MGM China’s IPO in Hong Kong

the IPO details

According to Bloomberg, details, including pricing, for the IPO of MGM China, have been set.  MGM China is currently a 50/50 joint venture between MGM Resorts International and Pansy Ho, daughter of Stanley Ho.   The stock is going to debut on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange–presumably next week–through a secondary offering of 760 million shares by Ms. Ho.  The IPO price will be set by underwriters at between HK$12.36 and HK$15.34.

If we assume that the high end of the range represents a 20x multiple on expected 2011 earnings per share, which is where I view Wynn Macau as trading today, that would mean MGM China could earn HK$.75-HK$.80 this year.

timing of the offer is very favorable

The Macau gaming market is booming.  The publicly traded stocks have been exceptionally strong performers, year to date.

the IPO means cash for Pansy Ho, not MGM

In this respect, the offering is different from the listings of WYNN’s and LVS’s Macau gambling subsidiaries, where the shares sold in the offering came from the US-based parent.

a bit of history

Stanley Ho, Pansy’s father, controlled the monopoly casino company in Macau when it was a Portuguese colony.  After the handover to China in late 1999, the government of the new Macau SAR decided to end the monopoly.  It issued a new gaming concession to Mr. Ho, but also awarded one to Wynn Resorts and to Galaxy Entertainment.  Subsequently, each of the three was allowed to sell a sub-concession to another party.  Mr. Ho chose MGM.  He originally proposed a 50/50 joint venture between himself and MGM.  The Nevada gaming authorities apparently told MGM this was unacceptable because of Mr. Ho’s alleged underworld connections, and Pansy Ho replaced her father as the Ho family partner.

structure of the sale

Pansy Ho will provide all the stock being sold.  1% will go to MGM, giving it a 51% stake and making it the majority owner of MGM China.  Another 20% will go to the investing public (Paulson & Co. and Kirk Kerkorian, the largest shareholders of MGM, are together putting in for about 8% of the issue)It also appears that Ms. Ho has agreed to a 3% overallotment, meaning that the underwriters can increase the size of the issue by that amount, if demand is strong.

So, rather than having a large cash inflow from selling stock, MGM will pay Ms. Ho about US$75 million to gain legal control of the venture.

The news isn’t really so bad for MGM, however.

Not content with keeping the transaction simple, Ms. Ho has apparently agreed to invest several hundred million dollars of her IPO proceeds in securities of MGM Resorts.

Also, pricing at the top end of the range (which is where I would guess the IPO will end up) implies that MGM’s stake in MGM China is worth just under US$4 billion, or about half of the parent’s market cap.  From now on, we’ll probably see the same sort of “tail wagging the dog” effect on MGM shares as we’ve witnessed over the past year with WYNN and LVS.  Given the still parlous state of the Las Vegas market, this is perfectly understandable.  I interpret the recent strength in MGM shares as the start of this behavior.

Pansy Ho’s role in MGM China?

The IPO will confirm Ms. Ho’s status as a multi-billionaire.  Other than that, your guess is as good as mine–maybe better.

As I wrote in more detail a little while ago, in a bizarre sequence of events earlier this year, control of the Ho family gambling concession–by far the largest in Macau, accounting for about a third of the market–appears to have been taken away from Stanley Ho by, among others, Pansy.  Press reports suggest Pansy has resigned from the board of MGM China–though I understand the IPO documents say otherwise.  As I indicated in my earlier post, my reading of the situation is that Ms. Ho wants to present herself as a passive investor in MGM China while she fights for control of the family company.

It’s ironic if the IPO is the vehicle Ms. Ho is using to distance herself from MGM China.  That’s because the IPO seems to me to undermine the argument of the New Jersey gaming authorities that Ms. Ho is completely financially dependent on her father–and therefore unsuitable to hold a casino license.

My guess is that a smaller role in MGM China by Ms. Ho will make little operational difference, and may make both MGM and MGM China more palatable to US investors.



Macau gambling, Macau gaming stocks: May 2011

the Macau gambling market continues to boom

It’s really late in the month for me to be writing about the recent strength in the Macau gaming market.  Nevertheless, here are the latest figures from the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau:

     * 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2011 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2011 2010 Variance 2011 2010 Variance
Jan 18,571 13,937 +33.2% 18,571 13,937 +33.2%
Feb 19,863 13,445 +47.7% 38,434 27,383 +40.4%
Mar 20,087 13,569 +48.0% 58,521 40,951 +42.9%
Apr 20,507 14,186 +44.6% 79,028 55,137 +43.3%

Another (ho-hum) stunningly strong month for the market in April. Another all-time revenue record, surpassing March’s high water mark even though April has one fewer day in it.  Early market chatter for May is that business is, if anything, better this month than last.

not all the stocks are following suit

Here’s the month-to-date performance of the US- and Hong Kong-based stocks:

S&P 500     -1.9%

WYNN     -1.4%

LVS     -12.0%  (disappointing(?) 1Q11 earnings)

MGM     +15.5%  (IPO of MGM Macau priced–more on this tomorrow)

Hang Seng H-shares     -5.1%

SJM     +7.8%  (reported strong 1Q11 results–up 85% yoy)

Galaxy     +7.4% (opened a new casino, to mixed reviews)

Sands China     -7.2%

Wynn Macau     -7.5%

what to make of this?

The US first:

I don’t see any general pattern, other than possibly the market misinterpreting what casino revenues are, that is, that they’re casino winnings, not revenues, and thus can fluctuate randomly, quarter to quarter, around a longer-term average.

MGM is a star performer, on the idea that when we have a publicly traded yardstick to value its Macau holdings, the US parent will benefit.  We’ll see.

I haven’t read the LVS 10Q carefully enough yet (although I bought a small amount on the selloff after the earnings report), but the market may be mistaking bad luck during 1Q11 for weakness in the company’s business.  The earnings report is the main reason, I think, for the poor performance of LVS.

WYNN, in contrast, is benefiting from a misreading of its phenomenal good luck in 1Q11 in Las Vegas as being the new norm.  That may be the reason the stock hasn’t been hurt by the fall in Wynn Macau shares.

In Hong Kong:

Here, I do see a pattern.  There’s an enormous (around 15%) difference between the weak performance of the higher quality companies, Wynn and Sands, and the strong gains of the lower tier ones, Galaxy and SJM.  Although I would find it hard to buy either of the latter two (I might be able to stomach Galaxy, but certainly not SJM), the fact that demand for gambling is so super-strong means that there’s a lot of business to be had by everyone in the market.  So it’s hard to find too much fault with the market rotating into the lower multiple names.  It’s also unreasonable to expect multiple expansion to continue for 1128 and 1928 without at least a sympathetic response from the others. 

My sense is that the correction in Wynn and Sands is just about over.  Still, while I perceive a quality difference worth paying up for in 1128 and 1928, the Hong Kong market disagrees.

what I’m doing

I’d sold about 10% of my 1128 holding at HK$27.  I tried, unsuccessfully, to buy it back two days ago, below HK$24.  Fidelity won’t let me buy 1928, and I won’t touch the others, so I’m going to do nothing for now.

I regard WYNN as the best company, but I think it’s a little pricey at the moment.  I’m trying to work though the huge amount of data in the LVS 10K, to see if it might be a way to get slightly different exposure to Asia, exposure that includes Singapore.  My biggest concern is LVS’s net US$7 billion in debt, and a repayment schedule that goes into high gear next year.  Most of the borrowings are linked to the properties in Macau and Singapore, where all the cash flow is, so matching assets and liabilities isn’t an issue.  At first glance, absent another recession, likely gross cash flow seems more than adequate to meet mandatory repayments.  It’s the continuing large capital spending bill that I haven’t quite gotten my arms around.

Bain Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study: Spring 2011 update

Note:  you can also get my analysis of the October 2011 Bain Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study.

Last week Bain released an update of its annual Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study, created by the head of its luxury goods practice, Claudia D’Arpizio (thanks to Bain for providing me with a copy of the presentation materials).

While the buying habits of the affluent may have some interest in themselves, studies like Bain’s (which is the best I’ve seen) are particularly significant for investors. Publicly traded global luxury companies are an excellent way of participating in the superior growth of emerging countries without having to take the risk of owning consumer-oriented stocks in local markets.

The main conclusions from the April update:

1.  The 2010 holiday season was surprisingly strong.  To some extent, we already knew this from earnings reports, but–

–in addition to Greater China (the mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan), the US was notably robust

–the high end did the best

–internet sales, although still small, are growing more quickly than the overall industry

–when the final reports are in (not for another month or two for some companies), 2010 will likely show global luxury sales surpassed the 2007 peak of €170 billion.

2.  2011 is following in the same vein. 

–retail continues to show double-digit same store sales growth, resulting both from higher traffic and from higher average purchase

–Chinese tourists are boosting business in Europe (over half of Chinese luxury spending is done abroad)

–wholesalers are restocking, after a couple of lean years.  Highly cyclical categories, like watches and menswear, are enjoying a rebound.  More stable areas, like leather goods and women’s shoes, are also showing strong growth.

3.  Greater China will pass Japan as the #2 luxury goods market this year, likely posting sales of €22 billion (up 25% year on year) vs. Japanese revenue of €17 billion or so (-5%).  The US will remain the #1 market at about €52 billion (+8%)–although, if we counted tourist purchases, China may already be #1.   According to Bain:

–the Chinese consumer is younger and more open to e-commerce than the typical Western luxury goods buyer

–the market is more skewed toward male consumers

–demand for luxury goods is spreading from the biggest cities on the east coast to second- and third-tier cities inland, following the development of the overall Chinese economy

–global luxury brands are increasingly shifting from distributing in China through wholesalers to opening company-owned stores there.  This move raises the capital intensity of their Chinese businesses.  But it also allows the firms to capture the lucrative wholesale to retail markup, as well as to better control their inventories and their brand message.  Perhaps most important, it signals the brands’ higher level of comfort in selling to consumers on the mainland.

4.  Japan will likely begin to recover from the March 11th earthquake in 3Q11.  Still, full-year luxury sales will probably fall by 5% from last year’s level.  Two Japanese luxury goods issues:

earthquake

–luxury goods stores were closed for ten days after the Fukushima earthquake/tsunamis on March 11th, due to lack of electric power.  Business was good after the stores reopened.  But (to me, anyway) it’s not clear how much, or for how long (six months?) luxury goods spending will be affected by feelings of jishiku –the idea that one should refrain from excessive consumption to show solidarity with those who suffered earthquake losses.

–business in Japan’s second city, Osaka, hasn’t been affected

secular

For many years, Japan was a premier market for Western luxury goods, driven by the strong preference of perhaps half the population (a much bigger proportion than elsewhere) for these products, and a willingness to pay much higher prices than prevailed in the rest of the world.   In my opinion, two developments of the late 1990s began to change this favorable picture:

–younger Japanese began shifting to local brands, partly as a rejection of their parents’ values, partly because Japanese brands were more affordable

–older Japanese began to retire (the working age population peaked in 1996).

I’m not quite sure why, but as Bain notes, these factors only impacted the Japanese luxury goods market in a significant way in 2007, when sales were flat, year on year.  In the two years since, revenues have dropped by about 15%.  Pre-earthquake, industry estimates for 2011 were for revenues to stabilize–but not increase.

Sales may get a temporary boost as Japanese GDP gains from spending to rebuild holes and factories destroyed by the earthquake/tsunamis, but my guess is that this is only a temporary reprieve.  Bain expects only 1%-2% annual growth in Japanese luxury goods purchases over the next several years from the depressed levels currently.

my thoughts

Ex Japan, the global luxury goods market looks to be in excellent health, driven by explosive growth in Asia ex Japan and expansion at a better-than-GDP rate in the US and EU.  Bain also highlights the increasing importance of developing markets like Brazil, Russia, India and the Middle East.  Today they amount to only about 7% of the world luxury goods market, but they are growing very quickly.  Companies able to manage their Japanese exposure effectively appear to me to be very well situated for superior growth.

will Hong Kong break its currency peg with the US$?–probably

the HK$-US$ peg

There has been increasing speculation recently that Hong Kong will abandon the policy, in place for almost thirty years, of tying the HK$ to the US$ at a fixed exchange rate.  Given the tenacity with which the former British colony defended the peg during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (against speculators who seem to have had no clue about Hong Kong), this may seem strange.  But I think the peg has served its purpose and may now be more trouble than it’s worth.  My guess is the peg will go–and in the near future.  In stock market terms, this would be good for domestic firms that use US$ inputs and bad for exporters.

why the peg exists (much more detail in this post)

In the initial post-WWII period, the Hong Kong dollar was pegged for economic reasons, first to sterling and later to the US dollar. In 1974, however, the Hong Kong government decided to let the currency float.

Pegging your currency to that of your largest trade customer makes a lot of sense  for an emerging economy ( the granddaddy of post-WWII pegging successes is Japan), since it ensures that you retain the labor cost advantage that’s your greatest development asset. Doing so has a number of costs, however. One of the most significant is that you give up control of your domestic money policy. You can’t tighten when the other party is loosening, even though that might be the right move for your economy. Why not?  Your interest rates go up; the other country’s go down.  The higher interest rate differential means arbitrageurs short the other currency and use the proceeds to buy yours.  This produces immediate upward pressure on your currency and downward pressure on the other party’s.  So you’d be shooting yourself in the foot.

Therefore, you’re stuck mimicking the money policy moves of your key trading partner. Unless the developing economy is extremely vigilant and conducts a restrictive fiscal policy, the consequences can be disastrous. The most recent example of calamity can be seen in the current situation of Ireland and Spain, which imported a vastly over-stimulative monetary policy through the euro—where interest rates were set with an eye to the needs of much less dynamic members like France and Germany.  Ouch!

unpegging in 1974

In the mid-Seventies, the US was beginning a policy of too much monetary stimulus that would spawn a late-decade inflationary spiral—and the subsequent Volcker medicine (sky-high interest rates and deep recession) of the early Eighties.

Rather than be dragged along down the same path, Hong Kong unpegged.

repegging–why?

In October 1983, however, Hong Kong repegged to the dollar. This had nothing to do with the now more orthodox money path of the US. The key reason was political.  The mainland refused to renew the lease the UK held over Hong Kong, meaning that the British colony would revert to Chinese rule when the then-current lease ended, in 1997.

At first, Hong Kong citizens weren’t thrilled. They had witnessed the ill effects of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and surmised that they might well be the recipients of extensive “reeducation” to purge them of their capitalist views. Given that the state and the Communist Party owned all the capital, they might forfeit all their personal wealth, as well.  And the UK wasn’t appearing overly worried about the future safety of colony residents (Parliament would eventually deny UK citizenship to the mostly ethnic Chinese Hong Kong citizens, saying they would find the climate of the British Isles inhospitable).

Given this situation, Hong Kong citizens had two priorities:

–find another country willing to make them citizens and give them passports, and

–get as much accumulated wealth as possible out of Hong Kong and out of Hong Kong dollars (which might not exist after 1997).

when to move?

When should you remove you money from Hong Kong? Assume your HK$ would have no value after the handover. Your first thought might be to take your money out of Hong Kong a few months before the fact, to avoid the terminal collapse of the currency.  But everybody is going to be thinking the same thing.  So the date when the currency begins its swoon may not be in 1997 but maybe in 1996. But everyone is probably working that out, as well. So the currency will exhibit terminal weakness even earlier.  Who knows how many iterations of this backing-off process there will be.  The only sure thing is that the penalty for waiting too long will be severe.  Maybe the safest course, then, is to start to move money out of Hong Kong immediately.

To forestall a currency crisis that was already starting to ignite, the Hong Kong government decided to repeg. It though–correctly–that if citizens were guaranteed that their currency would not lose value vs. some internatinoal standard during the runup to the handover, capital flight would be minimized.  The penalty in imported inflation might be high.  But the political necessity overrode this.

the present

The pegging policy worked.

We’re now almost thirty years later. Hong Kong has survived the continual inflationary problems that the peg to the US$ have caused. Citizens have long since realized that the luckiest day of their economic lives was the one when China decided not to renew the UK lease.

So there’s no real reason in today’s post-colonial world to keep the peg.  All it brings is inflation–especially now, when the US is maintaining super-low interest rates as it tries to recover from the near-meltdown of the financial system. And Hong Kong citizens would by and large prefer to hold currency tied to the renminbi than to the US$ anyway.

My guess is that the rumors we’re hearing are a testing of the waters as prelude to replacing the peg.

investment implications

In all likelihood, the HK$ will rise vs the US$ if the peg is removed.  If so, the implications are straightforward.  Any firm with revenues in HK$ and/or costs in US$ will benefit.  Any firm in the opposite situation will lose.

Beijing’s renminbi experiment

emerging market development

The standard road to economic development for emerging economies in the post-WWII era has been to emulate Japan …that is to say, to provide cheap labor and a supportive working environment to foreign firms in return for technology transfer.  To ensure the emerging country keeps its labor cost advantage, it typically pegs its currency to that of its largest target market (read: the US) or to a basket of currencies representing the bulk of potential customers.

As I’ve commented in more detail in other posts, the crucial testing point for this strategy comes when the emerging nation runs out of cheap productive resources.  Usually, the factor is labor–although it could equally be water or something else.  At this point, labor-intensive firms can no longer expand operations by turning farmhands into assembly workers.  They can only grow by poaching workers from each other, causing wages to rise and an inflationary spiral to begin.

letting the local currency rise

The orthodox solution to the problem is to dissolve the peg and allow the local currency to rise.  Doing so lessens or eliminates the labor cost advantage that has helped the emerging nation develop.  In theory, it also forces industry to evolve toward higher value-added production, and requires the labor force to learn new skills.  In practice, allowing the currency to rise is strongly opposed by industrialists who have become wealthy and politically powerful under the existing regime.

The rising currency solution has other characteristics, as well:

–overall growth slows, at least for a time,

–development reorients itself away from export-oriented manufacturing and toward the domestic economy,

–the real earning power of workers rises, but nominal wages do not necessarily change, and

–the real value of asset holdings increases for all.

This last characteristic is especially important.  In a rising currency environment, the wealthy make out like bandits.  Ordinary people get a boost to their earning power, but since they may not hold property or have a large amount of accumulated savings, they probably lose economic ground to the wealthy.

a different route

Of course, currency appreciation is not the only way to raise real wages.  Why not take the direct route and raise nominal wages?  Two considerations:  1) the mechanics of getting this done could be difficult, and 2) whoever mandates higher wages is clearly responsible for the consequences–there’s no possibility of blaming evil currency speculators for any negative effects.

Singapore

I can think of only one instance where an emerging nation tried this route.  Decades ago, when Singapore was primarily a textile manufacturer, the government there raised the cost of labor–through an increase in mandatory employer contributions to the government-run pension plan.  Singapore wanted to encourage higher value-added manufacturing.  What it got instead was textile firms fleeing and a recession–which lasted until the government rescinded the pension payment increases.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong might be seen as another case in point, although the currency peg there was instituted as a political measure–to lessen flight capital in advance of the handover of the former British colony back to Beijing–not an economic one.

The Hong Kong experience, created more by necessity than economic planning, had several important characteristics:

–economic/mobility increased significantly; power shifted quickly from the existing, mostly British, elites to new, mostly ethnic Chinese, players ,

–Hong Kong was forced to become a cauldron of entrepreneurial development, just to deal with the pressure of rising wages,

–nearby Guangdong province benefited greatly from the shift of more labor-intensive manufacturing there.

China

The large across-the-board wage increases for ordinary workers recently mandated by Beijing seem to me to be the clearest signal that China has decided to try to duplicate the beneficial effects of the Hong Kong currency peg.  The eastern seaboard will play the role of Hong Kong, western China that of Guangdong, and the “princelings,” the sons and daughters of former Communist Party leaders, that of the British.

The development of the offshore renminbi market may be a new twist in the plot, but I think that otherwise the story remains the same.  If this is correct, calls for Beijing to allow the renminbi to rise against the US dollar will continue to fall on deaf ears.  From a stock market point of view, the interesting consequence might well be surprisingly strong spending by middle- or lower-end consumers.  The big question is whether to play this through already prosperous retailers or to look for the emergence of new concepts tailored specifically to this audience.  The latter route promises much bigger payoffs; the big problem is identifying the correct stock/stocks to buy.