As I pointed out last week, WFM has gross margins that are much higher than the average supermarket’s. WFM also turns its inventory in a little less than two weeks, which is two or three times the rate of a typical grocery store. Over the past several years, it has been generating over a billion dollars in annual cash flow.
On the other hand, sales are falling. The largest use WFM has been making of the money it generates is to buy back stock ($2 billion worth over the past three years). Its working capital management seems to produce much less cash for it than rivals–although this may be the result of an unusual product mix and/or worry that the current poor sales trend will continue.
In addition, it appears WFM is attempting to extend its brand downmarket with the opening of 365 stores–a tacit acknowledgement that its core high-end market is saturated. In my experience, though, this strategy rarely works. Its main effect is typically to degrade the upscale image of the main brand. Tiffany is the only exception I can think of.
what interests Amazon (AMZN)
–WFM has a well-known brand name, that stands for healthy, high-quality, and ethical behavior. But it also stands for “whole paycheck,” an attribute that AMZN can most likely eliminate without damaging the rest of the image
–an ironic plus, WFM doesn’t appear to have kept up with the times in pricing, computerization or inventory control. So there’s arguably low-hanging fruit to be picked
–WFM has a physical distribution network that culminates in 430+ physical stores covering most major markets in the US
–the NPD Group, a leader in consumer marketing research, points out that:
—-WSM stores are located in areas that are younger and more affluent than average
—-52% of online grocery buyers are members of Amazon Prime, and therefore arguably disposed to by groceries through AMZN if the company had an adequate delivery mechanism
—-60% of Millennials bought at least one item from AMZN last year vs. 24% who bought something from WSM. So AMZN has, at least on paper, the potential to deliver a large new audience to WFM
–according to a Morgan Stanley survey, which I read about in the Wall Street Journal, 62% of WSM’s current customers are already members of Amazon Prime. Arguably, there’s a big opportunity for AMZN to increase the frequency/amount of WSM purchases through the Prime network.
From its high in early 2015, the WFM had almost been cut in half–in a market that was rising by 15%–before Wall Street began to anticipate a couple of months ago that the company would be either restructured or sold. Although I’m by no means an expert on WFM, that negative price action is hard to ignore. So, too, the declining sales trend.
The picture that emerges to me is of an high-end retailer that has saturated its niche and whose chief product–healthy, but expensive, food–is being commoditized by rivals. To date, management has marshaled no adequate response to this competitive threat.
AMZN provides a face-saving way for WSM to retain its counterculture self-image while turning over its market problem to more competent hands.