I think it has–at least in relative performance terms. But I also think that FB’s conduct during its IPO has created an enduring credibility problem for it.
The biggest factor depressing FB stock during its debut, in my view, was the joint, last minute, decision by the FB chief financial officer and the lead underwriter to expand the dollar amount of an already large offering by 40%. That left no buying demand for the aftermarket. If you think the underwriters didn’t know precisely what they were doing, there’s a bridge connecting Manhattan and Brooklyn you might be interested in buying.
However, it has only recently come out that the NASDAQ trading problems on the first day were much larger than I had originally appreciated. CNBC has reported that investment bank UBS alone may have racked up FB-related losses of $350 million. How so?
If you remember, NASDAQ’s computer systems weren’t able to handle FB orders at all for the first several hours of trading. Some retail investors didn’t know for the better part of a week how much FB stock they had bought or sold. It turns out, though, that institutional problems were a lot bigger.
CNBC says an unnamed UBS trader entered a buy order for 1,000,000 shares of FB. He didn’t get a confirmation from NASDAQ. So he entered the order again …and again …and again …and again. Then, apparently, confirmations for all the orders came at once. It’s unclear whether the confirms came on Friday, or during the following week.
CNBC also says UBS only liquidated some of the stock at below $30 a share. Do the math. If we say the UBS trader bought the stock at an average of $40 and sold at $30, that’s a $10 loss on each share. If so, he pressed the “buy” button 35x!!!, without thinking about the possible consequences (Welcome to the world of trading.).
Presumably the UBS trader wasn’t the only one doing this.
Notice, too, that the FB price didn’t dip below $30 a share until almost two weeks after the IPO. So it took UBS at least that long to trade out of its unwanted position. Throughout all that time, FB was under unnatural selling pressure.
I think that’s over.
The IPO materials suggest that FB wants to portray itself as carrying out an ethically good social mission. Mark Zuckerberg says as much when he leads off the IPO video. Thereby, I presume, it hopes to gain investor trust and support–and a higher PE.
FB has just released correspondence between it and the SEC about the prospectus. Media analysis of the documents indicates that FB withheld from the first version of the prospectus two items of information that I regard as the two most important facts about company operations. They are:
–the regional breakout of subscriber growth and profitability, and
–the effect on profits of the switch to mobile use of FB.
(Note: I haven’t looked at the correspondence, which is contained in SEC filings by FB. But every major news source I read has reported the same story.)
You might say that in the rough and tumble of economic life, the most prudent course for a company is to disclose as little as possible to potential competitors. You might also say that the initial draft of the prospectus is intended solely to stake out a negotiating position with the SEC. In one sense, that’s right. But if you do this, I don’t think you can pitch yourself as being socially responsible or try to cultivate potential investors as partners in the noble cause you’ve embarked on.
Think of it this way:
A married couple. One partner likes to gamble but always loses. One day, that partner comes home late from work, after losing $500 playing poker. The other partner says, “I see that look on your face. You’ve been gambling again. How much did you lose this time.” The reply: “$5.”
Is this last statement true? I don’t think so.
Yes, it is factually correct.
But it’s also incomplete.
If the two people were commercial adversaries, maybe the statement would be okay. But in a relationship where the partners have assumed an obligation to be fully and completely truthful with the other, the reply is a lie.
No, the prospectus isn’t a marriage proposal. On the other hand, I don’t think that FB can invite us to become partners on a socially uplifting journey while stamping caveat emptor on all its disclosure to us. We can’t be both trusted allies and sheep ready to be fleeced.
The “like me, trust me” route does generate a higher PE multiple, in my experience. But to the degree that investors perceive a double standard, I think the stock’s PE multiple will be lower than if it clearly chose one approach or the other.