EU insurance companies and coal–FAANGs the next step?

Yesterday’s Financial Times had a curious article, one with no immediate investment implications, but one that I thought was noteworthy anyway.  EU property/casualty insurance companies have decided they will no longer offer insurance coverage for new coal mining projects.  Their rationale is that ultimately they will be the ones paying out claims for damage that results from using this heavily polluting fuel.  So it makes no sense to make their situation worse by supporting the projects that lead to big loss payouts.


When I was looking for my first stock market job, I asked an interviewer why he had become a securities analyst and what was most satisfying for him in his work.  He replied that the best part of the job was in influencing investors through his reports to apply high price-earnings multiples to socially responsible companies (thereby making it easier for them to raise new investment capital), and low multiples to dishonest or socially irresponsible ones (making fund-raising harder).

Performing an important social service wasn’t what I’d expected to hear.  But over the years I’ve come to believe that, despite the cynical persona most professional investors adopt, very many–me included–think the way my old interviewer did.  This is one reason that tobacco companies, for example, are rarely market stars.

There may be enough problems with fossil fuels that low multiples are already permanently baked into the cake   …and that coal will continue to be a fertile ground for value investing.  I don’t think so, but who knows.

The more interesting question to me, though, is whether this thinking is being/will be applied to firms like Facebook, Google or Apple–serving as invisible anchors to the rise of their stocks.


question from a reader: the merger of Alpha Natural Resources and Massey Energy

the question

I listened to a debate recently on the merits of small commodity companies
acquiring larger ones. The company in question was Alpha Natural Resources purchasing much larger Massie Coal.
Can a smaller commodity company like ANR actually make the investment finacially feasible when they bought a company that was already foundering?
I enjoy your blog greatly!

my thoughts

At the outset, you should be clear that, although I’ve done extensive research in natural resources over the years, I don’t know much about the coal industry. So personally I don’t know enough to want to buy ANR stock.  But I can see several issues a buyer might want to explore.


ANR, which has private equity roots, was formed in 2002 to buy assets from Pittston Coal and has since growth by acquisition.  Its largest purchase to date is Massey Coal, a 2000 spinoff from Fluor.  It bought Massey in June 2011 for about $1 billion in cash plus just over 100 million shares of ANR stock, worth $5 billion+ at that time.

By revenues, both are roughly equal in size.  Mine output seems to be similar as well, with 5/6 thermal coal for power generation and 1/6 higher-value coking coal for blast furnace steel making.

Massey is the owner of the Upper Big Branch Mine in West Virgina, which experienced the worst domestic coal mining disaster of the past forty years on April 5, 2010.  A methane gas explosion there killed 29 miners.

Since the Massey takeover, ANR shares have lost about 60% of their value.  Part of this is due to general selloff of commodity stocks on worries about economic slowdown, part to former Massey shareholders cashing in their profits, part to ANR’s announcement in September that sales volumes will be lower than expected.

merger issues

My experience is that there are two types of risk in a merger like this:

–Are Massey’s safety problems confined to this one mine, or has that company been cutting corners to increase profits of other mines as well?  Certainly, industry gossip may provide clues.  But until ANR actually analyzes the Massey properties one by one in detail, it won’t know for sure.  Aside from the human issue, the question is whether ANR will have to make substantial capital investment to get the Massey mines functioning properly.  In other words, are the Massey properties actually less profitable than they appear to outsiders?

–Does ANR have the management depth to run an enterprise twice its former size.  It may be able to rely on the former Massey management.  But suppose they just refuse to do what ANR wants?  Sounds silly, but culture clash is a significant risk.  The risk going in is much higher when there’s evidence of badly-run operations.

In addition, is the ANR management composed of deeply knowledgeable and experienced coal miners?  …or is it basically a financial company doing a “rollup,” that can make generic efficiency improvements but entrusts the actual operation of the business to others?  I don’t know.

–One positive thing.  The combination was done mostly for stock.  So increased financial leverage isn’t a risk.

specific questions

A quick look at Value Line shows that ANR achieves only about half the operating margin of the VL coal industry.  Why?

My guess is that coking coal may be as much as a third of ANR’s profits, although only about 1/6 of volumes shipped.  At least some of that goes to China.  If so, have recent profits been inflated by flooding and transport problems in Australia?  How long will that advantage last?