December 2010 Macau gambling results

The Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau announced December monthly and full-year 2010 revenue for the SAR’s casino industry on Monday.  The numbers are as follows:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept 15,302 10,943 39.8% 133,237 83,208 60.1%
Oct 18,869 12,600 49.8% 152,106 95,808 58.8%
Nov 17,354 12,215 42.1% 169,460 108,022 56.9%
Dec 18,883 11,347 66.4% 188,343 119,369 57.8%
Source:  Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau

The December figures represent an all-time high for revenues for the market.  They exceed the seasonal peak of October.  And they are much better than expected, especially so since the Chinese central bank is trying to cool down the mainland economy.

According to a local Macau magazine, Macau Business, a big beneficiary of the gaming surge has been Wynn Macau (1128), which it says has passed Sands China (1928) for second place in market share, with 17% of total market revenues. Presumably, the firm’s profits will benefit from substantial operating leverage.  Stanley Ho’s SJM (Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, 0880), the long-time incumbent, remains the market leader with a 30% share.

The magazine also maintains that MGM Macau has risen out of last place in the market, passing Galaxy Entertainment (0028) to do so.

This news appears to be the reason that the Hong Kong-listed market entrants have been strong this week, as well as their US-traded parents.

Two points to note:

–the quarter on quarter gain in market revenues from September to December is 16%.  For 1128, however, if it has gained one percent of market share for the quarter, its revenue stands to be up 24% quarter on quarter.  If it has gained two points, which I think is closer to being correct, the growth rate in revenues is 32%.  Even without factoring in operating leverage, which 1128 surely has, this means a blowout quarter.  If the Macau Business information is correct, the firm’s accountants will doubtless be hard at work devising ways to hold the earnings down–like increasing bad debt reserves.  But there’ll be no chance of 1128 not reporting a stunning number.

This is good for its parent, WYNN, as well–both because WYNN owns four-fifths of 1128 and it collects management fees based on 1128’s success.

–MGM is off my radar screen because of the company’s connection with the Ho family.  I did notice that both LVS and WYNN mentioned a not-yet-listed competitor (to my mind, clearly MGM Macau) that had begun to rent its casino space to junket operators in return for a very low fee.  Both LVS and WYNN speculated that this firm was trying to generate revenue growth in any way possible so that it could make an initial public offering.  And MGM has raised its market share from 7% to 11%, according to MB. There’s another possible explanation for MGM Macau’s behavior, though.  I only recently learned that, despite the fact that the government has not permitted casinos to add new tables for some time now, MGM has been unable to attract enough gamblers to use all the capacity it has permission for.  It may have feared that this unused capacity would be diverted to someone else if it weren’t put into operation.  Time will tell.


buying Sands China (1928:HK): why, troubles, developments…(lll)

background

The Macau has been very proactive–and very astute–in cultivating the gambling business in the SAR.  It has, for example:

–introduced sophisticated competitors like WYNN, to spur growth and innovation,

–regulated the pace of capacity expansion, to maintain a balance between supply and demand as well as to regulate the number of construction workers imported into the economy at any one time, and

–prevented destructive price competition initiated by weaker entrants, to maintain a minimum level of overall market profitability.

The main area of planned capacity expansion for the Macau casinos is Cotai, an area that, as I see it, is more or less landfill.  Development of new properties there has two steps:

–an informal one, which consists in preliminary government approval, followed by land remediation and preparation for new construction, and

–a formal one, the preparation of a detailed casino plan and receipt of final government approval.

the Sands China situation Continue reading

buying Sands China (1928:HK): why, trouble, and recent developments (ll)

As I mentioned in my last post, I think Fidelity has the best international operation for individuals in the US to buy foreign stocks. The commissions are very reasonable. The traders are generally knowledgeable. And the Fidelity software allows you to trade in real time in foreign markets—meaning at midnight Eastern time for Asia or 5am for Europe.

I also have a tendency to trade in relatively less-known names and have rarely had difficulties. When I moved my main foreign account to Fidelity, the firm wouldn’t accept my holding in 2432:JP, the Japanese social networking firm DeNa (pronounced D-N-A). The transfer people mixed this security up with the Dena Bank in India. I haven’t really kept up with developments in India, but at the time foreigners could only hold Indian securities if they were institutional investors who had registered with, and were approved by, the Indian government.  So it couldn’t be in a non-registered account.  It took quite a while to straighten that one out!

An (eminently skippable) aside on Schwab

I tried for a while to use Schwab for international trading, but had a very bad experience with them. I (stupidly) placed an order to buy a Hong Kong stock without checking on the commission I would pay. Instead of the $100-$200 I had expected, the bill came to around $2,000, or 4%-5% of the principal amount of the trade. Yikes! (To boot, the stock was one of the worst picks I’ve ever made.)

When I got no satisfaction from the Schwab trading department over the phone, I decided to test the “talk to Chuck” exhortation I’d seen in advertisements. I wrote a letter addressed to the personal attention of Mr. Schwab, detailing my complaint.

To be brutally honest, I had no case. I had left myself open to a $2,000 charge by not determining the commission rate in advance. On the other hand, this is not a great way to treat a customer.  The most straightforward interpretation of the bill was that Schwab didn’t particularly want my business, or at least this business.

Anyway, I got a call from a woman who said she’d look into the matter and get back to me. A month later, having heard nothing from her I wrote a second letter to Mr. Schwab, enclosing a copy of the first. I got a second call, from a different person. He said, somewhat indiscreetly :

–when we hung up, my first caller had marked my file “closed” and not done anything,

–he would explain to me how the commission and fees were calculated.  But he couldn’t get the numbers, commission + fees, to get as high as $2,000 (he said he’d get back, but it’s been over three years, so I don’t expect he will)

–people misunderstand what “talk to Chuck” means. It doesn’t mean anyone actually gets to communicate with Mr. Schwab himself–as taking the commercials literally would lead you to believe. Instead, it means that all Schwab employees are so imbued with the principles of their founder that talking with any of them is just like talking to Chuck himself. Given I deduced my two conversations with “Chuck,” that an axiom of the Schwab credo appeared to be to ignore my complaints, if not everyone else’s.  So I took most of my money away.

Back to Fidelity.

At about 10pm one recent night, I turned on my computer, logged onto the Fidelity site and placed an order to buy shares of 1928:hk. Whoops. Error message. The stock trades in lots of 400 and I had inadvertently entered an odd lot order.

Easy to fix. I added 200 shares to the order and hit enter again. (Incidentally, Fidelity allows you to settle the trade either in the local currency or US$ and lets you buy currency on the spot, if you need to.  Pretty neat.)

Error message again. This time Fidelity said this order had to be placed with a broker, because it had a Reg-SHO issue.

Strange. Reg-SHO has to do with short-selling and the uptick rule, so it didn’t apply to my trade.

I called the 800 number contained in the message.

Whoops. Fidelity’s international department is only open between 8:30 am and 4:30 pm, New York time.

I called again the next morning. The trader I talked with said I didn’t have a Reg-SHO problem. I had a Reg-S problem.

Hmm. My understanding of Reg-S is this.  It allows a company  incorporated in the US to issue new securities to foreigners without having to file a registration statement with the SEC. Such shares are electronically marked (in the old days, there’d be a warning written on the physical share certificate), and can’t be sold to Americans.  Well, 1928 is incorporated in the Cayman Islands (typical for Hong Kong stocks).  Its home market is Hong Kong.

The Fidelity trader politely said there was more to Reg-S than I understood, exactly what being open to question. But neither of us really knew for sure. He said he’d check with his third-party data source to see if the Reg-S warning was correct or not.

When I called back the following morning, another trader told me S&P and FT had both confirmed that 1128 is a Reg-S security.  Therefore, the company couldn’t accept the trade.

a “mature” reaction

For all their talk of rational fundamental analysis, most Wall Street people, myself included, are deeply superstitious. I think it comes from operating in an environment where so many factors are out of your control.

At any rate, at this point I realized that, for me, the trade was cursed and I shouldn’t do it.

Now, there is an unsponsored ADR for 1928. So you can buy it on the pink sheets. The bid-asked spread, which can often be as much as 10% on smaller stocks, was within a couple of percent the day I looked. But the ADR is, to my eye, very illiquid, meaning it might be tough to sell if you needed to.

Just out of curiosity, I phoned and emailed the LVS investor relations department to see if they could explain what was going on with 1928 and Reg-S. They had no idea what I was talking about.

What did I end up doing?

A secondary consideration in my thinking about 1928 was that the stock had sold off about 15% from its recent high. It had made up about half its losses while I was trying in vain to buy it, making it a bit less interesting. 1128 had also fallen by about the same amount and hadn’t rebounded. So I bought a little bit of that.  That didn’t help me with my too-many-eggs-in-one-basket problem  But I figured it would give me time to look at the 1928 ADR more carefully, to decide if I could put up with the liquidity risk.

My gut feeling, however, is what I said earlier—the trade is cursed and I’ll only lose money if I buy Sands China. You’ll be able to tell if I override my better judgment and buy the ADR. You’ll see the Hong Kong shares crater soon after.

Actually, as you may be able to tell, I wrote this on Wednesday December 1st.  Sands China was suspended from trading on December 2nd in Hong Kong, pending dissemination of information.  The news was that the firm’s application for approval to build on two sites in Cotai had been rejected by the government.  On Friday, the stock opened down about 5% but recovered throughout the day.

More on this development in my next post.

buying Sands China (1928:HK): why I wanted to, troubles I had, recent developments (l)

I’m going to cover this topic in three posts. Today I’m going to talk about why I wanted to buy Sands China. Tomorrow I’ll write about the troubles  I encountered in doing so—and what I ended up doing.  The final post will deal with the Macau government’s rejection of a Sands China expansion proposal.

the Macau (or Macao, as LVS spells it) gaming market

I’ve written about this market extensively elsewhere. You can find more details here and here. The executive summary:

Macau is a Special Administrative Region of China, like Hong Kong. That’s because, like Hong Kong, it was controlled by a foreign power—in this case, Portugal—and reverted top Chinese rule about the same time Hong Kong did.

Macau has been a gambling center for longer (since 1986) than I’ve been involved as an investor in Hong Kong. And because Macau is part of China, it has privileged access to gamblers from the mainland, a large, fast-growing market that has only partially been tapped.

The SAR government invited WYNN, and later LVS, into the market to bring it upscale and, in my opinion, to act as a counterweight to entrenched competitors reputed to be controlled by organized crime.

In other words, the Macau government wants WYNN and LVS to be successful.

the growth of China Continue reading

Singapore the biggest factor in LVS’ 3Q10 earnings blowout

the report

LVS reported 3Q10 earnings after the close yesterday.  Adjusted EBITDA was $645.2 million vs. $272.3 million in the year-ago quarter.  Revenue was $1.91 billion vs. $1.14 billion.  Diluted eps was $.34 vs. $.03 for the September quarter 2009 and a consensus estimate of $.27.

The stock rose about 11% in aftermarket trading.  WYNN went up in sympathy by 3.7% and MGM by 2%.  There was a significant positive reaction in Hong Kong as well, with 1928 up by about 9%, although 1128 barely budged.

the details

The EBITDA for the quarter breaks down by location as follows (all figures are in US$):

Macau     $307 million vs. $237.7 million in the September period of 2009

Singapore     $241.6 million vs not open

US     $74.4 million vs. $42.8 million.

the conference call

To my mind, the really stunning information came in the conference call.  Chairman Sheldon Adelson began by saying he had been wrong at the company’s annual meeting to say EBITDA for LVS could be $3 billion in 2011.  According to Mr. Sheldon, business in October is running “substantially in excess” of that figure.

In Singapore, where all the elements of the resort complex are not yet in place, October revenues have been running at $8.4 million per day, at a 50% EBITDA margin.  This works out to EBITDA of $130 million for this month alone.  True, October is a holiday month.  But LVS also said that business momentum has been steadily building, with each month in the September quarter better than the previous one.

In Macau, October will also turn out to be a record month.

Las Vegas is slowly improving.  Demand from groups is very strong but massive overcapacity in the city will keep hotel room rates from rising.  Bethlehem, PA will benefit from the introduction of table games and from the hotel LVS is building there.

impressions

I don’t know LVS well enough to have an investment opinion, although it does appear the company has decisively turned the corner.  The biggest investment issue is that at the June 10-Q, LVS had about $9.5 billion in liabilities on the balance sheet, even after netting out $3.5 billion in cash on hand.  LVS thinks that when it gets permission to sell apartments at its Four Seasons complex in Macau, they could go for up to $1.4 billion.  Mr. Adelson also believes that LVS will be able to sell its retail space in Singapore for enough to repay all its construction-related debt there.  These sales have the potential to transform LVS’s capital structure.  On the other hand, LVS now appears to be lobbying aggressively to expand into Japan and Korea.

Singapore has an open-ended feel to it.  It’s possible LVS is only scratching the surface of potential demand.

In Macau, Mr. Adelson thinks all the competitors, except for LVS and WYNN, are starting to revert to the traditional way of doing gambling business.  That is to say, they are beginning to in effect rent their casino space to junket operators for a small fee.  Thereby, they avoid the problems of extension and collection of credit.  On the other hand, they lose contact with the high roller customers.  Presumably they become less desirable venues and end up being considerably less profitable than WYNN and LVS.

LVS has “mixed feelings” about Las Vegas.  Overcapacity won’t go away soon.  Even if smaller operators go into bankruptcy, the hotels and casinos will be acquired by entrepreneurs who will reopen them.  Bethlehem has the problem of competition from nearby states that are sponsoring casino gambling as a way to address budget woes.

We’ll get more information on Las Vegas and Macau when WYNN reports next Tuesday.