Shaping a Portfolio for 2011 (ll): stock market prospects

The #1 question

The most basic question for any individual investor to answer as he constructs an equity investment strategy for the new year is whether stocks are likely to go up or down over the twelve months.

My answer for 2011 is that stocks will be up, modestly. Ask me what “modestly” means and I would reply “around 10%,” based on the idea that the earnings growth for the S&P in 2011 will be of about that magnitude.  In rough terms, a quarter each of the earnings of the S&P 500 come from emerging markets and from Europe (including the UK). If we say that emerging markets profits will be up by 20% this year, the US by 8% and Europe by 4%, we get one percentage point of aggregate profit growth from Europe, five from emerging markets and four from the US.

The reality is, I think, that no one can forecast earnings even one year forward with great accuracy.  Perhaps a more persuasive justification for thinking that 2011 will be an average year for equities would be that the US economic growth appears to have begun to accelerate last September. Industrial production is rising, consumer confidence is improving, companies seem to be rehiring at a faster rate and, in consequence, consumer spending has a firmer tone. This implies to me that 2011will be a much better year economically than 2010 was.

In addition, I don’t think this better news is fully discounted in today’s stock prices. Earnings for the S&P 500 will likely come in at about $90 for 2010. A 10% earnings gain would imply eps for the index of around $100 for 2011. If so, that would mean the index is now trading on about 12.5x forward earnings. This is a modest multiple, considering the 30-year Treasury is yielding 4.5%. Historically, a 12.5x multiple would be more in keeping with an 8% long bond yield. Relative to bonds, their closest competitor among liquid investments, and even factoring in 150 basis points in increased interest rates, stocks look cheap.

easy money and caveats

Commentators are very fond of saying that “the easy money has already been made.” In hindsight that’s often an appropriate comment. But it ignores the considerable angst that an investor always faces when trying to predict future events, rather than analyze the past.

The reason this hackneyed phrase—one I dislike intensely–nevertheless comes to mind as I’m writing this is that the markets have begun to hoist two potential red flags about the current bull market. I don’t think they’re immediate concerns, but they weren’t evident at all a year ago.  They are:

time. On March 9, about two months from now, we’ll enter year three of rising stock prices. A typical inventory-driven market cycle consists of two and a half years of up and a year and a half of down. Under normal circumstances, then, this means that at the two year waypoint one should be at least considering becoming more defensive.

I think it’s too early to do so during this cycle, because the downturn wasn’t an inventory issue.  It wasn’t a minor one engineered by the money authority to take some excess steam out of a booming economy. Instead, it was a full-blown, train-wreck, shoot-yourself-in-the-foot financial disaster. As we can see from the two oil crises (1973-74 and 1981-82) and the internet meltdown (2000-2003), severe recessions take longer to recover from.  So the post-recession bull market should last more than two and a half years.

I think we have to put the end of the bull on our checklist of stuff to watch out for, in a way we didn’t need to last year. But I don’t think it’s a burning issue today. And I think it’s way too soon to assume a defensive portfolio posture.

the consensus of Wall Street pundits is now bullish, and more so than I am. This fact is a bit more troubling because buying high is so seductive and because you typically make money be betting against the consensus. Also, I’m a growth investor, so I find it particularly difficult to be bearish. Still, my reading of the market is that investors are still overly cautious. Two factors make me think this:

a. in the first half of an up cycle, value stocks tend to outperform. During the second half, that is, for well over a year in an inventory cycle, growth stocks do better. In this cycle, growth stocks as a group have only been outperforming for about four months.

b. as a bull market matures, the discounting mechanism changes. Investors go from paying attention only to bad news to incorporating good news into prices as well. That has clearly already happened.  But as time passes without new disasters striking, investors go from discounting good news as it’s being announced to anticipating future positive developments.  At the top, market participants aretypically discounting at least a year, and often more, in advance. I don’t think we’re at all close to doing that now.

The #2 question

The second question an investor, even in the US, should ask himself is whether economic strength will be greater in the home country or abroad. To the extent that you invest in foreign stocks, you should pose this question for each country where you’re going to buy a listed stock.

This doesn’t mean you should necessarily avoid countries where there’s poor economic growth.  I think, that you should have a preference for stocks whose revenues come from fast-growing areas and be skeptical of those main businesses are situated in slumping regions.  So the answer to this question tells you whether to concentrate your efforts on studying domestic or foreign-oriented companies.

My thumbnail sketch for 2011:

US:  better growth abroad, but not by as great a margin as last year

Europe:  weakest region in the world. Much better growth abroad

Emerging markets (investable ones): better growth internally, but not by as great a margin as 2010

Japan:  hopeless. As for the past twenty years, much better growth abroad

That’s it for today.  Next post:  what can go really right/wrong.

Shaping a Portfolio for 2011 (l): a macro view

I’m envisioning writing four posts on how I’m shaping my portfolio for 2011.  They are:  a macro view; what’s discounted in today’s markets; what I think about different sectors + overall trends; and, finally, my conclusions.  I can’t guarantee that I won’t deviate somewhat from this plan as I go along, since I tend to use the act of writing stuff down as a way of refining my thoughts.

Today is the macroeconomic view, or at least as much of it as I think an equity investor needs to know.  Actually, better make that as much of it as I’m aware of.

The most basic fact, I think, is that the world is in recovery.  That is to say, global economies are generally starting to grow again in a healthier way than they have been over the past four years or so.  I don’t mean that the world is healthy yet, just that it is in the process of repairing itself.  “Repair” means substantially different things in different parts of the world.

the US

The epicenter of the problem.  In early 2007, what proved to be a massive speculative real estate bubble began to unwind.  Two consequences:

1.  At the depths of the ensuing crisis, the entire world banking system froze up, as financial institutions stopped lending to anyone, even overnight, for fear the counterparty was insolvent and wouldn’t repay.  This problem, which caused the world economy to lurch to a halt, has long since been fixed.

There has been one lasting effect, however.  Industry responded with a rapid contraction of production, including deep layoffs.   Companies have learned that they could operate with far fewer employees than they had imagined.  Therefore, they have been slow to rehire.

2.  Crazy bank lending meant that when the bubble burst and house prices began to decline:

–Lots of people ended up with houses whose value was less than the mortgage and with too much credit card debt

–The country ended up with, to pluck a number out of the air, 10% more houses than anyone wanted/could afford.  The same for commercial–especially retail-oriented–real estate.

This is an enduring issue that is affecting the speed and scope of economic recovery, in the following ways:

a.  Unlike food or out-of-fashion clothing, excess houses and strip malls don’t wear out and can’t be moved.  So until the excess inventories are used up, there won’t be much new construction.

b.  People, especially soon-to-retire Baby Boomers, are trying to get their debt under control and will consume less.  Demand for luxury goods is already back above its pre-crisis peak.  But less buoyant middle- and low-end consumption will be with use for some time to come, I think.

c.  The housing bubble retarded for almost a decade the adjustment of US workers in labor-intensive jobs to the fact of competition from China, India or other low labor-cost countries.  This is likely to be a chronic social problem, and a reason why the unemployment rate won’t improve very quickly.

The federal government response to the crisis has been to flood the country with liquidity by stimulus spending and reducing short-term interest rates to effectively zero.  The idea has been to, as it were, take extraordinary measures to restore a sick person to health, even if doing so may create problems in the future.

From September 2010 onward, signs are that this strategy is beginning to work.  Hiring is happening at a faster rate.  Consumer confidence is rising.  The rate of economic growth is picking up.

My guess is that this trend will continue, and modestly accelerate, through 2011.  I think the recovery will continue to have a 90/10 aspect to it, however.  For the 90% of the workforce who are employed, life is returning to normal.  For the other 10%, however, it seems to me that their situation hasn’t changed for the better so far.

The net of all this is that I think 2011 will be at least as good economically as the consensus expects.  I expect that the aggregate numbers, by ignoring the 90/10 split, will underestimate the strength of high-end consumption and be too optimistic about ordinary Americans.

Two other points:

1.  Not all the liquidity flood has remained in the US.  A lot has flowed through currency pegs maintained by developing countries into the emerging world.

2.  I think there’s still one more economic shoe to drop in the US–state and local budget deficits.  My general picture is that during the boom times, governments of every stripe spent every penny that came in.  Now they are facing retrenchment.  This will mean layoffs of government workers, rather than tax increases.

At the same time, a potential crisis is brewing over the generous medical and pension benefits retired government workers typically have.  Part of this may be envy, part may be partisan politics, part may be dismay that the full cost of government workers has been hidden from the voters–but no matter what the cause, this could become a big issue later in the year.  To what effect?–renegotiation of benefits would result in less spending by government employees.

Europe

The UK is like the US, writ somewhat smaller and with one exception, noted below.  Also, most of the toxic transactions made by US financial institutions flowed through London, even though they may have involved US assets and US parties.  Why?  –UK policy was “regulation lite,” in return for which it got lots of tax revenue.

True, the sub-prime mortgage crisis may have originated in the US, but the ultimate “dumb money” in the banking world is state-controlled banks in continental Europe.  And,sure enough, they have ended up holding tons of dubious debt securities and derivatives.

But that isn’t the only economic problem the EU has.  It’s an association of countries that has agreed to maintain a common money policy, but whose members have had very different growth rates–a slow-growing core (Germany and France) and a fast-growing periphery (most of the rest).  A money regimen that’s appropriate for the center has proved to be as overstimulative for Ireland, Spain and Portugal as anyone imagined–and then some.  All that “extra” money sloshing round in the peripheral countries has not been soaked up by the countries in question through restrictive fiscal policy–as it should have been–but allowed to flow into speculative real estate deals.

What’s worse, Greece has been falsifying its national accounts for years.  And Irish banks somehow passed the European stress tests despite being thoroughly bankrupt.

The EU response to the banking crisis has been waffling.  It knows what has to be done–closer fiscal integration–but can’t bring itself to pull the trigger.

Unlike the US, the EU and UK response to government deficits has been austerity.  That is, higher value-added taxes and severe government budget cuts.  The idea has been to fix the problem no matter what the cost in near-term economic progress or pain to the EU citizen.

Not a place to look for domestic growth in during 2011.

BRICs

International investors have traditionally described emerging economies as acting like options on developed world economic growth, meaning that they move in the same direction as the developing world but with higher highs and lower lows.

That hasn’t been the case this time around.  The financial crisis has been almost completely a developed markets problem, leaving emerging economies relatively untouched.  To the degree that they provide raw materials or industrial/consumer products to each other or to the rest of the world, they have prospered.  And by the World Bank’s purchasing power parity measure, emerging economies in the aggregate product almost half the world’s output–scarcely an option any more.

To the extent that they peg their currencies to the US dollar, emerging economies are in somewhat the same position relative to the US as the peripheral countries in Europe have been to the core.  That is, hugely accommodative money policy in the US is communicated to the local economies, where it’s exactly the wrong thing, though the peg.  In addition, developed world investors have been shifting immense amounts of portfolio capital to the developing world as they search for better returns.  This increases the money stimulus.

The big question for many emerging countries is how to cool themselves down.

Australia/Canada

These commodity-producing countries have by and large escaped the financial crisis.

Japan

In the early Nineties, Japan decided that it would forgo economic progress if that were the price it had to pay to preserve its traditional way of life.  To a Westerner, that continues to be a horrible bargain.  An obsolete industrial base, an aged population and no economic growth in sight.  I haven’t looked for statistics, but I’d be willing to bet Japan is experiencing a huge brain drain as skilled young people move elsewhere.

December 2010 Macau gambling results

The Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau announced December monthly and full-year 2010 revenue for the SAR’s casino industry on Monday.  The numbers are as follows:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept 15,302 10,943 39.8% 133,237 83,208 60.1%
Oct 18,869 12,600 49.8% 152,106 95,808 58.8%
Nov 17,354 12,215 42.1% 169,460 108,022 56.9%
Dec 18,883 11,347 66.4% 188,343 119,369 57.8%
Source:  Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau

The December figures represent an all-time high for revenues for the market.  They exceed the seasonal peak of October.  And they are much better than expected, especially so since the Chinese central bank is trying to cool down the mainland economy.

According to a local Macau magazine, Macau Business, a big beneficiary of the gaming surge has been Wynn Macau (1128), which it says has passed Sands China (1928) for second place in market share, with 17% of total market revenues. Presumably, the firm’s profits will benefit from substantial operating leverage.  Stanley Ho’s SJM (Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, 0880), the long-time incumbent, remains the market leader with a 30% share.

The magazine also maintains that MGM Macau has risen out of last place in the market, passing Galaxy Entertainment (0028) to do so.

This news appears to be the reason that the Hong Kong-listed market entrants have been strong this week, as well as their US-traded parents.

Two points to note:

–the quarter on quarter gain in market revenues from September to December is 16%.  For 1128, however, if it has gained one percent of market share for the quarter, its revenue stands to be up 24% quarter on quarter.  If it has gained two points, which I think is closer to being correct, the growth rate in revenues is 32%.  Even without factoring in operating leverage, which 1128 surely has, this means a blowout quarter.  If the Macau Business information is correct, the firm’s accountants will doubtless be hard at work devising ways to hold the earnings down–like increasing bad debt reserves.  But there’ll be no chance of 1128 not reporting a stunning number.

This is good for its parent, WYNN, as well–both because WYNN owns four-fifths of 1128 and it collects management fees based on 1128’s success.

–MGM is off my radar screen because of the company’s connection with the Ho family.  I did notice that both LVS and WYNN mentioned a not-yet-listed competitor (to my mind, clearly MGM Macau) that had begun to rent its casino space to junket operators in return for a very low fee.  Both LVS and WYNN speculated that this firm was trying to generate revenue growth in any way possible so that it could make an initial public offering.  And MGM has raised its market share from 7% to 11%, according to MB. There’s another possible explanation for MGM Macau’s behavior, though.  I only recently learned that, despite the fact that the government has not permitted casinos to add new tables for some time now, MGM has been unable to attract enough gamblers to use all the capacity it has permission for.  It may have feared that this unused capacity would be diverted to someone else if it weren’t put into operation.  Time will tell.


covered bonds and EU sovereign debt

Happy New Year

I first started looking at Europe as an equity investor in 1986.  What struck me most forcefully was the Babel of languages, customs, laws and investing habits, all packed into tiny little countries with only a couple of stocks each that you might want to buy.  Translation:  a huge learning curve, with not much investment payoff at the end of the day.

I decided that instead of following the top-down, country-by-country investment process practiced by my London-based peers, I’d ignore the local politics, pretend that Europe was one big place and just pick stocks.  I was running a global portfolio for the first time.  I planned to make my money in US and Pacific stocks and hoped not to damage myself too badly in Europe.  As my funds under management got larger, I hired someone with a much better cultural and language background to concentrate on European stocks.

As it turned out, my performance in Europe was, more or less by accident, extremely strong.  And a sectoral approach, rather than the traditional macro-oriented country selection method, had become the conventional wisdom within a decade.

One negative consequence of what I did in the Eighties is that there are holes big enough to drive a truck through in my political-legal knowledge of European terrain.

One of them concerns covered bonds in the EU.

Covered bonds are collateralized, that is, specified assets are set aside to ensure that the borrower pays back interest and principal on the bond.  Collateral for covered bonds is specified by law is each country where they are issued, and usually consists of mortgages or mortgage-backed securities, or project loans to governments.

The idea of a collateralized bond is that in the case of default, the bondholders become owners of the set-aside assets.  What’s unusual about EU covered bonds is what happens in the case of the issuer’s bankruptcy.  Covered bonds are “ring fenced,” as Europeans like to say, meaning that the collateral belongs exclusively to the covered bondholders and no other claimants.

Under normal circumstances, this protection wouldn’t mean much.  But the EU is proposing that, starting in 2013, the union will no longer guarantee the safety of its members’ government bonds. If the issuing country is subsequently unable to pay its debts, a restructuring may follow.   As part of the process, post-2012 government bonds of that country may have their principal, maturity or coupon altered in a way that reduces the bond’s value.

It may well be that this proposal s not the final word on the matter and that existing government bonds of places like Greece will also be subject to a loss of value if/when a restructuring occurs.

The odd result of this situation is that bond investors should and do clearly prefer the covered bonds of European banks that are stuffed to the gills with sovereign debt of Greece, Portugal, Ireland et. al. plus an unknown quantity of dubious private debt, over the government obligations of member states.