What Janet Yellen did/didn’t say yesterday

Yesterday the Fed announced that its Open Market Committee had decided to postpone, yet again, beginning to raise interest rates from their current intensive-care lows.

In her press conference following the decision, Jane Yellen cited several reasons :  the recent rise in the dollar, a plateauing of consumer spending in the US and worries that the authorities in China might be bungling their way through the necessary change in that economy from export-led growth to one that’s led by domestic demand.  (Ms. Yellen pointed to recent ructions in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as evidence for the last.  Personally, I don’t think this is correct.  I see those markets’ rise and fall as what almost inevitably happens when a country allows margin borrowing for the first time.)

Whatever the motivations, the fact remains that the Fed sees the current situation in the US as too risky to warrant even a miniscule rise in short-term interest rates.  …and this is despite six years of economic growth and increasing employment since the economy bottomed in 2009.

What isn’t being said here?

Two things, I think:

–after Japan’s financial collapse in 1989-90, that country twice tightened economic policy prematurely–once by raising interest rates, a second by raising taxes.  The result of these miscues was a quarter-century of deflation and economic stagnation.  The Japan example suggests that in a slow growth environment with no inflation the risks of policy tightening are much larger than most people in the US suspect.

–governments have two main tools to influence GDP growth:  monetary (changes in the price or availability of credit) and fiscal policy (changes in spending and/or taxes).  Fiscal acts slowly but lays the general foundation for growth and indicates a broad direction for expansion.  Monetary acts relatively quickly and is most useful for mid-course corrections, slowing or accelerating the pace.  A dysfunctional Washington has meant that, other than the bitterly contested bank bailout plan in 2009, fiscal policy has done virtually nothing useful to stimulate growth over the past half-decade (arguably, it’s a mild deterrent).  Nor is it likely that Congress, now winding up to shut the government down, will change its stripes.  This implies that the Fed has no backstop if it makes a policy mistake.

 

Nothing about either is particularly new news.  But the Fed decision calls attention the major structural difficulties the US economy faces.  This is not a recipe for having stocks go up.

HSBC says the dollar is peaking

HSBC (Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corp) has begun to seek publicity for a research report arguing that the US dollar has peaked.  I’ve seen mention of it both in the FT and on Bloomberg (the link above).

HSBC is generally pretty good at economics, and has been ahead of the curve on major moves like this before.  So I think its argument is worth considering.  It also fits in with the way I’ve been thinking over the past few weeks.

The HSBC argument:

–the EU is starting to show economic strength as the US is beginning to slow a bit

–on purchasing power measures, the US$ is more overvalued than everything except the Swiss franc

–the Fed is reaching the end of its tolerance for dollar strength

–sentiment is universally bullish for the dollar (i.e., where are new buyers going to come from?)

–the dollar typically weakens after the first Fed Funds rate hike.

 

Risks to the view are mainly geopolitical:

–Greece exits the euro

–emerging markets crisis

–perceived failure of Abenomics

–US legislation forcing American companies to repatriate foreign cash holdings.

 

my take

I don;t know David Bloom, HSBC’s chief currency strategist and the report’s author, personally.  But I see his work as another piece of evidence that the pro-dollar consensus is beginning to crack and that at least a mild reversal of form is likely sooner rather than later.

 

 

Tiffany (TIF) vs. Nike (NKE)–US multinationals in a strong dollar world

TIF and NKE are two iconic US retail names.  Both have large international exposure.  As a result, results of both have been dented by the fall in the US$ value of their foreign sales.

Both stock charts also look virtually identical   …until the euro started falling in mid-2104.  Since then, NKE has continued to motor ahead, while TIF has fallen by the wayside.  From last June until now, NKE is up about 35%, while TIF has fallen by around 15%.  The S&P 500 has risen by  7% over the same span.

Both reported overnight.  As I’m writing this, NKE is up strongly, in a market that’s up; TIF is down.

Yes, I know the two brands stand for much different things, the products are very different and the business structures are, too.

Still,  NKE shows that foreign currency exposure in a rising dollar world need not be lethal if the underlying business is growing fast enough.

I’ve also been thinking a lot lately about the possibility that relative currency values can’t continue to diverge at the current rate forever.  More important, at some point–far ahead of the facts–Wall Street will have fully discounted likely potential changes in currency values.  At that point, even though weak foreign currencies may still be carving a chunk out of corporate results the stocks will no longer react badly when the ugly earnings are announced.

To my mind, that’s when it will be safe to de-emphasize domestic-oriented firms and pick through bombed out multinationals.

We’re apparently not there yet.

But TIF may well be a good indicator to gauge when investors have fully played out their desire to sell foreign currency earners.

 

 

 

yesterday’s Fed meeting announcement

My experience with Fed meetings is that the stock market usually heads off in the wrong direction on the release of the Fed statement and accompanying documents, but then quickly reverses course and moves in the way one might reasonably have predicted by actually reading the Fed materials.  This is not just computers trading.  The US market has operated this way for as long as I can remember.

Not this time, though.  Instead, the S&P made an immediate strong upward move   …and never looked back.

What’s different this time?

I think it’s the PDF where the Fed shows, among other things, where its voting members believe the Fed Funds rate will be at the end of this year, next year and in the longer term.

The previous release, in December 2014, showed the median estimate for 2015 at 1.0%.  For 2016, the figure was 2.5%.

Yesterday’s, in contrast, suggests the rate will be between 0.5% and 0.75% this December, and at 1.75% as we enter 2017.

That’s a big haircut for just three months.

The factors involved in the change are:

–the rise in the US$,

–moderation in domestic economic growth over the first quarter, and

–the lack of any sign of inflation.

Stocks and bonds spiked on the news.  The US$ came off its highs.

my take

Investors continue to be fixated on the numbers the Fed releases, and to be distrustful of any qualitative statement by the Fed saying it has taken the tragic 1990s example of Japan seriously and will err on the side of caution in raising rates.  Doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me that the market doesn’t believe this, but it’s the way it is.

My stocks were having an unusually strong day yesterday before the Fed announcement.  They lost a bit of their relative strength afterward, though.  Arguably, this shows I was preparing for faster rate increases than the market now thinks will occur. I have no desire to become more aggressive, but I will be interested in how my stocks fare today.

I’ve been mulling over whether to try to play a potential rally in domestic-oriented EU stocks.  My experience is that this isn’t safe until the domestic currency in question has stopped falling.  I wonder if yesterday was a turning point?  Again, more data today.

a dollar shortage?

response to a reader’s question

A reader asked me to comment on this post on the Zero Hedge website about a potential US$ funding shortage.  The post was sparked by (is a rehash of) this recent commentary by JP Morgan’s currency strategist.

Let’s be clear that this is not my area of expertise.

Nevertheless, here goes:

the blogger

The Zero Hedge post, following the JP Morgan piece, observes that it has become unusually expensive to buy large amounts of US dollars.  The last time this happened was just as Lehman was failing, signalling serious problems with the world financial system.

The post author concludes that because dollars are again pricy we’re warming up for another round of severe banking problems.

JP Morgan

I don’t think the blogger is correct.  It seems to me he’s mixing up cause and effect.  Also, this is not what JP Morgan is saying.

history

Back in 2008-09, the main issue  was counterparty risk.

Bear Stearns, whose financial statements showed assets–mainly bonds, loan participations…worth about $80 ended up bankrupt, with those “assets” really worth close to nothing.  Lehman’s value was coming under similar questioning.

The conclusion the financial markets drew was that maybe all the banks’ financials were similarly not worth the paper they were written on–and that therefore anyone you lent money to, even for a few days or weeks, might go under before you were repaid.  So the wisest–and only–course was to lend to no one.   The world financial system froze up.

An important leading indicator of this mess was the increasing cost of borrowing dollars to finance trade.

today

Today’s situation is very different.  Two factors are involved in the current high cost of finding dollars:

–it’s cheaper to borrow in euros, hedge currency exposure and convert the loan proceeds into dollars than it is to borrow directly in dollars. (Similarly, in recent years it’s been cheaper for a Mets fan to fly to San Francisco to see the Mets play there than buy a premium seat at Citi Field.) Enough American corporations are doing so to dramaically up the cost of obtaining dollars.  They will presumably continue to do so until do so until this arbitrage makes no sense.

–today’s carry trade is sell euros (or just about any other currency)/buy dollars.

my conclusion

Today’s situation, unusual as it is in post-WWII history, doesn’t signal the onset of a new banking crisis.  Rather, it’s a function of differences in central bank monetary policy between the US and EU caused by differences in the relative economic health of  the two areas.

an aside

JP Morgan mentions one thing for which it has no hard information but that may prove important.

The corporate borrowing situation described a few lines above makes no net impact (in theory, anyway) on the fx value of the euro.  The currency hedging contract exactly offsets the effect of the purchase of dollars.

Suppose, though, US companies aren’t hedging.    After all, multinationals have tons of money in overseas banks and lots of physical assets in foreign countries.  Currency losses on both are currently ripping gaping holes in firms’ income statements.  Companies might consider that having, say, euro-denominated liabilities would neutralize some of the damage (I feel confident that the JPM strategist has either made, sat in on, or at least heard about, financing pitches arguing US companies should do precisely this).

If so, their dollar-buying isn’t  being offest by hedging contracts and  is putting upward pressure on the US$.

equity implications

If so, once converting euros into dollars becomes expensive enough, US companies will presumably stop doing it.  This could cause a significant bounce in the euro.  This would likely switch European stock market preferences away from dollar earners toward (beaten down) domestic issues.