stock prices can “talk”

not for everyone

I look at the prices of the stocks I hold every day.  Sometimes, but not always, I’ll look several times intra-day.  The advent of smartphones has made this possible for everyone to do, both for US and foreign stocks.  This is so, almost no matter where you are.

It takes a substantial amount of self-control and emotional discipline to do this productively.  I’ve seen almost every professional investor I’ve worked with, including myself, at one time or another mesmerized–and paralyzed into inaction–by staring at random fluctuations of stocks marching across the screen that’s virtually always on your desk.  The only short-term cure is to turn the machine off.  Otherwise, it’s kind of like watching a trashy TV show.  You know it’s a waste of time but you’re sucked in.

With TV, this compulsion to watch may come when you have other, unpleasant, stuff to do.  For investors, it’s typically when plans have gone awry and you’re hoping against hope that a miracle will happen and you’ll see the situation reversing itself on your computer.  It never works.

Still, there’s sometimes information to be gleaned from stock prices.  Sometimes, the movements are unusual in that they’re not random.  The only way you can tell is by checking them regularly.

how I learned

My first international portfolio job, managing holdings in smaller (that is, non-Japan) Pacific Basin markets, was also my first time working in non-US markets.  Every morning my boss would call me into her office.  She always had a report showing prices and volumes for all the major stocks–whether we held them or not–in all the areas I was responsible for.

She would name a stock.  I had to tell her the stock price change, in dollars and cents and in percentage terms, the trading volume and who the major brokers were who were active in the stock–both on the buy and sell side.  I also had to say how the trading in this stock compared with the trading in similar stocks in the same industry.

This grilling went on for 15-30 minutes, every day for several months.  I stopped having to do this, I think, when I started to give my boss significant information that she didn’t already have.  Although I wouldn’t have described the process as pleasant, my boss forced me over a period of time to try to distinguish between random and information-laden price/volume data and to think about and improve my analytic/intuitive capabilities in this area.  Otherwise, I might still be in that room!

an (obvious) example

A number of years ago, I owned a Canadian energy royalty trust.  The stocks were primarily owned by Americans attracted by high income.  I bought after they collapsed when Canada announced the payouts were going to become subject to Canadian income tax.  The stock I bought had a 14% dividend yield that was slated to be gradually reduced to 8% as the new income tax was phased in.

One afternoon, very close to 4pm, someone placed a million share order, at the market, in the stock.  The US$20 million that the order represented amounted to about half a day’s volume and was maybe 100x the size of the typical order.  The broker who got the order seemed to do the minimum legally required to find stock away from his in-house market maker and then filled the order, pushing the stock price up about 5% in the process.

This trade screamed that something unusual was going on.  Maybe you should  think twice before saying someone with $20 million to spend on a single stock is a total idiot, but this trade was done in a way that would humiliate any professional trader.  So either the buyer was an idiot by entering a huge order with no price sensitivity, or he knew something that the market wasn’t yet aware of.  The “something” also had to be such that even waiting until the next day was an unacceptable risk.

A few weeks later, the stock was bid for by a Middle Eastern sovereign wealth fund at a 25% premium.

why I’m writing about this today

As regular readers of this blog will know, I like the casino industry–because it’s simple to analyze–and I own both WYNN and 1128 (Wynn Macau).  Overnight, 1128 was up 8.7% to HK$15.98, after hitting an intra-day high of HK$16.40.  The stock just doesn’t normally move more than a few percent in a day.

Sands China (1928) and Galaxy Entertainment (0027) were both up 4.6%.  The Hang Seng, in contrast, was up 1.2% and its China Enterprises index was up 1.5%.

These are all unusual price movements, although 1128 jumps out as extraordinary, especially since all three stocks have been star performers in the Hong Kong market this year and are all trading at relatively high PE ratios.

What’s going on?  My guess is that information is leaking out that the Golden Week holiday has gone surprisingly well for the Macau casinos–and especially so for the American-run ones.

What am I doing as a result?  I’m hanging on to my entire 1128 position longer than I would otherwise.  In my analysis of the Wynn-related companies posted earlier this year, I had used a sum-of-the-parts method to look at WYNN.  I started with the idea that HK$15 (20x what I estimated 2010 eps would be) was a fair price for 1128.  Although I may not have written it, I’ve been thinking that HK$18 (same multiple, eps up 20%) is a reasonable first target for Wynn Macau for 2011.

Ordinarily, I’d be selling a portion of the 1128 I hold, maybe with a limit order of HK$16.50, hoping to buy it back later on at a lower price.  I think I’m going to wait and see, instead.

Addendum:  WYNN gained 8.5% in New York trading on Monday in a flat overall market.  If we figure that 1128 represents at current levels about 70% of the market value of WYNN, the move up in 1128 is the equivalent of a 6% rise in WYNN.  The “extra” 2.5% is the interesting part of the parent’s performance.

The Macau gambling market: September 2010 results

The Gaming Inspection, and Coordination Bureau of Macau, the casino regulator in the SAR, posts total market casino win statistics monthly on its website.

The 2010 figures, year to date, along with comparisons with the comparable periods of 2009, are as follows:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept 15,302 10,943 39.8% 133,237 83,208 60.1%
Oct
Nov
Dec

Source:  Gaming Coordination and Inspection Bureau, Macau SAR

The pataca is worth about US$0.125.  So the market win in September is about US$1.9 billion.

To me, the most interesting aspect of the report is how quickly Wall Street picked up on it.  The figures were posted on the GCIB website at around 7am, New York time, on Monday.  Yet, the strong positive response to the figures in New York trading could be seen in the stock prices of the US firms with Macau interests–WYNN, LVS and MGM–from the opening bell.  US gaming analysts’ reports (I’ve only seen abstracts on the internet) commenting on the figures were apparently circulating among professional investors earlier than that.

the September figures

They’re really good.  That’s the bottom line.  Beyond that, the statistics aren’t completely straightforward.

Year over year comparisons are affected by the financial crisis, which severely reduced casino patronage in the first half of last year.  The market was still up for 2009, but only by about 10% vs. 2008.  If we look at the two-year growth rate for the market, as a way of offsetting some of the recession distortion, the advance comes in at a heady 30% annual rate.  That’s probably a better indicator of the market’s expansion than the 60%+ growth some first-half 2010 months showed.

In addition to the recession, government regulation has had an effect on the longer-term growth figures as well.  For one thing, it’s much easier today than it was a couple of years ago for a Chinese citizen to get a government ok to visit Macau.  For another, the SAR has stepped in over the past couple of years to slow down capacity expansion, capping the installation of new table games in Macau to an extra 10% in total.  And it intervened early in a potentially profit-devastating price war over VIP junkets, setting a ceiling on the incentive fees a casino could pay to organizers for steering clients their way.

The result of government policy, both the mainland and Macau, has generally been to slow revenue growth, meaning that above-average growth will continue for longer, but to ensure better profit performance.

where to from here?

One of the beauties of the casino business is that it’s relatively simple to analyze.  If we assume that the share of their income that gamblers wager in casinos is relatively fixed, then market revenue growth should be a function of expansion of nominal GDP and of growth in the number of gamblers.  In a mature market, the growth in gamblers is simply a function of the growth in the working population.

For Macao, the predominant source of gamblers is the mainland, at about 50%, followed by Hong Kong at around 25%.  Let’s say that nominal GDP will expand at around a 10% rate for the next few years in both places.  Put working population growth at 1%.  This would mean that in a mature state, Macau gaming revenues would rise by about 12% annually.

But the number of visitors to Macau is rising at close to a 20% annual rate, indicating that there are still gamblers, especially in China, who are potential Macau customers but who have yet to visit.  How long can this rapid annual increase in visitors go on?  That’s the big question for this market.

The short answer is there’s no way to tell.  We can try to extrapolate from experience in the US in Las Vegas.  The worry is that the size and structure of the US and Chinese economies is so different.  But here’s my guess:

Let’s say half the population of the US is affluent enough to afford to gamble in Las Vegas.  That would be 140 million people.  About 36 million, or about a quarter of the total, visited Las Vegas last year.  If we say that 10% of the population of China is affluent enough to gamble in Macau, that would be a potential market of about 130 million.  Of that number, about 10 million, or 7.7% of the total, are likely to visit Macau this year.

So, if mainland Chinese had the same propensity to gamble as Americans, then there are about another 20-25 million potential customers on the mainland yet to be tapped.

Even if that number is twice the real size, that would mean that mainland visitation to Macau could double from the current level, which could add 10% to the annual growth rate of casino revenues for the next seven or eight years.

signs capacity is getting tighter

We’ll know more when LVS, WYNN and MGM report September quarter earnings, but I’ve heard reports that hotel rooms are becoming harder to find between now and the end of the calendar year.  If true, that would be god for the non-casino side of the Macau businesses run by Americans.  The casinos might benefit as well, since an excess of patrons in a static capacity environment means table stakes may rise–leading by itself to a revenue boost.

lots of stock choices

So far, a quickly rising tide has supported all casino boats, year-to-date at least.  More than doubling, the Hong Kong-controlled companies have been the best performers.  Foreign-controlled firms have made about half those gains.

To me, the most basic questions are:

–do you want an American company trying to being Las Vegas-style gaming to Macau?  Americans think this is superior technology; Hong Kong investors, so far, see strangers who don’t know the market that well.  Hong Kong’s Disneyland probably didn’t help the Americans’ cause.

–do you want the baggage the Ho family brings with it?  Again, so far, this has been no problem for Hong Kong investors, although it has always been one for me.

My answers:  stick with either Wynn Macau or Sands China, or their US parents.

Macau gambling results for August 2010

After suffering a temporary slowdown in June, as gamblers stayed home to watch the World Cup, the Macau gambling market has bounced back vigorously over the past two months.  Here are the figures:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec

Source:  DICJ, Macau SAR

my thoughts

1.  Of the large world gaming markets where information is publicly available–Macau, Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Australia–Macau is at present much more of a high roller market than the others.  Is that important?  Ultimately what counts is the profit return that the physical capital of the casino generates.  But one salient characteristic of the high roller, table games segment vs. the average gambler, slot machine segment is that the law of large numbers (that is, the odds balancing out) works for periods of time as short as a quarter.  In the high roller arena, on the other hand, one or two unusually lucky or unlucky gambler’s results can affect the bottom line even over a three month period.

What counts as gross revenue in the table above is the amount “held”, or won, by the Macau casinos, not the (much, much larger) amount bet.  If gamblers are unusually lucky in a given month, then the DICJ number will be correspondingly low–and vice versa.

2.  So far this year, the Macau market has growth by 63% vs. the comparable period in 2009.  This number is much more important than shifts in market share among the various market participants.  When the market matures, the relative market shares will become much more crucial.

In addition, share figures can vary substantially as new capacity opens, or as gamblers try out different venues before establishing more regular patterns of patronage, or as a given casino’s win percentage varies randomly.

3.  The Macau government has been critical to the success of the gambling market there.  It issued the licenses that permitted new blood to open up in the former Portuguese colony.   It has prevented the weaker casinos to initiate severe price competition that would have hurt everyone in Macau.  And it has slowed down the pace of new construction to try to match capacity more closely with demand.  All these moves have greatly enhanced the profitability of the gaming industry in Macau.

4. In the simplest terms, it seems to me that the publicly traded Macau casino stocks divide into two groups.

–One consists of 1128 and 1928, which are American controlled firms trying to apply the upscale casino/resort experience model they developed in Las Vegas to Macau.  Their weakness is their relatively limited knowledge of China.  The open question in investors’ minds is whether the American model will work in the Pacific.

–The rest of the market consists of firms with much stronger local Pacific contacts and experience.  Their potential weakness is that they haven’t run the upscale American model.  Also, it’s not clear that some managements would be permitted to operate in the US–although so far this fact does not appear to have been a key factor for Asian investors.

Las Vegas Sands: an interesting June 2010 quarter

LVS 2Q2010 results

LVS reported 2Q2010 results after the close yesterday.  On a GAAP basis, the company was just slightly below breakeven vs. a loss of $.34 a share in the second quarter of last year.  Operating income was $166.8 million for the three months vs. a loss of $171.3 million in the comparable period of 2009.  Removing non-recurring items, net income was $129.3 million or $.17 per share vs. $8.8 million, $.01 per share, in the year-ago quarter.

The biggest reason for the improvement was the huge increase in income from the company’s casinos in Macau, where the overall market revenues in the first half grew strongly enough to eclipse the full-year 2007 results, with only about a 10% increase in the number of slot machines and table games.  LVS was also helped by the opening of its Singapore casino during the quarter.

my takeaways

I don’t have an investment opinion about LVS.  It’s a complex, highly financially leveraged company, with a lot of moving parts, and I haven’t studied it enough.  My thumbnail sketch:  LVS is a highly competent casino operator, with an emphasis on middle market and convention business.  The company overstretched itself in expanding aggressively–in Las Vegas, Macau, Singapore and Bethlehem, PA–going into the recent economic downturn and was hurt badly by that decision.  Conversely, although risky, it stands to be an outsized beneficiary of economic recovery, as it progressively gets its debt under better control.

Because of its geographical diversity, LVS can give good insight into global gaming trends.  That’s what I’m writing about today, based on the 2Q financials and the earnings conference call.

1.  The Singapore gaming business is off to a better start than expected.  The mass market is very strong, thanks in part to the efforts of LVS’s competitor in the market, Genting.  The highroller business is showing a greater geographical reach, and better credit experience, than LVS thought it would. The company is attracting gamblers from Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, as expected, but also from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and Korea.  It’s still early days for this market, but so far, so good.

2.   In Macau, LVS’s high roller business was good and its stores sold a lot.  The mass market segment lagged, though.  Despite its two main casinos posting operating income up 155% and 44% year on year, LVS seems to think it should be doing even better.  Recently, LVS fired its Macau chief executive, Steve Jacobs.  Commenting on this in the conference call, LVS CEO Sheldon Adelson said he would “opt for him to go to a direct competitor.”  The company also said the Macau “problem” was not in the layer of staff below Mr. Jacobs.  The Hong Kong market reaction to the Sands China earnings was muted.  Despite opening up about 4%, 1928 closed down HK$.04.

3.  Convention business is beginning to revive in Las Vegas.   Demand from groups for convention/meeting space is strong.  The biggest issue is that there’s so much overcapacity in Las Vegas that rates remain depressed.  (LVS, WYNN and MGM all launched major expansions just as the downturn was beginning.  The last of these, MGM’s mammoth City Center, only opened late last year.)

WYNN reports tonight.  We already know from offering documents for a proposed bond refinancing that WYNN’s results in Las Vegas were weaker in the second quarter of this year than last.  Hotel occupancies were up but rates were down.  It will be interesting to compare the Macau results of WYNN with those of LVS< however.