I’ve just updated my Keeping Score page for a surprisingly strong (to me, anyway) July. Sector rotation is the main message.
I’ve just updated my Keeping Score page for S&P 500 performance in June, 2Q18 and year to date.
Modern economics has been founded in study of what caused the Great Depression of the 1930s, with an eye to preventing a recurrence of this devastating period. We know very clearly that tariffs and quotas are, generally speaking, bad things. They reduce overall economic activity in the countries that apply them. Yes, politically favored industries do often get a benefit, but the cost to everybody else is many times larger. We also know that the use of tariffs and quotas can snowball into a storm of retaliation and counter-retaliation that can do widespread damage for a long time.
My point is that it’s inconceivable that high-ranking public officials in Washington don’t know this.
HOG motorcycles are Baby Boomer counterculture icon. The company’s traditional domestic male customer base is aging, however, and losing the strength and sense of balance required to operate these heavy machines. At the same time, HOG has had difficulty in attracting younger customers, or women or minority groups to its offerings. So it’s an economically more fragile firm, I think, than the consensus realizes.
HOG has been damaged to some degree by the Trump tariffs on aluminum and steel, which are important raw materials. (As I understand them, the tariffs are ostensibly to address Chinese theft of US intellectual property, although they are being levied principally against Japan and the EU. ???)
Completely predictably, the EU is retaliating against the tariffs. In particular, it is levying its own 25% tariff on HOG motorcycles imported from the US. This affects about 20% of Harley’s output. HOG says the levy will cost it $100 million a year in lost income, implying that all of the EU-bound Harleys are now made in the US. HOGs response is to shift production targeted for the EU to its overseas plants. My guess is that this will take 1000+ jobs out of the US.
In contrast to the job loss from this one company, public reports indicate the total job gain from the steel/aluminum tariffs to be about 800 workers being recalled to previously idle steel/aluminum plants.
Mr. Trump’s response to the HOG announcement was to threaten punitive tariffs on any imports of foreign-made Harleys–a move that could threaten the viability of HOG’s network of around 700 independent dealerships. 7000 jobs at risk?
The stock market declined sharply on the day of the HOG announcement. I think that’s because the HOG story is a shorthand illustration of how tariffs, and quotas, cause net losses to the country as a whole, although they may bring benefits to a politically favored few.
A second negative effect of trade protection is a long-term one. My experience is that most often the protected industry, relieved of immediate competitive pressure, ceases to evolve. After a few years, consumers become willing to pay the increased price to get a (better) imported product. In my mind, General Motors is the poster child for this.
Stock market implications? …avoid Industrials. The obvious beneficiary of Washington’s ill-thought out trade policy is IT. For the moment, however, I think that this group is expensive enough that Consumer Discretionary and Energy are better areas to pick through.
Stocks are down today. The ostensible reasons are trade war fears + the administration’s distinctly un-American decision to seize and imprison the children of asylum seekers at the border.
It’s not clear to me that–important as these issues may be for the long-term attractiveness of the US as an investment destination–they are the reasons for the market’s decline. (Personally, I think the mid-term elections will give us the first true read on whether ordinary Americans approve of the UK/Japan-like road Washington has set the country on.)
But I don’t want to write about macroeconomics or about politics. Instead, I want to call attention to the useful purpose that down days, or strings of down days, for that matter, serve for portfolio management.
There are two:
–portfolio realignment. This is as much about psychology as anything else. Typically during a selloff stars go down more than the market and clunkers underperform. Because of this, clunkers that have been hiding in the dark recesses of the portfolio (we all have them) become more visible. At the same time, stars that we’ve thinking we should buy but have looked too expensive are suddenly trading a bit cheaper. The reality is probably that we should have made the switch months ago, but a down day gives us a chance to tell ourselves we’re better off by, say, 5% than if we’d made the switch yesterday.
–looking for anomalies–that is, clunkers that are going down (for me, this is typically a sign that things are worse than I’ve thought, and a sharp spur to action), or stars that are going up. Netflix, for example, is up by about 1.4% as I’m writing this, even though it has been a monster stock this year. I already own enough that I’m not going to do anything. But if I had none (and were comfortable with such a high-flier) I’d be tempted to buy a little bit and hope to fill out the position on decline.
I’ve just updated my Keeping Score page for May. IT rises to the top again.
About a week ago, Saudi Arabia and Russia, two of the three largest oil producers in the world (the US is #1), announced they were discussing the mechanics of restoring half of the 1.8 million barrels of daily output foreign companies have been withholding from the market since 2016.
…to stop the price from advancing above $80.
To be honest, I’m a bit surprised that oil has gotten this high. But producing countries have held to their cutback pledges to a far greater degree than they have in the past, with the result that the mammoth glut of oil in temporary storage a couple of years ago is mostly gone. In addition, the economy of Venezuela is melting away, turning down that country’s output of heavy crude favored by US refiners. Also, the world is worried that unilateral US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement may mean the loss of 500,000 daily barrels from that source.
On the other hand, short-term demand for oil is relatively inflexible. Because of this, even small changes in supply or demand can result in large swings in price. An extra 1% -2% in production drove the price from $100+ to $24 in 2014-15, for example. The same amount of underproduction caused the current rebound. So in hindsight, $80 shouldn’t have been so shocking.
Two factors, I think. There must be significant internal pressure among producing countries to get even a small amount more foreign exchange by cheating on quotas. Letting everyone get something may make it harder for one rogue nation to break ranks.
More importantly, a $100 price seems to trigger significant global conservation efforts, as well as to shift the search for petroleum substitutes into a higher gear. So somewhere around $80 may be as good as it gets for producers. And it leaves some headroom if efforts to hold the price at $80 fail.
My guess is that most of the upward move for the oils is over. I think there’s still some reason to be interested in financially leveraged shale oil producers in the US as they unwind the restrictions their lenders have placed on them.
Italy has long been the weakest link among the three major continental European economies in the euro. Its economy has deep structural flaws. Pre-euro it had long been papering them over through heavy government borrowing. That allowed it to live beyond its means, protecting industries of the past and giving short shrift to future possibilities. Periodic devaluations of the lira let it continue this strategy by paying lenders back in debased coin.
Despite this checkered history, Italy became a founding member of the euro in 1999. It got in by the skin of its teeth–and that only after enacting a violence-wracked series of important reforms just in advance of the deadline. The hope back then was that once in the common currency Italy would continue down the reform path. Instead, however, it has used the privilege of issuing euro-denominated debt to resume a less aggressive version of its bad old ways. The result has been a domestic economy laden with debt, that has shown almost no real economic growth over the past decade.
The leaders of a nativist political coalition formed after recent elections have been speaking about their economic plans. Their idea is apparently to “solve” Italy’s problems by repudiating a portion of the national debt and withdrawing from the euro, presumably in order to substantially devalue a new currency.
…sounds a little like Greece, only ten times the size.
This development is, I think, the main reason the euro has been falling against the US$ since early April.
–although the new government hasn’t announced official policy, I think that what it ultimately says will be at best a watered-down version of what leaders have already been saying unofficially to their supporters. If so, we’re in early days of a looming crisis
–to the degree that professional investors hold Italian stocks, I think their reaction will be to seek safety elsewhere
–it wouldn’t be surprising to see official policy end up being something resembling Abenomics in Japan in its broad outlines. This implies the folliwing end result: a substantial loss of national wealth, a higher cost of living for ordinary citizens and protection of traditional industry/established elites from negative effects. There’s no reason to think Italy would end up any different
–it’s probably also worth noting that “protect sunset industries/stunt the future/lower living standards” summarizes the Trump economic playbook for the US, to the extent there is one. This means we can already see in Japan/Italy the trailer of a future disaster movie for the US
–What to do in the stock market? I think Italy has restored the safe haven character of the dollar for the moment. Given the distinct policy negatives in the US, EU and Japan, China is looking a lot better. Secular growth (i.e., IT) anywhere is probably safer than economic sensitivity