Do senior citizens make bad investors?

A soon to be published study of age-related investor behavior

A forthcoming article in the Review of Economics and Statistics by Alok Kumar of the University of Texas at Austin and George Komiotis of the Federal Reserve says older investors are indeed bad.  According to Kumar and Komiotis, a sharp, progressive deterioration of cognitive abilities that begins for most people around the age of 70 overwhelms the positive effects of superior experience.  The result is ever worsening active management performance.There’s a summary of the article, with useful investment tips, in this past weekend’s Wall Street Journal.

The research has actually been around for a while, and was also written up in the New York Times in 2005.

Aging is an issue

I think that aging is a real issue for investors, although not for the reason–age, per se–that the authors cite.

As we age, we become more susceptible to physical and mental diseases that absorb our time and energy, reducing our ability to concentrate on investments.

But also I  think we all underestimate the intense socialization inherent in modern work, especially white collar jobs.  When we retire, it’s like we’re professional athletes who have just broken ties with the team.  No more three hours a day of physical training, no three hours of practice.   No more big games, teammate pressure to perform, no mental training–concentration, visualization.

The intense atmosphere that we’ve become accustomed to and don’t consciously perceive is gone.  Some of us decide we’d prefer going fishing to continuing to train our brains.  And without the social atmosphere and the associated competition, it’s hard to reach the peak performance we achieved easily before.  In what seems the blink of an eye, we’re like the retired athlete who’s no longer a greyhound, but has gained 50 pounds of unsightly flab.

I’ll come back to this later, but first to the study.

How the study worked

The researchers got a discount broker to give them access to data for 62, 387 customers over six years, from 1991-1996.  They looked only at common stocks and common stock trading.

The average account had 4 stocks in it, with a combined value of $35,629.  The median account had 3 stocks in it, worth $13,869.

The study used zip code data to estimate income, education and ethnicity.  Average income, which didn’t vary much across age groups below 60 was $90,782.  Mean wealth was $268,909.  Therefore, the portfolios studied represented about a third of yearly income and 13% of estimated wealth.

About 27% of the accounts were of California residents.  The study looked at both total and ex-California results, which showed no differences.

The conclusions:

–no one beat the S&P 500

–relative performance by age group rose steadily from twenty-somethings to peak with people in their mid 40s.  Performance began a decline that really accelerated after 70.

–High income, better educated clients did better than average.  Low income, less educated and minority group clients did worse.

Where I think the study goes wrong

1.   A quibble. In any endeavor like this, you study the characteristics of a small group that you then argue is representative of the population as a whole.  In this case, the argument is that the traits of clients of the unnamed discount broker are indicative of investors throughout the US.  We already have reason to suspect that this isn’t true here, since California makes up 12% of the US population but 27% of the accounts studied.

2.  The dollar amount of stocks studied is very small.  More important, although the study’s authors argue that the stocks in question don’t represent “play money” or afterthoughts to the account holders, they have no way, other than information from account applications and zip codes, to determine this.

For younger investors, their main source of wealth is most likely their human capital, that is, their professional skills and educational investment in themselves.  Older investors will likely own real estate, pensions, IRAs or 401Ks or stock (or some other ownership interest) in the company where they work.  I don;t think this has ben factored into the wealth estimates.

3.  Financial information in a client’s initial brokerage application can be seriously out of date. Also, the wealth and income data can be seriously understated.  As any financial advisor will tell you, clients can be very reticent about revealing the true extent of their wealth, for fear they will be pressured to shift assets from elsewhere to the broker in question.

4.  I don’t think conventional risk adjustments address the situation of the older investor.  At some point, an investor’s goal changes from trying to accumulate more wealth to trying to preserve the wealth he has.  Beating the S&P 500 goes out the window and preserving income walks in the front door.

In addition, the more cautious attitude an older investor may have will likely be reinforced if he has a financial advisor.  Besides the client’s financial health, the advisor also has to consider the possibility that he may be sued by the client’s heirs if the investments have gone down in value.  Remember, customers of traditional brokers often have discount brokerage accounts as well, where they do trading based on the “full service” broker’s advice.  Why?  …to avoid the high fees the latter charges, and that the client thinks are out of line with the value of the advice received.

In other words, underperformance vs. the market may be a function of increased risk aversion, not cognitive decline.

What I think is important

I usually don’t like newspaper articles about investing, but I thought the Wall Street Journal one was pretty good.

1.  Simplify your investments, so that you are able monitor them in the time you are willing to devote to this.

2.  Have a backup plan for if you become sick or otherwise unable to spend time on investing–in other words, how do you get from where you are now to total indexing.

3.  Have records that allow you, or some one else, to determine things like cost basis.  Be especially careful if you have (as many people do) brokerage accounts you’ve closed but which contain cost data for stocks you’ve transferred elsewhere.  If you hold actual physical stock certificates, make sure that you have a separate list of what you own, in case the certificates become lost or damaged.


Disney–waiting for the upturn; Dec 09 results

First-quarter results–up 15%

DIS reported its December-quarter (first quarter of fiscal 2010) earnings results on February 9th.  Excluding unusual items, earnings per share were $.47 this year vs. $.41 last year.  That’s a gain of 15% over the deep-in-recession performance of 12 months ago.

The investment case for DIS…

…assuming there is one (I own the stock, so I must think there is) rests on three ideas:

1.   ESPN continues to motor along in the US and is successful in expanding into the UK,

2.  the theme parks gradually recover, and

3.  the movie business straightens itself out and starts to make money again.

It would be icing on the cake if the ABC television network/stations stabilized, and/or if–in a reversal of twenty-five years of avoidance–customers started to show up at EuroDisney.  But these operations are small enough that all they really need to do is not get in the way too much.

How did the quarter stack up? Continue reading

Activision–strong 2009, better 2010 in store

The earnings conference call

I listened to a replay of ATVI’s fourth-quarter earnings conference call the other day.  It was an odd event, in my opinion, conveying lots of data but not that much information.  This may in part have been due to the fact that the analysts participating in the call ranged from the very knowledgeable to people who gave no evidence they knew anything about either ATVI or the video game industry.  A fact of life on today’s Wall Street, or an indicator of the declining importance of the video game industry to investors?

High- and low-lights: Continue reading

Kindle economics (III): the Macmillan book dispute

The dispute

The Macmillan publishing house and Amazon had a recent, very public spat about Kindle book pricing.  Amazon had been paying Macmillan about $12.50 per e-book for a $25 list-price new release–the same as it would have paid for a physical book–and then selling it through Kindle for $10.  Macmillan wanted that stopped.

Instead, it wanted AMZN to raise the Kindle price to $13-$15 and use the iPad (and now Kindle, starting in June) agency model to pay it.  That model, also used by publishers in dealing with independent bookstores, calls for the sale revenue to be split 70% for the publisher and 30% to the retailer.  If AMZN didn’t agree, Macmillan apparently threatened to withhold its titles from e-book sale on Amazon for six months after publication, while Apple would be allowed to sell them on day one.

The arguing even went as far as having AMZN cease selling Macmillan books through its website for a short time.  AMZN then issued a surly letter to customers and acceded to Macmillan’s demands.

What’s wrong with this picture? Continue reading

Kindle economics (II): it’s vintage Amazon

Some AMZN history

Jeff Bezos founded Amazon in 1995 as an online bookstore and brought the company public in 1997, at a price of $1.50 per share (adjusted for splits).

By 2000, the company diversified into distribution of music and films, as well as merchandise for third parties.  AMZN had grown sales to over $2.7 billion.  But it lost $417.5 million for the twelve months–its sixth consecutive year of red ink.  the company’s operating margin was negative.  It had more than $2 billion in debt and a retained deficit of close to $1 billion.

The stock, which had peaked the prior year at $113 and was on its way to $6.  The company survived long enough to hit $4 billion in sales (in 2002), which was apparently the size it needed to break even.  Then things turned up–in a big way.

Not initially a fan…

I’ll admit I wasn’t initially a believer–I was a customer, yes, but not a stockholder.   AMZN seemed to me then to be one of the core “internet cult” stocks.   The AMZN high priestess was Mary Meeker, not in virtue of any ability to read financial statements or project earnings, but because Jeff Bezos was willing to speak directly to her.

I remember attending a brilliant AMZN roadshow.  The company said nothing about itself.  It showed slides of the price appreciation for leaders of prior generations of technology, like ORCL, MSFT or CSCO.  They said that big fortunes would be made in the Internet Generation by those who found internet stars in their infancy.  The crowd went wild.

I think that if AMZN hadn’t capitalized on the internet frenzy  to raise over $1.6 billion in debt capital during 1998-1999, it would not have been able to survive.  On the other hand, it did.

In hindsight, it seems to me also that at first AMZN had more of a vision than a business plan.  It clearly overestimated the size of the online book market and wildly underestimated the amount of spending on physical distribution infrastructure it would have to do to succeed.  To its credit, however, it adjusted.  When it saw its original market mature, AMZN quickly diversified.  By 1999, it was selling music CDs, movie videos, electronics, video games and home improvement products.  And it found enough willing (read: gullible) lenders to finance its capital expansion.

One other lesson AMZN learned quickly.  Soon after it started up, Barnes and Noble launched its own website.  I don’t think BKS did this because it was so enamored of the internet as a source of profits.  Instead, it wanted to make sure that online prices stayed low enough that AMZN–and the threat it posed to BKS’s bricks-and-mortar bookstores–would have maximum trouble earning money.

…but it’s a different company now Continue reading