Macau gaming in May 2012: a small month-on-month gain

the May DICJ report

Last week the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau released its monthly report on the gambling “win” achieved by the casinos in that market.  The figures are as follows:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2012 and 2011
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2012 2011 Variance 2012 2011 Variance
Jan 25,040 18,571 +34.8% 25,040 18,571 +34.8%
Feb 24,286 19,863 +22.3% 49,325 38,434 +28.3%
Mar 24,989 20,087 +24.4% 74,314 58,521 +27.0%
Apr 25,003 20,507 +21.9% 99,317 79,028 +25.7%
May 26,078 24,306 +7.3% 125,395 103,334 +21.3%

Source: Macau DICJ

Month on month, the Macau gaming market expanded slightly, continuing the pattern of recent months.  What makes the May figures noteworthy, however, is the year on year comparison, which is very weak by recent standards.  There is an issue of the timing of the Golden Week holiday, which occurred in April this year and May last.  That’s typically an extra-strong period for the casinos.  We can easily correct for the calendar by averaging April and May results.  This gives a 14% year on year gain for the casino business over the two month period.  A little better, yes, but not what we’ve become used to.

stock market implications

This is a situation with lots of moving parts.

On the plus side,

1.  Let’s start with the Macau market.  If we assume the market is mature, then it will likely grow in line with nominal GDP in China.  Let’s put that at +10%.  Let’s also assume that the Macau government continues to have a policy stance that encourages profit growth, so that massive overcapacity like that no in Las Vegas doesn’t emerge.

If so, then operating profit growth from casino operations will likely be around 15% annually.  The development of non-casino operations–conventions, shows, dining…–probably boost the overall profit growth rate to +20%.

2.  There’s considerable evidence that the Macau gaming market isn’t mature and will continue to grow at a (considerably) higher than +10% rate, as better transportion links bring in gamblers from farther-away provinces, and gamblers in larger numbers from nearby locations.

3.  The Macau-related casino stocks have lost 1/4 to 1/3 of their market value over the past two months and are trading at about 15x trailing earnings.  The numbers are actually much messier than that, due mostly to costs of newly-opened capacity, but I think 15x is a reasonable yardstick to use.

1-3 suggest to me that earnings growth prospects are good and valuations are very reasonable.

On the negative side,

1.  If we’re bouncing along a cyclical bottom caused by a slowdown in the Chinese economy, monthly casino win may not rise much from the current rate over the remainder of 2012.  If so, several months of flattish–or even negative–year on year comparisons are in store for the second half.

2.  This may not be the bottom for the gaming market.  I’m willing to guess that it either is or is close, but…  The speed at which the Macau government acts on pending applications for construction of new casinos–one more has supposedly been in Macau’s plans for 2012–could be a reasonable indicator.

3.  Competition is beginning to emerge from other Asian countries.  The Philippines, focus of a legal dispute involving WYNN, is an example.  I tend to think, however, that other than Singapore, other areas will probably not be able to offer the combination of a high level of service in the casinos and physical safety elsewhere that Macau offers.  Still, competition is a potential risk.

4.  This may not be the bottom for the stocks.  During the panicky days early last October, Hong Kong-traded gambling stocks reached much lower lows.  Their US counterparts, however, are at or very close to the October levels where they stopped falling .

Like most situations, what to do in this one comes down to risk preferences.  None of these stocks are for the very risk averse.  My favorite continues to be LVS (I bought a small amount yesterday).

Graff Diamonds yanks its proposed Hong Kong IPO

fuses blown

Bad day in New Jersey.  Yesterday was the first super-hot day of the late spring, with temperatures approaching 100 degrees Fahrenheit.  Creaking power infrastructure reacted in the way we’re unfortunately becoming accustomed to.  It collapsed.  No power for most of our neighbors, no internet or cable TV for us.  Hence the late post.

Graff

According to Bloomberg, the plug was pulled on the Graff Diamonds offering less than two days before the stock was supposed to debut.

I can’t say I was shocked, for several reasons:

–Hong Kong has been pummelled especially badly by selling emanating out of the EU, where another flight to safety by equity investors is in full flower.  It looks almost like last summer.  (Where did they get all the stock?)

–Chow Tai Fook Jewellery (HK: 1929) came public late last year and is now trading at about 2/3rds of the IPO price.  True, 1929 sells mainly chuk kam pure gold jewelry and knickknacks, not diamonds.  But the market is the same–China.

–TIF, whose main problems appear to me to be in the US, nevertheless also reported a deceleration in its China business last quarter.

–I suspect that retail investors in Hong Kong–always important in that market–were especially badly burned by the Facebook IPO.  IF US retail investors got 5x-10x what they expected, Hong Kongers could have gotten double that size.  Hong Kong is a market of veteran stock market participants, so they’ll shrug off their bad treatment by underwriters quickly.  But if I’m correct, they’re still licking their wounds.

–I haven’t tried to locate a copy of the Graff Diamonds prospectus.  My experience is that in Hong Kong these documents weigh a ton, but don’t contain anything like that amount of information.  Besides, they’re not supposed to be available in the US until after the offering.  Media reports do bring up two potentially worrying issues, however.

Apparently, a mere 20 customers make up 50% of revenues.

A large chunk of the IPO proceeds were said to be earmarked for buying diamond inventory from the company’s founding family.  I’d want to know how this inventory is being valued–and how many months’ (years?) sales this represents.  I’d also want to know how the acquisition of the gigantic gems Graff is famous for will proceed from now on.  Does the Graff family act as exclusive agent for the company?  …is the family paid a commission for acquisition?

a paucity of demand

When the IPO was pulled, the underwriters had orders for only half the shares intended to be offered by the company.  In a healthy offering the books would be, say, 5x covered.  A “hot” offering might have books 10x covered.  In Hong Kong, which operates under different rules than the US, 100x isn’t unknown.

my thoughts

In the current economic environment, Graff Diamonds was always going to be a tough sell, especially with the family wanting 25x earnings for its shares.  I think FB did much more to suck the life out of this offering than most brokers would be willing to admit, however.

how big is the Macau gambling market? …potential?

…a lot depends on how you measure.

the Nevada comparison

Let’s compare Macau with Las Vegas.

According to the Nevada State Gaming Control Board, during the three months ending February 29th (the latest figures available as I’m writing this) the Las Vegas strip casinos had revenue of $1.67 billion.  The downtown area of Las Vegas added about a tenth to that.

During the same three months, according to the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, Macau casinos took in MOP 72.9 billion, which translates into US$9.1 billion.

On this measure, then, the Macau market is 5x the size of Las Vegas.

gross revenue vs. net

That’s not the whole story, however.

The official figures don’t report the total amounts that are being bet in the market.  Instead, they record the net amount that the casinos win from customers during the period..  The amounts bet are much larger.

We have precise figures for Las Vegas.  On average, gamblers lost 9.6% of the amounts they bet in Las Vegas during December, January and February.  So they actually bet $17.4 billion during that period.

We don’t have comparable official numbers for Macau.  So we have to estimate.  Conveniently, though, virtually the only game played in the SAR at present is high-stakes baccarat, where casino win typically ranges from 2.7% to 3.0% of the money bet.  To err on the conservative side, let’s say that the win over the winter for the Macau market was impossibly high at 4%.  Using that percentage will give us a low-ball figure for total wagers.

In Macau gamblers actually bet $228 billion during the three months.  On this measure, Macau is already 12x the size of Las Vegas.

…potential?

When I began following casino stocks in the early 1980s, casino operators regarded hotels, restaurants and shopping as regrettable necessities (cost centers, in accounting jargon).  They basically gave the food away to draw patronage.  And the more spartan the room, the better.  That way gamblers spent the maximum amount of time in the casinos and not lounging around watching TV.

Since then the Las Vegas industry has been transformed–with a large assist from Steve Wynn and Sheldon Adelson–into a resort destination.  Prior to the Great Recession (and the accompanying Great Overbuilding), non-casino operations in Las Vegas made up about half the total revenue–and about an equal amount of profit.  In other words, by developing Las Vegas as a resort/convention center, the casinos doubled the size of their market.  This is the model Macau wants to copy.

My guess is that, at present non-casino revenue is only about 15% the size of casino win in Macau.  So the nascent resort business in Macau could, if it’s successful in emulating Las Vegas, be at least 3x the current size.  That would mean that–even without market growth–visitors to Macau could be spending half a trillion dollars a quarter and company profits could be close to 2x the current level.

The Financial Times just wrote a good summary of the current supply constrained situation in the SAR.

but there’s more

In its latest quarterly reporting to shareholders, LVS included in its packet of earnings presentation slides an appendix that touches on growth potential for the Macau market.

–Slide 21 illustrates the proposed high-speed rail system that will connect all the major cities, including Macau, in eastern and central China.

–The more interesting slide is #22, which breaks out recent visitors to Macau by domicile.  It shows that 72% come from nearby Guangdong province, an area with a population of 95 million.  Hunan and Chongqing provinces, which together also have a population of 95 million, but which are somewhat farther away, represent less than 7% of visitors so far.   But that number is starting to grow at a much faster than 50% annual clip.  This implies, I think, that the Macau casino market has come nowhere close to tapping its entire Chinese potential.

1Q12 for Las Vegas Sands/Sands China: record quarters again

the results

After the New York close last Wednesday, LVS reported results for 1Q12.  Revenues came in at $2.77 billion, up 30.8% year on year.  Adjusted Earnings Before Interest Taxes and Depreciation/Amortization (EBITDA) was $1.07 billion, up 42% yoy.  Adjusted EPS were $.70.  That was a gain of 89.2% over results in the year-ago quarter.  The figure also came in $.01/share above the highest Wall Street estimate, and $.07/share ahead of the consensus.

the details

EBITDA breaks out into:

$456.4 million in Macau, up 20.6% yoy

$472.5 million in Singapore, up 66.1% yoy

$115.8 million in Las Vegas, up 77.9% yoy

$27.5 million in Bethlehem, Pa., up 24.4% yoy.

three unusual items (all in Macau)

The ” adjusted” figures exclude two of the items:

–$51.5 million in pre-opening expenses for the Sands Cotai Central which opened earlier this month, and

–a $42.9 million writeoff of costs linked to the closing of the Zaia show at the Venetian Macau.

Results did, however, include $13 million of costs associated with retailing–management declined to provide any detail.

market reaction

1928 and LVS have dropped about 5% each on the results announcement, despite the obvious strength in the numbers.  I don’t see why.

True, there are some nits to pick, namely:

–LVS is currently keeping 3¢ of every dollar high rollers are betting in Singapore and in Macau.  History says that should be more like 2.85¢, or 5% less.  at some point the company will have a sub-par quarter or two to make up for the current largesse.  But that’s the nature of the casino business.

–There is the mystery $13 million loss in Macau.  But that’s more like a rounding error than a serious dent in operating income.

–EBITDA margins fell qoq in Macau in March.

On the other hand,

–management wasn’t much more incoherent than usual on the conference call that accompanied the announcement

–US operations are much healthier than they were a year ago

–1928 appears to be gaining market share in Macau, even before the new casino opening. Revenues were up 9% qoq, in a basically flat market.

–the mysterious $13 million shortfall in Macau seems to explain all the EBITDA margin deterioration in the SAR vs. 4Q11.  If management is correct in its diagnosis, this is a non-recurring item.  In addition,

LVS is deleveraging   …fast

At December 31, 2010, LVS had $10.1 billion in debt on its balance sheet plus $710.7 million in preferred stock.  Against that, the company had $3.04 billion in unrestricted cash.

As of March 31st, 2012, LVS has accumulated an extra $1 billion in cash.  All the preferred stock has been redeemed and debt is $200 million lower.

That’s about a $2 billion shrinkage in net borrowings.  At the current level of $1 billion in cash generation from operations per quarter, LVS could be completely debt free by June 2013.  (LVS points out that it could be completely debt free today, if it wanted to be, by selling a chunk of its retail space in Macau.)

next stop Spain?

LVS confirmed that it is deep in negotiations with Madrid and Barcelona to develop a huge casino/resort complex in Spain over a decade.  No details as yet.  I wrote about the possible Spanish expansion a little over a year ago.

investment arithmetic

I think that LVS will earn about $3 a share this year.  So at Friday’s closing price, LVS is trading at 18.6x this year’s earnings and yielding 1.7%.

That’s not the right way to value the company, however, in my opinion.  I prefer sum-of-the-parts.

Based on its current market cap in Hong Kong, LVS’s share of 1928 is worth roughly $22.5 billion.  If we think the Marina Bay Sands in Singapore should trade at 80% of 1928’s EBITDA multiple, then it’s worth about $25 billion ($31 billion if MBS were to trade at parity with 1928).

LVS’s market cap (even though it’s up over 30% ytd) is $41 billion.  Therefore, LVS’s US operations are still trading at a value of negative $6.5 billion.

What should the value of Las Vegas + Bethlehem be?

There are, of course, two parts to US profits for LVS–casino operations and management fees collected from Asia.  For simplicity’s sake, lump them together.  Say they’ll generate $600 million in cash from operations this year.  Let’s cut that down to $400 million after taxes.  Now, let’s assume this business never recovers and should be evaluated as if it were a junk bond.  If we assume a that the cash represents a yield of 7.5%, then the principal value of the “bond” should be $5.3 billion.  Subtract $2 billion in debt (that may be excessive, but…) and we’re left with $3.3 billion.

Fair value for LVS, then, should be $3.3 billion + $22.5 billion + $25 billion  =  $50.8 billion, or 24% higher than where the stock is currently trading.

WYNN may be the highest quality casino company, but this analysis means for me that LVS is the most attractive casino stock (remember, I own both LVS and WYNN–more WYNN than LVS, though).

Wynn Macau’s Cotai project

Wynn on Cotai

The reason I see for the recent strength in the shares of both Wynn Macau and its parent Wynn Resorts is a press report that 1128 will receive government approval this coming Monday for its proposed new casino in the Cotai section of the SAR.  The news was first published in the Portuguese-language newspaper Jornal Tribuna de Macau and subsequently in Macau Business.

According to MB, the contract signing ceremony will take place while Steve Wynn is in Macau next week, but the official announcement will not come until the contract is published in the Official Gazette in mid-May.

oops!!

Twice before during the past several months, parties associated with WYNN have, prematurely, announced that the company had received approval for the project.  These breaches of protocol appear to have offended the Macau government and resulted in further delay each time.  In the current case, it appears to me that the leak must have come from the government itself, so the article shouldn’t matter.  When questioned about it, Mr. Wynn said nothing, just that he was hopeful of approval but that the decision was up to Macau.

The Wynn Cotai project, whose design was complete over a year ago, will include hotels, casino(s), restaurants, retail and convention/meeting space.  The size of the casino floorspace isn’t clear, although we know the Macau government is eager to see new projects contain a greater percentage of area devoted to non-gambling activities than has been the case to date.  The project will probably end up costing close to US$3 billion.  Opening could be in early 2016.

The Cotai casino would be good for WYNN and 1128…

Cotai, Sheldon Adelson’s idea for recreating the Ls Vegas Strip in Asia, is becoming the hot new gaming location in Macau.  Also, it’s increasingly evident that both Wynn and Encore in Macau are closing in on the limits of their capacity.  So the new project will provide a concrete (no pun intended) path for future earnings growth–both for 1128 and, by implication, for its parent WYNN.

…and for the SAR as well

After all, Steve Wynn is the premier casino designer in the world.  And his company is a master at catering to high roller gamblers.  It would make no sense for the SAR to deprive itself of his expertise.

approval for another firm coming later this year

The government’s overall idea is to continue to expand its tourism business, but at a controlled rate.  It has announced that this means approving two new projects in 2012.

The two prominent other applicants for permission to build a new Cotai casino complex are MGM China and SJM.  If they’re the two finalists, as they probably are, this presents an interesting–and possibly revealing– decision for the SAR.  SJM, the former monopoly casino operator when Macau was a Portuguese colony, which continues to control about a third of the market, is owned by the Ho family.  Pansy Ho also continues to have significant influence over MGM China, where she has about a 20% equity interest.  Declaration of the winner may give some insight into the direction of government gambling policy.