BP’s writedown …and asset writedowns in general

British Petroleum, one of the world’s largest integrated oil companies, announced last week that it will write down the value of its fixed assets ($191 billion at yearend 2019) by $13-$17.5 billion. The reasons: a drop to $55 a barrel in its estimate of the future price of oil; plus its assessment that the world will turn away from fossil fuels more quickly than it had previously thought.

The BP stock price barely moved on the news, so it was no surprise.

The stock has been trading at around 80% of the balance sheet value of shareholders equity (translation: what shareholders would get if the company were instantaneously liquidated at the values listed on the balance sheet for assets and liabilities)–meaning investors already assumed that balance sheet asset values were too high.

It seems to me that the reasons for the announcement are: to underline to investors that BP intends to be an energy company, not an oil company; and to set internal company expectations and priorities.

For what it’s worth, I think this is the right path to take. The pandemic has likely made the integrated oils’ task more difficult, though. Demand for jet fuel is likely to remain depressed for some time. And gasoline sales in the US, the world’s most profligate user of petroleum products, are likely to remain damaged as a hapless (self-destructive?) president contrives to spread the pandemic through the nation’s vacation spots.

in general

–although accounting rules require writedowns as soon as a company realizes the value of some of its assets is impaired, my experience is

they mostly occur at times like now, when enough other stuff is going on that they won’t be noticed

–one benefit to a writedown in bad times is that won’t detract from a future good earnings report

–accounting rules also say that the balance sheet value of impaired assets can’t be reduced to below fair market value–thus manufacturing a future profit if they’re sold. If I were BP, though, I’d want as low a value as my accountants would permit

–writedowns like this are financial accounting actions. In themselves, they have no effect on the company’s real world operations or their tax books. It isn’t until an asset is sold or otherwise disposed of at a loss that the loss can be used to reduce taxes. So a potential tax deduction can be preserved indefinitely by not selling the asset even though it no longer appears on the financial reporting balance sheet.

is there really a counter-trend rally underway?

A short while ago, I began to think that what I considered extreme performance and valuation differences between the NASDAQ index vs. the Russell 2000 (large multinational techy companies vs. medium-sized domestic firms) had become so wide that there had to be a period of catch up, when the R2000 would significantly outperform NASDAQ.

I thought it was possible that the R2000 might outperform by, say, 15-20 percentage points over a two-month period. The trigger could well be evidence emerging that the worst of the pandemic in the US was behind us. I was also noticing that I was checking my stock accounts closely almost every day–something that my experience has taught me to be a reliable sign that my holdings are getting near-term toppy.

The turn toward domestic, business cycle-sensitive names started shortly after I wrote about the possibility. BUT the move has stopped dead in its tracks this week. My reading of prices says that the market no longer wants to make this turn.

Of course, I could be wrong, as portfolio managers often are. And I’m not removing the small pro-domestic economy bet I made based on my sense that a market rotation was imminent.

What has changed?

Keeping in mind that the “what” is less important than the “that,” it seems to me that the show-stopper has been the White House. It’s the fact that new coronavirus cases in states like Florida, Texas and Oklahoma, which have relaxed social distancing precautions at Trump’s urging–and against the advice of medical authorities, are spiking sharply upward.

Trump is also launching a series of his signature political rallies, even though such events appear to be prime breeding grounds for infection. The Trump campaign has booked a 20,000 seat arena for the event, but claims to have requests for over a million tickets–which would be about half the adult population of the state, and well ahead of the number of votes Trump garnered in OK in 2016. None of this makes a lot of sense to me, nor apparently to Wall Street.

My guess is that at least until this situation sorts itself out the pro-business cycle rally is on hold.

losing competitiveness

IMD, a business school in Switzerland, recently issued its 2020 global competitiveness list, the 32nd in its annual series. Two years ago, the US was the #1 economy in the world . We fell to #3 in 2019 and dropped a further seven places to #10 this year. IMD’s reasoning? …the Trump administration’s anti-growth policies. IMD prizes economic openness, a strong education system. support for scientific research and a good health care system, all areas Trump has sought to undermine.

Hong Kong dropped from #2 last year to #5 and China to #20 from #14 in 2019.

Although the ranking includes some data from early 2020, as far as I can tell it does not factor in either Trump’s disastrous coronavirus response or his attempts to foment race violence. Nor does it consider China’s breach of the Hong Kong handover agreement with the UK. All of these factors would presumably have dropped rankings.

the Trump economy

Recent election polling seems to show that potential voters don’t approve of anything in the Trump administration except its handling of the economy. One might argue that in comparison with supporting white racism, subverting the Justice Department, causing tens of thousands of Americans to die needlessly from the coronavirus and trying to corrupt the military, blunting economic growth is the least bad thing Trump has done.

It appears, however, the common belief is that Trump has actually done good things for US economic growth during his time in office and that on economic grounds he would be a better presidential choice than Joe Biden. (Personally, I think it’s a sign of the extreme poverty of domestic politics that the Democrats can’t come up with a better candidate than Biden but that’s another issue.) My opinion is that Trump is worse than economically clueless; I think he has been doing potentially incalculable damage to the long-term economic prospects of the country. If so, why don’t people realize this?

I think the explanation is in the financial results of Walmart (WMT), the largest retailer in the US. WMT’s target market is Americans of average and somewhat below average income. The company started in the midwest. Political action by incumbent retailers in California and the Northeast have limited its exposure to those areas. So it’s a reasonable thermometer for economic health in the rest of the country.

EPS growth for WMT over the past seven years is as follows:

year yoy eps growth

2019 +6.3%

2018 +11.1%

2017 +2.3%

2016 -5.5%

2015 -9.9%

2014 -0.8%

2013 +1.8%.

Note: Like many retailers, WMT’s fiscal year runs from February through January of the following calendar year. So, for example, what I’ve labeled as 2019 is actually 2/19 – 1/20.

What I read from these numbers is that recovery from the financial crisis of 2007-09 didn’t reach the large chunks of America that WMT services until almost eight years after the overall economy bottomed. This coincided with Trump’s election.

Did Trump cause this pickup or is it simply the “trickle down” of recovery to a a part of the country neither major party cared that much about? I don’t see anything in Trump’s past or present performance record to make me think it’s the former.

what might cause a dollar swoon

government saving/spending–in theory

In theory, governments spend more than they take in to ease the pain and speed recovery during bad economic times. They spend less than they take in during booms to moderate growth and repay borrowings made during recession.

what really happens

In practice, this occurs less than one might hope. Even so, the Trump administration is one for the books. Despite coming into office after seven growth years in a row, Trump endorsed an immediate new dose of government stimulus–a bill that cut personal income tax for his ultra-wealthy backers and reduced the corporate tax rate from nosebleed levels to around the world average. While the latter was necessary to prevent US companies from reincorporating elsewhere, elimination of pork barrel tax breaks for favored industries that would have balanced the books was conspicuously absent.

The country suddenly sprouted a $1 trillion budget deficit at a time when that’s the last thing we needed.

Then came the coronavirus, Trump’s deer-in-the-headlights response and his continual exhortations to his followers to ignore healthcare protocols belatedly put in place have produced a worst-in-the-world outcome for the US. Huge economic damage and tens of thousands of unnecessary deaths. Vintage Trump. National income (and tax revenue to federal and state governments) is way down. And Washington has spent $2 trillion+ on fiscal stimulus, with doubtless more to come.

To make up a number, let’s say we end 2020 with $27 trillion in government debt (we cracked above $26 billion yesterday). That would be about 125% of GDP, up where a dubious credit like Italy has typically been. It would take 7.7 years worth of government cash flow to repay our federal debt completely. These are ugly numbers, especially in the 11th year of economic expansion.

At some point, potential buyers of government bonds will begin to question whether/when/how they’ll get their money, or their clients’ money, back. In academic theory, foreigners work this out faster than locals. In my experience with US financial markets, Wall Street is the first to head for the door. The result of buyers’ worry would be that the Treasury would need to offer higher interest rates to issue all the debt it will want. To the degree that the government has been borrowing short-term (to minimize its interest outlay) the deficit problem quickly becomes worse. Three solutions: raise taxes, cut services, find some way of not repaying borrowings.

not repaying

Historically, the path of least resistance for governments is to attempt the last of these. The standard route is to create inflation by running an excessively loose monetary policy. Gold bugs like to call this “debasing the currency.” The idea is that if prices are rising by, say, 5% annually and the stock of outstanding debt has been borrowed at 2%, holders will experience a 3% annual loss in the purchasing power of their bond principal.

The beauty of this solution in politicians’ eyes is the ability it gives them to blame someone else for what they are doing.

The downside is that international banks and professional investors will recognize this ploy and sell their holdings, creating a potentially large local currency decline.

The issue with the devaluation solution in today’s world is that sovereign debtors have been trying for at least the past decade to create local inflation–without success.

This would leave either tax increases or default as options. The slightest inkling of either would trigger large-scale flight from the country/currency, I think. Again, Wall Street would likely be the first. Holders of local currency would assume third-world-style capital controls would soon be put in place to stop this movement, adding to their flight impulse.

The most likely signal for capital flight to shift into high gear, in my view, would be Trump’s reelection.