retailers and inventories

I want to write about prospects for retail during the upcoming holiday selling season in the United States.  I’m going to do it in two posts.

In today’s I’ll cover the general issue–how retailers figure out how much inventory to have on the shelves.  In Sunday’s I’ll cover what activity at the major ports in China and on the west coast of the US is saying about what retailers are doing this year.

the inventory problem

In its simplest form, the ground-level decision retailers make about how much stuff to buy to stock their shelves can be framed in terms of the two possible unfavorable outcomes.

They are:

–stock-out costs, meaning the opportunity loss a retailer suffers if a potential customer comes in to buy a specific item and is willing to pay full price, only to find that the store has run out.

This is a tragedy.

There’s some chance a good salesperson can persuade the customer to buy a substitute item that is available.  More likely, the customer goes elsewhere and the chance to grab a 100% markup over cost of goods is lost.

On top of that, the rival that makes the sale has a shot at becoming the customer’s first stop from that point on.  Also, too many empty shelves can create a “don’t go there” atmosphere akin to walking down a dark street in a bad neighborhood at night.  And a thoughtful shopper might construe the absence of certain product lines as a statement by their manufacturer about the retailer’s (low) status or creditworthiness.

 

The other side of the coin is:

excess inventory, especially of seasonal items.  In this case, the retailer has the problem of how to dispose of the extra merchandise.

Three reasons for this:

the value of the inventory is eroding as time passes,

the merchant wants to recover the cash he sunk into buying the merchandise, and

he wants to create shelf space for more salable items.

Some things may be returnable to the manufacturer, whether the sales agreement, strictly speaking, allows this possibility or not.  Most, though, will go through a process of markdowns in the store, followed by sale (maybe even at a loss) into the extensive closeout network that crisscrosses the US.

Although the reality is that few retail purchases in the US are at full price, customers are put off if a store always looks like a fire sale is happening.  Branded goods manufacturers may also become very upset if retailers sell their wares at a discount or if they find their merchandise floating around in closeoutland.

True, some manufacturers are vertically integrated.  That is, they maintain retail doors themselves, as well as wholesale warehouses to serve both affiliated and non-affiliated customers.  In such cases, retailers can operate just-in-time by ordering periodically from local distribution centers.  This doesn’t eliminate the inventory planning issue, however; it just shifts it from the retailer to the distributor.  The tradeoff for the retailer is that he doesn’t capture the full markup from the factory door (as a rough rule of thumb, maybe half the total markup on any item goes to the wholesaler).

Over the past couple of decades, department stores, which still serve many of the needs of average Americans, have increasingly turned to house brands, with merchandise ordered more or less directly from the (usually Asian) manufacturer.  They may use an intermediary like Hong Kong-based Li and Fung for ordering or for design services, or they may go straight to the factory themselves.  In either case, their decision has been to increase their inventory-related risk in order to generate higher margins.

taking retail’s temperature

Generally speaking, small, lightweight, high-value items like laptops, tablets or cellphones, are delivered from Asia to the US by air. For most merchandise, however, speed isn’t essential and airfreight costs from Asia would take too big a chunk out of profits.  So this stuff travels by ship from, say, Hong Kong to California, and then by truck or rail to a distribution center.

Anyone can get a reasonable idea–with some caveats–of how retailers see the holiday season shaping up by monitoring the publicly available data on activity in the major import-export ports.

The message the ports are delivering is that despite relatively robust retail sales in recent months in the US, retailers are planning on at best a flattish holiday selling season.

More about this on Sunday.

 

Harrisburg, PA, the state capital, declared bankruptcy yesterday

the Harrisburg incinerator project

Years ago, Harrisburg, a town of under 50,000 in population, decided to borrow heavily to build a gigantic trash incinerator.  The contraption was supposed to turn a big profit for the municipality by generating energy it could sell.  The project was a big roll of the dice for a small town.

The incinerator quickly needed an expensive overhaul and it never worked as planned.  That left Harrisburg, as guarantor of over $300 million in municipal bond financing, at least nominally on the hook for loans it can’t possibly repay (the entire town budget, including transfer payments from the state, is around $60,000). What were they thinking?

The bonds are insured, however, and as Harrisburg has fallen behind on payments, the insurance company has been taking up the slack.

why Chapter 9 bankruptcy?

Why the Chapter 9 filing, then?  The state legislature apparently decided that Harrisburg hasn’t taken enough austerity measures.  So it was preparing to take control away from the town fathers and cut town services to get more money for debt repayment.  But as government bodies do, the legislature decided it needed a rest and recessed for a few days in the middle of  considering the enabling bill.  That gave the Harrisburg Town Council time to vote, 4 to 3, to enter bankruptcy.

legal questions

Legal issues abound.  For example. the town’s attorney says the council vote isn’t binding because town rules require him to review council measures before a vote, and he didn’t get to do so.  The state legislature already has a law on the books telling Harrisburg it can’t enter Chapter 9.  Is that law constitutional?

equity investment implications

I wrote about this topic in more detail late last year, when former brokerage house bank analyst Meredith Whitney predicted massive municipal bankruptcies in 2011.  Virtually nothing so far, though.

Two points to remember:

states, which have lots more debt than towns, can’t declare bankruptcy

–in some states, municipalities aren’t allowed to declare bankruptcy; in others, state government permission is required first.  We’ll eventually learn whether Pennsylvania is one of the latter sort.

Also, the Harrisburg situation has been clear for years.  While the actual filing may be news, the town’s predicament isn’t.

thinking about pensions?

It’s not clear to me that the Harrisburg town council actually has a plan for what it wants to do in Chapter 9, other than just to foil the state’s effort to take over the town.  In Chapter 9, the town can try to renegotiate the incinerator project debt.  But it can also open the issue of municipal employee pensions that it is committed to but can’t afford.

There’s no indication yet that it wants to do the latter.  But if it does and is successful we can imagine a rash of follow-on Chapter 9 filings by other financially strapped Pennsylvania cities and towns.

That could have a counterintuitive positive economic effect, since it would reduce the need to lay off current employees to get the money to pay retirees.  The monthly BLS Employment Situation reports clearly show that the biggest negative factor in the current labor situation in the US is the constant stream of state and local government layoffs.

conclusion

I think the Harrisburg situation is one to watch out of the corner of your eye, but one that–in my view–holds no big plusses or minuses for equity investors.

Alcoa’s 3Q11–bellwether for the S&P 500? No.

AA as bellwether

AA is the first major company in the S&P 500 to report earnings for the calendar year quarterly cycle.  Market commentators often make a big deal about AA’s results on the idea that they set the tone for the earnings season.  I don’t think that’s right, either in general or for this quarter.

My reason?

I should probably confess in advance that aluminum isn’t my favorite metal and that I’ve only occasionally owned AA or any of its affiliated companies in my portfolios.  But I’ve spent years analyzing metals and mining stocks.  In fact, my first portfolio job was to manage Australian stocks at a time when half that market was natural resources.

Anyway, I view AA is an exceptionally well-managed industrial company.  But, contrary to the images that “aluminum” and “mining” conjure up of machines taking special dirt out of a big hole in the ground, AA is an unusually complex enterprise, whose quarterly earnings are very hard to analyze.  Most quarterly earnings surprises, positive or negative, are mostly due to how hard it is for an outsider to see the inner workings of AA.  As a result, earnings surprises, including this one, have very little meaning, in my view.

3Q11 results

As it turns out, AA earned $.15 per share for the September period.  That was 2.5x the $.06 per share it posted for the comparable quarter in 2010.  But it was also down 46% from the $.28 a share it earned in 2Q11.  Results also fell short of the Wall Street analyst consensus of $.22.

As I’m writing this, AA shares are down about 4% in pre-market trading, while S&P futures are suggesting an opening gain for the index of about .9%.

More below about why AA results are so hard to predict.  But first,

how AA sees the world today

In its conference call, AA drew a sharp contrast between the current situation and that during the dark days of 2008-09.  The company is better prepared now for a possible downturn than it was then.  However, right now it doesn’t see a downturn as likely.  In AA’s view, the fall in London Metal Exchange prices during the third quarter is purely speculative, with short-sellers using aluminum solely as a proxy for world economic growth (which, when you get down to it, the metal is).  But AA thinks the speculatros are making a mistake.  Underlying demand remains strong, especially in emerging economies.

True, Europe is a worry.  One reason for AA’s quarter on quarter weakness is that European customers pulled back their orders.  At this point, it’s not that final demand has collapsed.  It’s that companies have been shrinking their inventories to unusually low levels in order to raise cash in anticipation that EU political leaders may yet bungle their way into a banking crisis.  As/when that rear abates, the European order flow should quickly reverse.

why so hard to analyze?

AA is vertically integrated.  It mines ore, refines it into basic products, and manufactures advanced aluminum industrial components. It buys and sells stuff at every point in the production chain.

Its products are in everything from airplanes to toothpaste and soda cans, and in products that sell all around the world.

It has many sources of raw materials, some owned, some not, to choose from.  Its selections are constrained by contractual relationships that can rival for complexity anything in the film or oil industries. While prices of inputs and outputs may be tied to industry benchmarks, there can be leads or lags of months before changes kick in.  Contracts may require the buyer to pay for specified quantities whether he takes delivery or not (it’s a little more complicated than this, but nothing to worry about).  All of this is difficult for an analyst to find out about and model.

Even more discouraging, the stock tends to move on changes in aluminum prices, which can occur far in advance of reported earnings.

my thoughts

To my mind, AA is giving a relatively upbeat view of the world economy–well, maybe ex the EU. And even there, the situation doesn’t sound too bad.

I don’t think the company’s earnings “miss” has any predictive value for firms outside the base metals industries.  Given the stock’s severe underperformance of the S&P over the past three months, I’m a bit surprised that it’s down at all after the earnings report.  It will be interesting to see how it fares in regular trading today.

 

 

the power of media endorsements

what they are

Why to professional investors appear on radio and TV shows?  Why do they give interviews to newspaper reporters?  After all, it takes time, they don’t get paid, the interviewer may be clueless and have his/her own agenda, and they give away information that they normally charge their clients for.  Nevertheless, professionals are eager to do so.

why appear in the media?

Ego is one reason, but that only goes so far.

 

The real reason is that most people have an unusually favorable view of the media.  They think that before you get to appear on a TV show about investing, you have to pass a rigorous screening process that weeds out all but the best and the brightest.  With retail clients in particular, the implied endorsement by the media can be a more important factor in their deciding to hire you as a manager than your experience and track record.

The reality is that a media appearance can simply be the result of a phone call by your public relations company, or the fact that you look good in a suit and can talk in sound bites, or that you can appear on short notice when a comment on your specialty is needed, or that your firm is a big advertiser.  So the appearance is actually more like a product placement in a movie than an independent evaluation of your competence.

Despite this, the sales materials for your products will doubtless feature your media appearance prominently  …because it works.

 

 

Macau market gambling results for September 2011

Macau gaming results for September

On October 4th, while the Hong Kong stock market was closed, Macau’s Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau announced total gambling “win” for the SAR’s casinos for the month of September.  Brokerage house analysts in Hong Kong had hinted broadly that the number would be weak, due to supposed financial reverses being suffered by affluent mainlanders.  There was also the negative effect of Typhoon Nesat, which forced a shutdown of schools, businesses and most transportation (but not the casinos themselves) in Macau on September 29th, to consider.

Nevertheless, the reported figure was another excellent one, as can be seen from the chart below:

Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2011 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2011 2010 Variance 2011 2010 Variance
Jan 18,571 13,937 +33.2% 18,571 13,937 +33.2%
Feb 19,863 13,445 +47.7% 38,434 27,383 +40.4%
Mar 20,087 13,569 +48.0% 58,521 40,951 +42.9%
Apr 20,507 14,186 +44.6% 79,028 55,137 +43.3%
May 24,306 17,075 +42.4% 103,334 72,211 +43.1%
Jun 20,792 13,642 +52.4% 124,126 85,853 +44.6%
Jul 24,212 16,310 +48.4% 148,337 102,163 +45.2%
Aug 24,769 15,773 +57.0% 173,106 117,935 +46.8%
Sept 21,244 15,302 +38.8% 194,350 133,237 +45.9%

If we adjust the figures for the negative effects of the typhoon, on the idea that Macau lost a day’s gambling business (I think two days might be more realistic), then the gross gaming revenue for the SAR in September would be MOP 21.977 billion, and the year on year gain would be 43.6%.

massive selling ahead of the report

There has been huge selling of the Hong Kong-listed Macau gaming stocks since a report from a prominent analyst at Deutsche Bank predicted that a sharp slowdown in the growth of the Macau gaming market was imminent.  Even though Las Vegas Sands was quoted in the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times on October 2nd as saying that the company saw no signs of weakness in September, selling in Hong Kong seems to have reached a crescendo on October 3rd.  On that day, most Macau gaming stocks fell over 10%; SJM, whose casinos generate about a third of Macau’s total gaming revenue, lost 25% of its market value.

Yes, this was a little (more than a little, in my view) crazy.  The only sense I can make of the sharp declines is that short-term traders feared weak revenue numbers would be released by the Macau DICJ while Hong Kong was closed on October 4-5.  Maybe they had no time to read the papers.

where to from here?

It seems to me that the recent selling in world equity markets, including Hong Kong, has been driven by fears of an implosion in the EU financial system, leading in Lehman-like fashion, to a freezing up of world trade and a consequent severe global economic turndown.  However unlikely this scenario may be, a turn in the mood of short-term traders will probably require concrete evidence that this won’t happen.  Hence the focus of eyes and ears on Germany and France.

For the Macau casino stocks, the idea that a substantial downshift in gambling by affluent mainlanders is “just around the next corner” is a difficult one to disprove, no matter how many corners are successfully negotiated.  In addition, the market participants who dumped out casino shares at, say, 5x normal volume and at prices 25% below today’s prices will have a hard time convincing either themselves or their clients that they should buy the stocks back any time soon.

So the bearish mood surrounding these stocks may remain for a while.

On the other hand, the companies seem to me to have excellent long-term (and short-term) prospects and to be trading at unusually low valuations.