a view from fixed income land

My first boss on Wall Street, who taught me securities analysis in the late 1970s, switched to the fixed income arena in the early 1980s.  He runs Jamison and McCarthy Investment Advisors LLC, which manages money for institutions and high net worth individuals.  His most recent quarterly letter to clients gives a polished industry veteran’s view of the current global economic situation.  It’s very worthwhile reading.  (Sans charts), here it is:

Where We Are

Economic setbacks come in many different forms. Some are self inflicted – like those caused by over-investment in business assets (inventories, plant
and equipment) or excess spending by individuals. Others are caused by higher interest rates and tighter lending practices in response to inflation
fears or credit risks. Over a relatively short time, the excesses can be worked off and, as inflation and credit fears abate, credit begins to expand again.
The economy recovers. Wealth and the total value of goods and services quickly surpass their old high water marks.

Then, there are economic declines that fall outside the realm of the usual business cycle downturns. These are the ones that occur after a debt-
fueled boom goes bust – the bubble pops. We have just experienced such a pop – caused largely by over investment in housing, not just in the U.S.
but in many other countries. The resulting credit losses and credit contraction will persist over an extended period. And while the root cause can be
traced to one sector of one economy, the resulting credit contraction will trigger shocks in unexpected places. So, the collapse of the U.S. sub-prime
housing market causes banks in Iceland to default. Then, investors worry whether the financial extended countries around the edges of Europe will be
able to pay their debts. Maybe, you shouldn’t even put much faith in paper currencies at all.

It takes a long time to clean up the aftermath of credit cycle bubbles. For example, in the wake of All-Time Depression, it took over a decade for
Gross National Product to reach the level recorded in 1929.   Japan experienced a credit crisis in the late 1980’s caused by over expansion in the
manufacturing sector. Since 1990, that economy has grown on average 0.8% a year and ten year Japanese government bonds yielded just 1.3%. So, it should come as no surprise to investors that ten-year U.S. bond yields recently dipped below 2% especially since the Federal Reserve recently stated that they plan to keep short term interest rates near zero for two more years.

Few are predicting a Japanese style period of malaise for the U.S. economy. They cite the flexibility of the U.S. labor market, the willingness of
American consumers to borrow to support spending, an entrepreneurial spirit, and actions by the federal government and central banks to spur
spending. Perhaps they’re right but the jury is still out.

Housing

At the core of the recent economic collapse is housing – or specifically, housing speculation that encouraged people to leverage in order to
maximize their gains from rising home prices. Buyers had both solid reasons and strong incentives to play the game. According to data from the
National Association of Realtors, housing prices rose 85% between 1996 and 2005. The Case-Shiller Index of home prices advanced 12% a year from
2001 to 2005. Interest rates were low, home ownership received favorable income tax breaks, and the government mandated rules that made it
easy to qualify for mortgages regardless of income level, assets, or down payment amount.

The U.S. housing sector is very cyclical. In fact, by raising interest rates and choking mortgage credit, the Federal Reserve used housing as a swing
factor in regulating economic growth during most of the post-World War II period. But this housing downturn was different. It wasn’t caused by a
contraction of credit and a reduction in building activity. It was caused by a price collapse. The Federal Housing Finance Administration produces an
index of housing prices based on same home sales extending back to 1975. While there have been slight price declines over a short period, the 16%
decline that occurred during the four years ended June 30, 2011 is an anomaly.

Real estate is a major component of household wealth in the United States. It totaled $18.1 trillion on June 30, 2011. As per statistics compiled
by the Federal Reserve, owners equity in household real estate was $13.2 trillion in 2005.  By June 30, 2011, the equity in homes had fallen to $6.2 trillion. Meanwhile, stock prices were tumbling and interest rates were falling. Both factors eroded the value and earning power of most consumers’
financial assets, like their 401k’s.

The natural reaction to these forces was to curtail borrowing. And that’s just what happened. The borrowing binge of the early 2000’s has been followed by the borrowing bust of the last few years. Since the consumer accounts for two-thirds of the total economy, it’s no surprise that this new found spirit of frugality produced first, a sharp recession and second, a weak recovery.

The housing sector led the way into the current financial quagmire and that’s the place to look for the route out. Higher home prices would do much
to improve consumer sentiment and balance sheets. Recent data from Case/Shiller indicate the price decline in housing is moderating, but we have
seen false signs of a recovery before.

A New Twist

…on an old theme. The Federal Reserve’s got a new dance and it goes like this. They plan to sell a bunch of the $1 trillion worth of notes they bought
during Quantitative Easing I and QE II. With the proceeds, they will buy a bunch of longer term government bonds. The plan was announced on
September 21st, but was rumored to be in the works since August. The goal is to drive down the spread between yields on long term securities –
those with maturities beyond ten years – and those on shorter dated items. They figure this will stimulate economic activity. (It’s more likely to
stimulate speculative activity and push up the price of “risk” assets like stocks. But the Fed probably would settle for that, too.)

Based on a Federal Reserve study of an earlier twist operation in the early Sixties, they estimated the new twist would narrow the spread by fifteen basis points (the study) or thirty basis points (Chairman Bernanke’s comments in September). The market – ever the efficient discounting mechanism – took the guess work out of these estimates. Between mid-August and the end of September, it narrowed the yield spread between 10- and 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds by forty basis points, helping to spur a huge rally in longer dated bonds.

This occurred even as the year over year increase in core CPI reached 2.0% compared with 0.8% last December. In fact, core inflation has risen every
month this year. The same is largely true if you add back food and energy to get the full inflation picture. The year over year total consumer price
index is up 3.8% through August. These inflation numbers compare with zero yields on money market securities, a 2% yield on ten-year notes, and a 3% yield on thirty year government bonds. Obviously, the goal of Federal Reserve policy is to push investors into riskier assets by creating negative yields in safe securities. They hope such investments will promote stronger economic growth. It might – or it might just create another mini-bubble somewhere.

Still Lost in the Woods

In the last few weeks, there has been some encouraging news. Recent employment data in the U.S. have put to rest fears of a renewed economic
contraction. Based on the number of new hires and hours worked, we’ll probably see 2% GDP growth for the third quarter. In Europe, the French
and Germans have put together a number of plans to keep Greece from defaulting and dragging the European banks with them. One Belgium bank
has been successfully pulled from the brink – even as that meant splitting it apart. When the positives became news, investors flocked to risky
assets – like equities and industrial commodities – and sold safe investments – like U.S. Treasury bonds and the Swiss franc.

Unfortunately, many of the positive developments are rooted in an ever growing mountain of public debt. It remains to be seen whether this is
sustainable either politically or practically. Some reversal of the recent bond price gains is likely before year end and there may be an opportunity
to profit from such market volatility. But any significant rise in long term interest rates will require a turnaround in consumer sentiment and home
prices in the U.S.

Note:  This Market Environment reflects the views of the Investment Advisor only through the date of this report. The Investment Advisor’s views are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. September 30, 2011.

Barney Frank’s idea of “reforming” the Fed

the Fed’s Open Market Committee

The Fed’s Open Market Committee, which determines the Fed’s interest rate policy, consists of 12 members.  Seven are appointed by the president, five are taken on a rotating basis from among the heads of the 12 regional Federal Reserve banks.  The regional bank heads are selected by the boards of directors of their respective banks–typically prominent local businesspeople–and approved by the Fed’s board of governors.  The Huffington Post has the best synopsis I’ve seen.

the Frank proposal

Barney Frank, the senior Democrat on the House banking committee, is trying to change that.  According to Bloomberg, Mr. Frank wants the five regional banker votes eliminated.  They would be replaced by four appointees chosen by the president.

Why the change?  In Mr. Frank’s opinion, the current procedure isn’t “democratic” enough, because the regional Fed chiefs aren’t vetted by publicly-elected officials.     …and, oh, by the way, Mr. Frank also disapproves of the way the regional Fed chiefs vote.  They’re too worried about inflation (that is, about sound money).  Looser money policy than they’re willing to tolerate might help spur job growth, he thinks.  Presumably political appointees would vote as they’re told to by their political bosses.

Basically, then, Mr. Frank’s goal is to induce a significant level of inflation in hopes of creating jobs.

This is a bad idea.

The one sure effect of a higher level of inflation would be to weaken the dollar.  That would doubtless frighten the foreigners who own huge amounts of Treasury bonds, causing them to demand higher coupon rates before they roll over their holdings as existing bonds come due.  In fact, the last time the US was in this situation, during the Carter administration, foreigners flat out refused to buy dollar-denominated bonds from the US.  They not only demanded higher rates; they demanded to be repaid in harder currency, like the D-mark, before they would lend Washington money.

During the same period, companies stopped investing in new plant and equipment.  Rising inflation made it too hard to figure out whether these investments made any economic sense.  Then there was the mammoth recession of 1981-82, when interest rates rose above 20% as Paul Volcker set about putting the inflation genie back in the bottle.  At the time, it was conventional wisdom that this process caused so much economic hardship for the country that no one would advocate reintroducing inflation into the economy ever again in our lifetimes.

So more inflation = high interest rates + weak currency + economic slump = higher unemployment + personal bankruptcies + business failures.

Would anyone want that?

But here’s Mr. Frank, who lived through the pain once–and who should know better, eager to take the risk of this happening again.

Why, Barney?

It may be that Mr. Frank, as a Democrat in a legislative chamber controlled by the Republicans, figures he can make a political statement without any risk, because no bill of his will ever pass the House.

Even so, the pro-labor/anti-business tone of his proposal invokes memories of an era of class struggle in the US that ended half a century ago.  It may resonate with voters in their seventies or eighties; anyone younger will likely just regard the Frank bill as I do–irresponsible and dangerous.

investment implications

Higher inflation means lower bond prices and lower price-earnings multiples for stocks.  Any threat to the independence of the central bank will create big problems financing government debt.  It may not be foreigners who balk at buying Treasuries, either.  Historically, domestic bond investors have been the first to react when government policy threatens the value of their investments.

My guess is that the Frank bill is DOA.  Given that far-right Republicans also want to lessen the independence of the Fed, however, I think the situation warrants continuing monitoring.

is a Chinese bailout of Italy in the cards?

the situation

The S&P 500 spiked upward into positive territory toward the close of New York trading yesterday.

Why?

The Italian government announced that:

–it had sent a delegation to Beijing last month to speak with state-controlled investment companies there about making major investments in Italy, and that

–a delegation of Chinese investors arrived in Rome for follow-up discussions last week.

Italy’s in trouble

 

The European Central Bank has been supporting Italian bond prices by buying in the market, but indicates that this help is only temporary.   The consensus view is that, in contrast with Greece, Italy is too big for an EU bailout to handle anyway.

According to the Financial Times, which reported the news online yesterday, China already owns about €75 billion of Italy’s €1.9 trillion in outstanding government bonds.

not a great place to invest, but…

On the surface, Italy wouldn’t seem like anyone’s first choice as a place to invest.  The Rome government is inefficient and dominated by the business and political interests of the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi.  Financial practices in Italy are opaque; industry is dominated by a small coterie of insiders who shape the rules for their own benefit.  The establishment is also very hostile toward foreigners (of course, in China’s case that makes Italy no different from the US or anywhere else in the EU).

On the other hand, Italy may have no choice but to deal with China.

what I think China wants

Italy wants China to buy large amounts of its government bonds.  I think China is willing to do that.

However, that’s not what China itself really wantsI think bond purchases only come in return for China’s ability to invest in:

natural resources, a minority stake in the oil company ENI, for example.  Not just a passive interest, either.  China would also want the right to buy specified amounts of output–at market prices–in order to ensure supply of industrial raw materials in times of shortage.  Maybe China would also like to be able to invest side-by-side with ENI in future projects.

a bank or other financial institution.  It’s a fact of life around the world that no one ever gets to buy a healthy bank.  It’s only ones that have horrible loan books that go on sale.  So buying one that it would immediately have to prop up probably wouldn’t bother China too much.  It’s the inside access to the EU that owning an EU financial institution brings that’s important.

stakes in industrial companies–state-controlled or not–where China can offer privileged access to the China market in return for technology transfer.  China is already doing this in Japan.  If business could be done in renminbi, so much the better.

will any deals materialize?

It’s hard to say.  But it strikes me that if Italy is serious, the chances of finding mutually acceptable terms are very high.  China is being frozen out of the US and other parts of the EU; Italy has few other options.  China wants access, and is probably less concerned about money; Italy needs cash.

investment implications

There’s at least some chance of a sharply positive turn away from the psychology of worry that now dominates investor thinking about the EU periphery.  Not something to bet heavily on now, I think, but something to monitor carefully.  (The ultimate buying target for us, in my opinion, is well-managed EU multinationals with substantial non-EU businesses.  Speculate at your peril about what trashy Italian companies China might invest in.)

 

 

 

reducing government debt: the Carmen Reinhart cookbook (I)

“The Liquidation of Government Debt”

Over the Memorial Day weekend, I was catching up on my reading–including some back issues of the Financial Times that I just hadn’t gotten to in recent weeks.  That’s how I found out that Gillian Tett had written an article on May 10th, titled”Policymakers learn a new and alarming catchphrase.” 

The article calls attention to recent research by Carmen Reinhart (of This Time is Different; Eight Centuries of Financial Folly fame) and M. Belen Sbrancia, called “The Liquidation of Government Debt.”  Ms. Tett says the work is getting a lot of attention in Washington.  The paper is simultaneously a history of government strategies for reducing excessive debt, accumulated in the developed world mostly as a result of world wars.  More importantly, it also serves as a recipe book of sorts for the US and the EU to do so again today to shrink the liabilities created in the financial crisis.

opening points

Ms. Reinhart makes two opening points:

1.  As a percentage of GDP, the current surge in government debt in advanced economies, which stems from what she calls the Second Great Contraction, is stunningly large.  It dwarfs what was accumulated during the Great Depression.  It also exceeds the amounts amassed in fighting World War II.  (Alone, checking out the chart she uses to illustrate this is worth downloading the article for.)

2.  Growing out of debt of this magnitude is highly unlikely.  This is at least partly because the large debt burden itself acts to slow economic growth.  Yes, the popular myth is that the US grew out from under its WWII debt, but it didn’t happen that way.

shrinking post WWII debt:  “financial repression”

How did the US free itself from WWII liabilities?  …through “financial repression.”   Basically, this means the government of a country engineers a situation of:

–negative real interest rates and

–forced investor purchase of government bonds,

–over a very long period of time.

In the post-WWII US, which implemented such a regime, the country reduced its outstanding debt at the rate of 3%-4% of GDP yearly–suggesting “financial repression” would have to remain in place of at the very least ten years to get government borrowings under control.

two elements to financial repression

Financial repression has two elements:

1.  ceilings on nominal interest rates.  This would mean caps on the interest that banks or other financial intermediaries could pay to savers, as well as ceilings on the rates at which they could lend, either to all borrowers or at least to the government.

2.  forced lending to the government, including:

–capital controls to prevent money from leaving the country for more lucrative investments elsewhere, making government securities more attractive by default,

–high bank reserve requirements, i.e., mandated low- or no-cost loans to the government,

–“prudential” regulatory requirements that institutional investors–insurance companies, pensions funds, bond mutual funds–hold significant amounts of government debt in their portfolios.

financial repression is politically attractive…

As Ms. Reinhart points out, what makes financial repression especially attractive to politicians is its “steath” nature.  Unlike increases in taxes or cuts in government programs, it leaves no fingerprints that can be traced back to individual officeholders and foil their reelection chances.  Imagine trying to explain what’s going on in an election speech without having your listeners’ eyes glaze over.

…but very bad for bond returns

The bottom line:  in its simplest terms, financial repression is a hidden tax on bonds that could be in place for ten or twenty years.  From an investor’s point of view, having the government do this–and it might be the easiest choice for Washington–would return bonds to being the unattractive holdings they were in the pre-Volcker years.  No wonder bond fund managers are beginning to squawk.

Tomorrow, the effect of  financial repression on stocks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

John Taylor’s WSJ op-ed column

John Taylor, professor of economics at Stanford, former Fed official and formulator of the “Taylor rule” for money policy, wrote an op-ed piece in last Friday’s Wall Street Journal

The article has a very simple message, illustrated by an accompanying chart, which I’m paraphrasing as follows:

1.  The government budget was equal to around 18% of GDP in 2000, and had risen to about 19% by 2007.  This compares with Federal tax receipts of 18%-19% of GDP.  A problem, yes, but a small one.

2.  In response to the financial crisis, government spending has been upped to between 24% and 25% of GDP over the past three years.

3.  The Obama budget of February 14th, ignoring the recommendations of the commission on deficit reduction the President appointed, called for the deficit to remain at about 24% of GDP for the next decade.  A big problem!

4.  The Ryan budget passed by the House on April 15th reduces the deficit to 20% of GDP by 2016.

5.  Obama offered a second budget proposal on April 13th.  It pares back the original budget proposal, but still leaves the deficit at more than 22% of GDP ten years from now.

The virtue of Professor Taylor’s message is simplicity:  deficit reduction can be done.  And it seems to paint President Obama in a very unfavorable light, which, I suppose, is why the article appeared in the WSJ and not the New York Times. 

I understand that talking about political positioning risks diverting attention from the essential point, but I think several factors should be pointed out:

–according to the Congressional Budget Office, the main reason the original Obama budget proposal keeps the deficit so high is that the administration wants to keep applying a high degree of stimulus to the economy.  By itself, this increases the deficit.  But it also results in the return of a full-employment economy sooner than otherwise.  That brings with it higher interest rates and higher interest payments on the federal debt, creating much of the deficit blowout.

Of course, if history is any guide, the stronger the economy the greater the chances of Mr. Obama’s reelection, and vice versa.

–around 2015, large amounts of extra government spending on entitlement programs–especially medical care–begin to kick in, putting upward pressure on the deficit.  Congressman Ryan’s budget deals with this issue by more or less eliminating medical support for the poor.  Not so great, unless you’re sure you’ll be wealthy when you’re old.

–neither proposal touches the military, implicitly assuming that the country will be involved in a foreign war someplace elseor at least that the military will be paid as if we are.

To my mind, it isn’t just that today’s positions of the two major parties are so deeply rooted in partisan politics as they are.  It’s that both the Republicans and Democrats seem to be in a time warp.  What they are battling about and see as essential are issues from the 1940s and 1950s, which have long since been settled–or discarded as irrelevant–in the minds of average Americans, who are living their lives in 2011. 

Not a pretty picture.

There are some grounds for hope, however.  Most Americans want the deficit issue to be settled, so current elected official realize that their jobs are on the line.  S&P’s recent credit downgrade threat has highlighted the need for action now.  And, deep down, most citizens are aware that the country can’t pay for all the entitlement programs that Washington has promised to deliver.

For once in my investing career, I think that what Washington does is relevant.  Legislative action over the next couple of months will be interesting–and important–to watch.