a report card for smart beta

Purveyors of “smart beta” equity portfolio strategies have been very popular over the past few years, both with individual investors and with institutions.

The source of the attraction is clear:

smart beta claim to provide better performance than an index fund without engaging in active portfolio management. Actually, it claims to outperform because it doesn’t employ value-subtracting human portfolio managers to muck up the works.  Rather, smart beta operates by reshaping the weightings of stocks in the index according to predetermined computer-managed rules.  (I’ve written about smart beta in more detail in other posts.)

In other words, it’s free lunch.

My observation is that smart beta is a marketing gimmick  …one that has been very successful in bringing in new money, but a gimmick nonetheless.  Basically what it does is to create a portfolio that contains the index constituents, but in different proportions from their index weightings.  The rules for determining the smart beta weightings are set in advance and the portfolio is periodically rebalanced to restore the “correct” proportions.  For my money, the preceding sentence describes active management.  The portfolio managers are just hidden behind a computer curtain.

A simple example of smart beta:  maintain a portfolio of S&P 500 names but have .2% of the money in each stock–rather than having it loaded up with lots of Apple, ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Johnson&Johnson and Berkshire Hathaway.  Historically, this is a strategy that had its best run in the late 1970s – early 1980s, but which followed with a very extended period of sub-par performance.

Anyway,

I was catching up on my reading of the Financial Times over the weekend and came across an article from the FTfm of February 2nd titled,“Smart beta is no guarantee you will beat the market.”

It turns out that of the 10 biggest smart beta ETFs in the US, seven have underperformed over the past three years and five over the past five years.

That’s not that different from what active managers have done.

However, unlike the case for active managers, assets under smart beta management have grown fivefold since 2009.

 

 

 

St. Gobain and Sika: are there implications for the US?

The French building materials company St Gobain recently agreed to acquire control of a Swiss adhesive and sealant firm, Sika, for SF2.8 billion (US$2.8 billion).  The move has caused quite an uproar in Switzerland.

The issue isn’t the purchase itself.  It’s that Sika has two classes of stock:  shares (Namenaktien) held by descendants of the firm’s founder represent 16% of those outstanding, but 52% of the voting rights.  St. Gobain is buying out the family at a very large premium. But it has no intention of buying in the publicly held shares (Inhaberaktien)   …which have lost about a quarter of their stock market value since the acquisition was announced.

Another day in the life of holders of an inferior security in Europe.

 

What’s most interesting to me about this transaction is that it’s being offered as a cautionary tale for holders of shares in US internet companies like Google, Facebook…which also have a number of classes of stock, with voting control held by the founders.

 

While a repeat of the Sika experience might in theory occur in US social media, I can see three factors that argue against this:

1.  St. Gobain/Sika is a case of a large company swallowing a smaller one.  The US internet companies with voting control by insiders are by and large already whales.  Who’s big enough to be the buyer?

2.  In my experience, obtaining operational control either through a large minority interest or a small majority–and without the possibility of tax consolidation–is a particularly European phenomenon.  US firms typically strive for at least 80% ownership, which allows funds to pass between parent and subsidiary without triggering a tax bill.

3.  This is an especially nasty sellout of minority shareholders in Sika by the controlling Berkard family.  Perfectly legal perhaps, and a possibility minority shareholders should have contemplated before buying, but nasty nonetheless.   For a firm that makes industrial forms of glue, there’s not likely to be significant negative fallout for the business.  In the case of GOOG or FB, treating loyal user/shareholders this poorly would be bound to have severe negative business consequences.

 

Shaping a portfolio for 2015 (vii): putting the pieces together

I expect 2015 to be a “normal” year, in contrast to the past six.  This is important.

Over the past six recovery-from-recession years, global stock markets have had a strong upward bias.  Yes, outperformance required the usual good sector and individual security selection.  But if “bad” meant up 12% instead of up 15%, most of us would be happy enough with the former.

This year, though, is more uncertain, I thin.  Whether the S&P 500 ends the year in the plus column or the minus depends on importantly on four factors:

–PE expansion.  Unlikely, in my view.  

–interest rates.   Arguably, rising rates may cause PE contraction, ash or bonds become more attractive investment alternatives to stocks

currency changes.  A rising currency acts much like an increase in interest rates.

profit growth.  In a normal year, earnings per share growth is the primary driver of index gains/losses.  It will be so for 2015, in my view.

Another point.  Four moving parts is an unusually large number.  There are other strong forces acting on sectors like Energy and Consumer discretionary, as well.  Because of this, unlike the past few years, where one could make a plan in January and take the rest of the year off, it will be important in 2015 to monitor plans frequently and be prepared to make mid-course corrections.

profit growth

Here’s my starting point (read:  the numbers I’ve made up):

US = 50% of S&P 500 profits.  Growth at +10% will mean a contribution of +5% to overall index growth

EU = 25% of S&P 500 profits.  Growth of 0 (due to euro weakness vs. the dollar) will mean no contribution to index profit growth

emerging markets = 25% of S&P 500 profits.  Growth of +10% (really, who knows what the number will be) will mean a contribution of +2.5% to             index growth.

Therefore, I expect S&P 500 profits for 2015 to be up by about 7% – 8%.

interest rates

The Fed says it will raise short-term rates, relatively aggressively, in my view, from 0 to +1.5% by yearend 2015, on the way to +3.5% by yearend 2017.  This plan has been public for a long time, so presumably at least part of the news has already been factored into today’s stock and bond prices.  What we don’t know now is:

–how much has already been discounted

–what the Fed will do if stocks and junk bonds begin to wobble, or emerging market securities fall through the floor, because rates are rising.  My belief:  the Fed slows down.

–is the final target too aggressive for a low-inflation world?  My take:  yes it is, meaning the Fed’s ultimate goal of removing the US from monetary intensive care may be achieved at a Fed Funds rate of, say, 2.75%.

My bottom line (remember, I’m an optimist):  while rising rates can’t be considered a good thing, they’ll have little PE contractionary effect.  Just as important, they won’t affect sector/stock selection.  The major way I can see that I might be wrong on this latter score would be that Financials–particularly regional banks–are better performers than I now anticipate.

If rising rates do have a contractionary effect on PEs, the loss of one PE point will offset the positive impact on the index of +6% -7% in earnings growth.  So the idea that the Fed will slow down if stocks begin to suffer is a crucial assumption.

 

currency effects

The dollar strength we’ve already seen in 2014 will make 2015 earnings comparisons for US companies with foreign currency asset/earnings exposure difficult.  Rising rates in the US may well cause further dollar appreciation next year.  Even if the dollar’s ascent is over, it’s hard for me to see the greenback giving back any of its gains.

Generally speaking, a rising currency acts like a hike in interest rates;  it slows economic activity.  It also redistributes growth away from exporters and import-competing firms toward importers and purely domestic companies (the latter indirectly).

The reverse is true for weak currency countries.  At some point, therefore, companies in weak currency countries begin to exhibit surprisingly strong earnings growth–something to watch for.

growth, not value

Typically, value stocks make their best showing as the business cycle turns from recession into recovery.  During more mature phases (read: now) growth stocks typically shine.

themes

–Millennials, not Baby Boomers

–disruptive effects of the internet on traditional businesses.  For example: Uber, malls, peer-to-peer lending.  Consider an ETF for this kind of exposure.

–implications of lower oil prices.  Consider direct and indirect effects.  A plus for users of oil, a minus for owners of oil.  Sounds stupidly simple, but investing isn’t rocket science.  Sometimes it’s more like getting out of the way of the oncoming bus.

At some point, it will be important to play the contrary position.  Not yet, though, in my view.

–rent vs. buy.  Examples:  MSFT and ADBE (I’ve just sold my ADBE, though, and am looking for lower prices to buy back).  Two weird aspects to this: (1) when a company shifts from buy to rent, customers are willing to pay a lot more for services (some of this has to do with eliminating counterfeiting/stealing); (2) although accounting for rental operations is straightforward, Wall Street seems to have no clue, so it’s constantly being positively surprised.

 

 

Shaping a portfolio for 2015 (vi): the rest of the world

world GDP

A recent World Bank study ranks the largest countries in the world by 2013 GDP.  The biggest are:

1.   USA         $16.8 trillion

2.  China         $9.2 trillion

3.  Japan          $4.9 trillion

4.  Germany          $3.6 trillion.

The EU countries taken together are about equal in size to the US.

stock markets

From a stock market investor’s point of view, we can divide the world outside the US into four parts:  Europe, greater China, Japan and emerging markets.

Japan

In the 1990s, Japan choked off incipient economic recovery twice by tightening economic policy too soon–once by raising interest rates, once by increasing its tax on consumer goods.  It appears to have done the same thing again this year when it upped consumption tax in April.

More important, Tokyo appears to me to have made no substantive progress on eliminating structural industrial and bureaucratic impediments to growth.  As a result, and unfortunately for citizens of Japan, the current decade can easily turn out to be the third consecutive ten-year period of economic stagnation.

In US$ terms, Japan’s 2014 GDP will have shrunk considerably, due to yen depreciation.

If Abenomics is somehow ultimately successful, a surge in Japanese growth might be a pleasant surprise next year.  Realistically, though, Japan is now so small a factor in world terms that, absent a catastrophe, it no longer affects world economic prospects very much.

China

In the post-WWII era, successful emerging economies have by and large followed the Japanese model of keeping labor cheap and encouraging export-oriented manufacturing.  Eventually, however, everyone reaches a point where this formula no longer works.  How so?    …some combination of running out of workers, unacceptable levels of environmental damage or pressure from trading partners.  The growth path then becomes shifting to higher value-added manufacturing and a reorientation toward the domestic economy.  This is where China is now.

Historically, this transition is extremely difficult.  Resistance from those who have made fortunes the old way is invariably extremely high.  I read the current “anti-corruption” campaign as Beijing acting to remove this opposition.

I find the Chinese political situation very opaque.  Nevertheless, a few things stand out.  To my mind, China is not likely to go back to being the mammoth consumer of natural resources it was through most of the last decade.  My guess is that GDP growth in 2015 will come in at about the same +7%or so China will achieve this year.  In other words, China won’t provide either positive or negative surprises.

For most foreigners, the main way of getting exposure to the Chinese economy is through Hong Kong.  Personally, I own China Merchants and several of the Macau casinos.  The latter group looks very cheap to me but will likely only begin to perform when the Hong Kong market is convinced the anti-corruption campaign is nearing an end.

EU

In many ways, the EU resembles the Japan of, say, 20 years ago.  It, too, has an aging population, low growth and significant structural rigidity.  The major Continental countries also have, like Japan, strong cultural resistance to change.  These are long-term issues well-known to most investors.

For 2015, the EU stands to benefit economically from a 10% depreciation of the euro vs. the US$.  As well, it is a major beneficiary of the decline in crude oil prices.  My guess is that growth will be surprisingly good for the EU next year.  I think the main focus for equity investors should be EU multinationals with large exposure to the US.

emerging markets

I’m content to invest in China through Hong Kong.  I worry about other emerging Asian markets, as well as Latin America (ex Mexico) and Africa.  Foreigners from the developed world provide most of the liquidity in this “other” class.  If an improving economy in the US and higher yields on US fixed income cause a shift in investor preferences, foreigners will likely try to extract funds from many emerging market in order to reposition them.  That will probably prove surprisingly difficult.  Prices will have a very hard time not falling in such a situation.

 

Shaping a portfolio for 2015 (iv): interest rates

The Fed has made it clear that it intends to begin the multi-year process of raising short-term interest rates back to normal sometime in 2015.  The agency says it expects to boost the Fed Funds rate from the current zero to around 1.5% by next December.

This is a good news/bad news development for investors.  On the one hand, the economic data clearly show that the US is finally–after six years–coming out the other side of the Great Recession.  On the other hand, rising interest rates are typically not good for securities markets ( a rising return on holding cash makes long-term investments like stocks or bonds look less attractive.).

If the Fed were to begin next April, it would have to do a .25% interest rate increase about every six weeks to get to 1.5% by yearend.  That’s just the beginning, though.  Fed documents indicate that the final goal is a Fed Funds rate of 3.5%.

what history shows

Rising rates are unequivocally bad for bonds.

In contrast, inpast periods of Fed-induced rate rises stocks have gone sideways to up.  That’s because the downward pressure that rising rates exert has been offset by upward pressure from strong-growing earnings.

 four differences today

1.  In past plain-vanilla recessions, interest rate hikes come pretty quickly after the worst of recession is over.  So consumers are just starting to spend (a lot) to satisfy needs deferred during the downturn.  In this case, however, we’ll be six years past the bottom.  Is there any pent-up demand left?    …probably not.  So the typical surge in earnings may be absent.  This is a minus for stocks.

2.  The Fed has been unusually clear  for a long time in publicizing what it intends to do and over what time frame.  Arguably, investors have absorbed this information and already made some portfolio adjustments in advance of the Fed’s actions.  I don’t see this in fixed income markets, but…

3.  The rest of the developed world hasn’t made anything close to thepost-recession progress in that the US has.  As a result,foreign interest rates  either remain at emergency lows, or are even dropping.  Rising interest rate differentials–and a strengthening US$–suggest that international fixed income investors may increase purchases of Treasury bonds, cushioning the fall in their prices.

4.  The Fed is acutely conscious of the repeated mistake that Japan has made over the past quarter-century of trying to return to normal too quickly–and pushing that country beck into recession instead.  Because of this, it’s possible that stock market weakness might cause the Fed to slow down planned interest rate rises.

my take

I think rising interest rates will make 2015 a sub-par year for stocks.  Will “sideways to up” hold true as it has in the past?  I don’t know.  I think a lot will depend on whether the Fed’s commitment to raising rates is greater than its wish to have relatively stable financial markets.  My guess is that stability is more important.

The Fed’s ultimate target for short rates is 3.5%.  I think that’s too high for a 2% inflation world.  I think 3% is more likely.  But let’s keep 3.5%.  Add a 2% real return to that and we get the endpoint for the yield on the 10-year Treasury,  5.5%.  This would imply a price earnings multiple for stocks of 1/.055, or 18x.  Arguably, then, the current multiple on stocks already discounts all the tightening the Fed is setting out to accomplish.

Even I think that the last paragraph paints too optimistic a picture.  What I’ve written may ultimately prove to be correct, but I don’t think the consensus would be willing to put much faith in this idea.

My starting out point is that interest rate rises will make next year a volatile one for stocks.  Without positive influences from earnings growth or foreign money flows, rising rates have the power to push US stocks down by, say, 5% in 2015..  At the same time, I think that good stock and industry/sector selection will enable investors to generate positive portfolio returns.