buying Sands China (1928:HK): why I wanted to, troubles I had, recent developments (l)

I’m going to cover this topic in three posts. Today I’m going to talk about why I wanted to buy Sands China. Tomorrow I’ll write about the troubles  I encountered in doing so—and what I ended up doing.  The final post will deal with the Macau government’s rejection of a Sands China expansion proposal.

the Macau (or Macao, as LVS spells it) gaming market

I’ve written about this market extensively elsewhere. You can find more details here and here. The executive summary:

Macau is a Special Administrative Region of China, like Hong Kong. That’s because, like Hong Kong, it was controlled by a foreign power—in this case, Portugal—and reverted top Chinese rule about the same time Hong Kong did.

Macau has been a gambling center for longer (since 1986) than I’ve been involved as an investor in Hong Kong. And because Macau is part of China, it has privileged access to gamblers from the mainland, a large, fast-growing market that has only partially been tapped.

The SAR government invited WYNN, and later LVS, into the market to bring it upscale and, in my opinion, to act as a counterweight to entrenched competitors reputed to be controlled by organized crime.

In other words, the Macau government wants WYNN and LVS to be successful.

the growth of China Continue reading →

WYNN, and indirectly Wynn Macau, report strong 3Q2010 results

After the close on Tuesday, WYNN reported its 3Q2010 earnings results.  Since it breaks out the performance of its US and its (72.3%-owned) Macau operations separately, it also in effect renders an accounting of 1128’s performance, even though Hong Kong securities regulations only call for semi-annual reports.

the numbers

WYNN’s revenues for the quarter reached $1 billion, up from $773.1 million in the comparable period of 2009.  Of the increase of $226.9 million, $222.9 million comes from Macau (remember, accounting conventions in the US–and just about everyplace else–dictate that WYNN show 100% of the revenues and costs of 1128 in the income statement and then subtract the share of profits that belongs to third-party owners in a “minority interest” line at the bottom).

Macau had operating income of $124.7 million for the quarter, up 50% from $83.2 million in the September period of 2009.  Las Vegas had an operating loss of $16.2 million, an improvement from the deficit of $20.9 million it  posted last year.

Net income was $48.7 million, or $.39 per share, after adjusting for a loss of $64.2 million on redeeming a bond issue early.  This compares with net of $39.9 million, or $.33, in the third quarter of 2009.  Given that Macau operations earned about $113.7 million, after tax, in the quarter, this implies the rest of the company lost $65 million.

the details

Quarter on quarter, Macau’s operating results were down by about 11% as the house winning percentage from high rollers returned to a more normal 2.88% of the amounts bet, as compared with the very favorable 3.22% it enjoyed during the three months ending in June.

In Las Vegas, casino income was down, hotel results were flattish, but the popularity of WYNN’s nightclubs more than offset this.

the (near-term) future

October was a huge month for Macau–both the market, where revenues were up 50% year on year (up 20% over the average month of the third quarter), and for 1128, which earned $90 million for the month.  WYNN was unclear whether this figure was EBITDA, which it presumably is, or some even more favorable measure.  Assuming WYNN means EBITDA, that would be a 25% jump over what 1128 earned in the average month of the third quarter.

Steve Wynn thinks the Las Vegas market bottomed in the third quarter and that a slow recovery is now underway.

Planning is just about complete and preliminary construction work for 1128’s expansion in the Cotai area of Macau is starting.  Opening of the new casino complex is slated for 2014-2015.

what about the stocks?

WYNN has a market capitalization of about $13.7 billion.  1128 has a market cap of around $11.7 billion, meaning WYNN’s ownership share of the subsidiary is being valued in the Hong Kong market at $8.5 billion.

The most straightforward conclusion would be that Wall Street is assigning a value to WYNN’s Las Vegas assets of around $5 billion.  Yes, the company is perhaps the only healthy body in a sea of walking wounded.  Yes, there’s the iconic name, the well-maintained facilities, the promise of economic recovery in the US that will likely bring WYNN a larger share of a more profitable Las Vegas.  Still, that seems like a lot to pay–and implies one should hold 1128, the “pure” Macau play, that can easily be bought through any discount broker.

Maybe that’s not 100% right, though.  There are certainly institutional investors whose contracts with clients prevent them from buying foreign stocks.  Hong Kong and Macau are different places with different rules, where it’s sometimes hard for many people to keep up with what’s going on–or even to understand how local investors are likely to react to a given piece of news. In addition, WYNN controls 1128 and receives management fees from it.  For al these reasons, there may be an “intangible” premium attached to owning WYNN.

Having said that, as a growth investor, my preference is for 1128.  My guess is that the parent company premium is as wide as it’s going to get.  This would mean all the upward price momentum will come from developments in Macau, until Las Vegas gives strong signs of profit recovery.  Given the sluggish overall US economy and the large amount of overcapacity in Las Vegas, I don’t think that will be soon.  As it happens, I own a very large (at least, for me) combined position in WYNN and 1128.  I’m going to trim the former.

…oh–the dividends!

WYNN will be paying an $8 per share dividend on December 7th to holders of record on November 23rd.  Given that the company is not paying taxes in the US as present, this makes a lot of sense.

The board of 1128 is considering paying a regular dividend, and has declared an initial payout of HK$.76 on December 3rd to holders of record on November 22nd.  1128 thinks it will easily be able to finance Cotai construction costs of maybe $2.5 billion, and still pay a dividend.

Singapore the biggest factor in LVS’ 3Q10 earnings blowout

the report

LVS reported 3Q10 earnings after the close yesterday.  Adjusted EBITDA was $645.2 million vs. $272.3 million in the year-ago quarter.  Revenue was $1.91 billion vs. $1.14 billion.  Diluted eps was $.34 vs. $.03 for the September quarter 2009 and a consensus estimate of $.27.

The stock rose about 11% in aftermarket trading.  WYNN went up in sympathy by 3.7% and MGM by 2%.  There was a significant positive reaction in Hong Kong as well, with 1928 up by about 9%, although 1128 barely budged.

the details

The EBITDA for the quarter breaks down by location as follows (all figures are in US$):

Macau     $307 million vs. $237.7 million in the September period of 2009

Singapore     $241.6 million vs not open

US     $74.4 million vs. $42.8 million.

the conference call

To my mind, the really stunning information came in the conference call.  Chairman Sheldon Adelson began by saying he had been wrong at the company’s annual meeting to say EBITDA for LVS could be $3 billion in 2011.  According to Mr. Sheldon, business in October is running “substantially in excess” of that figure.

In Singapore, where all the elements of the resort complex are not yet in place, October revenues have been running at $8.4 million per day, at a 50% EBITDA margin.  This works out to EBITDA of $130 million for this month alone.  True, October is a holiday month.  But LVS also said that business momentum has been steadily building, with each month in the September quarter better than the previous one.

In Macau, October will also turn out to be a record month.

Las Vegas is slowly improving.  Demand from groups is very strong but massive overcapacity in the city will keep hotel room rates from rising.  Bethlehem, PA will benefit from the introduction of table games and from the hotel LVS is building there.

impressions

I don’t know LVS well enough to have an investment opinion, although it does appear the company has decisively turned the corner.  The biggest investment issue is that at the June 10-Q, LVS had about $9.5 billion in liabilities on the balance sheet, even after netting out $3.5 billion in cash on hand.  LVS thinks that when it gets permission to sell apartments at its Four Seasons complex in Macau, they could go for up to $1.4 billion.  Mr. Adelson also believes that LVS will be able to sell its retail space in Singapore for enough to repay all its construction-related debt there.  These sales have the potential to transform LVS’s capital structure.  On the other hand, LVS now appears to be lobbying aggressively to expand into Japan and Korea.

Singapore has an open-ended feel to it.  It’s possible LVS is only scratching the surface of potential demand.

In Macau, Mr. Adelson thinks all the competitors, except for LVS and WYNN, are starting to revert to the traditional way of doing gambling business.  That is to say, they are beginning to in effect rent their casino space to junket operators for a small fee.  Thereby, they avoid the problems of extension and collection of credit.  On the other hand, they lose contact with the high roller customers.  Presumably they become less desirable venues and end up being considerably less profitable than WYNN and LVS.

LVS has “mixed feelings” about Las Vegas.  Overcapacity won’t go away soon.  Even if smaller operators go into bankruptcy, the hotels and casinos will be acquired by entrepreneurs who will reopen them.  Bethlehem has the problem of competition from nearby states that are sponsoring casino gambling as a way to address budget woes.

We’ll get more information on Las Vegas and Macau when WYNN reports next Tuesday.

 

 

The Macau gambling market: September 2010 results

The Gaming Inspection, and Coordination Bureau of Macau, the casino regulator in the SAR, posts total market casino win statistics monthly on its website.

The 2010 figures, year to date, along with comparisons with the comparable periods of 2009, are as follows:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept 15,302 10,943 39.8% 133,237 83,208 60.1%
Oct – – – – – –
Nov – – – – – –
Dec – – – – – –

Source:  Gaming Coordination and Inspection Bureau, Macau SAR

The pataca is worth about US$0.125.  So the market win in September is about US$1.9 billion.

To me, the most interesting aspect of the report is how quickly Wall Street picked up on it.  The figures were posted on the GCIB website at around 7am, New York time, on Monday.  Yet, the strong positive response to the figures in New York trading could be seen in the stock prices of the US firms with Macau interests–WYNN, LVS and MGM–from the opening bell.  US gaming analysts’ reports (I’ve only seen abstracts on the internet) commenting on the figures were apparently circulating among professional investors earlier than that.

the September figures

They’re really good.  That’s the bottom line.  Beyond that, the statistics aren’t completely straightforward.

Year over year comparisons are affected by the financial crisis, which severely reduced casino patronage in the first half of last year.  The market was still up for 2009, but only by about 10% vs. 2008.  If we look at the two-year growth rate for the market, as a way of offsetting some of the recession distortion, the advance comes in at a heady 30% annual rate.  That’s probably a better indicator of the market’s expansion than the 60%+ growth some first-half 2010 months showed.

In addition to the recession, government regulation has had an effect on the longer-term growth figures as well.  For one thing, it’s much easier today than it was a couple of years ago for a Chinese citizen to get a government ok to visit Macau.  For another, the SAR has stepped in over the past couple of years to slow down capacity expansion, capping the installation of new table games in Macau to an extra 10% in total.  And it intervened early in a potentially profit-devastating price war over VIP junkets, setting a ceiling on the incentive fees a casino could pay to organizers for steering clients their way.

The result of government policy, both the mainland and Macau, has generally been to slow revenue growth, meaning that above-average growth will continue for longer, but to ensure better profit performance.

where to from here?

One of the beauties of the casino business is that it’s relatively simple to analyze.  If we assume that the share of their income that gamblers wager in casinos is relatively fixed, then market revenue growth should be a function of expansion of nominal GDP and of growth in the number of gamblers.  In a mature market, the growth in gamblers is simply a function of the growth in the working population.

For Macao, the predominant source of gamblers is the mainland, at about 50%, followed by Hong Kong at around 25%.  Let’s say that nominal GDP will expand at around a 10% rate for the next few years in both places.  Put working population growth at 1%.  This would mean that in a mature state, Macau gaming revenues would rise by about 12% annually.

But the number of visitors to Macau is rising at close to a 20% annual rate, indicating that there are still gamblers, especially in China, who are potential Macau customers but who have yet to visit.  How long can this rapid annual increase in visitors go on?  That’s the big question for this market.

The short answer is there’s no way to tell.  We can try to extrapolate from experience in the US in Las Vegas.  The worry is that the size and structure of the US and Chinese economies is so different.  But here’s my guess:

Let’s say half the population of the US is affluent enough to afford to gamble in Las Vegas.  That would be 140 million people.  About 36 million, or about a quarter of the total, visited Las Vegas last year.  If we say that 10% of the population of China is affluent enough to gamble in Macau, that would be a potential market of about 130 million.  Of that number, about 10 million, or 7.7% of the total, are likely to visit Macau this year.

So, if mainland Chinese had the same propensity to gamble as Americans, then there are about another 20-25 million potential customers on the mainland yet to be tapped.

Even if that number is twice the real size, that would mean that mainland visitation to Macau could double from the current level, which could add 10% to the annual growth rate of casino revenues for the next seven or eight years.

signs capacity is getting tighter

We’ll know more when LVS, WYNN and MGM report September quarter earnings, but I’ve heard reports that hotel rooms are becoming harder to find between now and the end of the calendar year.  If true, that would be god for the non-casino side of the Macau businesses run by Americans.  The casinos might benefit as well, since an excess of patrons in a static capacity environment means table stakes may rise–leading by itself to a revenue boost.

lots of stock choices

So far, a quickly rising tide has supported all casino boats, year-to-date at least.  More than doubling, the Hong Kong-controlled companies have been the best performers.  Foreign-controlled firms have made about half those gains.

To me, the most basic questions are:

–do you want an American company trying to being Las Vegas-style gaming to Macau?  Americans think this is superior technology; Hong Kong investors, so far, see strangers who don’t know the market that well.  Hong Kong’s Disneyland probably didn’t help the Americans’ cause.

–do you want the baggage the Ho family brings with it?  Again, so far, this has been no problem for Hong Kong investors, although it has always been one for me.

My answers:  stick with either Wynn Macau or Sands China, or their US parents.

Macau gambling results for August 2010

After suffering a temporary slowdown in June, as gamblers stayed home to watch the World Cup, the Macau gambling market has bounced back vigorously over the past two months.  Here are the figures:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2009 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2010 2009 Variance 2010 2009 Variance
Jan 13,937 8,575 62.5% 13,937 8,575 62.5%
Feb 13,445 7,912 69.9% 27,383 16,488 66.1%
Mar 13,569 9,531 42.4% 40,951 26,019 57.4%
Apr 14,186 8,340 70.1% 55,137 34,359 60.5%
May 17,075 8,799 94.1% 72,211 43,158 67.3%
Jun 13,642 8,269 65.0% 85,853 51,427 66.9%
Jul 16,310 9,570 70.4% 102,163 60,997 67.5%
Aug 15,773 11,268 40.0% 117,935 72,265 63.2%
Sept – – – – – –
Oct – – – – – –
Nov – – – – – –
Dec – – – – – –

Source:  DICJ, Macau SAR

my thoughts

1.  Of the large world gaming markets where information is publicly available–Macau, Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Australia–Macau is at present much more of a high roller market than the others.  Is that important?  Ultimately what counts is the profit return that the physical capital of the casino generates.  But one salient characteristic of the high roller, table games segment vs. the average gambler, slot machine segment is that the law of large numbers (that is, the odds balancing out) works for periods of time as short as a quarter.  In the high roller arena, on the other hand, one or two unusually lucky or unlucky gambler’s results can affect the bottom line even over a three month period.

What counts as gross revenue in the table above is the amount “held”, or won, by the Macau casinos, not the (much, much larger) amount bet.  If gamblers are unusually lucky in a given month, then the DICJ number will be correspondingly low–and vice versa.

2.  So far this year, the Macau market has growth by 63% vs. the comparable period in 2009.  This number is much more important than shifts in market share among the various market participants.  When the market matures, the relative market shares will become much more crucial.

In addition, share figures can vary substantially as new capacity opens, or as gamblers try out different venues before establishing more regular patterns of patronage, or as a given casino’s win percentage varies randomly.

3.  The Macau government has been critical to the success of the gambling market there.  It issued the licenses that permitted new blood to open up in the former Portuguese colony.   It has prevented the weaker casinos to initiate severe price competition that would have hurt everyone in Macau.  And it has slowed down the pace of new construction to try to match capacity more closely with demand.  All these moves have greatly enhanced the profitability of the gaming industry in Macau.

4. In the simplest terms, it seems to me that the publicly traded Macau casino stocks divide into two groups.

–One consists of 1128 and 1928, which are American controlled firms trying to apply the upscale casino/resort experience model they developed in Las Vegas to Macau.  Their weakness is their relatively limited knowledge of China.  The open question in investors’ minds is whether the American model will work in the Pacific.

–The rest of the market consists of firms with much stronger local Pacific contacts and experience.  Their potential weakness is that they haven’t run the upscale American model.  Also, it’s not clear that some managements would be permitted to operate in the US–although so far this fact does not appear to have been a key factor for Asian investors.