the heavy half: internet gambling and Native American casinos

The article in the Wall Street Journal that I mentioned in yesterday’s post contains information about the business of an online gambling company in the EU and about a Native American casino in the northwest US.  It contains one piece of disturbing information.

The article leads with a “shocking” conclusion:  almost no one wins when they gamble.

…Duh!

Didn’t anyone look at a table of the odds on different casino games?  Everything favors the house. )The one exception is poker, where, ex the video game variety, the house merely collects a fee for organizing the game.)   To me, the more surprising information is that over 10% of gamblers–both online and in the Naive American casino–who wer net winners over an extended period of time.

The much more concerning statistic is that in the Native American casino, 2.8% of the patrons were big enough losers that they made up 50% of that casino’s profits.  The next 8% provided another 30% of the house take.

From a purely pragmatic p&l standpoint, this is a potentially dangerous concentration.  From a social/ethical point of view, my guess is that a good chunk of that 2.8% are problem gamblers who should be getting medical care and not be allowed to wager.

The pragmatist would begin to calculate how likely it is that legislative action would bar the casino doors to at least some of these golden-egg-laying geese.  The deeper question, however, is whether gambling is like cigarette smoking.  In the latter case, I think no self-respecting person can be a shareholder–and thereby lower the cost of capital of an ethically unsound business and share in the profits of promoting a fatal addiction.

I have several observations:

1.  Other than online poker, it;’s not clear that online gamblers and frequenters of physical casinos have anything in common.  It’s also not clear that although the games have the same names, that the odds for various online games are the same as those in physical casinos.

2.  A career of living and working with professional stock market gamblers makes me think that some people go to casinos expecting to lose and find that has a cathartic effect. (I’ve always felt casino gambling is too much like work to be fun.)

3.  I’m willing to think that the experience of the single Native American casino studied is similar to what happens in other local casinos around the US.  But I don’t think any of these has much in common with the resort casinos in Las Vegas–and certainly nothing to do with the US-run casinos in Macau or Singapore.

4.  The high roller  business (people who gamble $1 million+ in, say, a weekend casino jaunt) is very different from the low roller business examined in the WSJ article.  We have the clearest view of this in Macau, where companies disclose separately their profits from high rollers and from everyone else.  The everyone elses lose on average around 20¢ of every dollar they bet on baccarat.  High rollers lose 3¢–and have about half of that rebated back to they by the casinos as a condition of getting their patronage.

How is this possible?  High rollers know the rules, have lots of experience and want to win.  Low rollers don’t know the rules, like the atmosphere and want to be entertained.

5.  In the resort casino model practiced in Las Vegas and being implemented by WYNN and LVS in Macau, gambling produces half the firm’s profits.  Rooms, food, shopping and entertainment make up the rest.  So, in a purely pragmatic sense, even if all the large losers are  self-destructively in need of medical help and are barred from patronizing casinos, resort casinos would lose at most a quarter of their income.

 

 

 

 

Las Vegas Sands (LVS) and Sands China (HK: 1928): 3Q13 earnings

the results

After the New York close yesterday, LVS announced 3Q13 results for itself and for its subsidiaries, Macau-based 1928 and wholly owned Marina Sands of Singapore.

Revenues for LVS came in at $3.57 billion, up 31.7% year on year.  EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)  advanced by 45.5% yoy to $1.28 billion.  EPS was $.82, a 78.3% yoy increase.  That figure exceeded the Wall Street consensus by $.05.

During the quarter, LVS repurchased 4.6 million shares of its stock, at an average price of $65.18.  It says it will buy back a minimum of $75 million in stock a month from now on.

LVS also raised its quarterly dividend from $.35/share to $.50, giving a forward yield of 2.8%.

 

1928 rose by almost 10% in overnight trading in Hong Kong (in a market where other Macau casino stocks were up by 4%-5% or so).  LVS has barely budged in this morning’s pre-market trading.

 

the highlights

Macau

LVS is a convention hotel operator.  Its strength is catering to customers who have, say, $10,000 to gamble during a stay rather than VIPs with $1 million or more.  Its huge investment in hotel/casino capacity in the Cotai section of Macau on the conviction that if Sands built it, customers would come, is beginning to pay off royally now.

EBITDA for 1928 came in at $785.3 million for the quarter, up 61.7% yoy.

Singapore

Marina Bay’s EBITDA was $373.6 million, up 43.3% yoy.  However, the amount bet by VIP gamblers was only up by 16.9%.  The largest portion of the EBITDA increase comes from the casino “win” (the amount gamblers lose, which is what casinos count as revenue) bouncing back from an abnormally low 1.79% of the amount bet during 3Q12 to a more normal 2.85%.

US

Down a bit, yoy.  EBITDA in Las Vegas was $87.1 million (vs. $98.2 million during 3Q12).  Bethlehem, Pa brought in $29.6 million (vs. $32.1 million).

my take

At this point, over 90% of LVS’s EBITDA comes from Asia.  That percentage will continue to climb.

Marina Bay is an enigma to me.  …a good enigma, but a puzzle nonetheless.  It isn’t that long ago that Marina Bay and Macau were neck-and-neck in generation of cash for LVS.  But while Singapore has been relatively stagnant, LVS’s Macau EBITDA have doubled.  Has Marina Bay already topped out at $1.5 billion in annual EBITDA?  I find it hard to think this is the case, but I can’t see any evidence to the contrary from the financials.

Macau is booming   …and the market is rapidly developing a large resort/convention segment, which is LVS’s management specialty.

valuation

At today’s Hong Kong closing quote, LVS’s interest in Sands China is worth $49 billion.

If we make the (conservative, in my view) assumption that Marina Bay will generate about $1.5 billion in annual cash flow and that we’re willing to pay 10x for that, then the Singapore subsidiary is worth $15 billion.

The same calculation for the US operations (let’s put a cash flow multiple of 8 on it) would value it at about $4 billion.

Total value = $68 billion.  That compares with a total market cap for LVS at yesterday’s close of $58.5 billion.

If these back of the envelope figures are close to correct, LVS is trading at about a 15% discount to the sum of its parts.  Further upside could come from continuing flowering of the Macau operations, which I think is highly likely, and/or a return to growth for Marina Bay.  (I own the stock and am happy to remain a holder.  At some point, I’ll have to trim the position simply because of size, but see no present reason to do any other selling.)

 

 

restaurants vs. supermarkets: reversal of form?

trend reversals

The government shutdown means that all the government databases are unavailable.  That’s good news for me   …and bad.  It means I can’t get precise data.  On the other hand, I feel justified in winging it.

I’ve been thinking a lot lately about Millennials vs. Baby Boomers, probably because I’m one and my kids are the other.  I’ve also been thinking about trend reversals, mostly because I believe we’re in a time when a lot of this is happening.  There are always to make money from recognizing trend reversals early.

restaurants vs. supermarkets

I remember seeing a piece of truly excellent sell-side research about ten years ago that documented the changes in American eating habits over a 30-40-year period.  The essence was that through good times and bad Americans were spending an ever-increasing proportion of their food budgets on meals away from home (eating in restaurants + take out).  Not only that, but the extra expense of restaurant meals vs. home cooking had been on a steady decline from, say, a 40% premium over cooking at home two decades earlier to 20% at the time of the report.

The conclusion:  a MEGATREND favoring restaurants over supermarkets (which were having competitive problems with Wal-Mart, anyway).  At that time, home cooking represented just over half of what consumers were spending on food.  The restaurant share was inching up by 0.5% – 1.0% annually.  NO END IN SIGHT!

Well, the Great Recession has changed that.  Over the past few years, eating out has been falling as a percentage of consumer spending on food.

Details:

–everyone outside the top 20% by income has cut back on restaurants a lot in order to save money– and by enough to derail the long-lasting pro-restaurant trend

–Millennials have not only cut back, but they’ve aggressively traded down to less expensive eateries

–seventy-somethings have changed their behavior the least

I think there are two related reasons for the cutback:

–what economists call a substitution effect, as consumers rejigger their spending to maintain, or enhance, their lifestyles in a world without pay increases and where interest rates are ultra-low, and

–workers realize they can’t get sick if they want to retain their jobs, so they’re eating healthier.

I’m not sure how much of this is already baked in the stock price cake, as it were.  But I think it’s worth taking a look at eat-at-home beneficiaries to check.

Atlantic City gambling in 2013

the current situation

In 2006, Atlantic City casinos “won” $6 billion from gamblers there.

National GDP that year was $13.9 trillion.  This year the figure will be around 20% higher.  Using this change as a(n admittedly very crude) gauge for what gambling win for the New Jersey shore resort in 2013, AC should take in $7 billion+.

In actuality, aggregate casino win will be closer to $3 billion.  …and even that 50% haircut from seven years ago may be too high.

How so?

By far the biggest reason is that similar lower-end gambling establishments have been legalized in neighboring states, notably in Pennsylvania.  Why drive when you can get your entertainment in newer venues in Philadelphia, Bethlehem or Mt. Pocono?

The profit situation in AC is in all likelihood worse than that (filings with the Casino Control Commission would show how bad things have gotten, but I haven’t looked).  For reasons best known in Trenton, the New Jersey state government offered $300 million+ in subsidies to persuade foolhardy entrepreneurs to add new capacity into a declining market by opening Revel in 2011.  Already through bankruptcy once, that casino is still up and running in its newest incarnation.  All Revel has done has been to force all casino operators to pay out larger incentives to lure customers in.

At least one more shoe may be about to drop.  Governor Cuomo of New York has been persuaded (thanks to the Lim family of Malaysia?) that his state, too, needs more non-Native American, non-racetrack casino gambling and has been pushing for legislative action in Albany for a while.

how Trenton is responding to the decline

…after the Revel disaster, that is.

–most important, it’s launching online gambling in the state.  Borgata is the first casino to have the service–customers need not be on the casino premises, but must be physically located in New Jersey while they’re online.

–the state has tried to offer sports betting in the casinos, but its thumbs-down to sports books years ago when Federal enabling legislation was being written closed the door to this possibility

–it’s trying to persuade United to service the AC airport, dangling better treatment in its Newark terminals as an incentive, and,

–newspaper reports a while ago suggest the Casino Control Commission has been asked to reconsider its ban of Ho family ownership of casinos (although unless a Ho-related entity were going to buy and refurbish/rebuild an existing casino, I don’t see any positives here).

success = slowing the AC decline?

That’s the best I think Trenton can hope for.

what catches my eye

As an analyst, what gets my attention is the combination of large amount of effort Trenton is exerting, with apparent lack of any forethought.  AC is clearly important to Trenton, but I wonder why there’s so little effective action.

From a stock market point of view, Borgata will soon be giving us some practical insight into the effect of online gambling on casino operations.  Does it bring in new customers (a clear positive)?  does it increase the amount existing customers gamble with Borgata (another positive)?   or does it mostly substitute for visits to the physical casino (presumably a negative)?

Macau casinos, August 2013

Over the Labor Day weekend, the Macau Gaming Inspection and coordination Bureau (DICJ) released its monthly report on the aggregate amount won by the casinos in the SAR during the month.  Here are the figures:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2013 2012 Variance 2013 2012 Variance
Jan 26,864 25,040 +7.3% 26,864 25,040 +7.3%
Feb 27,084 24,286 +11.5% 53,948 49,325 +9.4%
Mar 31,336 24,989 +25.4% 85,284 74,314 +14.8%
Apr 28,305 25,003 +13.2% 113,589 99,317 +14.4%
May 29,589 26,078 +13.5% 143,178 125,395 +14.2%
Jun 28,269 23,334 +21.1% 171,447 148,729 +15.3%
Jul 29,485 24,579 +20.0% 200,932 173,308 +15.9%
Aug 30,737 26,136 +17.6% 231,670 199,444 +16.2%

Source: Macau DICJ

The figures are obviously good.  the MOP 30.7 billion achieved in August surpasses all but the win from last March, a holiday month.  They’re 4% better than the results for July.  They’re also up 17.6% year on year.  August of last year may have been negatively affected both by weather and by high rollers beginning to pull in their horns as the anti- conspicuous consumption attitude of the new Communist Party leadership began to make itself known.

What’s most interesting–and encouraging–are company comments that VIP gamblers are beginning to return in higher numbers to Macau as they feel more comfortable about what the Party’s anti-corruption stance and dislike of lavish displays of wealth actually means for them.  Apparently, gambling, in itself, isn’t a bad thing.  In addition, the tide of merely affluent gamblers–who might gamble US$10,000 on a visit, rather than US$1 million–is continuing to rise strongly.

The real shortage element at present is casino and hotel capacity to receive customers.  The biggest beneficiaries of market growth are those who are opening new space in Cotai.  To my mind, this means Galaxy Entertainment and Sands China (I own shares of  Galaxy and of Sands China’s parent, Las Vegas Sands.  (Both Fidelity and Schwab maintain Americans aren’t permitted to buy Sands China in Hong Kong and refuse to transact in the name.   I’ve asked LVS several times for an explanation–their investor relations people are clueless, however.  I find that disturbing for a big company, but not to the degree that I want to sell LVS.)

One’s instinct in any attractive market is to look for laggards–companies that may not be the best-positioned, but which are significantly cheaper than the leaders.  Buy them, wait for a run and trade into the leaders, the strategy goes.  In theory this sounds good.  And Hong Kongers have no trouble executing it among the Macau gambling stocks.  As for me, some of the laggards are controlled by people I don’t trust.  So I’d rather stick with the names I have (I also own Wynn Macau and WYNN).