I got my first couple of portfolio manager jobs in the 1980s because one of my industry specializations as a securities analyst was natural resources. Back then, there were an enormous number of mining analysts in an information industry based in London. The large size and vitality of the analyst community were partly because there had been an enormous spike in the prices of gold and oil in the late 1970s-early 1980s. So investors were willing to pay handsomely for information and interpretation. Also, the prevalent economic theory of the day, since proved to be woefully incorrect, held that a necessary condition for global economic growth was a continuously expanding supply of mineral resources.
When the Chinese economic expansion-driven commodities boom began a decade and a half later, I found that, unsurprisingly after 15 years of no one being interested, the entire stock market information infrastructure for metals had disappeared. There were still the odd steel or oil analyst around eking out a living and staggering toward retirement, but little else, either in London or New York.
As far as I can see, from an information perspective the situation is at least as bad today. In the perverse way that Wall Street works, however, that lack itself is the basis of the positive thesis for mining in general.
Mineral extraction industries are very capital-intensive. This means that projects typically require large amounts of up-front money. But they can often continue, once up and running, for long periods without new funds being put in.
Mining projects often have very long lives.
Very often, projects are also huge. This is partly the nature of the beast, partly a function of the temperament of the people who run minerals companies. This means that new supply is often added in gigantic chunks. New supply almost invariably arrives in amounts way above the increase in demand and typically, therefore, marks the high water mark in terms of price. Boom and bust, boom and bust–the rhythm of these markets.
finding the bottom
Falling prices indicates that there’s more supply than demand. In theory, that situation can be reversed either by demand expanding or by supply contracting. In practice, the first rarely happens.
What establishes the bottom for these markets, in my experience, is a price decline that’s deep enough to force high-cost capacity to close. This does not mean the price at which companies stop earning a financial reporting profit. That price is too high. That’s because it includes as an expense a non-cash allowance for recovering the money spent to open the project. A company can also be compelled to sell at unfavorable prices by creditors.
What actually matters is the point at which the out-of-pocket cash cost of getting output out of the ground is less than what it can be sold for. That’s the point at which projects begin to shut themselves down. They may not do so immediately. They may continue to bleed in the hope of an imminent turnaround.
For gold, the relevant figure is around $850 an ounce, I think. Oil is a bit more complicated, but the magic number is likely about $40 a barrel.
Thanks Dan, this is interesting and helpful. If your estimates are about right regarding variable cash costs for oil and gold, then there is considerable more downside, i.e., we first need to get to the cash costs, then we need to stay there long enough that producers start to run out of cash.
Thanks for your comment. That’s exactly right. At some point, the highest-cost producers will be forced to shut down. I think the case is more straightforward with oil than with gold, where the very high level of inventories vs. production and its use as a form of money in third world countries like India come into play.