Hedge fund manager David Einhorn has been urging AAPL for some time to adopt his pet idea of issuing preferred stock that would basically be backed by the company’s gigantic accumulated cash position.
APPL isn’t interested.
In the Steve Jobs days, I think the AAPL CEO would have told Mr. Einhorn, either directly or through the press, that his answer was “No!!,” and that Einhorn should stop trying to interfere with the running of AAPL’s business. This probably would have been the end of the matter.
The current AAPL management didn’t do that. Instead, it put on the agenda at the company’s annual meeting this week a shareholder vote to change the company’s charter in a way that would forbid the kind of perpetual preferred Einhorn is championing (see my analysis of the preferred idea).
Not only that, but AAPL wrapped this proposal in a package of others and asked for a single vote on the whole bundle.
Mr. Einhorn sued, saying in effect that the bundling violates both common sense and SEC rules. On Friday, a federal judge agreed–and barred a vote on “Proposal #2” at this annual meeting.
According to the Financial Times, by the time of the court ruling AAPL had received ballots representing 40% of the outstanding shares. Of them, 97.5% had voted for the company and, by implication, against Mr. Einhorn.
the voting results are no surprise
In my experience, individual shareholders vote with management no matter whether it’s in their economic interest or not. Hard for me to understand, but easy to predict.
For almost two decades, the SEC has been pushing the compliance departments of professional money managers on proxy voting. The regulator wants them to take seriously their fiduciary obligation to vote the shares under their stewardship in the best interests of their customers–or else. This pressure has resulted in the rise of third-party firms like ISS and Glass Lewis, which have set themselves up as independent experts in proxy analysis and making shareholder-friendly voting recommendations. The path of least resistance for institutional investors seems to me to be to subscribe to one of these firms’ services and vote accordingly.
Both ISS and GL recommended voting for AAPL in this matter.
In other words, all the individuals and all the traditional institutions were going to vote against Einhorn.
why a vote at all? …and why this vote?
Mr. Einhorn points out on the Greenlight Capital website that because no one has tried his preferred suggestion, that doesn’t mean it’s a bad idea. Of course, it doesn’t mean it’s a good one either …or a good one for AAPL.
What’s clear, however, is that AAPL doesn’t want to discuss the idea publicly–even to say that it’s a thought, but one that won’t work for AAPL. I think this is a mistake.
I think I understand why AAPL set up the vote as a bundle, though, rather than a straight yes-or-no on the preferred issue alone. From my common sense viewpoint, as well as from an SEC perspective, grouping a bunch of disparate proposals together just doesn’t seem fair. (In addition, for what it’s worth, I don’t see how narrowing the scope of possible future preferred issues serves shareholders interests. It just makes Mr. Einhorn go away.)
Why bundle? AAPL must know that institutions pretty much vote whatever way ISS tells them. I think AAPL presented the preferred proposal to the advisory service in a package that it simply couldn’t recommend voting against. It thereby also avoided the risk that if the preferred ban were offered separately ISS would recommend a “no” vote, which a ton of institutional holders would then cast.
AAPL management hasn’t done itself any favors,
…in my view.
The company’s unwillingness to lay out reasons–like that the preferreds might constrain needed US-sourced cash flow–for opposing the Einhorn proposal make management look weak.
The bundling makes the company look like it has something to hide.
AAPL’s odd behavior suggests there’s considerably more to this story than meets the eye.