The financial crisis and the renminbi

As I apparently never tire of writing, the financial crisis that came to a head five years ago has resulted in an extended period of emergency ultra-low interest rates.  The tried-and-true idea behind this is to give economic activity a boost by making loans carrying negative real interest rates readily available.  “Free” money should make anyone with a pulse willing to borrow and spend.

In the past, these low-interest periods engineered by the Fed lasted at most a year.  We’re now into year six of the current episode.

One result of this extremely long emergency period is that fixed income investors are currently lapping up low-coupon Italian, Greek…even Iraqi..sovereign debt.  And crazy (in my view) fixed income products like contingent convertibles, no-covenant junk bonds and pik (payment in kind) junk bonds, where interest is paid in new bonds, not cash, are all finding eager buyers, as well.

Another is that savers living on interest payments (increasingly Baby Boomers), who are in effect subsidizing the financial rescue, are suffering.  In fact, Millennials have just surpassed Boomers as the most important single demographic force in the US economy.

All of this is well-known.

Another development, though, which may turn out to be the most important in the long run, has escaped notice so far.  It’s the increasing acceptance of the Chinese renminbi in world trade and in investment.

Fifteen, or even ten, years ago, China was content with the fact that all of its trade was effectively done in dollars.  Beijing let Treasury bonds pile up in its coffers, to the point where it rivaled–and the surpassed–Japan as the largest creditor of the US.  It had become uneasy about this situation even before the financial crisis.  Stunned by the meltdown of 2008-09, China decided to offer its currency as a substitute for the dollar.

Until the past year or so, the renminbi has drawn pretty close to zero interest.   This is partly because at first it wasn’t easy for either foreigners or Chinese parties to use the renminbi in trade.  Also, foreigners can’t spend “offshore” renminbi in China itself.

Yes, the renminbi is easier to use today.  But I think a big reason the renminbi is suddenly extremely popular now is the very low-interest rate environment we’re in.  Multinationals with Chinese operations can save 3% – 5% by settling Chinese trade transactions in renminbi.  In other circumstances, this might not be worth the hassle.  But if your cash balances are earning effectively zero and if you have to buy a pik bond or Iraqi debt to get a 5%+ yield, then switching from dollar to renminbi trade settlement is a relative bonanza.

This movement seems to be feeding on itself.  It’s causing very rapid growth in renminbi use, admittedly from a low base.  I don’t think this development has any important immediate investment consequences.  But it could end up making a profound (negative) impact on the dollar and the euro if it continues–as I expect it will.  The ultimate result would be to make renminbi earners much more attractive as investments than they currently are.

The big investment question is when the inflection point will come, when the renminbi will begin to be regarded as a viable alternative to the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.  Perception will likely precede reality by a long stretch   …although I don’t think the tipping point will come this year or next.  I view this as something important to keep in mind, however, so we can recognize what’s happening if this trend develops faster than I now think it will.

 

frontier markets: safer than emerging markets?–I don’t think so

On Sunday the Wall Street Journal published an article whose apparent conclusion is that frontier stock markets have not only better performance than emerging or developed markets, but they’re safer as well.

I don’t think this is right.

developed, emerging, frontier

The dividing lines between developed, emerging or frontier markets are a little vague, but basically they are as follows:

–Developed markets are in politically stable, high GDP mature countries that have large liquid stock markets and where there’s a long history of trading in different economic climates.  Think:  US, UK, Japan…

Emerging markets are the next step down.  They’re in relatively politically stable countries whose stock markets offer a variety of sectors and names.  Under normal conditions, liquidity of large-cap names is good, although there may be restrictions on taking profits out of the country.   Think:  Taiwan, China, Brazil…

Frontier markets are the countries with stock markets that don’t make the emerging markets cut.  They may be too small, not liquid enough, politically unstable…or just new.  Think:  Nigeria, Bulgaria…

performance

Over the past ten years,

the MSCI developed markets index has returned 5.16% annually.

the MSCI emerging markets index has returned 9.44% annually.

the MSCI frontier markets index has returned 5.35% annually.

Yes, frontier markets have had a fine past 18 months, but a lot of that is catch-up with other markets.

riskiness

Here’s where I really question the WSJ article.

It refers to a study distributed by LR Global, a tiny frontier markets specialist($200 million under management), to its clients.  The report measures weekly stock market volatility–the ups and downs of stock prices.  Such volatility is the standard academic measure of risk.  Its main virtues are that it’s simple, clearly defined and easy to calculate.  In my view, however, weekly price volatility has virtually nothing to do with what investors mean when they talk about the risks they are taking in investing…but that’s another issue.

LR points out that over the past ten years frontier markets have routinely been less volatile than emerging markets.  In addition, they have been less volatile than developed markets over the past three years.  LR’s conclusion:  frontier markets are safer than popular opinion would make them.

my take

I have two observations about this, both of which relate to liquidity:

–smaller markets, in my experience, have the appearance of stability because it can be difficult to trade in them.  In bad times in particular, bids for a stock may completely disappear–or come in for only a small number of shares and at a 20% discount to the previous trade.  Holders a choice between taking taking this price to sell , say, 10% of the holding (thereby devaluing the entire holding), or do nothing.  The easier choice is the latter.  So no trade happens, and the official stock quote remains unchanged.

–liquidity in small markets is very often mostly provided by foreigners trading with one another.  If they leave–and they may be gone for several years, liquidity dries up.  Volatility may be low, but that’s a bad thing, not a good one.

For individual investors in frontier market mutual funds that are part of a large, well-capitalized mutual fund complex, the liquidity issue is probably not crucial.  For anyone else, it deserves a lot of thought.

Personally, I have no burning desire to invest in frontier markets.  I don’t see what advantage I would have there.  But I don;t think that safety is one of the virtues of these markets.

 

Macau casinos, after their stock market decline

a weak few months

Macau casinos, and their foreign parents, have been bludgeoned in the stock market over the past couple of months.  Several reasons:

–general worry about stocks that had gone up a lot

–the Ukraine situation, which has unnerved European investors

–fear that the the current anti-corruption/anti-excessive consumption drive by Beijing will hurt the VIP business which has been the heart of Macau casino profits, and

–the possible proliferation of casino openings elsewhere in China, or in other Asian countries like the Philippines or Japan.

what, me worry?

Every portfolio investor acts on small amounts of imperfect information.  That’s why we don’t put all our eggs in one basket (Bernard Baruch to the contrary).   From where I sit, a lot of the negative things now being said about Macau seem to be (mistaken) attempts to explain the stock price drops.   I don’t think they have much factual basis.  Of course, even the best stock market investor is wrong 40%+ of the time.

For what it’s worth, here’s my take:

–So far there’s no hard evidence so far that Beijing’s anti-corruption campaign is having any negative effect on the VIP gambling business in Macau.

–More important, the Macau gambling market is no longer being driven solely by VIPs.  The new sweet spot is the mass affluent, a market segment that’s now the source of most of the SAR’s growth.  How so?  VIPs bet huge amounts, but they’re semi-professional gamblers.  They lose on average about 3% of the amount they bet; the casino rebates half of that, either to the high roller himself or to the middlemen who has brought him there.  So margins are razor-thin.  The mass affluent, on the other hand, are seeking entertainment.  At table games, they make much smaller bets, but they lose about a quarter of what they wager–and they don’t care that much.   A mass affluent pataca bet is worth 15x-20x in casino operating profit what a high roller pataca is.  Hordes of them are now descending on Macau.  (There’s also a shift among winners and losers within the market, but that’s another story.)

The mass affluent also want non-gambling entertainment.  In the salad days of Las Vegas, shows, concerts, restaurants…brought in just as much profit as the casino operations.  In Macau, this business is still in its infancy.  But I see no reason why Macau in the end will be any different.

–Transportation links are still being built to allow more far-flung areas of China to reach Macau, meaning market saturation is still years off.

–It makes no sense to me to believe both (1) that Beijing’s crackdown is aimed squarely at casinos and (2) that the government will give permission for more casinos to open in other areas of China.  But this is what some bears are saying.

–Macau has critical mass and lots of amenities.  Chinese is the dominant language.  Kidnapping high rollers isn’t an issue.  Japanese casinos, whatever they may eventually look like, are years away.  Singapore has already been up and running for a considerable while–and Chinese junket operators aren’t welcome there anyway.  Some VIPs will certainly try out the Philippines or other venues.  I just don’t see this as a big deal.

 

Yes, I trimmed my Macau exposure significantly last year–because my position size was much too large.   At this point, I’m a potential buyer, not a seller.

 

the Chinese economy (ll): what’s happening now

The administration of Xi Jinping took over leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2012 determined, I think, to deal with a number related issues:

–economically, China has reached the point where can no longer grow by exporting simple products made with labor-intensive methods.  It also has much too much simple, inefficient basic industry.  It has to shift to more sophisticated, higher value-added production.

How so?

The country, particularly in the more industrialized east, has finally run out of unskilled workers to staff labor-intensive operations at low cost.  Air, ground and water pollution from primitive basic industry is becoming a very serious national problem (by the way, I’ve traveled to a lot of developing countries in my career, but Beijing is the only place where I’ve been physically ill from the poor air quality the moment I got off the plane).

The textbook way of dealing with development transition is to allow the local currency to rise to the point where simple manufactured goods are priced out of the world market.  But that invariably causes large scale unemployment, which is the last thing China wants.  Beijing has been taking another approach over the past few years–keeping the currency stable but mandating large wage increases for employees.  As far as I can see, this approach seems to be working.

–forces of the status quo, epitomized by province and local governments, have continued to resist making the transition.  They continue to strongarm local banks into making loans for old-style (and now uneconomic) construction, manufacturing and basic industry projects.  Why?  …some combination of:  it’s easy, it’s all they know, they’re under pressure to create GDP growth and they get kickbacks from all parties concerned.

Beijing has ordered the banks to stop this sort of unsound lending.  Unfortunately, the banks in China have done what banks everywhere else in the world do in the same situation.  They set up non-bank subsidiaries that continue to make the dud loans.  (Ever wonder why most of the horrible US sub-prime mortgage derivatives originated out of London?   –to evade the regulators, of course.)

Xi Jinping has decided to crack down on the non-banks, too, even allowing s0me of their projects to fail.  I don’t mean to suggest that a banking crisis is imminent in China.   Far from it.   As I see it, Beijing is just establishing that it will hold banks, and bankers, to account for violating the spirit of its regulations, not only the letter.

–clinging to a growth model that’s no longer viable has three “externalities,” namely, that it’s destroying the environment, it weakens the banking system and it’s seen by ordinary citizens as simply a vehicle for official corruption–which threatens the legitimacy of the Communist Party.

investment implications

Ever the optimist, I think that Beijing is well-intentioned, its policies are sound and that they have a good chance of being successful.  So, all in all, what’s happening is a good thing   …and necessary for China’s future economic development.  Maintaining the status quo would be a recipe for disaster.

Nevertheless, transitions take time, and:

–GDP growth in China will be lower as export-oriented manufacturing disappears faster than domestic-demand, consumer-oriented businesses can be built up to replace them

–there’ll be less basic industry in China, and less demand for metals

–there’ll be more focus on technology and, as time goes on, on export of consumer goods

–there already is a shift in the luxury goods market away from foreign brands toward local.  This will likely continue and eventually spread to other areas.

 

the Chinese economy (i): background

size by GDP

According to the CIA World Factbook, the US is the largest economic power on the globe, with 2013 GDP (calculated using the Purchasing Power Parity method) estimated at $16.7 trillion.

The EU is a close second, with GDP of $15.8 trillion.

China is in the #3 spot, with GDP of $13.4 trillion.

Together, the trio make up about half the world’s GDP.  (A quarter century of stagnation has left former co-#1, Japan, a mere shadow of its former self, with GDP of $4.7 trillion.)

China’s economic strategy

Since turning away from central planning toward a market economy under Deng Xiaoping, China has faced two related issues:

–creating enough new jobs to absorb new entrants to the workforce, thereby avoiding political instability, while at the same time,

–reining in the inefficient, loss making, often corrupt state-owned industrial sector, which accounted for three-quarters of all employment in the late 1970s.

Two other constraints:  China had to do this without an effective central bank and with a cadre of state and local government officials who thought (many still do) that the fastest and most lucrative road to the top was to create more labor intensive, inefficient (and corrupt) local analogues of big state-owned enterprises.

China has achieved spectacular economic growth by embracing capitalism.  To some degree, the remaining state-owned sector, which now accounts for just over one quarter of the economy, has also shaped up.  But while doing this, China has tended to lurch between periods of substantial credit restriction to try to force state-owned enterprises to become more efficient or die, followed by excessive expansion when layoffs become too severe.

the latest wrinkle

Emerging economies, following the post-WWII Japan model, start by offering cheap labor for simple manufacturing businesses, so that they can acquire training and technology from foreign firms.  At some point, a given country will run out of labor.  It must then transition to higher value-added endeavors.  Few succeed without a lot of heartache, because–I think–vested interests attached to the status quo are so powerful.

China now finds itself at this transition point, an issue which dominates its current economic policy.

More tomorrow.