contribution margin

three sets of books

A couple of years ago, I wrote a post about the three sets of accounts that a publicly traded company maintains:

–tax books, where the objective is to pay the smallest amount of tax legally possible–in other words, to fool the IRS,

–financial reporting books, where a more liberal view of when and how revenues and expense occur allow a company to put its best foot forward with owners–in other words, to fool shareholders, and

–management control books, also called cost accounting books, which the company uses to actually run its operations.

contribution margin

Contribution margin is a cost accounting concept.

The first thing to note is that despite its name it’s not really a margin–that is, it’s not a percentage.

Instead, it’s the amount by which an activity or a  line of business exceeds its own direct costs and makes a contribution to corporate overhead.  This isn’t the same as making a standalone profit, meaning after covering total costs.

Take a restaurant that’s now open for lunch and dinner and makes money doing so.

Should it open for breakfast, as well?

In the simplest case, the question is whether the restaurant can generate enough revenue to offset the cost of paying for the food and the staff.  If so, it makes a positive contribution margin.  If we were to allocate, say, 20% of the restaurant’s total expense for rent, electricity and depreciation of equipment,  breakfast might be bleeding red ink.  But those costs are there anyway, whether breakfast is or not.  As long as the contribution margin is positive, the firm is better off with breakfast than without.  (Yes, the actual situation is more complicated   …is the wear and tear higher because of breakfast?   …does breakfast cannibalize the other meals?   But I’m keeping it simple to illustrate a point.)

Another case.   Some lines of business may never have been intended to create growing profits, or may no longer be capable of doing so, even if they once were.  A manufacturer may make precision components in-house.  The component division will typically be run as a cost center, not a profit center.  It’s mission will be to provide high quality parts at the lowest price, not to maximize profits.  Its managers will be evaluated by their ability to provide output more cheaply than third-party alternatives can.  Again, the division may not be profitable after allocation of its share of corporate overhead.  Still, it may be very valuable.  Its value will be measured by contribution margin, defined as the difference between in-house and third-party component costs.

Why is this important?

It’s a mindset thing.  Not every part of a company may be intended to grow.  Rising stars may eventually turn into cash cows as businesses evolve.  It’s important both for company management and investors to understand the role an activity should be playing in the overall enterprise.

 

 

the “decimation” of Portland, Oregon’s container business–is this LA’s future?

Last week I wrote about the Los Angeles-area container ports’ continuing problems between the shipping lines and port workers.  My view is that inability to resolve these conflicts is the motivating factor behind the shippers’ support for alternate routes to the east coast of the US, like the expansion of the Panama Canal now under way.  A corollary is that there’ll be a significant supply chain reshuffle for East Coast customers once the canal expansion is completed.

Shortly after that post, I found an article in the Journal of Commerce about the contraction of the container business in Portland, Oregon.  It seems to me to anticipate what is likely to occur in the LA area in coming years.

According to the JOC,  a jurisdictional dispute between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) over who controls two electrician positions servicing refrigerated containers has resulted in continuing work stoppages and slowdowns in the Portland port over the past three years.  The jobs were originally IBEW positions.  In 2010, the ILWU demanded–and was given–control over the two slots.  After ILWU members were unable to do the work satisfactorily, the port returned control to the IBEW.  That triggered local work stoppages and slowdowns.  In addition to this, the Portland local of the ILWU participated in the recent four-month work slowdown that affected all West Coast ports.

A month ago, Korean shipper Hanjin, which represented about 2/3 of the port’s container business, ceased operations at Portland.  Last week, German shipper Hapag-Lloyd, which is virtually all of the rest, did so as well.

This leaves Portland with two problems:

–exporters to Asia of agricultural products from Oregon and Idaho, which had been using the return leg of trans-Pacific shipping routes to get their output to market no longer have that possibility.  Their (more expensive) choices:  truck goods to Tacoma, Seattle or LA.

–the ILWU contract calls for full-time workers to be paid $35.58/hour for 37.5 hours per week, whether there is work or not.  If the recently negotiated contract is ratified, those figures will rise to $36.68 and 40 hours.

 

The Oregonian estimates that the loss of Hanjin will eliminate work for 657 longshoremen, being paid $225,000 a day–and put 5,000 more jobs in the community at risk.  The earliest it sees possible replacement traffic is in two years.  By then, however, the Panama Canal expansion should be complete–or very close.

 

West Coast shipping and the Panama Canal

I first became aware of how important the ports around Los Angeles were for commerce in the US in 2002, when a 10-day work stoppage brought the flow of goods through them to a halt.    At that time, Los Angeles and Long Beach were the only deep-water ports on the West Coast equipped with machinery that could offload big container ships from Asia.  Just as important, all the major rail links across the country terminate at the big Southern California port complex.

The dispute was, of course, about wages and benefits.  But it was also about work rules–the desire of the shipping companies that own the ports to replace typewriters with computers and to record container numbers by scanning barcodes instead of writing them down with pencil and paper and typing them up.  That would ultimately mean layoffs of the typists–something the union was dead set against.  At one point, the shipping companies offered to ensure that all then-employed workers would receive a full salary for life (at the going rate of roughly triple the average American worker’s pay) in return for permission to make productivity improvements.  The union rejected the offer, reportedly because jobs that the workers’ children would otherwise “inherit” would be lost.

Ultimately Washington stepped in to end that strike.

We’ve had a relatively mild reprise of the 2002 job action during recently concluded contract negotiations between the shippers and the longshoremen, ended, again, with Washington’s help.

The 2002 strike, however, marked a crucial turning point in shippers’ attitudes toward what the LA Times has called “a crucial chokepoint in the global economy.”

After that strike, the shipping companies began to develop alternative routes to get merchandise to their American customers.  Measures included revival of East Coast ports and expansion of ports in the Pacific Northwest.

The keystone of the shippers’ plans, however, is the ongoing enlargement of the Panama Canal.  At present, Panamax container ships (that is, the “max” that can fit through the canal) can hold up to 5,000 containers.  When the expansion–mired in cost overruns and delays–is complete in 2017, that figure goes up to 13,000, thereby upping the canal throughput 1.6 times.  There’s already talk of another expansion when this one is done.  (There are also what appear to be hare-brained schemes to spend $50 billion to dig a canal through Nicaragua and  another to create a rail/canal route through northern South America.)

Why do I find this saga interesting?

In a narrow sense, the Panama Canal expansion suggests that future LA port disruptions won’t have the significant negative impact on the US economy that they’ve had in the past.

I also find it noteworthy that an aggressive bargaining stance by a relatively small number of people over a decade ago can continue to have important economic ripple effects fifteen or more years later.

It’s also funny that actions taken to preserve a position of power are ending up having the opposite effect.

 

Friday’s bad jobs report

Last Friday morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issued its monthly Employment Situation report for March.

The numbers were bad.

At a gain of +126,000 positions for the month (+129,000 jobs in the private sector, -3,000 in government), the growth in  jobs was less than half the monthly gains over the past year, which averaged close to +270,000.

Revisions to January and February were also negative.  The February figure was revised down by -31,000 jobs to +264,000 and the January number by -38,000 to +201,000.

Among industries:

–retail trade continued to perk along,

–business and professional services and healthcare continued to expand, although at a slower rate

–most other industries showedd little change in employment, and

–mining fell by -11,000 jobs–presumably as a result of the slowdown in oil and gas drilling.

Although there was no equities trading in the US on Friday, the stock index futures market was open for business until 9:15.  Futures for the S&P 500, NASDAQ and the Dow all dropped by about a percentage point on the ES report.

 

As I’m writing this at about 8:30 today, futures have recovered around a third of Friday’s decline.

 

The most likely explanation for the March weakness is the unusually cold and stormy weather in many of the most highly populated parts of the country during the month.  The revisions to the very strong figures of the two prior months–also plagued by awful weather–are curious only in that they suggest that the firms that were suffering most during the quarter also the ones who dragged their feet in reporting.

To my mind, the weak March ES has no real economic significance.

Today’s reaction to the report in stock trading on Wall Street will be interesting, though,  It will give us some insight into the mood of the market.  A bullish market would shake the news off and end the day up.  A skittish one would use the figures as an occasion to sell off.  So it will be important, I think, to see whether  the market ends up or down, and where the areas of strength and weakness are.

Intel (INTC0 and Altera (ALTR): implications

What can we conclude from INTC’s interest in acquiring ALTR?

–when I became interested in INTC as a stock a couple of years ago, it seemed to me that the firm could be viewed as having two businesses–a high-growth one selling servers and a low-growth, cash cow one selling chips for PCs.   At the time, I thought the server business alone more than justified the then stock price, and that the PC business was mainly important for its contribution to overhead and its free cash flow generation.  A desire to acquire ALTR seems to confirm that this is also INTC management’s view.

–good companies periodically reinvent themselves.  After a period of stagnation, this appears to be what INTC is doing

–the threat of low power servers run by ARM chips is serious

–my guess is that a bid will take the form of all or mostly INTC stock.  An all or largely cash offer would imply either that INTC thinks its shares are deeply undervalued, that debt financing is too ridiculously cheap to pass up, or that long-suffering ALTR shareholders want  to declare investment victory and move on.

–an INTC-ALTR merger spells trouble for Xilinx (XLNX), the main competitor to ALTR

–the main source of value in ALTR is its software.  Assessing that, thorough accumulated R&D spending, is the key.

Numbers tomorrow.