S&P downgrades Japan: a cautionary tale?

the S&P downgrade

Last week Standard & Poors downgraded the sovereign debt of Japan, reducing its rating on the Tokyo government’s bonds by one notch, to AA- from AA.  In doing so, S&P cited:

–high government debt ratios

–persistent deflation

–an aging population and shrinking workforce

–social security expenses at almost a third of the government budget, and rising

–the lack of a coherent plan to address the growing debt problem, and

–the global recession, which has worsened the situation.

With the possible exception of the last point, none of this is exactly news.  S&P could have cited all the other factors five years–or even ten years–ago.

What’s going on?

Two things, in my opinion:

1.  The Liberal Democratic Party, the dominant force in Japanese politics for the past fifty years, was tossed out of office in a landslide victory for the opposition Democratic Party of Japan in August 2009.  This happened once before, in the late 1980s, when the Socialist Party, from which the DPJ springs, did the same thing.  On both occasions, the transfer of power was followed by heavy-duty partisan infighting within the winning party, stunning ministerial ineptitude and legislative paralysis.  The past eighteen months have demonstrated that chances of another charismatic leader like Prime Minister Koizumi of the LDP emerging from the current fray are pretty remote.

2.  There’s a business cycle pattern to changes in the credit agencies’ ratings.  While the globe is expanding, the agencies’ ratings lag the economic reality.  They end up being too bullish for way too long.  In contrast, after having been castigated by the regulatory authorities and the markets for this behavior, the agencies become excessively cautious.  They downgrade aggressively and actively search for high-profile instances to do so, in order to tout their new-found conservatism.  Once the economic cycle turns up, of course, the rating agencies have tended to quickly forget this prudence and resume their former generosity to client bond issues.

no market reaction, but lots of expert commentary

Since the ratings downgrade contains no new insights into Japan’s malaise, the reaction from financial markets has been ho-hum.  But pundits have seized on this chance to air their views.  Internal commentators have been beating the drum again for economic reform.  External ones have reiterated their stance that Japan today is a look into the future for the US if we don’t mend our ways.

my thoughts, too

Since everyone else is doing it, I thought I’d also give my views about Japan (yet again), based on my twenty-five years of experience in the Japanese equity market.  Here goes:

1.  Reform just isn’t going to happen.  For decades, Japan has followed a policy of preserving the status quo, even at the cost of no economic growth.  The result has been that creative destruction, where a new generation of firms rises from the ashes of the old, isn’t allowed to happen.  Weak and inefficient entrants in an industry aren’t compelled either to change their ways or fail.  They receive explicit and implicit social protection instead.  So they drag down the strong.

2.  Perversely, the economic stagnation and mild deflation that result from this policy help perpetuate the system.  Lack of economic growth keeps interest rates low. Domestic investors have few viable investment alternatives, so they continue to put their savings into government bonds.    Therefore, Tokyo can fund continuing deficits easily and at low cost.  In a funny sense, the worst thing that could happen to Japan over the next several years would be for the economy to spontaneously (it would take a miracle, though) begin to grow.  Alternatives to government bonds would arise for investors.  And interest rates would likely go up, raising Tokyo’s financing costs.  Voilà, government debt crisis.

3.  There is a point of similarity, I think, between the Japanese situation and the American that is something to worry about.

It’s not in the industrial base, which is much more dynamic and much less hide-bound in the US than in Japan.

It’s not in the politics, either, though both the Capitol and Nagatacho are to my mind similarly dysfunctional.  But the Japanese electorate has put up with legislative failure for over twenty years.  I think, however, as Americans work out that Washington is not meeting its needs, change will come swiftly and dramatically.  We’ve already seen some of this twice within a little more than two years.

One of the most striking aspects of Japan to me as an investor is the strongly held belief in that country of its cultural and economic superiority over everyone else.  The fact of this belief isn’t so surprising.  Every major power seems to think more or less the same thing about itself.  Certainly, the US does, too. But in Japan, sort of like in France, its intensity stands out.  Neither seems to me to have a sense of perspective/humor about itself. (I’ve been told, for example, by a Japanese CEO in a face-to-face interview that he didn’t want foreigners like me holding stock in his company.  Why?  …we’re subhuman, that’s why.  Actually, he told my translator, who skipped over that part–both unaware that a “subhuman” might actually understand a little Japanese.)

If you think it’s a priori impossible for a foreigner to have anything to teach you, you can be blind to the objective situation–meaning that a sense of national pride that’s out of control will act as a barrier to beneficial change.

Although the US may have prominent individuals who believe as intensely as the Japanese/French that anything domestic is superior to anything foreign, I think most of us have a little more common sense.  Again, however, only time will tell.

Chinese mergers and acquisitions in Japan on the rise?

Bloomberg published an article yesterday in which it pointed out that merger and acquisition activity by mainland China and Hong Kong companies in Japan is up by more than a third so far this year, to $437.7 million.  (The same article gives the figures, but doesn’t do the math, to show that this amount is about 0.5% of the money Chinese companies have spent on m&a globally over the same period.)  Must have been a slow news day.

Is there anything of significance here, though?

Maybe.  …or maybe I’m just having a slow news day.  In any event:

1.  The targets are small companies.  Larger firms are effectively protected against foreign acquisition by legislation enacted during the first of Japan’s “lost decades,” the Nineties.  Unlike most other places, Japanese tax law (as I understand it) no longer regards all bids where the acquirer offers to exchange shares of his stock for those of the target as being tax-free exchanges.  Instead–but only in the case of a bidder offering stock in a non-Japanese corporation–people tendering their stock are subject to special punitive taxes.

One unintended result of this protection, I think, is that ex the auto companies many major Japanese firms have fallen farther behind their global rivals.

2.  American and European “activist” investors–hedge funds and private equity–have been stunningly unsuccessful at plying their trade in the small company arena in Japan over the past twenty years.

Western financial investors have been enticed by very attractive financial metrics (lots of net cash, how price to book, low price to cash flow) and the existence of bunches of “low-hanging fruit,” in the form of very inefficient work practices.

They’ve typically quietly acquired a substantial ownership stake in a target company and then approached management with proposals for change, including cost-cutting and layoffs.  Management refuses.

The westerner starts a proxy fight but gets no support from domestic institutions and loses.

The westerner tries to increase his stake, so he can force changes, but finds that the target’s customers and suppliers counter these efforts by buying up stock that will vote in favor of current management.

The net result:  the westerner is stuck in a highly illiquid position in a poorly managed company–and no one will buy his stock to allow him to exit.

3.  There’s little love lost between Japan and China.  The real issue, I think, is not recent territorial disputes between the two.  It’s the history of Japanese militarism in Asia in World War II and earlier.  …that and gestures like PM Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which suggest a lack of remorse for wartime atrocities.

4.  There is one big difference between the western approach to small Japanese firms and the Chinese one.

In the former case, financial investors wanted to change the Japanese operations of their targets in ways that were culturally unacceptable.

In the latter, investors may want to acquire either relatively low-tech craft skill–how to operate a retail chain in an environment with a complex web of distribution partners, how to deliver fresh food frequently to convenience stores.  Or the target may either have Asian distribution rights for western products, or options on those rights, or long relationships that will help substantially in securing those rights.

Chinese investors are willing to leave the Japanese operations of their targets to wither on the vine.  They want technology they can transfer to the mainland.

Investment implications?  No direct ones that I can see.  You certainly don’t want to fool around on the low-tech small-cap Japanese arena, in my opinion.  My guess is that we’ll see very rapid growth in the Chinese companies that benefit from Japanese craft skill.

Two things to note:  the targets are all involved in domestically oriented businesses, suggesting the transformation of the mainland economy in this direction may take place more rapidly than the consensus expects.  Also, it’s interesting that from a quality of life perspective, Chinese investors see the mainland and Japan as not being that dissimilar.

higher gold prices ahead: the 3Q10 report of the World Gold Council

The conclusion is mine, but the support comes from the just released 3Q2010 report of the World Gold Council, a leading authority on the yellow metal.

The highlights:

world demand

Identifiable world demand is actually up by 12% year on year, despite a 28% rise in the US dollar gold price over that time.  Buying of gold, year to date, breaks down into the following categories by tons:

jewelry 1468.3 t, up 8% year on year,  comprising 52% of demand

Industrial/dental 320.5 t, up 13% year on year, 11% of demand

investment 1350.2 t, up 19% year on year, 37% of demand.

 

Geographically, third quarter consumer demand (i.e., excluding industry and central banks) breaks out as follows:

India     33.2% of demand.   Purchases up 28% year on year, mostly jewelry

Greater China     22.2%     purchases up 16% year on year, mostly investment

Middle East     9.7%     purchases down 10% year on year, mostly lower jewelry

United States     8.9%     purchases up 8% year on year;  jewelry down, investment up

Western Europe     7.6%     purchases down 3% year on year

Turkey     6.8%     purchases up 35% year on year, virtually all investment

Vietnam     3.3%     purchases up 17% year on year; jewelry down, investment up

Thailand     3.2%     purchases up 139% year on year;  jewelry down, investment up

Russia     2.6%     purchases up 17% year on year, on jewelry demand

everybody else     2.5%.

Industrial demand, which is primarily for technology products, has already rebounded to the pre-crisis levels.

Central bank activity has been, from a private investor’s point of view, really odd.  Until 1Q09 and at prices at or below $900 an ounce, central banks were heavy sellers.  Since then, they have turned into big net buyers.  Russia has added 46.2 t to its stockpiles, Thailand 15.6 t, Sri Lanka 6.9 t and the Philippines 4.2t (through late August).

Investment demand breaks out into three categories:

–hoarding of bars, coins, medals–mostly in developing countries, which accounts for 55% of investment and is up by about a third vs. 2009,

–ETFs and similar products, which accounts for 33% of investment and is down by about 40% year on year, and

–“other” identified retail investment–mostly coins bought in the US and Europe, which accounts for 12% of investment and is  also down by more than 40% year over year.

world supply

Happily, supply is much more straightforward than demand.  It comes from:

mine production     62% of supply, up 3% year on year

recycling     41% of supply, down 1% year on year

central bank sales     -3% of supply (since central banks have turned net buyers)

my thoughts

On the supply side first, I don’t think there’s any reason to expect a large increase in the supply of gold from current levels.

Yes, higher prices will make new gold mining projects (which can be developed relatively quickly) economically viable.  At the same time, however, prudent mining practice calls for existing mines to process progressively less gold-rich ore as prices rise.  That way, they maintain profits in boom times, but save higher grade ore for a rainy day.

Again, higher prices should mean more recycling.  But one of the reasons for the sharp increase in recycled gold over the past few years is the recession-induced development of a gold recycling industry in the US.  Output here has presumably reached a steady-state level.  More important, the World Gold Council thinks the rest of the world has pretty much run out of gold lying around to be recycled.

Central bank sales are harder to figure.  Luckily, they’re not that large in the overall scheme of things.  On the IMF still has about 50 t. of gold to sell.  On the other, Russia is carrying out a program to increase central bank holdings of gold.  And some smaller, less stable governments, appear to want to remain net buyers as well.

As to demand, the figures above should make it clear that gold is a developing world phenomenon.  The US and Western Europe make up only 16.5% of consumer demand and 12% of non-ETF investment purchases. (By the way, Japan isn’t mentioned on the consumer list.  That’s because Japanese individuals have been net sellers of gold this year.)

India alone is a third of the overall market for gold.  It and China together make up more than half of global demand.  In India, buyers want pure gold, to serve both as adornment and savings.  The same is true for China, though 18k jewelry has been making inroads.   So demand in both places should be a function of economic growth.  If the two were to intend to buy gold next year at only half the current pace–and I think that’s a very conservative estimate–this would mean almost over a 6% increase in total demand.

Absent an increase in recycling, which the WGC says is unlikely, I don’t see where the extra gold will come from.  Even ignoring demand from fiscally unstable areas like Turkey or Vietnam, or continuing central bank buying, as positive factors, it think this spells higher gold prices in 2011.


 


 

 

 

 

 

Singapore the biggest factor in LVS’ 3Q10 earnings blowout

the report

LVS reported 3Q10 earnings after the close yesterday.  Adjusted EBITDA was $645.2 million vs. $272.3 million in the year-ago quarter.  Revenue was $1.91 billion vs. $1.14 billion.  Diluted eps was $.34 vs. $.03 for the September quarter 2009 and a consensus estimate of $.27.

The stock rose about 11% in aftermarket trading.  WYNN went up in sympathy by 3.7% and MGM by 2%.  There was a significant positive reaction in Hong Kong as well, with 1928 up by about 9%, although 1128 barely budged.

the details

The EBITDA for the quarter breaks down by location as follows (all figures are in US$):

Macau     $307 million vs. $237.7 million in the September period of 2009

Singapore     $241.6 million vs not open

US     $74.4 million vs. $42.8 million.

the conference call

To my mind, the really stunning information came in the conference call.  Chairman Sheldon Adelson began by saying he had been wrong at the company’s annual meeting to say EBITDA for LVS could be $3 billion in 2011.  According to Mr. Sheldon, business in October is running “substantially in excess” of that figure.

In Singapore, where all the elements of the resort complex are not yet in place, October revenues have been running at $8.4 million per day, at a 50% EBITDA margin.  This works out to EBITDA of $130 million for this month alone.  True, October is a holiday month.  But LVS also said that business momentum has been steadily building, with each month in the September quarter better than the previous one.

In Macau, October will also turn out to be a record month.

Las Vegas is slowly improving.  Demand from groups is very strong but massive overcapacity in the city will keep hotel room rates from rising.  Bethlehem, PA will benefit from the introduction of table games and from the hotel LVS is building there.

impressions

I don’t know LVS well enough to have an investment opinion, although it does appear the company has decisively turned the corner.  The biggest investment issue is that at the June 10-Q, LVS had about $9.5 billion in liabilities on the balance sheet, even after netting out $3.5 billion in cash on hand.  LVS thinks that when it gets permission to sell apartments at its Four Seasons complex in Macau, they could go for up to $1.4 billion.  Mr. Adelson also believes that LVS will be able to sell its retail space in Singapore for enough to repay all its construction-related debt there.  These sales have the potential to transform LVS’s capital structure.  On the other hand, LVS now appears to be lobbying aggressively to expand into Japan and Korea.

Singapore has an open-ended feel to it.  It’s possible LVS is only scratching the surface of potential demand.

In Macau, Mr. Adelson thinks all the competitors, except for LVS and WYNN, are starting to revert to the traditional way of doing gambling business.  That is to say, they are beginning to in effect rent their casino space to junket operators for a small fee.  Thereby, they avoid the problems of extension and collection of credit.  On the other hand, they lose contact with the high roller customers.  Presumably they become less desirable venues and end up being considerably less profitable than WYNN and LVS.

LVS has “mixed feelings” about Las Vegas.  Overcapacity won’t go away soon.  Even if smaller operators go into bankruptcy, the hotels and casinos will be acquired by entrepreneurs who will reopen them.  Bethlehem has the problem of competition from nearby states that are sponsoring casino gambling as a way to address budget woes.

We’ll get more information on Las Vegas and Macau when WYNN reports next Tuesday.

 

 

Coach is starting off fiscal 2011 with a bang

COH reported earnings results for the first fiscal quarter of 2011 (the company’s fiscal year ends in June) before the market opened in New York yesterday morning.  The news was strong enough to push the stock up by about 12% that day.

the results

Sales for the quarter were $912 million, up 20% year on year.  Earnings per share were $.63, up 43% vs. the comparable period in fiscal 2010.  This was far ahead of the analysts’ consensus for the quarter, which was $.55.  Wall Street expects the company to earn about $2.75 for the full fiscal year, although I would imagine that number is even now being revised up.

Two “unusual” factors helped performance a bit.  The weak US currency turned sales in Japan from a 3% gain in ¥ ( impressive itself, in a market that’s shrinking) to a 14% increase in $.  Also, US department stores are restocking in anticipation of a better holiday season, so their orders were very strong.  Still, the COH figures were very good.

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