breaking companies apart

corporate activism/raiding

Lots of activist hedge funds–or corporate raiders, as they used to be called–have been taking small stakes in publicly traded companies and then beating the drum for management either to articulate, or to change, corporate strategy.

Why do this?

…to make money for themselves and their backers, of course.  Also, the targets they’re attacking nowadays are very big.  So the prior tactic of taking control of the company through a takeover and forcing change isn’t possible.

How will change create value?

There are two main ways:

–a company may consist of several parts that have virtually no connection with each other.  A firm might, say, own office buildings and an airline, or make medical devices and lease airplanes.

Many times, these are family controlled firms that following the whims of the patriarch/matriarch.  They can also be small divisions whose growth had skyrocketed (think:  ESPN in Disney).  Or the firms might be holdovers from the 1960s, when, unlike today, the world believed there “pure” management skills could be applied to any field–and that, therefore, the best corporate form was the conglomerate.

People don’t think that way anymore.  We believe that the best companies are ones run by top management deeply skilled in one particular area.  Also, today’s professional stock market investors want to create a portfolio of stocks themselves.  They don’t like or want a corporate management that will create a portfolio of subsidiaries and offer it as a take-it-or-leave-it package.  The result:  a heavy discount applied in today’s world to conglomerates.

Put in a different way–n theory, and in practice, there are investors with differing investment styles and different investment objectives who will pay a higher price for some of the corporate components, provided they don’t also have to take the ones they don’t particularly want.  So breaking the package up creates value.

In the case of the airline/office building company I mentioned above (Swire Pacific of Hong Kong), announcement of plans for a separate listing for Cathay Pacific shot the stock price up by 40%.

–Sometimes companies are dysfunctional.  Internal political fiefdoms get created, preventing cash flows generated by operations from being reinvested sensibly.  Sometimes, companies are clueless about where their profits come from, so that some parts run horribly sub-optimally in order to make other parts look good.  This was the concept behind the activist interest in J C Penney–that the retail operations were being propped up by the property division, which was collecting below-market rents to the department stores.  The idea was to fix the retail and then break up the company into retail and real estate parts.

I once studied a publicly traded, family owned department store in Hong Kong.  I found the stores I visited to be completely unappealing, with dated merchandise at high prices–and stronger competitors a short walk away.  Yet the company, which owned all the property where its stores were located,  made a hefty profit each year.  How could that be?  When I began to work out how much rent the locations would command from third parties, I realized that profits would easily be 50% higher if the firm shuttered its stores and simply rented the properties to other.  But that would have meant that all of the relatives  who “worked” in retail would be out of jobs.  So the idea was a non-starter.

In most instances, management is unlikely to disturb the status quo without being educated/forced by outside parties.  That’s where the activists come in.

Sometimes activism doesn’t work, however.  That topic on Monday.

knowing vs. doing

Sometimes (read: most of the time), I fall behind in reading the FT and the Wall Street Journal.  So I binge read to catch up.

During my last, snowstorm induced, round I came across last weekend’s WSJ article, “When a Giant Gain Causes Pain.”  It’s about a married pair of PhD economists from Harvard who both taught finance, while together running a consulting company that advised corporate clients on financial risk.

The husband taught a course on securities analysis, centered around the study of a single stock.  About eighteen months ago, the subject was Tesla (TSLA).

The professor had eschewed (a word my son Brendan favors) tasting his home cooking since having been wiped out buying naked options (as most people crazy enough to do this are).  He had never bought a student-analyzed stock.  But this time he backed up the truck and filled it to bursting with TSLA, at $38.  Not only that, he bought enough naked calls to make $30,000 in a week.  …all this apparently without his wife noticing.

Haunted by his previous options experience, he cashed the calls out, told his wife he was thinking of selling TSLA at $200   …and promptly died.

The wife had an immense amount of professional education and training–plus her husband’s notes and plan.  But she had no practical experience.  She’s quoted as saying she was “utterly unprepared for how difficult it would be emotionally.”  Unnerved by TSLA’s volatility, she sold the stock, apparently about as badly as one possibly could.

What I find instructive about the article is that it brings home the idea that investing is a craft skill.  It requires common sense and experience, which we only get by doing, not simply by book learning.  It’s kind of like the difference between reading sabermetrics and actually going to the plate to face a pitcher.

Everyone botches up his/her first trade–and usually much more than that.  If I have any fault to find in this situation it’s that the wife waited until she was 60 to take part in the game she studied, wrote about and taught for her entire professional life.

(A side note:  in this latest binge, I also read a sizable number of reflections on Mohamed El-Erian’s departure from Pimco.  It’s clear that Mr. El-erian is well-liked and well-respected.  He is a brilliant marketer, whose gimmick is that he’s an academic, not really a marketer.   Along the way, he has become fabulously wealthy as co-CEO of Pimco.

Everyone agrees he’s a very intelligent guy.  What’s striking to me, however, is that  in the extensive press reports I’ve read I can’t find a single comment to the effect that he is a competent investor.  Pimco seems to want to avoid the issue; anonymous grumblings come from Harvard.  Sad, although it’s hard to feel too sorry for the ultra-wealthy.)

 

 

the evolution of Macau gambling

an old fashioned winter here

We woke up to see  two foot snow boulders blocking our driveway this morning, a product of the second of three snowstorms hitting the northeast US this week.

Macau gambling stocks sold off sharply in Hong Kong overnight on reports that the year-on-year revenue gains are starting to shrink in percentage terms.  I find this a little weird.  Of course the comparisons are narrowing.  We’re cycling past the period of weakness surrounding the change in Communist Party leadership in later 2011 – early 2012.  Who didn’t know this?  In particular, who didn’t know this when the stocks were shooting through the roof less than a month ago?

Anyway, on to today’s topic, the evolution of Macau gambling.

— When Macau was a Portuguese colony, it had a single monopoly casino operator, Stanley Ho.  Although I’ve visited a lot of Asian casinos, I never made it to Macau.  Friends told me operations were dull, potentially dangerous and with a strong influence from the Chinese underworld.  …sort of  like Las Vegas in the very early days.

–When Macau reverted to Chinese rule, the new government decided to remake its gambling industry into a Pacific clone of present-day Las Vegas.  To do so, it invited in WYNN–and later LVS–among others, to set up shop.

–The early focus was on the high-roller gambling niche.  This required the least infrastructure.  It tapped an already existing clientele that was able to sidestep the considerable administrative hassle involved at that time in leaving the mainland.  The government intention was always to create a large mass-market gambling result in the SAR, however.

–The high roller business isn’t as easy as it might seem.  Clients are typically highly skilled gamblers, who lose, at high stakes baccarat  (the dominant game in Macau), around 3% of the money they bet.  However, they require perks while they’re gambling.  The intermediaries who steer them to a given casino (sometimes the high rollers themselves) also collect commissions for doing so.  The commissions can amount to half the pre-amenities take by the casino.

At one point, a potentially ruinous bidding war broke out in Macau, as less successful entrants sought to “buy” high roller business by conceding virtually all their profits to junket operators who brought the VIPs.  The government stepped in, though, and set limits on commission payments, saying its goal was to ensure that all the casinos remained profitable.

–During the past year or so, Macau reached the tipping point where there were enough hotel rooms, restaurants and entertainment to foster a mass market tourist business.  There were also much better transportation links (even better ones to come) and a much more relaxed attitude by Beijing toward travel to Macau.

The important thing to note is that mass market gambling operates by different rules.  It’s much more a “normal” resort hotel business.  Negotiation with the client is at a minimum.  Very little personal attention is required.  Gamblers bet less–but they’re generally not very skilled, so they can lose 20% – 30% of the money they wager.  Therefore, allocating casino space to them can still be very lucrative–especially so for operators who don’t have a knack for running high roller operations.

Put in different terms, you no longer need to be Steve Wynn to succeed in Macau.  The market is expanding to include Sheldon Adelson’s wheelhouse, as well.

Two investment consequences:

–most casinos are increasing their allocation of floor space to mass market gamblers because, for them at least, it’s much more profitable to do so.  So they’re making more money.

–the reduction in the number of casinos using price as their main tool to attract VIPs means that downward pressure on the profits for Wynn Macau-like operations is abating, as well.

Everyone becomes more profitable!

PS:  When I wrote this post I hadn’t yet looked at the website of the Macau casino authority.  The DICJ reports that monthly revenue from the SAR’s casinos was up only 7% year-on-year in January.  I think the true run rate is well more than double that figure.  The main reason for the weak reported outcome, I think, is the timing of the Lunar New Year.  As the New York market works this out, both WYNN and LVS, which were each down by over five percent in early trading, have rallied close to breakeven.

Las Vegas Sands (LVS): a revealing 4Q13 earnings report

the results

Last week LVS reported 4Q and full-year 2013 results.

The quarter was another very good one.  Revenue (remember, this basically means the amount won from gambling customers) was up 18.8%.  EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization), smoothed to eliminate the effects of good/bad luck, were up by 25.8%.   Macau was up 55.8%–meaning it was the whole growth story.  EPS, on the same adjusted basis, were up by 35.9% at $.87.

For the full year, the company made $2.90 a share in earnings, and paid out $2.00 a share in dividends.

a tale of three countries

I think for an investor it’s more imformative to look at full-year results than just 4Q13.  It’s easier to see the overall economic underpinnings of LVS this way.

LVS had adjusted EBITDA of $4.767 billion last year.  That breaks out as follows:

1.  the US = flattish, at less than 10% of the total

The US had EBITDA of $475 million in 2013.  That’s up by $30 million, or 6.7% the year prior.  Of the total, about 30% comes from royalties paid to the parent by Asian gaming operations ( to be honest, I’ve never followed up on this detail like I would if I were still working).  The rest is split about 3/4 for Las Vegas and 1/4 for Pennsylvania.

Las Vegas is still suffering from the massive overcapacity created by the major casino operators MGM, LVS and WYNN just as the economy was cresting in 2007.  In addition, revenue-hungry states are continuing to create new gambling capacity within their own borders, the latest being Massachusetts.

So flattish is my best guess for the next few years.

2.  Singapore = flattish at just about 30% of the total

The Marina Bay Sands had hold-adjusted EBITDA of $1.385 billion in 2013, up from $1,366 billion in 2012.

For the first time–or maybe the first time I’m aware of–LVS has stated (more or less) clearly its assessment of its Singapore operations.  The evaluation?  …the operation is mature.  It has been government policy in Singapore from the beginning to discourage local citizens from frequenting either of the casino operations in the island state.  So growth there is out.  Its high background check standards–again, no surprise–mean many VIP junket operators are barred from doing business there.  So any high roller growth will come slowly and be the result of hard work.

So Marina Bay has turned into a $1.5 billion yearly annuity.  Not the outcome one might have hoped for a few years ago from LVS’s huge investment, but not a bad result either.

Note:  Marina Bay has also had an unusually long streak of bad luck, during which the amount actually lost by high rollers has consistently fallen shy of what historical experience would lead one to expect.  (translation:  the actual results have been below the hold-adjusted amount).

3.  Macau = 60%+ of the total–and rising

Macau’s EBITDA in 2013 was $2.907 billion, up 45.6% from the prior year.

Yes, the year-on-year comparison is flattered by relative weakness in Macau during the leadership transition in Beijing two years ago.  So Sands China won’t be up by 50% again in 2014.

More important, mass market gambling–which is the sweet spot for LVS–is just beginning to emerge in Macau (more about this tomorrow).  LVS has the experience and the hotel/casino capacity to take advantage of this new trend.  In what will likely be a 15% growth year in revenue for the Macau market in the aggregate, I think Sands China has a reasonable shot at being up by 20% in–and by a considerably higher percentage in EBITDA.

the stock?

First, I should mention that until recently I’ve been selling bits and pieces of my casino stock holdings (WYNN, LVS, Galaxy) because of position size.  Because of this, I don’t feel any urgent desire to add more.

If I owned none?  I’d be torn between Galaxy and LVS (assuming, as I do, that LVS has created conditions where US citizens can’t buy Sands China–company representatives I’ve spoken with appear to be clueless).  

At 20x forward earnings and a dividend yield of 2.7%, LVS strikes me as appropriately valued today–not cheap, but not that expensive if my view on Macau proves correct.  Personally, I’d be waiting to see how the correction we’re in develops, for the chance of buying the stock, say, 10% cheaper than now.