From almost my first day in the stock market, domestic macroeconomic policy has been implemented by and large by the Federal Reserve. Two reasons: a theoretical argument that fiscal policy is subject to long lead times–that by the time Congress acts to stimulate the economy through increased spending, circumstances will have changed enough to warrant the opposite; and ( my view), until very recently neither Democrats nor Republicans have had coherent or relevant macroeconomic platforms.
If pressed, Wall Streeters would likely say that Washington has historically represented a net drag on the country’s economic performance of, say, 1% yearly, but that it was ok with financial markets if politicians didn’t do anything crazily negative–the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930, for example.
During the Volcker years (1979-87), money policy was severely restrictive because the country was struggling to control runaway inflation spawned by misguided policy decisions of the 1970s (Mr. Nixon pressuring the Fed to keep policy too loose). Since then, the stock market has operated under the belief that the Fed’s mandate also includes mitigating stock market losses by loosening policy, the so-called Greenspan, Bernanke and Yellen “puts.”
We’ve learned that monetary policy is not the miracle cure-all that we once thought. We could have figured this out from Japan’s experience in the 1980s. But the message came home in spectacular fashion domestically during the financial crisis last decade. As rates go lower and policy loosens, lots of “extra” money starts sloshing around. Fixed income managers gravitate toward increasingly arcane and illiquid markets. In their eagerness to not be left out of the latest fad product, they begin to take on risks they really don’t understand as well as to forego standard protective covenants.
We could almost hear the sigh of relief from the Fed as the tax bill of 2017, which reduced payments for the ultra-rich and brought the corporate tax rate down to about the world average, passed. Because the bill was so stimulative, it gave the Fed the chance to raise rates as an offset, meaning it could tamp down the speculative fires.
Enter the Trump tariffs.
–tariffs are taxes. Strictly speaking, importers, not foreign suppliers (as the president maintains (could it be he actually believes this?)) pay them to customs officials. But the importer tries to ease his pain by asking for price reductions from suppliers and for selling price increases from customers. How this all settles out depends on who has market power. In this case,it looks like virtually all the cost will be borne by domestic parties. Domestic economic growth will slow. The relevant stock market question is how much of the pain consumers will bear and how much will be concentrated in a reduction of import business profits.
–I think Mr. Trump is correct that the US subsidy of NATO is excessive. It represents the situation at the end of WWII, when the US left standing–or at best the time when the USSR began to disintegrate into today’s Russia (whose GDP = Pennsylvania + Ohio, or California/2). I also think that China, with a population five times ours and an economy 1.25x as big as the US (using PPP), is a more serious economic rival than we have seen in decades. It doesn’t have the post-WWII sense of obligation to us that we have seen elsewhere. So we have to rethink our relationship.
Having written that, I don’t see that Mr. Trump has even the vaguest clue about how the country should proceed, given these insights.
To my mind, tariffs + retaliation mean both domestic and foreign companies will be reluctant to locate new operations in the US. Tariffs on Chinese handicrafts may bring industries of the past back to the US, at the same time they force China to increase emphasis on industries of the future. I don’t get how either of these moves should be a US strategic goal….
The question for the Fed: should it enable the president’s spate of shoot-yourself-in-the-foot tariff policies by lowering rates? …or should it let the economy slide into recession, hoping this will jar Congress into action?
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