So far the Trump administration has launched two countervailing economic thrusts:
Starting in 2018, the corporate tax rate was reduced from a highest-in-the-world 35% to a more nearly average 21%. The idea was to remove the incentive for highly taxed US-based multinationals, like pharmaceutical firms, to shift their businesses elsewhere. In the same legislation the ultra-wealthy received a very large reduction in their income taxes, as well as retention of the carried interest provision, a tax dodge by which private equity managers convert ordinary income into less highly taxed capital gains (this despite Mr. Trump’s campaign pledge to eliminate carried interest). Average Americans made out less well, receiving a modest reduction in rates coupled with loss of real estate-related writeoffs that skewed the benefits away from heavily Democratic states like California and New York.
Washington made little, if any, attempt to end special interest tax breaks to offset the lower corporate rates. The result in 2018 was a yoy increase in individual income tax collection of about $50 billion, more than offset by a drop in corporate tax payments of about $90 billion. Given the strong economy in 2018, the IRS would likely have taken in $150 – $175 billion more under the old rules than it did under the new.
What I find most surprising about the income tax legislation is that the large deficit-increasing fiscal stimulus it provides came at a time when none was needed–after almost a decade of continuous GDP growth in the US and the economy at very close to full employment.
—the tariff wars.
Right after his inauguration, Mr. Trump pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade group aiming to, among other things, fight China’s theft of intellectual property. However, exiting the TPP for a go-it-alone approach hurt US farmers, since it also meant higher (and escalating each year) tariffs on US agricultural exports to TPP members, notably Japan.
Next, Trump presented the tortured argument that: (1) that there could be no national security if the economy were not growing, (2) that, therefore, the presence of foreign competition to US firms in the domestic marketplace threatens national security, (3) that Congress has given the president power to act unilaterally to counter threats to national security, so (4) Trump had the authority to unilaterally impose tariffs on imports. So he did, in escalating tranches.
No mention of the fact that tariffs slow GDP growth, so under the first axiom of Trump logic are themselves a threat to national security.
Not a peep from Congress, either.
Recently, Mr. Trump has announced that he also has Congressional authority, based on a 1977 law authorizing sanctions against Iran, to order all US-based entities to cease doing business with China.
Results so far:
–the predictable slowdown in economic growth in the US
–retaliatory tariffs that have slowed growth further
–higher prices to consumers that have for all but the ultra-wealthy eaten up the extra income brought by the new tax law
–a sharp drop in spending on new capital projects in the US by both foreign and domestic firms
–tremendous pressure by Trump on the Federal Reserve (in a most un-Republican fashion (yes, I know Nixon did the same thing, but still…)) to “debase” the dollar.
A falling currency can temporarily give the appearance of faster growth. But it can also do serious, and permanent, damage to a country by reducing national wealth (Japan is a good example). Its only “virtue” as a policy measure is that it’s hard to trace cause and effect–politicians can deny they are mortgaging the country’s heritage to cover up earlier mistakes, even though that’s what they’re doing.
–an apparent shift in the goal of US trade negotiators away from structural reform in China to resuming purchases of US soybeans
–if there had been a plan to Trump’s actions, tariffs would have come first, the tax break later. The fact that the reverse happened argues there is no master strategy. Again no surprise, given Trump’s history–which people like us can see most clearly in his foray into Atlantic City gaming.
–what a mess!
A better way to combat China? The orthodox strategies are to strengthen the education system, increase scientific research spending and court foreign researchers to come to the US. Unfortunately, neither major domestic political party has much interest in education–Democrats refuse to fix broken schools in large urban areas and Republicans as a party are now against scientific inquiry. The white racism of the current Washington power structure narrows the attraction of the US in the eyes of many skilled foreigners. The ever-present, ever-shifting tariff threat–seemingly arbitrary levies on imported raw materials and possible retaliatory duties on exported final products–means it’s very risky to locate plant and equipment in the US.
For what it’s worth, I think that were the political situation in the US different there would be substantial Brexit-motivated relocation of multinationals from London to the east coast.
To my mind, all this implies having a focus on software companies, on low-multiple consumer firms that focus on domestic consumers with average or below-average incomes, and on companies whose main business is in Asia. Multinational manufacturers of physical things for whom the US and China are major markets are probably the least good place to be.