AAPL’s eye-popping 3Q11

the results

AAPL reported earnings for its fiscal 3Q11 (the company’s fiscal year ends in September) after the close of trading in New York yesterday.  Sales came in at an all-time high for the company at $28.6 billion.  That’s up 82% over 3Q10.  Net income of $7.3 billion ($7.79 a share) was another company record and represents 125% more than in the comparable period of last year.  Analysts had been expecting eps of $5.85.

the details

All the company’s product categories showed interesting deviations from what one might have expected:

iPad  …the biggest positive surprise.  iPad was over 20% of AAPL’s revenue in the quarter, in which the company sold 9,246,000 of them.  Sales were up 97% quarter on quarter in units and 113% in revenue.  Year on year, units were up 183% and revenue 179%.  The iPad continues to be capacity constrained, meaning AAPL is selling them as fast as it can make them and still can’t satisfy demand.  With manufacturing capacity added in early July, the company appears to be close to supply-demand balance, however.  My hunch is that there’ll be a strong seasonal uptick in the December quarter as consumers buy holiday gifts.  If so, we may see shortages again in a few months.

iPhone  …another big number.  The company sold 20,338,000 in the June period.  That’s up 9% in units and 8% in revenues qoq, and +183% in units, 179% in revenue, yoy.  A continuing surge in smartphone sales, combined with the fall from grace of both NOK and RIMM, are the main reasons.

Mac   Overall sales were up 5% in units qoq and 14% yoy.  Portables, however, were up only 1% qoq and 13% yoy.  One reason is the strength in the prior-year quarter, which saw a new MacBook Pro introduced.  Another, however, is that some customers are buying iPads instead of Macs.

iPod  …sales dropped sharply.  This shows how far APPL has evolved in the past half decade.  The product that sparked AAPL’s revival and effectively doubled the size of the company now represents less than 5% of current total revenue.  Management said the 7,535,000 units AAPL sold in the quarter exceed its expectations.  But qoq units were down 16% and revenue down 17%;  year on year, units were down 20% and revenue minus 14%.

what caught my eye/ear

1.  The company conference call seemed to me to be almost devoid of content.  Maybe it’s always been this way and the fact just hasn’t struck me so forcefully.

2.  Analysts did ask two interesting questions, both of which the company evaded.

–The first concerned the relative strength of Android-based phones, which appear to be growing faster than iPhones.

–The second was about whether the iPad is cannibalizing Mac sales to a greater degree than it’s cannibalizing Windows-based machine sales.

The non-answers suggest two things to me.  First, the ability of Android phones to cover a wide spectrum of price points, vs. AAPL only at the high end, is a bigger competitive issue for AAPL than the consensus thinks.  Second, while it’s always better to cannibalize your own sales than to allow a competitor to do so, it sounds like more potential Mac buyers than AAPL expected (maybe MacBook Air buyers) are “trading down” to an iPad instead.

3.  Look at the difference between analysts’ estimates and AAPL’s actual reported eps for fiscal 2011 to date.

1Q:   $5.40 estimate, $6.43 actual

2Q:  $5.37 estimate, $6.40 actual

3Q:  $5.85 estimate, $7.79 actual

Actuals were 19%, 19% and 33% above what analysts had projected.

Two points:  analysts have been pretty awful–and unusually so–at projecting AAPL’s earnings this year.  Also, despite the big positive earnings surprises, huge earnings growth, and a price earnings multiple in the mid-teens, AAPL has been no better than a market performer in 2011, until a couple of weeks ago (more about this phenomenon in a day or two).

the stock

The numbers continue to be stellar and the PE is low, so I think AAPL will continue to be at least a mild market outperformer.  For the first time in many years, however, I don’t feel that I can pencil in an aggressive earnings growth number for the upcoming fiscal year and be confident the actuals will be at least what I’ve estimated…and probably substantially more.  In fact, if you told me you thought AAPL’s eps would only be up by 15% in fiscal 2012, I’d have to do a bunch of spreadsheet work before I could express an opinion.  (Note, too, that AAPL is making a minor accounting change that will depress near-term results slightly.)

That shouldn’t be so surprising, since the stock (I haven’t owned it for some time) is up 30x since I first bought it, and is now one of the largest-cap stocks on Wall Street.  Could this maturing of AAPL’s business be what Wall Street has been discounting for a while now?  In conceptual terms, probably.  Myself, I think the inflection point for growth is a new thing–but it’s possible I’ve just been behind the curve.

2Q11 for Wynn Resorts (WYNN) and Wynn Macau (HK: 1128): better than I’d expected

WYNN reported results for 2Q11 after the close yesterday.  Revenue came in at $1367.4 million for the three months ending in June, up 32.4% over the comparable period in 2010.  Sales were up 36.7% in Macau and 22.8% in Las Vegas.

EBITDA for WYNN was $447.0 million, a 58.9% gain over the prior year.  In early July, Las Vegas operations exceeded its results for full-year 2010.

Earnings per share for the quarter were $.97.  Adjusted for a charitable contribution to the University of Macau (charged against current earnings, but payable in installments through 2022), the figure was $1.60, substantially higher than analysts’ estimates of a shade below $1.10.

If we were to guess that WYNN will earn $6 this year, the stock is trading at 27.5x current earnings;  if we pluck HK$1.50 a share out of the air for 1128, that stock, which went down overnight in Hong Kong on the results, is trading at 17.5x.

what caught my eye

Obviously, WYNN is doing extremely well operationally, both in Las Vegas and in Macau.  Both WYNN, up 59% year to date through yesterday, and 1128, up 54% through Hong Kong trading today, have made huge gains for shareholders.  But neither looks outrageously priced, given its growth prospects.  More on the stocks below.

Here’s what jumped out at me about the quarter.

Las Vegas

WYNN had a stellar March quarter.  What made it unusually profitable was extraordinary good luck at table games, where the house “held” over 30% of the amount bet.  This compares with WYNN’s historical experience of retaining 21%-24%.  I figured that a return to normal could easily clip $20 million off 2Q11 operating profit, and possibly a lot more–and that the market hadn’t noticed this possibility.

The actual quarter on quarter fall was about $40 million.  Nevertheless, Las Vegas EBITDA was just better than flat.  Why?  Non-casino profits are beginning to pick up very noticeably.

Two factors are at work:

–Domestic business is strengthening.  Lots of guests are booking at the last minute–and therefore paying higher prices for their rooms. 

–Wynn Macau has raised the parent company’s profile in Asia.  When Chinese visitors come to Las Vegas, they’re increasingly staying, and gambling, at the Wynn properties.  At $240 a night, on average, a Wynn room in Las Vegas is a bargain compared with the $314 it’s charging in Macau.  Also, it’s possible that the presence of more Asian gamblers is changing Wynn’s table game hold percentages in a favorable way.

As far as future bookings are concerned, Wynn’s second half will be surprisingly strong.

Macau

Two observations:

1.  The June quarter for Wynn Macau was extremely strong, at around HK$.45 a share (which annualizes to HK$1.80).  The timing of the charitable contribution to Macau University makes this less obvious, and sets the stage for large positive earnings comparisons next year, almost no matter what the economic circumstances.

2.  Quarter on quarter, the Macau market grew by about 12%.  So, too, did 1128’s results, despite the fact that the opening of new casino space by rivals means that 1128 represents a smaller percentage of the market.  This is the Wynn formula for success:  do, say, 14% of the business in a market while owning 10% of the plant and equipment.

The Hong Kong market doesn’t “get” this yet.  Investors there are concentrating on plant additions as the key to success–unaware that a casino can “add” capacity by raising table limits.

the stocks

I think both are still attractive.  Personally, given that my positions in both are large and acquired at much lower cost, I find it psychologically hard to get really excited about either.  But the numbers say I should be.

WYNN or 1128?  WYNN’s market capitalization is slightly over $20 billion.  Its interest in 1128 represents $13 billion, or about two thirds of the total.  That leaves $7 billion for the US properties, which have a large amount of operating leverage but aren’t running much north of net profit breakeven.  I suspect some US investors buy WYNN simply because they find it too hard to buy 1128 directly (if so, they should look at Fidelity’s international trading service).  In addition, there’s some risk in holding stocks in a Hong Kong market whose attitudes toward gambling stocks and whose general rules of operation you may not be familiar with (see my post).

I consider myself an aggressive investor.  About two-thirds of what I own is WYNN, one-third 1128.  This means that I have a roughly 50/50 split between the US and Macau.

what’s wrong with a balanced budget amendment?

a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution proposed

Over the weekend, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, aware of the possible threat from the Tea Party to his reelection, proposed that the US should “solve” its budget deficit woes by passing a constitutional amendment ordering Congress to maintain a balanced Federal budget.

The idea has some initially plausibility.  After all, politicians of all stripes think they get reelected by delivering benefits to potential voters.  The bigger the largesse, the more certain the election victory.  How to pay for them is only a secondary consideration.  So there’s a natural tendency for Washington to provide benefits to constituents before/without figuring out how to fund them.  A balanced budget amendment is supposed to close the door on this tactic by forcing Congress to find the money to pay for new programs before enacting them.

Optimistic supporters of the idea also argue it will end waste and corruption in Washington, since there would be less potential for loose money to be floating around.  The idea of a balanced budget also appeals to a kind of reverse NIMBY feeling–the idea that others are somehow getting a bigger slice of the Washington pie and that a better accounting for expenditures would put an end to that.

The basic positives of the balanced budget idea are supposed to be:

–no more chronic deficits threatening the nation’s financial health, and

–politicians could blame higher taxes/lower benefits on the requirements of the new constitutional amendment, so they’d be more likely to enact them.

one fly in the ointment

Modern economics came into being after, and because of, the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Much of economists’ efforts since have been devoted to understanding what went wrong back then, and in devising was of preventing the Depression from ever happening again.

Perhaps the most basic lesson learned is that contractionary fiscal or monetary policy in an economic downturn just makes things worse.  This bad policy comes in two flavors:

–voluntary contraction, when, as they did in the Thirties, governments raise interest rates as a way of nursing an economy back to health.  This is sort of like the old medical practice of bloodletting that was supposed to cure you by freeing the body of bad humors.

–involuntary contraction.  When economic activity slows, so too does the flow of tax revenue to governments.  In fact, because income taxes are typically progresssive (meaning that added amounts of income are taxed at rising rates), in this situation government revenue falls faster than income does.  If government wants to spend no more than it takes in during a given year, the falloff in tax revenue means it has to lower transfer payments and lay government workers off.  That makes the downturn worse, not better.

the orthodox solution

Based on the terrible experience of the Depression (for example, 25%+ unemployment), economists began to realize that the better course of action is countercyclical government policy–that is, lowering interest rates and increasing net government spending, despite the decreased flow of revenues.  Doing so makes the downturn shorter and shallower.

In an ideal world, a government would also generate a surplus in boom times with which to fund the extra outlays during recession.

another one

For the idea of countercyclical policy to work, government must have enough resolve and foresight to “take away the punchbowl,” that is, to remove the extra stimulus, once the economy is expanding again.  That’s harder to do than it seems.  The George W. Bush administration, for example, started off with a government surplus but increased spending enough to turn that into a big deficit in less than a decade.  In hindsight, the career of the “Maestro,” Alan Greenspan, as head of the Federal Reserve can also be seen as a long series of failures to restore the status quo ante after crises.

the lesser of two evils?

It seems to me that the (unmade, but) most persuasive argument in favor of a balanced budget amendment is that–unlike the cases of Germany or the ECB–in the hands of Washington, countercyclical policy has become just another boondoggle.  Yes, the policy is sound, but Washington just can’t be trusted to implement it.

what about external shocks?

In my career, there have been three:  the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-80, and the financial collapse of 2007.  One might add the stock market collapse of 1987 to the group, although it would have been the runt of the litter.  Both 1973-74 and 2007 have invited comparison with the early days of the Great Depression.

These downturns were so unusual and so severe that simply deciding to wait them out would have been a very poor option.  In 2007, which should be the freshest in memory, global commerce was frozen, brought to a halt by worries about bank solvency.  Money market funds, which supply short-term finance for industry, were on the verge of collapse.  Citigroup, among other banks, were about to become bankrupt.  Businesses were beginning layoffs on a truly massive scale.  A replay of the 1930s was staring the world in the face.

Luckily, the world understood the appropriate response and implemented it (in the two most important countries, China and the US, at least)–although the US stock market dropped by 7% when Republicans (inexplicably) refused to vote in favor of countercyclical stimulus–making matters that much more urgent.

like the gold standard

Advocates of a literal gold standard seem to me not to know what that means–or to be unaware of the example of the California gold rush that produced massive, destabilizing inflation in the US.  That’s why the gold standard is a rallying cry for monetary regimes which, when you examine the details, are anything but.  (See my posts on gold and the Gold Standard.)

I view calls for a Federal balanced budget amendment in a similar vein.  They’re rallying cries for fiscal programs that have got to have safety valves to address unusual situations–and therefore aren’t really mandating true budget balancing.

I think most Americans think the real solution to Washington’s dysfunction is systematic reform.  That’s what the country thought it was getting with Mr. Obama.

Fidelity China Special Situations PLC–what’s the fuss about?

China Special Situations

Some time ago, Fidelity International announced that the all-star former manager of its UK-based Special Situations Fund, Anthony Bolton, would be moving to Hong Kong and starting up a closed-end China Special Situations fund (FCSS: LN), to be listed on the London Stock Exchange.  It debuted in April 2010.

the “China setback”

The other day, the Financial Times carried an article talking about the fund’s “China setback.”  In an interview with the paper, Bolton disclosed that his fund had lost money on two US-listed Chinese companies accused of fraud, as well as on put options he had bought on the main Korean stock index.

According to Morningstar (the documents I refer to in this paragraph are available on the Fidelity International website), FCSS has lost 12.22%, year to date.  This compares unfavorably with a decline of 3.08% by its benchmark MCSI China index over the same period. 

On a one-year basis, the fund is up 2.8% vs. an index gain of 3.26%.  That’s a lot better.  Nevertheless, the  FCSS figures contrast sharply with Fidelity’s own China Region fund (FXKCX), which is presumably supported by the same research staff, and which is up 18.34% over the past year.

Before the launch of the China Special Situations fund, much was made of Mr. Bolton’s lack of experience with China-related investing (although the prospectus for FCSS states he has been investing in China stocks since 2004).  I don’t think this in itself is an important issue.  (To be clear, I don’t know Mr. Bolton personally and have no knowledge of the details of his investing success in the UK.)  However, even in a world where every national stock market has its own quirks, the UK has always struck me as a particularly idiosyncratic one.  So there is a question in my mind how well experience in the UK travels.

My take:

–The UK market is very value- and dividend-oriented.

–It doesn’t appreciate technology.

–Rules of conduct for investors and listed firms are strict and well-enforced; to my knowledge there’s nothing like Denver or Perth there.

–Much in the way old zaibatsu relationships still count for something in Japan–the relationship between investment banker and company still has an effect on the quality of information the market receives.

–Understanding who’s who and getting tapped into the best analysis, which to some extent depends on local social relationships, creates a big advantage but requires a lot of time and effort.

China, in contrast, strikes me as much more a no-holds-barred, Wild West kind of market.  It has a strong growth stock orientation, which makes sense given the rapid expansion of the domestic Chinese economy and the preferences of Hong Kong-based investors, who are the stock market model for the mainland.

looking at the FCSS portfolio

First, there isn’t enough current detail available about FCSS’s holdings to say a lot for certain.  Nevertheless:

–To me, the most striking observation is the more than 15 percentage point advantage that Fidelity-managed FXKCX has had over FCSS during the past 12 months, even though both presumably have the same research information.

–FCSS had 15.7% of its portfolio in US-listed China stocks.  That’s a big bet, and one that apparently hasn’t worked out.  It’s also a very unusual one, in my experience.  Why?

What motivates a company to list in a foreign market and take on the associated regulatory burden?  Invariably, it’s because the company can get a higher price for its shares abroad than at home.  Usually, this is because the company is maturing and local-market investors have turned cool toward the shares, or because there’s some flaw in the company’s operating model (like that it’s a securities fraud) that locals would much more easily detect than foreigners.

–Although FCSS is heavily skewed toward small companies, the top ten holdings, which make up a third of the portfolio, don’t have much of a special situations look to them (see my post on special situations).  They’re mostly large-cap financials like HSBC, Bank of China or Ping An Insurance; or other giants, like China Unicom, the big telecoms company.

–Usually when investors talk about China or “greater China,” they mean the mainland, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  South Korea doesn’t enter into the discussion.  What was Mr. Bolton doing in speculating about short-term movements in the Seoul market?

–Year to date, FCSS has lost about 12 percentage points to its benchmark index.  According to the FT, the fund held 30 US-listed Chinese companies, representing 15%+ of the portfolio.  Of them, six were so-called “reverse merger” companies–ones where all the trouble has been.  FCSS sold “several” of these, including the two accused of fraud.

On average, the weighting in each of these stocks would be about 50 basis points (.5%).  Selling five at a loss of 100%, which is doubtless far worse than what actually happened, would mean a performance loss of 2.5%.  That doesn’t go very far in explaining the year to date underperformance.

–For that matter, the Kospi is up about 3% year to date.  So the existence of the curious Kospi puts don’t explain much either.

my thoughts

Even the most successful portfolio manager has times when he underperforms.  That’s just a fact of life.  It’s also possible that the FT reporter didn’t understand what Mr. Bolton was telling him in their interview.

What’s perplexing in this case, though, is that the extent of the underperformance is large and the reported explanation doesn’t seem to really address it.  I think there has to be a lot more to the story.

What is a “special situation” stock?

special situations

I was reading in the Financial Times earlier today that the China Special Situations fund has not been doing particularly well lately and decided I’d write about it.  The closed-end offering, Fidelity sponsors, is traded on the London Stock Exchange and run by Anthony Bolton, a portfolio manager who made his reputation through his long tenure with Fidelity’s UK-oriented special situations fund.

Before I do, I realized I should write something about what a “special situation” is and how it differs from a run-of-the-mill growth or value stock.

what they are

To my mind, a special situation stock is one that:

–offers the possibility of very high absolute returns, where

–returns will be based on factors that are specific to one firm or a small group of firms, and

–where understanding the relevant factors requires a lot of specific company knowledge (and not just awareness of general industry or macroeconomic developments, or of the general information contained in the financial statements).

Many times a special situation stock is relatively small and has few analysts following it.  Sometimes, returns are dependent on the occurrence of specific events.

risks

Generally, special situations have a lot of stock-specific risk.  The event may not happen.  The detailed securities analysis may be incomplete or wrong.  New competition may appear from out of the blue.

Examples:

–a company may have privileged access to an essential raw material that is about to come into shortage.  Rare earths might be a current instance.

–a firm may own key intellectual property, like patents or copyrights.  At one time, the Japanese company Pioneer was one of two companies that held basic patents for CD players.  For many years, royalties from this patent (now expired) exceeded 100% of the company’s net income.  In another country, that fact would have invited takeover or management-led restructuring.

–a company may have two divisions, one that makes money and one that has losses.  By allowing investors to see the performance of each separately, with, say, growth investors bidding up one part and value investors the other, breaking the company apart may unlock value.

–a firm may be a likely takeover target, at a stock price that would be a large premium to the prevailing level. 

–Merger and acquisition investing involving companies already being bid for–on the idea that the final bid price will be significantly higher than the market now realizes–is a narrower form of this.

–a company may have significant off-balance sheet assets, such as big potential/realized tax losses, or unproved mineral reserves, whose value isn’t well-understood.

–a company may be developing a revolutionary new product that’s big enough to make a dramatic difference to company profits, as Apple was with the iPod or the iPhone a half-decade ago, or Monsanto was with genetically modified seeds at around the same time.

what they aren’t

–well-known

–dependent on general macroeconomic forces

–easy to figure out.

That’s it for today.  China Special Situations on Sunday.