raising funds

Last week TSLA announced that it is raising $1 billion in new capital, $750 million in convertible notes due in 2022 + $250 million in common stock.

The offering itself isn’t a surprise.  TSLA has been chronically in the situation where analysts can see a point on the near-term future where the company could easily run out of funds.  This is partly the lot of any startup.  In TSLA’s case, it’s also a function of the firms continuingly expanding ambitions.  Elon Musk has been saying for some time that TSLA will will need new capital, too.

What is surprising, to me at least, is that the offering is not bigger   …and, more significantly, that the stock went up on the announcement.

To the first point, why wouldn’t TSLA give itself some breathing room by raising more money?  Of course, it’s possible that the small size is a marketing tactic and that the underwriters will soon announce that, “due to overwhelming demand,” it’s raising the size of the offering to, say, $1.5 billion.  Otherwise, I don’t get it.

To the second, this is just weird.  TSLA shares rose by a tad less than 30% in the first six weeks of 2017 and have been moving more or less sideways since.  So the idea that investors are willing to buy the stock can’t be surprising positive news.  And I don’t see the plus in some commentators’ claims that the market is relieved the offering isn’t larger.  I think the market should be mildly concerned instead.

Something else must be going on.

The only thing I can think of is that Wall Street is beginning to believe that electric vehicles are going to enter the mainstream much sooner than it had previously thought.  At the same time, the Trump administration’s intended moves to make it easier for American car makers to sell gas guzzlers for longer may result in Detroit remaining stuck in the past, paying less attention to electric vehicles.  So market prospects for TSLA may be improving just as competition from the “Big Three” may be weakening.

However, that alone shouldn’t be enough to propel a well-known stock higher in advance of an offering.




The kinks of financial journalism

This is the tile of a 2014 paper by Prof. Diego Garcia of the University of North Carolina, in which heanalyzes the relationship between recent behavior of the stock market and subsequent reporting in financial newspapers.

Conventional wisdom holds that reporters’ articles mirror and perhaps intensify the tone of the recent past.  That is to say, they are unduly bearish when the stock market has been making losses, and similarly unduly bullish when it has been making gains.

Prof. Garcia, studying Wall Street as reflected in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times from 1920 to 2005, draws a different conclusion.  He writes:

“…the asymmetry of journalists’ writing is pervasive: it has barely changed from the 1920s to the 1990s, and virtually all authors exhibit the same pattern, emphasizing negative returns, ignoring large positive market moves.”

Why should financial reporting have a negative bias?

The first thing that comes to my mind is television and radio weather people, who have a strong tendency to predict more precipitation than the US Weather Service, the government body from which they derive their data, says will happen.  How so?  Media weather people know that talking about looming bad weather has more entertainment value than a more benign forecast.  Also, viewers/listeners feel relieved if the forecast is for rain and the day is sunny instead.  They only get angry if the forecast is for fair weather and it ends up pouring.  Therefore, media weather people have every business/career reason to shade their forecasts heavily toward more precipitation rather than less.

John Authers, a reporter from the Financial Times from whom I learned about Prof. Garcia’s paper, gives more or less the same rationale for the similar phenomenon with newspapers.

my thoughts

–if the default position of a newspaper writer is to write a negative story, then we probably get no investment information from it.  On the other hand, if the story is positive, it’s unusual enough that we should look into the company or industry being reported on as a possible investment idea.

–Mr. Authers illustrates the risks to a journalist of making a positive recommendation.   Better, he says, to recommend not buying Amazon and watch it double than to run the risk of a loss.  Suppose the positive recommendation turn out to be Enron?

Of course, anyone in his right mind who read the Enron financials would have stayed as far away from that company as possible (yes, a couple of less-skilled colleagues at my last firm were, incomprehensibly to me, quite eager to buy the stock just before it imploded–and, yes, I did buy a stock certificate before it was delisted at $.80 or so as a souvenir–but that’s another story).  Reporters are trained journalists, however, not securities analysts.  They typically don’t have the economics, accounting or finance background to do analysis (although Mr. Authers does have an MBA from Columbia).  Nor do they have the time.  So the risk they run by saying something positive about a company is enormously high.

–An aside:  oddly enough, one of the first steps in training a growth stock analyst is to question this common sense attitude that avoiding all possibility of loss is the highest virtue.  For growth investors, finding a stock that can triple is.

–this study is only of US newspapers.  In my experience, reporters for the Financial Times are much more highly skilled than their US paper counterparts.



Tesla (TSLA), me and momentum investing

Why should a company fundamentals-driven investor have a problem with momentum investing?

Two reasons:

–momentum investing is a reactive strategy, and

–one that focuses son the past price movement of the little pieces of paper (or electronic impulses) that trade in the secondary market.

In contrast, fundamental investing is a predictive strategy based on the idea that the price of the paper/bits will ultimately be determined by the value of the underlying company.  Among fundamental investors, value investors believe that the key is the worth of the company as presently constituted (but perhaps running more smoothly than it in fact is).  Growth investors think the key is in early recognition of novel and unexpected profit positives that will fully emerge only in the future.


What kind of a thing, reactive or predictive, is my formula for TSLA of:   buy at $180 and sell at $250?  In a sense, I’ve got some fundamental underpinning.  My back-of-the-envelope figuring suggests nothing is likely to happen inside the company Tesla over the next couple of years that could possibly justify more than a $250 price.  And I’m willing to sell at that price even though the stock is still exhibiting positive price momentum.

But how did I get the $180?

What I’ve really done is to take a chart of the stock and draw a line that runs through the lows of the past four years or so and to conclude that this line forms the bottom of a channel (with something like $250 as the top) that TSLA has been navigating itself through since late 2013.  Yes, at $180 I have better potential for upside than I do at $250.  But that’s more a fact about arithmetic than a deep insight into corporate operations at Tesla.

In sum, then, the fundamental underpinning of at least the buying are pretty lame.

So I guess I have to say that there’s a healthier dose of momentum in my fooling around with TSLA than I might like to admit.  On another non-fundamental note, though, this ensures that my California son and I stay in regular contact.